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This dissertation argues for the adoption of a new interpretative standard that urges the WTO 
adjudicator to explicitly take account of the economic heterogeneity of the WTO Membership 
when construing exemption provisions in the GATT 1994. In particular, the judicial decision 
maker should construe and interpret exemption provisions using the embedded standard of 
review, such that the Member States’ economic conditions enlighten the contextual interpretation 
of the language of the provision. This multilateral standard of review compels the adjudicator to 
accord conditional deference to developmental policies, as applied by a Member State in 
expression of its preferred economic strategy to expand the trade and production of goods and 
services. This dissertation examines the history of the standard of review in the GATT 1947 and 
GATT 1994 in order to critically examine its application to the construction and interpretation of 
the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. The proposed multilateral standard of 
review overcomes the post-modern critique of judicial practice by emphasizing the collaborative 
intent of the Membership, as revealed through the adjudicator’s understanding of the object and 
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Following the inauguration of Donald Trump as 45th President of the United States of America, the rhetoric around 
international trade has been intensely negative. The Administration, and others, have inflamed existing doubts 
whether international trade really creates shared gains for all involved, or whether trade is a zero-sum game centered 
on bilateral trade deficits. The pressure on the international trading system not only targets the mega-regionals, TPP 
and TTIP, but also extends to threaten the multilateral regime of the World Trade Organization – a pivotal set of 
multilateral agreements anchoring China, the US and the EU, together with most of the world, to a single regime on 
international trade. 
 
In July, 2016, the EU and the US filed another complaint against China on its use of export restrictive duties and 
quotas: their third against China, covering different raw materials at each complaint. Maintaining export restrictive 
taxes, duties and other charges is not a recent policy innovation, in fact it has an old history tied closely to the UK 
and the US1 –  better-known for their endorsements of international trade, at least until recently.  
 
Whereas export restrictions can certainly have Mercantilist effects (and intent), Stiglitz stressed a competing 
analytical narrative.2 Not only can trade restrictive policies serve to build up sufficient reserves to stabilize financial 
pressures or ease fluctuations in earnings by commodity exporters, a well-targeted industrial policy can reinforce 
learning by exporting effects (in global value chains or independently), or dynamically propel an economy to a skill-
dependent tipping point. Lastly, demographic reasons might also necessitate a measure of trade restrictiveness – 
particularly when considering shortages in staple foodstuffs.3 
 
                                                        
1 Ha-Joon Chang has reminded economists and policy makers alike that the relatively recent discovery by the West of the virtues of efficient 
resource allocation and strong intellectual property protection through international markets goes preceded in the development history of many 
OECD member countries by a plethora of “catch up” policies (at one time these policies were even known as the American system). These 
economies now seem to be in the process of “kicking away” this very development ladder under the guise of rational and efficient allocation 
doctrines that work to reinforce static comparative advantages while relegating questions of economic growth and development to the practical 
and conceptual constraints of (historically constructed) market failures, externalities and “extractive” institutions; see Ha-Joong Chang, Kicking 
Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press, 2002); and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, 
Why Nations Fail (MIT Press, 2012). 
2 Joseph Stiglitz, “Is Mercantilism Doomed to Fail?,” Keynote Address at INET 2012 Plenary Conference: Paradigm Lost Rethinking Economics 
and Politics (2012), available at: http://www.cigionline.org/videos/joseph-stiglitz-mercantilism-doomed-fail. 




The verdict on these policies by the WTO’s dispute settlement system relies on the judicial labor of dispassionate 
adjudicators fitting the disputed policy to the text of the agreement in Panel and Appellate Body proceedings. In the 
summer of 2016, the United States challenged the re-appointment of an adjudicator from South Korea to the 
Appellate Body. The United States cited their dissatisfaction with the performance of the adjudicator and his alleged 
failings not to “add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 
 
In this dissertation I develop a multilateral standard of review, which offers a method of “open” construction and 
contextual interpretation suited for the adjudication of exemption provisions in multilateral agreements, such as 
Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994. I posit that the judicial decision maker should construe and interpret exemption 
provisions using the embedded standard of review, such that the Member States’ economic conditions enlighten the 
contextual interpretation of the language of the provision. Application of the multilateral standard of review to the 
construction and interpretation of exemption provisions compels the adjudicator to accord conditional deference to 
developmental policies as a method to limit prejudicial reliance on the adjudicator’s preconceptions. 
 
Central to my argument are three observations. First, the Membership of the WTO is not homogeneous, but instead 
characterized by a measure of rational heterogeneity in economic preferences. It is furthermore time-inconsistent. 
Second, the covered agreements – most importantly the GATT 1994 – are multilateral agreements and are an 
expression of the collaborative intent of Parties to selectively cooperate on and coordinate their domestic trade 
policies. Third, the adjudicator can accomplish her judicial task without relying on the concepts of power and 
Utopia. The adjudicator instead derives her perspective from Parties’ collaborative desire as expressed through the 
covered agreements. 
 
My constructive critique of the method of interpretation of GATT exemption provisions on export restrictions 
adopted by the Panel and Appellate Body has two sides. First, I question the assumption that the equilibrium 
conditions derived from mature growth models determine the optimal structure and growth path for all open 
economies. I argue that, in the absence of full convergence, economic models of specialization and diversification 
exist in parallel. This bifurcation in economic models in turn describes the possibility and desirability of viable 




Second, I criticize the international economic regulatory structure of the GATT/WTO that is too often interpreted on 
the (implicit) assumption of normative homogeneity in the Membership with respect to optimal economic models. 
Furthermore, I reject the notion that the ideal structure to dispute resolution mirrors a unique and immovable “line of 
equilibrium.” Instead, I argue the adjudicator should adopt an interpretative stance that is characterized by 
constrained interpretative deference when fitting domestic policies to the provisions of the GATT. 
 
In particular, I argue that the Appellate Body incorrectly construes Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. As a result of a 
linguistic extension of certain words, the Appellate Body effectively collapses the exemption provision of Article 
XI:2(a) into a “critical shortage”-test. The Appellate Body then proceeds to read its “critical shortage”-test in 
relation to the exception provision Article XX(j) GATT and narrows the scope of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 
accordingly. This is a contextualization of the exemption provision I object to. Moreover, I contend that it that 
damages the prospects of countries to temporarily adopt export restrictive measures as an overt industrial policy. 
 
Instead I argue that the appropriate interpretative context of Article XI:2(a) is determined by its scope and character, 
as found by the application of the appropriate standard of review (Chapter 1) and derived from Article XI:1 GATT 
(Chapter 5). As such, Article XI:2(a) accepts the possibility of “viable” industrial policies (Chapter 2), conditional 
on an interpretation that rejects the premises of Textualism (Chapter 3) and allows for an “open” construction of 
exemption provisions in the GATT 1994 (Chapter 4). More specifically: 
 
Chapter 1 sets out the history of the standard of review in the GATT and frames the relevance thereof to the coming 
argument. The applicable standard of review is one of the central mechanisms the Appellate Body and Panels have 
employed to move toward greater judicialization of the dispute settlement system in the GATT/WTO. From the 
Uruguay Round on, with the adoption of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and the establishment of the 
Appellate Body, the adjudicator more formally engages in judicial decision making instead of moderating 
disagreement between Contracting Parties. This development however centers attention on the preconceptions and 




Chapter 2 examines the static and dynamic economic effects of imposing export restrictive trade policies. The first 
part of the chapter offers an overview of the various static reasons for restricting exports. In addition to the classic 
argument on maximizing market power (“strong theorem”), four other static arguments are put forward for using 
export restrictive policies: consumption and investment smoothing, revenue and redistribution, market 
rationalization (each an aspect of the “weak theorem”), and as a counter to import tariffs. 
 
The subsequent dynamic assessment of export restrictive measures clearly shows normative differentiation between 
models of mature and catch up growth. The main difference between the two type of models is found in the 
emphasis they place on economic specialization and frontier growth (mature growth), and economic diversification 
and the pattern of skill relatedness (nested) in economic production (catch up growth). Specifically, the skill 
component that explains the nested structure of the Product Space is unobservable to the households and centrally 
justifies industrial policy as coordination and developmental policy at the central level. 
 
Chapter 3 sets the analytical stage for the legal analysis by according emphasis to the role of the adjudicator. In 
addition to describing the role of the adjudicator in GATT/WTO disputes, this chapter introduces the central query 
driving the dissertation’s legal analysis: “by which method are Member States’ economic conditions positively 
recognized, such that they enlighten the contextual interpretation of the language of the provisions of the 
GATT/WTO in a manner that furthers both the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.” 
 
In its application of the customary rules of international law, codified in Articles 31-33 VCLT, the Appellate Body 
has favored adherence to a Textualist interpretation of the covered agreements. This approach is intended to bolster 
the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. A Textualist reading of a multilateral agreement 
that governs the collaborative intent of a heterogeneous Membership however unwittingly favors the innate biases of 
the adjudicator. 
 
Chapter 4 critiques the application of Textualism to the GATT/WTO and offers a competing method of “open” 
construction and interpretation – the multilateral standard of review. In a critical examination of the post-modern 
critique on the judicial decision making process in international law, powerfully voiced by Koskenniemi, I find that 
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the adjudicator’s understanding of the collaborative intent of Parties maintains her ability to come to a coherent 
judicial decision. Her ability to accomplish this task is however constrained by applicable teleologies: doctrinal, 
normative, and sociological. 
 
An open-ended construction of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, by applying the appropriate 
standard of review, allows the adjudicator to actively recognize the heterogeneous preferences of the Membership, 
balanced by the doctrinal and normative constraints the GATT/WTO places on her decision-making. The extend of 
deference that the multilateral standard of review compels the adjudicator to apply is furthermore limited by the 
formal demands of the Oats Decentralization Theorem.  
 
Chapter 5 applies the multilateral standard of review to the adjudication of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, commenting 
on the governing case law China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths. After having defined the scope of 
Article XI:1 GATT, I construe Article XI:2(a) as a hierarchical dependent exemption provision. As the exemption 
provision adopts its scope from Article XI:1 GATT 1994, I argue that by applying the appropriate standard of 
review in her construction and interpretation of the provision, the adjudicator can incorporate industrial policies 
within the ambit of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
 
I subsequently resist a construction of Article XI:2(a) that effectively collapses it into a “critical shortage”-test, 
which the Appellate Body then reads against the “short supply” element in Article XX(j) GATT. Instead, I critique 
this reasoning on doctrinal, economic, and, ultimately, normative grounds. 
 
The arc of argumentation in Chapters 1-5 offers a complete and encompassing answer to this dissertation’s central 
query. The open construction and interpretation of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994, following application 
of the multilateral standard of review, offers a superior method of contextual interpretation; such that the economic 
conditions and preferences of Member States are positively recognized in a manner that furthers both the security 




The Epilogue restates the argument of the dissertation and confronts some of the central challenges to the application 
of the multilateral standard of review as a judicial method of construction and interpretation of exemption provisions 
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Chapter 1: GATT Exemptions and the Multilateral Standard of Review 
 
 
With the collapse of the Doha Development Round, questions on the proper scope for and the international 
regulation of diverging national policies on optimal economic growth fall back onto the established frameworks of 
the WTO covered agreements. The interpretation of the provisions of these multilateral agreements is likely to 
continue to guide and constrain the adoption of economic policies in both mature and catch-up markets alike – 
despite the growing tendency to seek pluri-lateral, regional and even bilateral deals on such topics. 
 
This work centrally questions, critiques and (re)constructs the breadth and character accorded to the exemption 
provision on quantitative restrictions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994). I will 
argue that judicial decision makers should accord a higher measure of deference to developmental policies when 
constructing the breadth of exemption provisions in the GATT, relative to the standard of review used when 
according meaning to regulatory exceptions. The sensitivity of the judicial decision maker to the three-part test 
following Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) - namely a standard of review particular to the 
construction of rules (objective assessment), the facts (qualified intrusiveness4), and the application of these facts to 
the rules (through a case-by-case analysis5) – will be pivotal and shape the favored approach to exemption 
provisions, such as Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
 
In this work I argue and theorize that an objective assessment of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994 is guided 
by a standard of review that is embedded in the covered agreements and subject to its declared object and purpose. 
Moreover, that the WTO adjudicator, in the presence of (macro-)economic preference heterogeneity, should 
interpret the terms of exemption provisions in an “open,” i.e. minimally constrained, manner to maximize for true 
“developmental” policies.6 When fitting “economic facts” to the terms of exemption provision, decision makers 
                                                        
4 See Section A, infra. Also, Chapter 4, infra. 
5 See, for example, WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.279. 
6 In this work, I argue for a theoretical framework that facilitates a minimally constricted reading of exemptions in the GATT 1994 and, 
possibly, in other covered agreements. This approach is not without precedent in the practice of the WTO Panels and Appellate Body (however 
unstructured, erratic, and under-theorized); Howse, for example, notes “[w]here a substantive norm is ambiguous, seemingly not coherent or based 
on a delicate but elusive historical compromise, the Appellate Body has favoured, selectively, judicial minimalism” in, Robert Howse, “The World 
Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,“ 27(1) European Journal of International Law 9 (2016),  p. 66. As will be 
argued in Chapter 3, infra, I do not find a procedural or formal approach to legal interpretation and construction fundamentally helpful; and as such 
do not find common ground with Ioannadis writing on procedural approaches to adjudicative legitimacy in the WTO. See Michael Ioannadis, 
“Deference Criteria in WTO Law and the Case for a Procedural Approach,” in Lukasz Gruszczynski and Woutwer Werner, eds., Deference in 
International Courts and Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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maintain conformity with their interpretative mandate, to safeguard the predictability and security of the multilateral 
trading system, by applying a measure of deference that satisfies the conditionality of the modified Oates’ 
Decentralization Theorem. Such reading of exemption provisions does justice to legitimate macro-economic 
preference heterogeneity among Member States, while putting a premium on the demands of persuasive reasoning. 
 
I consciously adopt the perspective of the adjudicator to emphasize the hermeneutical aspects of construing 
provisions within the established multilateral framework of the covered agreements, in particular the GATT 1994. I 
have found the standard of review, as it pertains to both the construction of the provisions of covered agreements 
and the “fitting” of established facts thereto, a valuable lens. By adopting the position of the adjudicator, I accord 
center-place to the directional or teleological component of collaboration by the multilateral WTO Membership 
under the GATT 1994. In this way, attention switches from the mechanics to achieve collaboration, to the focal 
point thereof – the provisions and terms of the covered agreement.7 
 
As Mavroidis points out, most of the edifice around the standard of review is “judge made law,”8 around limited 
statutory anchor language. Mavroidis criticizes the Appellate Body for failing to “develop[] its own understanding 
of the rationale for, and the objective function of the agreements that it is called to interpret.” Rather, the Appellate 
Body “behaved as a political body reacting to signs of times.” As a consequence, “[t]he quest for contextual 
understanding of the key terms remains […] elusive.”9 
 
In this work I argue for such contextual understanding of exemption provisions in the covered agreements, and in 
the GATT 1994 in particular. In response to Mavroidis’ critique, I postulate that the adjudicator’s presumptions and 
pre-judgments come to the fore strongest in her consideration of policy flexibility provisions; as her assessment 
thereof is directly reflective of her understanding of the regulatory structure of the GATT and of the collaborative 
intent of the multilateral Membership. The favored higher measure of deference in the construction and 
interpretation of exemptions in the GATT 1994 is however not to be based in perceptions of power or political 
                                                        
7 See for the role of international law in support of collaboration between sovereigns generally, Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch, The Impact 
of International Law on International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
8 Petros C. Mavroidis, “The Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight: The Not So Magnificent Seven of the WTO Appellate Body,” EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2016/31. 
9 Petros C. Mavroidis, “The Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight: The Not So Magnificent Seven of the WTO Appellate Body,” EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2016/31, p. 1. 
10 
 
choices by decision makers. Rather, the appropriate measure of deference is anchored in the decision maker’s 
understanding of the agreement’s object and purpose. 
 
Without doing away with the ultimate case-by-case analysis preferred by the Appellate Body, I argue for the 
adoption of an “open” construction of exemption provisions to do justice to the Hobbesian ethos of avoiding the 
summum malum of a free fall into beggar-thy-neighbor protective discrimination,10 while allowing the rational 
macro-economic (or directional) preference heterogeneity of the Membership to find full expression. 
 
In Section A, I introduce the standard of review as it features and pertains to the GATT and establish the importance 
of the standard of review as a lens through which the adjudicator construes the provisions of the covered agreement. 
The standard of review guides the adjudicator in constructing the provision within the framework of the covered 
agreement. In this process, the character of the provision is revealed (rule, exception, or exemption) and accorded an 
appropriate scope, in accordance with the adjudicator’s understanding of its object and purpose. 
 
Section B submits that the GATT is an economically directional agreement between Member States (as apparent 
from the preamble to GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement), but observes that there is considerable heterogeneity 
among the Membership as to optimal local policies (industrial policies). I consequently focus the hermeneutical 
framework on Member States’ economic preference heterogeneity. Consequently, a successful interpretation of the 
provisions of the GATT 1994, such that the judicial assessment maximally comports to Member State economic 
preferences, first clarifies the perspectives on economic growth maintained by the adjudicator. 
 
Section C argues that instead of mechanically applying the customary rules of international law of interpretation, 
seeking the “ordinary meaning” of the terms in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, the adjudicator is engaged in a 
decision-making process. The adjudicator’s adoption of one economic theory (sociological teleology) over another 
in her construction of terms and provisions is, or so Koskenniemi argues, driven by her ultimate reliance on the 
external concepts of Power or Utopia. 
                                                        
10 Paraphrasing Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) European Journal of 




In Section D, I formulate an alternative method of constructing the meaning and scope of exemptions in the GATT 
1994. By emphasizing the collaborative desire by Parties, captured in the preamble of the GATT 1947 and the WTO 
Agreement, the adjudicator can resist Koskenniemi’s deconstructive technique. Her understanding of the 
collaborative intent of Parties allows her to maintain an object and purpose analysis of the terms and provisions of 
the covered agreement. The judicial decision maker is thereby not liberated however, but remains constrained in her 
construction of the covered agreement. Kantorowicz’ triptych details these constraints on the decision-making 
process of the adjudicator: any adjudication remains subject to normative, sociological and doctrinal teleology. 
 
In Chapter 5, infra, I apply this framework to the construction and interpretation of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
There, I explore how the adjudicator of the multilateral agreement can, in her construction of the exemption 
provision and interpretation of its terms, be sensitive to the preference heterogeneity of Parties, while simultaneously 
be constrained by the normative and doctrinal aspects of adjudication within the framework of the GATT/WTO. 
 
A. The GATT Standard of Review 
 
The judicialization of international economic law has been one of the more pronounced developments in the 
relationship between countries in contemporary history, especially regarding international trade law.11 The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) embodies this development in its historical transition from a diplomacy-
led to a rules-based judicial system of governance.12 The postwar trade order aims to balance the rights of Member 
States to manage their domestic economies optimally with the imperative to prevent protectionist measures to set off 
a race to the bottom.13 The legal structure of the GATT is designed to make tariff concessions binding and enforce 
                                                        
11 While this observation is historic in nature, it expresses the hope of the author that the international trading system will continue to function 
judiciously, regardless of the sometimes fraught relationship with some of its most powerful Member States – such as the United States. I believe 
that the argument offered in this work can aid the legitimacy and expediency of the dispute settlement system at the WTO. 
12 See, for instance, Robert Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading System,” 96 American 
Journal of International Law 94 (2002); and Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
13 Robert Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading System,” 96 American Journal of 
International Law 94 (2002), p. 95. 
12 
 
non-discriminatory application,14 while allowing for a variety of exceptions and exemptions to facilitate individual 
Member States to responses to opportunity or crisis. 
 
At the outset of the GATT (1947), a diplomatic outlook and framework bolstered the effectiveness of the legal 
structure of the GATT.15 Diplomacy however gave way to full judicialization at the Uruguay Round with, among 
other agreements, the adoption of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Some of the key changes the DSU 
introduced include the near-automatic adoption of Panel reports (Articles 6.1, 16.4, 17.14, and 22.6 DSU) and the 
establishment of the Appellate Body, charged solely with addressing “issues of law covered in the panel report and 
legal interpretations developed by the panel” (Article 17.6 DSU). In contrast, “a panel should make an objective 
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of 
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, […]” (Article 11 DSU). 
 
The key assumption remains unchanged however, such that “one should be able to protect domestic social and 
political stability, using means that avoid exporting domestic social economic difficulties and threatening global 
stability - in other words, to avoid destructive forms of interdependent behavior.”16 That is to say, the dispute 
settlement system should support “the security and predictability to the multilateral trading system, […] [such as] to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements [….] [and neither] add to or diminish 
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” (Article 3.2 DSU) 
 
Article 11 DSU makes clear that the Panel is supposed to accomplish its mission through “an objective assessment 
of the matter before it” – in both law and fact. This “standard of review” was the subject of intense negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round (see Section A.1, infra) as it moderates between the object and purpose of the GATT, the 
                                                        
14 See general the literature around Article III GATT 1994; see also, Alan O. Sykes, “Regulatory Consistency Requirements in International 
Trade,” Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 502 (2017). 
15 As Mavroidis notes, “[e]conomists often describe GATT as a “relational contract,” with like-minded countries brough in by invitation only, 
and they managed to proceed with consensus decisions.” [i.e. “GATT-think” operated by a close(d) network of diplomats] in Petros C. Mavroidis, 
The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 60. See also, Joseph Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: 
Reflection on WTO Dispute Settlement,” in Roger B. Porter, et al., eds., Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium (Brooking Institutions, 2001). See also, Thomas J. Bollyky and Petros C. Mavroidis, “Trade, Social Preferences and Regulatory 
Cooperation: The New WTO-Think,” EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2016/47 (2016). 
16 Robert Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading System,” 96 American Journal of 
International Law 94 (2002), p. 95. 
13 
 
language of its provisions, and the policy space Member States have to optimally respond to opportunities and 
challenges.17 
 
In response to political and economic divisions in the WTO Membership, the Appellate Body developed an 
approach by which to review domestic measures against the text of the multilateral agreement that – at the best of 
times – aided it to decide “controversial questions in balanced or deferential ways that indicate neutrality or even 
caution in regard to the neo-liberal ‘deep integration’ trade agenda reflected in the Uruguay Round [...].”18 In this 
work I press for such balance and argue that the moderating position of the standard of review should instruct the 
Appellate Body to construct exemptions broadly when they pertain to “developmental” (see for a definition Chapter 
2, infra) challenges, but likewise should demand a high level of specificity in the argumentation of “economic facts” 
before the Panel. 
 
The standard of review WTO Panels and the Appellate Body apply to their respective weighing and “fitting” of 
domestic policy measures against the text of the appropriate agreements affects both the vertical as the horizontal 
allocation of competency.19 The standard of review establishes the measure of intrusiveness or deference20 with 
which national policy measures are read against the structure and rules of the WTO Agreements (both in questions 
of law and fact).21 
 
The determination of the appropriate standard of review not only informs the proper scope of the rules, including 
their exceptions and exemptions, it also provides the lens by which the Panel and Appellate Body should accord 
                                                        
17 For examples of other standards of review in domestic law (Australia, the United States, and France, for example) or international law 
(European Court of Justice, or select international dispute settlement bodies) see, Ross Becroft, The Standard of Review in WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Critique and Development (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 12-26. Note however that most arguments that arise in the domestic context 
(such as an emphasis on expertise, democratic rule, and efficiency of governance) do not easily or convincingly translate into the WTO context; 
see Stephen Croley and John H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review and Deference to National Governments,” 90(2) American 
Journal of International Law 193 (1996), pp. 208-212. 
18 Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) The European Journal of 
International Law 1 (2016), p. 12. 
19 Which is to say, the applicable standard of review may affect the allocation of competency between WTO Panels and the Membership 
(vertical), as well as affect the relationship between the Panel/Appellate Body and other parts of the WTO institutional structure such as the 
Ministerial Conference (horizontal). See Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 38; See also, John H. Jackson, “Sovereignty, Subsidiarity, and Separation of Powers: The High-Wire Balancing Act of Globalization,” in 
Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
20 Jan Bohanes and Nicolas Lockhart, “Standard of Review in WTO Law,” in Daniel Bethlehem, Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld and Isabelle 
van Damme, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 379. 
21 See, among others, Andrew Stoler, “The WTO Dispute Settlement Process: Did the Negotiators Get What They Wanted?,” 3(1) World 
Trade Review 99 (2004), p. 113. 
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meaning to these provisions. The method by which the rules are constructed in relation to national measures 
automatically delineates the universe from which the judicial decision maker accords appropriate meaning to the 
provisions.22 
 
As the jurisprudential acquis grows and the approach of the Appellate Body remains notoriously fluid, subject to 
rapid changes and strongly case specific,23 critics question whether some kind of political or diplomatic control over 
the Panel and Appellate Body decisions needs to be reasserted.24 Such critics, perhaps surprisingly, recently include 
the United States of America – both on judicial independence25 as on the nature of the dispute settlement system26 --  
one of the voices that has historically shaped the contours of the multilateral trading system and sought to minimize 
the political influence of “the state.” 
 
With the collapse of the Doha Development Round in December 2015, “vertical” issues pertaining to the proper 
scope and construction of (developmental) exceptions and exemptions have returned to the sole ambit of the Panels 
and Appellate Body. Ehlermann, who served as member and Chairman of the Appellate Body to 2002, noted at the 
end of his term that “during the last months, the question of standard of review has […] become one of the most 
controversial aspects of the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence.”27 Little has changed. 
 
In the Section A.1, I set out the historical development of the standard of review in the GATT to situate the 
discussion in Section A.2, on the current interpretation thereof, as well as to provide additional context when 
                                                        
22 The review process is further determined by various issues, including the allocation of the burden of proof, adoptionby the decision maker 
of a judicial method of interpretation (see Chapters 3 and 4 infra), requirements for standing, and certain issue avoidance techniques such as judicial 
restraint and efficiency. 
23 See Michael Ioannidis, “Beyond the Standard of Review Deference Criteria in WTO Law and the Case for a Procedural Approach,” Chapter 
6, in Lukasz Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner, eds. Deference in International Courts and Tribunals (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
p. 95. See Frieder Roessler, “Changes in the Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body During the Past Twenty Years,” (2015), RSCAS 2015/72 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance. See also, Appellate Body Report, United States—Investigation of the 
International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, (2006), ¶93. 
24 See, for instance, Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Democracy, Sovereignty: The Future of the World Trade Organization (Washington 
D.C.: The AEI Press, 2001). 
25 Obama administration publically criticized (and blocked) the appointment of a Korean member of the Appellate Body on account of 
unwelcome judicial activism. See, for an overview, Simon Lester, “What’s at Stake with the Appellate Body Reappointment Controversy,” 
International Economic Law and Policy Blog (June 7, 2016); “More on the U.S. Objections to Certain Appellate Body Practice,” (June 6, 2016); 
“The U.S. Justification for its Appellate Body Reappointment Actions,” (May 28, 2016). 
26 The Trump administration has formulated a generally combative tone on the framework of multilateral trade regulation; including a rather 
extreme interpretation of Article 3.2 DSU’s clarification that “Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 
27 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, “Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO,” Policy Paper RSC No. 02/9 (2002), 
¶64; in Matthias Oesch, “Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution,” 6(3) Journal of International Economic Law 635 (2003), p. 636. 
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considering the drafting history of Article XI GATT and associated exemption provision (Article XI.2(a) GATT) in 
Chapter 5, infra. 
 
1. Historic Standard of Review: GATT 1947-1994 
 
To determine the contours of the standard of review in the GATT 1994, it’s important to consider its progression 
and development since the inception of the GATT in 1947, through several rounds of negotiations, and finally as 
subject of a rigorous debate during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). The next Section (A.2) will address the 
interpretation, application, and critique of the standard of review since the Uruguay Round. Generally, two trends 
emerge from the application of the standard of review: (i) adoption of a standard of review depending on the type of 
obligation under review; (ii) an increasingly more unilateral, or de novo, type of review (i.e. less deferential to 
Member State arguments and constructions28). 
 
The GATT 1947 emerged, through a Protocol of Provisional Application, from the failed process to adopt and ratify 
the Charter for the International Trade Organization.29 Accordingly, the GATT 1947 failed to acquire administrative 
and institutional features to fully take its place next to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The 
early GATT 1947 was instead administered through collective decision making of its “Contracting Parties.” These 
Contracting Parties at first “simply gave themselves the power to make whatever decisions were necessary to 
implement the agreement.”30 
 
                                                        
28 Especially under the GATT 1947, before the introduction of DSU and the associated emergence of a strong judiciary function in the Panels 
and Appellate Body, the international trade system can be described as more “power” rather than “rule” orientated; see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), p. 66. Under the GATT 1994, the members of the Appellate Body and Panels have, more strongly, adopted the position of 
judicial decision maker – rather than powerbroker. 
29 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System – Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Boston: MIT Press, 1997). 
30 Such by means of a broad interpretation of Articles XXII and XXIII GATT 1947; quote from Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International 
Trade Law – The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworths legal Publishers, 1993), p. 30; see also, T.N. Srinivasan, “The Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A Brief History and an Evolution from Economic, Contractarian, and Legal Perspectives,” Stanford Law and 
Economics Olin Working Paper No. 320 (2005). 
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As a high degree of policy cohesion existed between the early Contracting Parties,31 disputes could be referred to 
informal working parties that functioned as “ad hoc negotiating bodies.”32 In 1952 however a panel system was 
introduced and staffed by diplomats from neutral Contracting Parties. In the 1960s, this system of diplomatic dispute 
settlement came more politicized with the admission of quite a few developing countries33 to the GATT 1947 – the 
Membership became more heterogeneous in terms of policy preferences, economic needs, and political power; 
effectively grinding diplomatic forms of dispute settlement to a halt.34 
 
In a series of negotiating rounds, tariffs were lowered and a host of associated issues clarified. From the perspective 
of the development of the standard of review, the seventh negotiating round (1973-1979) or the Tokyo Round, is 
especially significant. In the Tokyo Round a number of “codes” were adopted dealing with non-tariff issues; made 
possible, in part, by the United States negotiating team recently being invigorated by “fast-track” authority (US 
Trade Act 1974) to negotiate on matters ordinarily under the purview of the US Congress. 
 
In order to effectively address non-tariff barriers to trade, more detailed legal rules are necessary as many non-tariff 
barriers are more nuanced (and more opaque) than straight tariffs. Hudec notes that “the new codes required a strong 
dispute settlement procedure to make them credible” as “unlike tariffs, NTBs [non-tariff barriers] could not simply 
be bargained away, one against the other.”35 
 
The 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement offers the first legal guidance on how Panels are to approach 
domestic measures,36 brought before them ex Article XXIII:2 GATT 1947. Article 16 prescribes: 
 
                                                        
31 In US – Fur Felt Hats (1951), it was held that the question of “serious injury” was “essentially a matter of economic and social judgment 
involving a considerable subjective element” (¶30). See further, WTO Panel Report, US – Underwear (1996), ¶¶ 5.32, et seq. 
32 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law – The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworths legal Publishers, 
1993), p. 30; These ad hoc working parties generally showed great deference to the Contracting Parties, noting in US – Fur Felt Hats (1951) that 
“It would not be proper to regard the consequent withdrawal of a tariff concession as ipso facto contrary to Article XIX unless the weight attached 
by the government concerned to such factors was clearly unreasonably great” (¶48). 
33 Among them: Argentina (1967), a host of African countries, Jamaica (1963), Republic of Korea (1967), Poland (1967), Portugal (1962), 
Spain (1963), Yugoslavia (1966), and Israel (1962). 
34 See, Terence P. Stewart and Christopher Callahan, “Dispute Settlement Mechanisms,” in Terence P. Stewart, ed., The GATT Uruguay 
Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol-II, 2680. 
35 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law – The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworths legal Publishers, 
1993), p. 40. 
36 An important detail is that a number of the Tokyo Round Codes had separate dispute resolution mechanism imbedded; see, for example, 
Article 18.1 of the Subsidies Code. See, David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice 
and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 7-11. 
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Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the General Agreement 
[…]37 
 
Despite the standard of review being an explicit “discussion topic,”38 no GATT dispute panels explicitly referred to 
or identified this Article as describing the appropriate general standard of review.39 Nevertheless, some panels did 
address the standard of review. Although somewhat erratic in their decisions (ranging from very deferential to rather 
intrusive), the Panel in New Zealand – Finnish Transformers (1985) marked the high-point for intrusiveness of 
review. The Panel noted that to be fully deferential to domestic findings on material injury (in anti-dumping cases), 
“would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding antidumping cases without any 
possibility to review the action taken in the GATT.”40 
 
In US – Swedish Steel, a Panel Report on the cusp of the Uruguay Round, the United States argued for a “systemic 
analysis” in its determination and assessment of the facts. Such systemic analysis would guard against a domestic 
authority “deliberately act[ing] in a way which would prejudice the outcome of an investigation in favour of one 
party or [being] seriously negligent in the manner in which it conducted the investigation […].”41 The Swedes on the 
other hand, argued that a “detailed analysis of certain factual aspects of these determinations”42 was necessary to 
appropriately analyze whether the challenged determinations had been made in accordance with the provisions of 
                                                        
37 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, L/4907, adopted November 28, 1979, BISD 
26S/210, quoted in relevant part only (Article 16). Furthermore, an Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of 
Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2), BISD 26S/215 (1980) was attached to the Understanding on Dispute Settlement (1979). 
38 See, 1976 Report of the Consultative Group of Eighteen, BISD 23S/42 (1977). 
39 See, Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.61-62, noting “[…] 
panels were under no explicit obligation to defer to factual findings as established and evaluated by domestic authorities […]”; See also Ross 
Becroft, The Standard of Review in WTO Dispute Settlement: Critique and Development (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2012), noting that the 
1979 Anti-Dumping Code did however “cast some limitations on the fact reviewing task of panels,” (p. 41). 
40 GATT Panel Report, New Zealand – Finnish Transformers (1985), ¶4.4. Oesch suggests that the panels intrusive review can be equated to 
a de novo assessment the facts (p. 65), in Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003); while Hudec observes that the “case clearly served as another solid building block in the GATT’s legal reputation, in retrospect it might 
have been wiser to spend more time defining the degree of review GATT panels were to conduct in antidumping and countervailing cases.” (p.174) 
in Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law – The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworths legal Publishers, 1993). 
41 GATT Panel Report, US – Swedish Steel (1990), ¶3.11. 
42 GATT Panel Report, US – Swedish Steel (1990), ¶3.12. 
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the GATT 1947. The Panel, declining to formulate a general standard of review, emphasized that a case-by-case 
approach was more appropriate.43 The diplomatic tradition suggested a need for “flexible rules.”44 
 
This set the analytical stage45 for the most important negotiating round to shape the standard of review as applied in 
the GATT 1994; the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). The entire agenda of the Uruguay Round was extraordinarily 
ambitious (and successful), expanding the substantive coverage of the newly instituted World Trade Organization 
considerably. In the present context it is especially noteworthy that one negotiating group was dedicated to 
strengthening the rules of dispute settlement proceedings and shore up the surveillance of implementation.46  
 
Until late in the negotiations the standard of review did not feature prominently,47 toward the end however the issue 
became a “deal-breaker.”48 Despite what may have been the legal practice of panels under the GATT 1947, there 
was a perception – most notably voiced by the United States -- that panels had set a too intrusive standard of review 
in general and regarding the evaluation of facts in anti-dumping and countervailing measure cases in particular.49 
The United States criticized “the perceived willingness of certain panels to overturn the actions of investigating 
authorities that were reasonable.”50 
 
In the final phases of the Uruguay Round several proposals were tabled to ensure for a more deferential standard of 
review in the traditional categories of factual and legal findings pertaining to the provisions of the covered 
                                                        
43 GATT Panel Report, US – Swedish Steel (1990), ¶5.3; see similarly GATT Panel Report, Korea – Resins (1993); and GATT Panel Report, 
US – Norwegian Salmon AD (1994), ¶494, GATT Panel Report, US – Norwegian Salmon CVD (1994), ¶258. Also, Matthias Oesch, Standards of 
Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.62. In antidumping and countervailing duties the applicable 
standard of review was discussed more often though. Vermulst and Komuro hold that broadly in the GATT 1947 case law, “[w]hile most panels 
established to determine GATT-compatibility of importing countries’ anti-dumping laws and/or measures have held against the importing countries’ 
positions, generally after a painstaking review of all the details […], GATT panels have not re-done factual determinations.” Edwin Vermulst, 
Norio Komuro, “Anti-Dumping Disputes in the GATT/WTO – Navigating Dire Straits,” 31(1) Journal of World Trade 5 (1997), pp. 7, 15-19. 
44 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law – The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworths legal Publishers, 
1993), p. 266. Such flexible rules lead to a deferential standard of interpretation and accords national authorities a certain margin of appreciation in 
interpreting and applying the provisions of the GATT 1947. How much is too much remains difficult to verify and substantiate, according to Hudec. 
45 See broadly, Stephen Croley and John H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review and Deference to National 
Governments,” 90(2) American Journal of International Law 193 (1996). 
46 See broadly, Terence P. Stewart and Christopher Callahan, “Dispute Settlement Mechanisms,” in Terence P. Stewart, ed., The GATT 
Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol-II, 2724-2812. 
47 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. No. MTN.TNC/W/FA 
(December 20, 1991) – the “Dunkel Draft”. 
48 John H. Jackson, American Society of International Law (ASIL), Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (1994), p. 139. 
49 Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 72. 
50 Stephen Croley and John H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review and Deference to National Governments,” 90(2) 
American Journal of International Law 193 (1996), p. 190. 
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agreements (treatment of domestic international law by Panels and the Appellate Body were never considered).51 
The United States offered the standard of review developed in its domestic administrative law jurisprudence (the 
“Chevron”-doctrine52) as a useful and adequate model of judicial restraint under the GATT/WTO.53 
  
In 1989, the US suggested, before the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Group, that “a GATT dispute 
settlement panel must not substitute its own judgement for that of the investigating authorities (i.e., a panel may not 
conduct an independent de novo investigation).”54 Again in 1992, the US pushed a narrow standard of review that 
was to be included in the Anti-Dumping Agreement,55 but failed to convince other delegates. In 1993 the US yet 
again attempted to insert language limiting the applicable standard of review in GATT/WTO dispute settlement; this 
time as an Interpretative Note to the draft Article 11 DSU.56 
 
Despite having milder language, this limit to the standard of review was rejected as well, on two accounts. First, 
countries worried that a narrow standard of review would allow governments from applying GATT rules 
illegitimately to protect domestic industries. Second, intellectual property circles desired an intrusive review by 
Panels to review Member State implementation of the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. 
 
The resulting standoff, with the United States (at times supported by the European Communities) pushing for 
deference and the majority of the Membership opposing this,57 resulted in a tense compromise: formal incorporation 
of a deferential standard of review into the Antidumping Agreement, centered on the standard of “permissible” 
instead of “reasonable.” The door to more general application of the “permissible” standard beyond Article 17.6 
                                                        
51 Stephen Croley and John H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review and Deference to National Governments,” 90(2) 
American Journal of International Law 193 (1996), pp. 194-197; and Stefan Zleptnig, “The Standard of Review in WTO Law: An Analysis of 
Law, Legitimacy and the Distribution of Legal and Political Authority,” 6 European Integration Online Paper (2002), pp. 429-431. 
52 Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); putting forward a general deferential standard of review for 
Federal Court reviewing agencies’ interpretations of law if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise issue in question. In the absence of 
Congressional guidance, Federal Courts should test whether an agencies’ interpretation was “reasonable.” 
53 See for a critical review of the parallel between the Chevron-doctrine and the standard of review in the GATT/WTO, Stephen Croley and 
John H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review and Deference to National Governments,” 90(2) American Journal of 
International Law 193 (1996), pp. 197-203; Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 96 et seq. See also, Antonin Scalia, “Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,” 1989(3) Duke Law Journal 511 (1989). 
54 Cited from Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 74. 
55 See, Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 74; see also Gary N. 
Horlick and Peggy A. Clarke, “Standard for Panels Reviewing Anti-Dumping Determinations under the GATT,” in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., 
International Trade Law and the GATT and WTO Dispute Settlement System (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 298. 
56 See, Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 74 
57 “Ending the Uruguay Round: An Interview with GATT Chief Sutherland,” Inside US Trade (December 2,3 1993). 
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Antidumping Agreement was left open.58 In practical terms, setting the appropriate level of intrusiveness or 
deference in specific circumstances has been part of the work of the WTO dispute settlement body since 1994. The 
Appellate Body, in EC – Hormones, found that Article 11 DSU “articulates with great succinctness but with 
sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review.”59 
 
2. The GATT 1994: An “Objective Assessment” 
 
The Uruguay Round, a defining marker against which subsequent case law and jurisprudence on the GATT 1994 
needs to be understood, left the question of the appropriate standard of review relatively open. The close relationship 
between Article 16 of the 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement and Article 11 DSU obviously suggests a 
measure of continuity between dispute settlement under the GATT 1947 and GATT 1994.60 While the relevance of 
the negotiating history to post-Uruguay Round decisions is limited by Article 32 VCLT,61 practice has also 
established some continuity of thought between GATT 1947 and GATT 1994. As Roessler notes: “in short, in dubio 
pro GATT 1947.”62 The Appellate Body, in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, similarly finds adopted reports63 “an 
important part of the GATT acquis.”64 
 
Whereas Panels and the Appellate Body have observed that the DSU does not contain an explicit reference to the 
standard of review as such,65 Article 11 DSU has been deemed to serve as locus for the applicable standard of 
                                                        
58 See Ministerial Decision on the Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994; made part of the Results of the Uruguay Round Final Act, The Legal Texts, p. 397. Subsequent case-law however has 
interpreted Article 17.6 AD Agreement as containing a separate, though related, standard of review: see WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Hot 
Rolled Steel from Japan (2001); see WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Iron, Steel and H-Beams (2001); and WTO Appellate Body Report, 
US –Offset Act (2003). 
59 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶116. 
60 See, for instance, Gary N. Horlick and Peggy A. Clarke, “Standard for Panels Reviewing Anti-Dumping Determinations under the GATT,” 
in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., International Trade Law and the GATT and WTO Dispute Settlement System (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), p. 317. 
61 See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC –Computer Equipment (1998), where the AB limited the use of negotiating history to a supplementary 
source of interpretation. Under the GATT 1947, negotiating history had often been regarded as controlling; see Robert Howse, “The World Trade 
Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) European Journal of International Law 9 (2016), p. 32. 
62 Frieder Roessler, "The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the WTO" in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard 
Quick, eds., New Directions in International Economic law: essays in honor of John H. Jackson (Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 
2001), p. 343. 
63 Unadopted reports under the GATT 1947 can still provide “useful guidance” to GATT 1994 Panels and the Appellate Body; see WTO 
Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (1996), ¶6.10; confirmed by the Appellate Body in WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages (1996), p. 15. 
64 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (1996), p. 14 et seq., while reversing the Panel on its finding of adopted reports 
as “subsequent practice” according to Article 31(3)(b) VCLT. See also, WTO Panel Report, US – Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses (1997), ¶7.15. 
65 WTO Panel Report, US – Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses (1997), ¶7.16; and WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶114.
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review to the GATT/WTO. In US – Underwear, the Panel held that “the main relevant provision of the DSU in this 
respect [standard of review] is Article 11.”66 The Panel went on to note that “a policy of total deference to the 
findings of national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 DSU,” while 
stressing that it does not “see our review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating 
authorities […].”67 The Appellate Body, reversing the Panel in Canada – Periodicals, noted that the Panel is held to 
an “adequate” analysis of the facts.68 
 
In its report EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body eventually made Article 11 DSU its cornerstone provision; 
informing standard of review questions in all disputes where the relevant agreement contains no clear individual 
language on the appropriate standard.69 With respect to the standard of review pertaining to legal interpretations, the 
Appellate Body held: 
 
“—that is, consistency or inconsistency of a Member’s measure with the provisions of the applicable 
agreement – a standard not found in the text of the SPS Agreement itself cannot absolve the panel (or the 
Appellate Body) from the duty to apply the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
[…] It is appropriate to stress that here again Article 11 of the DSU is directly on point, requiring a panel to 
‘make an objective assessment of the matter before it’.”70 
 
With regard to the standard of review in factual matters, the Appellate Body noted: 
 
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of 
Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference,’ but 
rather the objective assessment of the facts’.”71 
 
Accordingly, Article 11 of the DSU demands an objective assessment of the matter before it in (i) the facts, (ii) the 
applicability of the relevant rules, and (iii) the conformity of the facts with the relevant rules.72 This three-part test is 
not much enlightened by the instruction to pursue an “objective” construction thereof,73 although the Appellate 
Body has provided some guidance as to the framework within which these aspects are to be positively applied. In an 
                                                        
66 WTO Panel Report, US – Underwear (1997), ¶¶7.9-7.10. 
67 WTO Panel Report, US – Underwear (1997), ¶¶7.13, 7.16. 
68 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals (1997), p. 22. 
69 See, for instance, Argentina – Footwear Safeguard Measures (2000), ¶¶117-118; “We have stated, on more than one occasion, that, for 
all but one of the covered agreements, Article 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels.” 
70 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶117. 
71 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶118 (footnotes omitted). 
72 See Article 11 DSU; also, for example, Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), p. 86, referencing Pierre Pescatore, Handbook of GATT (WTO) Dispute Settlement (Springer, 1996), p. 37. 
73 See, for instance, Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 70. See 
also, Ross Becroft, The Standard of Review in WTO Dispute Settlement: Critique and Development (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2012), section 
2.4, where he notes: “the mayor difficulty with this type of definition is that an objective assessment does not really signify any particular degree 
of deference or intrusion for panels to adopt in examining measures. There is therefore an absence of conceptual sophistication that would provide 
guidance to panels in their review of measures” (p. 51). 
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early comment on EC – Hormones and the “objective assessment”-test, Desmedt rightly points out that “[t]he notion 
of objectivity rather assumes an alternative to the [defendant’s] proposals for the development of an appropriate 
standard of review. The question is if the Appellate Body will further develop the confines of this review through 
the principle of objectivity rather than vacillating between total deference and de novo review.”74 
 
In Argentina – Footwear Safeguard Measures, the Appellate Body makes clear it requires the Panel to “correctly 
interpret[] and [apply] the substantive provisions of [the relevant agreement].”75 This formulation confirms that the 
interpretation of a covered agreement at the substantive level of the provisions is governed by the standard of review 
of Article 11 DSU and narrows any deference a panel generally has to accord Member States in its interpretation of 
the applicable agreement. The judicial decision maker is thus compelled to approach the construction of the 
applicable agreement as a matter of an “objective assessment” governed by the rules of interpretation of public 
international law.76 (for a comparative analysis between the amount of deference accorded to Member States in 
provisions stipulating exceptions and exemptions to the GATT/WTO, see Chapter 4, infra) 
 
The Panel’s “objective assessment” is tied to “the matter before it,” thus anchoring a possibly general standard in the 
agreement, provision and, possibly, substance before it. The Appellate Body in its report in US –Lamb noted that the 
precise nature of the objective assessment is determined by Article 11 DSU in combination with the obligations 
imposed by the provision under investigation (i.c. Article 4.2 Safeguards Agreement).77 Such approach could be 
interpreted as an attempt by the Appellate Body to give effect to the character of the various measures and 
                                                        
74 G. Alex Desmedt, “Hormones: Objective Assessment and (or as) Standard of Review,” 1 Journal of International Economic Law 695 
(1998), p. 697. 
75 WTO Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear Safeguard Measures (2000), ¶122; see also WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Certain Computer Equipment (1998), ¶89. 
76 An understanding further confirmed by the WTO Panel Report, US – Sections 301-310 (2000), which notes: “Of course, when it comes to 
deciding on the correct interpretation of the covered agreements, a panel will be aided by the arguments of the parties but not bound by them; its 
decisions on such matters must be in accord with the rules of treaty interpretation applicable to the WTO” (¶7.16); see also WTO Panel Report, US 
– Antidumping Act of 1916 (2000), ¶6.26; and WTO Panel Report, EC – Asbestos (2001), ¶8.82. See furthermore, Thomas Cottier, “Risk 
Management Experience in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Chapter 4 in David Robertson and Aynsley Kellow, ed., Globalization and the 
Environmental Risk Assessment and the WTO (Edward Elgar Online, 2001); and especially, Thomas Cottier and Matthias Oesch, “The Paradox of 
Judicial Review in International Trade Regulation: Towards a Comprehensive Framework,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds.,  
The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for the WTO (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2003). 
77 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb Safeguards (2001), ¶105. 
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provisions governed by the standard of review set in Article 11 DSU.78 Similarly, the Appellate Body in its report 
US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS held that: 
 
“[W]e recall that an ‘objective assessment’ under Article 11 of the DSU must be considered in the light of 
the obligations of the particular covered agreements at issue in order to derive the more specific contours of 
the appropriate standard of review.”79 
 
The Appellate Body then went on to note that its embedded standard of review is instructive as an agreement-
specific expression of a broader rule.80 There remains a high onus on Panels to review factual matters thoroughly, 
without entering into a de novo review, while construing the provision “in the light of the obligations of the 
particular covered agreements.”  
 
This embedded standard of review has gained particular salience in the context of the general exception to the 
GATT, Article XX, which has been found to localize the “right to regulate.” The Appellate Body in its report China 
– Publications clarifies the relationship between headline rules and exceptions from the perspective of the 
adjudicator that:81 
 
[W]e see the ‘right to regulate’, in the abstract, as an inherent power enjoyed by a Member’s government, 
rather than a right bestowed by international treaties such as the WTO Agreement. With respect to trade, the 
WTO Agreement and its Annexes instead operate to, among other things, discipline the exercise of each 
Member’s inherent power to regulate by requiring WTO Members to comply with the obligations that they 
have assumed thereunder. [...] We observe, in this regard, that WTO Members’ regulatory requirements 
may be WTO-consistent in one of two ways. First, they may simply not contravene any WTO obligation. 
Secondly, even if they contravene a WTO obligation, they may be justified under an applicable exception.  
 
The scope accorded to provisions detailing exemptions to WTO Members’ regulatory requirements are the 
(unobserved) third defining element in a balanced construction of the GATT and other covered agreements. 
Examination of the relationship between exemptions and applicable regulatory requirements (“headline rules”), as 
well as the relationship between these exemptions and related exceptions, demands an “objective assessment” as 
                                                        
78 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, “Standard of Review in WTO Law,” 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 491 
(2004); and Ross Becroft, The Standard of Review in WTO Dispute Settlement: Critique and Development (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2012), 
p. 57. 
79 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS (2005), ¶184. See further WTO Appellate Body Report, 
US – Continued Hormones Suspension (2008), ¶¶590-593; and WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples (2010), ¶¶356-359. 
80 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS (2005), ¶184; notes that its standard of review is 
“instructive for cases under the SCM Agreement that also involve agency determinations.” 
81 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222-223; building on WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), p. 
30, where it held that “so far as concerns the WTO, [Member State legislative autonomy] is circumscribed only by the need to respect the 
requirement of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements.” 
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much as the construction between exceptions and headline rules does. This unobserved third element of a balanced 
understanding of the GATT (and other covered agreements) is centrally addressed by the WTO Appellate Body 
report in China – Raw Materials (critically examined in Chapter 5, infra). 
 
A thorough reflection on the character of the embeddedness of the standard of review can prevent violations of the 
principle of equality (similar cases treated differently), as well as support the predictability of the construction of 
provisions across their legal and factual ambit. Application of the standard of review in a manner more sensitive to 
the obligation under investigation – that is construed with regard to the object and purpose of the agreement and 
provision under review – can lead to a more nuanced and sophisticated practice in WTO dispute settlement 
procedures. 
 
The most convincing argument against anything less than full de novo review by Panels and the Appellate Body in 
the construction of covered agreements is the imminent threat of what Palmeter and Spak describe as a “legal tower 
of Babel.”82 Such loss in uniformity in the language and meaning of each provision could (indeed would) result in 
legal chaos. Furthermore, such loss in uniformity of interpretation might very well be considered in contravention of 
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law which demand from the adjudicatory interpreter that 
she find the “ordinary meaning” (singular) of the words of a provision.83 
 
This is not to say that the objective assessment of the meaning of a provision in covered agreements cannot be 
mindful of the diverging preferences within the multilateral Membership on the desired level of policy space.84 
Indeed, when constructing an objective assessment of the scope and meaning of exceptions and exemptions to the 
rules of the GATT 1994, the adjudicator has to make a conscious decision on the appropriate scope of the exception 
                                                        
82 David Palmeter and Gregory J. Spak, “Resolving Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes: Defining GATT’s Role in an Ear of 
Increasing Conflict,” 24 Law and Policy in International Business 1145 (1993), 1158. See also, Jan Bohanes and Nicolas Lockhart, “The Standard 
of Review in WTO Law,” in Daniel L. Bethlehem, Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld, and Isabelle van Damme, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
International Trade Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
83 Interestingly, a similar “singular” standard seems to be adopted in the practice of applying the “permissible” standard of review in Article 
17.4 AD Agreement; see, Thomas Cottier and Matthias Oesch, “The Paradox of Judicial Review in International Trade Regulation: Towards a 
Comprehensive Framework,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience 
and Lessons for the WTO (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
84 See, for instance, Robert Howse, “The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the 
Judicial Power,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for 




and exemption in light of the object and purpose of both the article and the agreement as a whole. This decision as to 
the legal construction of the article does not therewith resolve the issue however. The decision maker can (and must) 
balance the degree of “openness” which she accorded to the interpreted provision, with corresponding demands on 
the persuasive reasoning necessary to fit facts (recognized according to its own standard of review) to the interpreted 
provision’s scope. 
 
If, as a reading of EC – Hormones might suggest,85 the principle in dubio mitius were to be considered an applicable 
principle of international law (as, for example, a “supplementary means of interpretation” governed by Article 32 
VCLT),86 it cannot resolve the issue of deliberate determination of the scope of any provision as it presumes an 
understanding of the boundaries of the provision in first instance.87 In absence of clear delineation, such boundaries 
are shaped through (a combination of) subsequent interpretative practice, scholarly commentary,88 and through the 
decision makers’ hermeneutic approach more generally. 
 
Article 3.2 DSU sets some boundaries to the contours of the standard of review from the perspective of the 
adjudicator. The dispute settlement system “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements […], [such that] [r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” Furthermore, the adjudicator’s sense of the appropriate 
deference, the leeway afforded to the right to regulate in exception provisions, and the general construction of the 
GATT/WTO-edifice needs to be mindful that “the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”  
 
                                                        
85 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶12. 
86 See for an overview of the concept, Christophe J. Larouer, “In the Name of Sovereignty? The Battle over In Dubio Mitius Inside and 
Outside the Courts,” Cornell Student Conference Papers (2009). The principle of in dubio mitius, capturing the obligation to prefer the interpretation 
that legally constrains the sovereign the least, naturally finds expression as part of a conception of international law that starts its analysis from the 
concept of absolute and unrestrained sovereignty of the state in its relations with other states. I, in Chapter 3, infra, reject this notion and prefer an 
approach to interpretation that ultimately resides in the adjudicator’s understanding of the object and purpose of any collaborative agreement.  
87 Michael Ioannidis, “Beyond the Standard of Review: Deference Criteria in WTO Law and the Case for a Procedural Approach,” in Lukasz 
Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner, eds., Deference in International Courts and Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), observing that “most of the time […] the in dubio mitius principle will not be conclusive for deciding how 
much deference the WTO adjudicating bodies need to show to domestic assessments.” (p. 101). 
88 See, for an early overview of academic citations, David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade 
Organization: Practice and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 49-50. 
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Within these limitations, the adjudicator needs to come to a dispositive judicial decision in an “objective” manner 
(as Article 11 DSU instructs). She is thus compelled to positively determine the conceptual borders of the terms and 
provisions under consideration in a manner that comports to the demands of Article 3.2 of the DSU. The adjudicator 
ultimately achieves this by becoming aware of the teleologies that constrain her meaning attribution through 
application of the appropriate standard of review. In other words, she determines the boundaries of the provisions 
and terms before her with reference to her understanding of the object and purpose of the terms and provision under 
consideration. 
 
B. GATT 1994: Law and Economics 
 
The GATT 1994 is a collaborative89 multilateral agreement that, according to its 1947 preamble, establishes 
“reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce […].”  Such 
arrangements are however to be understood as expressions of Member States’ desire to, in relevant part, conduct 
“their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour […] with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring 
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, […] in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns 
at different levels of economic development […]” (preamble WTO Agreement, GATT 1994). 
 
The GATT 1994 is thus, with only the smallest (hegemonic) doubt,90 an economically directional document in the 
field of international trade and economic endeavor. Accordingly, many economists and political scientists have put 
forward various theories about the underlying rationale for trade agreements – ranging from a focus on bargaining 
                                                        
89 The choice for “collaborate” is deliberate and intended to denote a document capable of being known and interpreted on its own, not in 
conjunction with the trade “cooperation” that is part of the political process preceding conclusion of the collaborative treaty. The GATT allows the 
interpreter to understand Member States’ cooperation and policy coordination as a multilateral collaborative exercise between Member States with 
heterogeneous economic preferences. A multilateral interpretation of the GATT/WTO should thus be capable of substantiating a collaborative 
equilibrium; see WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶¶158-159; see also WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials 
(2012), ¶ 325. 
90 See, Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Charles P. 
Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” 25 International Studies 
Quarterly 242 (1981). 
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power91 and the stabilization of the relevant terms of trade92 to securing the pure93 gains from trade against domestic 
interests.94 As Horn and Mavroidis however observe, the negotiating record of the GATT 1947 seems to initially 
resist relying on the commitment theory (mainly because domestic instruments are not disciplined by the GATT 
beyond the principle of non-discrimination).95  (see for a more in-depth review of static trade theory, with emphasis 
on export restrictions, Chapter 2.A, infra) 
 
To more fully understand the process of translating the descriptions of the economic effects of trade restrictive and 
discriminatory trade policies into the realm of the GATT 1994, the interpreter needs to consider static economic 
“facts” against the directional proclamations of the preamble of the GATT 1947 and WTO Agreement and the 
prescriptions in the provisions that follow. To successfully construct and interpret the provisions of the GATT 1994, 
such that the judicial assessment comports with both static and directional components, it is important to clarify the 
adopted perspectives on economic growth.  
 
It is in economic growth theory that the favorite notions of economists, such as allocative efficiency and the 
informational content of prices, find meaningful expression. Indeed, without an understanding of the dynamic 
aspects of economic theory, it is impossible to accord directional meaning to economic provisions – especially in the 
light of the aspirational preambles to GATT 1947 and to the WTO Agreement. 
 
In other words, a description of static trade theory does not fundamentally enlighten the construction of the GATT 
1994, as envisioned in its preamble and justified by its multilateral Membership. This multilateral Membership 
furthermore rationally holds different normative convictions on its needs and concerns in terms of economic 
development and growth – as explicitly recognized by the WTO (not least in the – now defunct – Doha 
Development Round). 
                                                        
91 See, Gene M. Grossman, “The Purpose of Trade Agreements,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11151 (2016); For a multilateral perspective 
see, Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger, and Ali Yurukoglu, “Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 21488 (2015, version to March 2017). 
92 See, for instance, World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (Geneva: WTO, 2010); see also 
Chapter 2, infra. 
93 “Pure” in this context refers to the absence of monetary theory. 
94 See for an overview, Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “Economic Theory and the Interpretation of GATT/WTO,” (August 2003); and 
Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002). 
95 Petros Mavroidis, “The Genesis of the GATT Summary,” in Hendrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., Legal and Economic Principles 
of World Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 7. See for a broader examination of the negotiating history of the GATT, 




In Chapter 2, infra, I formulate two alternative theories of economic growth, one applicable to developed countries 
(a “mature” growth model) and the other designed to describe “catch-up” growth for developing and emerging 
markets. Both models normatively describe the process of economic growth of its set of countries, but by 
emphasizing different aspects. Whereas the “mature” model relies on effective resource allocation and lets 
household consumption patterns steer innovation at the technological frontier, the “catch-up” model concentrates on 
capacity accumulation and production diversification to drive its growth path. 
 
Policies directed at “catch-up” growth can purposefully aim to get some prices temporarily “wrong” in order to 
entice entrepreneurial activity to embark on production diversification. While world prices are assumed to be 
unaffected, domestic prices are largely assumed to be sticky and only over the long run responsive to a specific and 
temporary price distortion. In this approach, market-driven rationalization of resource allocation consequently 
occurs after the acquisition of the necessary productive skills, or when the entry into new product markets has 
proven viable; i.e. at the moment when capital deepening occurs.96 The formulation of the “catch-up” growth theory 
in Chapter 2, infra, allows for the weighing and balancing of economic “facts” and the efficacy of “Developmental” 
policies in a no-less rigorous way as its mature cousin allows for the judicial interpretation of “Commercial” 
policies.97 
 
The Membership of the WTO consists of developed and developing countries, in both a legal and economic sense, 
and both approaches to economic growth thus rationally co-exist within the Membership at any time. The 
adjudicator of the multilateral agreement is, in the presence of this normative preference heterogeneity, compelled to 
positively consider the prevalence she accords to any economic theory in an “objective assessment” of the provision 
under consideration. Rather, without clarifying her relationship to economic theory, it is not possible for the 
adjudicator to sensibly complete the three steps required by Article 11 DSU: (i) to interpret the provision within the 
agreement, (ii) to assess the facts, and (iii) to fit the facts to the provision. 
 
                                                        
96 See Akbar Noman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Efficiency, Finance, and Varieties of Industrial Policy: Guiding Resources, Learning, and 
Technology for Sustained Growth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). 
97 The terms “Developmental” and “Commercial” are defined in Chapter 2, infra. 
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C. GATT 1994: Power and Hermeneutics 
 
Following adoption of the DSU and the associated transition of the GATT 1947 into the GATT 1994, the Appellate 
Body sought to establish itself in partial opposition to the diplomatic – and thus power-centric - “WTO 
institution.”98 The Appellate Body proceeded to give weight to the increased judicialization of the international 
trading system99 by emphasizing the formal and semantic aspects of an interpretation of the GATT guided by the 
VCLT (note that Article 3.2 DSU prescribes merely the “customary rules of interpretation” of public international 
law). 
 
By replacing a functional, consensus directed, approach to dispute settlement with textualism and formalism, the 
Appellate Body ostentatiously introduced a measure of distance between its reading of the GATT 1994 and the 
specific values of free trade that arguably reigned supreme at the Uruguay Round.100 Whereas both the VCLT and 
the GATT/WTO recognize the role of an “object and purpose” analysis in its framing of the interpretative exercise, 
adjudicatory practice has deliberately dethroned a “general purpose” analysis of the treaty as primary analytical step.  
 
Instead, the adjudicator is tasked to adhere to the “ordinary meaning” of the text. The provisions of the GATT 1994 
are however neither self-evident (or self-interpreting101), nor is their ordinary meaning immediately accessible to an 
able adjudicator. Instead, the adjudicator must, inevitably, rely on her understanding of the declared intent of the 
Parties, accessible both in the text of the regulating provisions and in the preambles to the GATT 1947 and WTO 
Agreement, to accorded meaning to the words of the agreement. 
 
To come to a dispositive declaration on the meaning of the provisions in the multilateral agreement, I argue that the 
interpreter needs to critically examine her original assumptions as to the character of the treaty and its constituent 
                                                        
98 See, Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) European Journal of 
International Law 9 (2016), p. 31. 
99 Acknowledging increasingly loud protests aimed at the legitimacy of the world trading system, the Appellate Body not only sought to 
distance itself from the “GATT 1947”-ethos but also from the legacy of the Uruguay Round, which marked a high-point in belief in the Washington 
Consensus. 
100 See, Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) European Journal of 
International Law 9 (2016), p. 31. But see also, Petros C. Mavroidis, “No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law As Practiced by WTO Courts,” 102 The 
American Journal of International Law 421 (2008). 
101 Petros C. Mavroidis, “No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law As Practiced by WTO Courts,” 102 The American Journal of International Law 
421 (2008), p. 423. 
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provisions. She cannot suffice with, indeed cannot positive rely on her finding of “ordinary meaning” without a 
thorough assessment of the provision’s context, legally as well as factually, and object and purpose. The adjudicator, 
to fulfil the obligations laid out in Articles 11 and 3.2 DSU, must consider the ambit and character of the provision 
under consideration against her understanding of the object and purpose of the covered agreement. (see for an in-
depth consideration and critique of the interpretative elements of the VCLT, as applied by the Appellate Body and 
Panels, Chapter 3, infra) 
 
The artifice of mechanical application of the VCLT, with as totem first recourse to a dictionary to assess the 
meaning of a term, further softened in the EC – Chicken Cuts. 102 In its report, the Appellate Body clarifies that the 
ordinary meaning is to serve as first step in a “holistic” application of Article 31 VCLT. Abi-Saad observes that 
“[i]n practice [despite the appearance of strict constructivism] much of the reasoning in interpretation is informed by 
the object and purpose, either consciously or subconsciously, ... even though they may not figure explicitly as such 
in the analysis.”103 
 
From the perspective of the adjudicator, this statement by Abi-Saad is as troubling as it is true. In her “objective 
assessment” of hard cases,104 those where genuine differences in directional economic preferences among the 
Membership acutely surface, the adjudicator must actively confront and explicate her understanding of the object 
and purpose of the provision and agreement. The economic theories laid out in Section B, supra, and Chapter 2, 
infra, can however not be accepted as singularly dominating her hermeneutic exercise. If the adjudicator were to 
postulate a single blanket explanation, she would be interpreting the collaborative agreement toward a pre-selected 
Truth (the “origin-becoming” or historicism fallacy).105 In the absence of preference homogeneity in the 
Membership (quod non), her acceptance of such pre-selected truth in turn reveals her prejudice and subjects her to 
power-dynamics identified by Mavroidis.106  
                                                        
102 See, WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶186; WTO Appellate Body Report, US - Continued Zeroing (2009), ¶268; 
See also Georges Abi-Saab, “The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation,” in Fitz-Maurice Malgosia, Olufemi Elias, and Panos Merkouris, eds., 
Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), pp. 99–109; and see 
Chapter 3, infra. 
103 Georges Abi-Saab, “The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation,” in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes, eds., The WTO 
at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 453. 
104 For a complete definition of “hard cases” and the case China – Raw Materials as a hard case, see Chapter 3, infra, and Chapter 5, infra. 
105 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971); 
see also Michel Foucault, "What is Critique?" in Sylvère Lotringer, ed., The Politics of Truth (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007). 
106 Petros C. Mavroidis, “The Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight: The Not So Magnificent Seven of the WTO Appellate Body,” EUI Working 




Koskenniemi, in a powerful post-modern critique of the ability of the interpreter to accomplish her task deductively 
argues that an adjudicator ultimately needs recourse to extra-legal concepts in support of her conclusion. The 
adjudicator partakes in an international legal discourse, determined by structural elements such as power dynamics 
or external values, in a historically contingent manner. According to Koskenniemi, the international legal discourse 
thus oscillates interminably and necessarily between two poles of argumentation that ultimately force recourse to an 
external source of validity: abstract utopianism and power apologism. (see Chapter 4, infra, for a fuller exposition) 
 
In Koskenniemi’s approach to international law, the aporia of law to satisfactorily complete and positively attain 
meaning attribution is limited through “cultures of formalism.” In his execution of the deconstructionist technique, 
and ultimate introduction of cultures of formalism, I argue Koskenniemi overlooked a fundamental, non-reducible, 
element internal to the legal universe of the GATT 1994: Member States’ desire to collaborate. While Koskenniemi 
only retains an immediate sense of power from his deconstruction, he, arguably, accords insufficient weight to the 
decisive role that practical reason and inter-subjectivity play in the adjudicator’s effort to achieve coherent meaning 
attribution. 
 
To positively resolve adjudication in hard cases, those where Parties’ directional economic preferences genuinely 
clash and adjudicatory coordination substitutes for cooperation,107 the interpretative exercise should not merely 
reveal the adjudicator’s biases. Instead, an adjudicative construction of exemption provisions in hard cases should be 
guided by the preference heterogeneity of the multilateral Membership (inter-subjectivity). Exemption provisions 
should be construed broadly or in an open fashion to, ipso facto, capture a broad range of Developmental policies. In 
accordance with the demands of Article 11 DSU, this open construction of the legal provision can (and indeed 
should) be balanced by a strict or intrusive assessment (practical, or persuasive, reason) when fitting the economic 
facts to ambit of the provision. 
 
                                                        
107 The notion of “coordination” indicates enforcement of a particular normative equilibrium by an adjudicator, whereas “cooperation” 
references a more natural progression toward a stable optimal equilibrium solution (such as through the clarification of boundary conditions or the 
resolution of relevant information deficits). 
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In this manner, I shift the conditions of the interpretative framework laid out by Article 11 and 3.2 DSU from 
implicit contractual cooperation (as Schropp argues108) to an explicit consideration of both integral and distributive 
components of multilateral collaboration. In her “objective assessment” of matters concerning headline and 
exception provisions, the adjudicator should, in accordance with the object and purpose of the agreement, construe 
such provisions with emphasis on the “integral” component of Parties’ collaboration.109 However, when a matter 
implicates an exemption provision, the adjudicator is called to acknowledge the diversity of Member State’s 
directional preferences as part of the “distributive” component of the collaborative intent of Parties. 
 
To fully frame the ensuing confrontation between the “right to regulate,” governed by the general exception of 
Article XX GATT 1994, and the proper scope of Member States to pursue catch-up strategies under exemption 
provisions, such as Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, it is useful to be reminded of Kantorowicz’ triptych.110 Kantorowicz 
insightfully distinguishes between normative, sociological and doctrinal sources of teleologies – an approach that is 
particularly useful when seeking to  parse out an interpretative method of codified, or rule-based, international law 
that incorporates notions from economic theory into a normative and doctrinal science. 
 
The three sources of teleology identified by Kantorowicz are each reflected in GATT/WTO theory and practice: (i) 
normative teleology is expressed in the obligation to rule in good faith (“bona fides”) and respect the objective 
expectations of the Membership; (ii) doctrinal teleology is captured by the power of persuasive precedent111 (no 
stare decisis); and (iii) sociological teleology is captured in the economic object and purpose of the covered 
agreements and their provisions. Together these points in the triptych set limits to the embedded standard of review 
and color the interpretational space within which the adjudicator confronts exemption provisions with the headline 
rule and exceptions thereto. 
                                                        
108 Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
109 In international economic law collaboration among sovereigns occurs to pursue beneficial outcomes that cannot be realized in autarky and 
always consists of “a distributive as well as an integrative aspect […],” see I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “Introduction: Return to the 
Theories of Cooperation,” in I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 7. 
110 Hermann Kantorowicz, Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie (Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller, 1962 [1911]), cited in Anne van Aaken and Joel P. 
Trachtman, “Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior,” University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series No. 2015---08 (July 2015), p. 3, fn. 6. See also Andrew Jeffrey Spadafora, Freedom from Value Judgments: 
Value-Free Social Science and Objectivity in Germany, 1880-1914, Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University (2013). 
111 See, for instance, Bernadette Meyler, “The Rhetoric of Precedent,” in Austin Sarat, ed., Rhetorical Processes and Legal Judgements: How 




D. Exemption Provisions: “De Novo” Contextualization 
 
As the Appellate Body clarified in its report in US –Lamb and in its report US – Countervailing Duty Investigation 
on DRAMS, an “objective assessment” under Article 11 of the DSU must be considered “in the light of the 
obligations of the particular covered agreements at issue in order to derive the more specific contours of the 
appropriate standard of review.”112 This approach, referred to as the embedded standard of review in the above, in 
combination with the demands of Article 3.2 DSU and the declared collaborative intention of the Membership (in 
the preamble) guides the interpretation of the provisions of the covered agreements. 
 
The embedded standard of review works to shape the conceptual boundaries wherein the adjudicatory labor is to be 
completed. This space, within which the customary rules of interpretation of public international law find 
application, is normatively colored. As Kantorowicz’ triptych points out, any adjudication is subject to normative, 
sociological and doctrinal sources of teleology. Whereas doctrinal constraints and the obligation of the adjudicator 
to preserve and promote the “security and predictability of the international trading system” inform two of the three 
points of the triptych, the adjudicator’s understanding of the economic teleology of the GATT 1994 anchors the 
third point of the triptych. 
 
An explicated understanding of the economic objective and purpose of the covered agreement is thus necessary to 
add the sociology-inspired directional component to an “objective assessment” of the relevant provisions under 
consideration. The Appellate Body has recognized as much when it clarified that the object and purpose of covered 
agreements provides “colour, texture and shading”113 to the construction and interpretation of the provisions of the 
covered agreement. 
 
                                                        
112 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS (2005), ¶184. See further WTO Appellate Body Report, 
US – Continued Hormones Suspension (2008), ¶¶590-593; and WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples (2010), ¶¶356-359. 
113 WTO Appellate Body, US –Shrimp (1998), ¶153. 
34 
 
The preamble to the WTO Agreement comes to the aid of the adjudicator to indicate that the provisions of the 
GATT 1994 are primarily understood as “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations.” Simultaneously, the provisions of the covered agreements, including the GATT 1994, 
seek to enhance the means of the Membership to “expand[] the production of and trade in goods and services” in a 
manner “consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development” (WTO 
Agreement, preamble). 
 
Adjudicating the appropriate balance of concessions has been envisioned by the Appellate Body as akin to an 
equilibrium exercise114 within a “rule-exception”-framework.115 The “right to regulate” of Article XX GATT 1994, 
operating as an exception to the headline rule, necessarily shares the directional understanding governing the 
headline rules of GATT 1994.116 In China – Publications the Appellate Body stated accordingly: “With respect to 
trade, the WTO Agreement and its Annexes [] operate to, among other things, discipline the exercise of each 
Member’s inherent power to regulate by requiring WTO Members to comply with the obligations that they have 
assumed thereunder.” 
 
Exemptions to these obligations, such as Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, do not necessarily share the normative 
direction of the headline rules or their exceptions (to lower tariffs and other barriers to trade). These provisions are 
instead envisioned in direct confrontation and therefore well-placed to be interpreted in a manner that allows the 
rules and obligations of GATT 1994 to be applied in a manner “consistent with [Member States’] respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development.” 
 
                                                        
114 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶¶158-159; see also WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 
325. 
115 As the Appellate Body clarified in China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222-223, in relation to the general exception of Article XX GATT: 
“WTO Members’ regulatory requirements may be WTO-consistent in one of two ways. First, they may simply not contravene any WTO obligation. 
Secondly, even if they contravene a WTO obligation, they may be justified under an applicable exception.” (stress added) 
116 This necessity is both dictated by the hierarchical relationship between rule and exception (especially in the presence of exemptions to 
these same rules), as well as by the chapeau language of Article XX GATT (which maintain the demands that exclude measures which would 
“constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade […].”). See further Chapters 4 and 5, infra. 
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As a result of various negotiations during the life of the GATT 1947, the GATT 1994 also incorporates a hybrid 
“developmental exception” in Article XVIII. This Article sets out to provide temporary relief for “economies in the 
early stages of development.” The Appellate Body examined the relationship between Article XVIII and Article 
XI:1 GATT in its report India – Quantitative Restrictions.117 The relationship of Article XVIII with the exemption 
provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 is examined in more detail in Chapter 4, infra. 
 
In line with an embedded approach to the standard of review, I reiterate that the adjudicator is called upon to 
construe the ambit of provisions with respect to her understanding of their object and purpose. I argue that a broad, 
or “open,” construction of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994 does justice to the declared collaborative intent 
of the Membership in the preamble of the WTO Agreement and actively recognizes the existing preference 
heterogeneity among the Membership in terms of the applicable sociological teleology. 
 
After the embedded standard of review establishes the appropriate ambit for exemption provisions, a contextualized 
interpretation of the language of the exemption provision – in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law, determined as the VCLT – completes the adjudicatory “objective assessment” of the 
matter before the Panels and Appellate Body. A contextual interpretation of the language of the GATT is, as 
recognized by the Appellate Body,118 both “textual” as well as “contextual,” i.e. related to the factual context of the 
matter. 
 
When fitting economic facts to the language of the provision, the adjudicator is again subject to Kantorowicz’ 
triptych of teleological elements. With regard to the sociological component, the adjudicator needs to be mindful of 
her preconceptions and present a reasoned assessment according to the appropriate standard of review.119 The 
adopted standard of review in turn needs to be both mindful of the preference heterogeneity among the Membership, 
as well as ensure that the adjudicatory decision does not undo the balance of concessions. 
 
                                                        
117 WTO Appellate Body Report, India –Quantitative Restrictions (1999). 
118 See, for example, WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶¶148, 175; see similarly WTO Panel Report, US – Shrimp 
(Article 21.5 – Malaysia) (2001), ¶5.51 
119 The Appellate Body similarly held that when making a determination as to what would happen in the “marketplace,” it expects that the 
“panel would at least explain the economic rationale or theory that supports its intuition.” WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (2012), ¶643. 
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Some120 have expressed concern that decisions may become more unpredictable were Panels to adopt a standard of 
review that is value or objective-specific, such as a blanket determination of whether a measure is “reasonable” or 
“least trade restrictive.” Such increased uncertainty would specifically run counter to the obligations that Article 3.2 
DSU lays out for the adjudicator: to maintain the security and predictability of the international trading system and 
not to add to or diminish the obligations provided in covered agreements. 
 
The argued for “developmental” or open construction of exemption provisions does, in combination with a 
appropriate standard of review when fitting economic facts thereto, guard against this risk. Were the adjudicator to 
construe exemption provisions accordingly, she must be mindful of the two other balancing elements of the triptych: 
the obligation to decide and interpret in good faith (normative) and with an eye to established doctrine. 
 
The obligation to interpret the provisions of the GATT 1994 in good faith has long been determined to include the 
protection of legitimate expectations as to the “conditions of competition.”121 An “effective” interpretation of the 
provisions of covered agreements seems to suggest recourse to the objective expectations of Member States.122 If the 
contested measure safeguards the objective expectation of the Membership related to the conditions of competition, 
the adjudicator should be unconstrained to adopt a developmental interpretation of exemption provisions over a 
Member’s disappointed expectations of realizing a particular benefit. 
 
The constraints set by the teleology of doctrine in the GATT/WTO pertain mostly to the power of persuasive 
reasoning - the GATT/WTO does not recognize the doctrine of “stare decisis.” In the words of the WTO website: 
“Even if adopted, the reports of panels and the Appellate Body are not binding precedents for other disputes between 
the same parties on other matters or different parties on the same matter, even though the same questions of WTO 
law might arise. […] This means that a panel is not obliged to follow previous Appellate Body reports even if they 
                                                        
120 See Ross Becroft, The Standard of Review in WTO Dispute Settlement: Critique and Development (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2012), 
p. 29. 
121 See, GATT Panel Report, Italy–Agricultural Machinery (1958); GATT Panel Report, US–Taxes on Petroleum (1987), ¶5.1.9; and the 
WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcohol (1996), p 32 (see also WTO Panel Report, Japan – Alcohol (1996), ¶¶7.1-7.2). The WTO Panel 
Report, India – Patents (1998), ¶¶7.20-7.22 and fn. 81-84, declared the condition of competition a “well-established GATT principle.” 
122 See, Robert Howse, “The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power,” 
in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for the WTO 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), p. 11. 
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have developed a certain interpretation of exactly the provisions which are now at issue before the panel. Nor is the 
Appellate Body obliged to maintain the legal interpretations it has developed in past cases.”123 
 
However, the Appellate Body in its report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II recognizes that previous reports “create 
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant 
to any dispute.”124 The adjudicator is thus free to deviate from previous doctrine, but is bound to provide a fully 
reasoned explanation thereof.125 This work offers such reasoned defense as it critiques and proposes a deviation 
from the decision of the Appellate Body in its report China – Raw Materials, the governing precedent on the scope 
and applicability of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
  
                                                        
123 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (last accessed, March 19, 2017). 
124 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II (1996), pp. 107-108. 
125 See critically, Raj Bhala, “The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Trilogy),” 14(4) American University International 
Law Review 845 (1999); and “The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Trilogy),” 33(3) The George 
Washington International Law Review 873 (2001); See also, Joost Pauwelyn, “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate 
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Chapter 2: Economics: Static and Dynamic Teleology 
 
In a pure theory of international trade, divorced from the concerns of monetary theory,126 countries exchange a 
(large) number of (final) goods on the international market at relative or world prices. Gains from trade are, under 
(neo)classic assumptions, maximized by exploiting a country’s comparative advantage in the production of some 
products over others, as determined by the domestic marginal rate of substitution. By specializing in line with its 
comparative advantage, an open economy realizes the best possible outcome over autarky by virtue of its access to a 
larger total opportunity set of production and consumption choices. In an open economy, consumers generally 
receive a surplus from importing against lower world prices (hurting domestic producers, but to a lesser extent). 
Likewise, competitive producers can export toward a larger market at a higher price (hurting domestic consumers, 
but also to a lesser extent).127 
 
The (neo)classic theory of trade consequently posits, under strong assumptions, that attempts to (re-)engineer or 
modify the domestic marginal rate of production substitution through the introduction of taxes and subsidies (or 
import tariffs and export restraints) works only to dampen efficiency and distort price signals (see Analytical Annex 
and Section 2.B.1, infra). Restricting the export of certain products, especially in the face of a viable export demand, 
puts a break on openness and offends clear maximization logic. Such a policy thus damages the economic prospects 
of the majority of producers and consumers in favor of a small(er) group of beneficiaries.128 
 
Before examining the static and dynamic properties of export restrictions in international trade in detail, we would 
be amiss not to remark upon the considerable number of assumptions underlying equilibrium models of international 
                                                        
126 See Jagdish Bhagwati, “The Pure Theory of International Trade: A Survey,” 74(293) The Economic Journal 1 (1964). 
127 This creation of “losers” through international trade, both through exports and imports, gives rise to “adjustment costs,” which can be fairly 
large and painful, even destructive to the political process itself. Most countries therefore have adjustment programs in place to smooth the domestic 
reallocation of resources (especially of labor). See for the treatment of “adjustment costs” in the context of the GATT/WTO, Michael J. Trebilcock, 
Dealing with Losers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) . 
128 These beneficiaries can either be established industrial players with a lobby capacity or infant industries (or some combination of both, 
considering some infants never grow up). The pre-eminent model for the former is provided by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Protection 
for Sale,” 84(4) The American Economic Review 833 (1994), while for the latter see, among an enormous literature, Anne O. Krueger and Baran 
Tuncer, “An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument,” 72(5) The American Economic Review 1142 (1982). For a modern political economy 
application see, for instance, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions,” 98(1) The American Economic 
Review 267 (2008). 
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trade. These assumptions have been recognized and criticized in the literature; including those associated with 
welfare economics, as highlighted in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem129 and, more recently, those challenged by the 
non-equilibrium models of the economy.130 
 
As a consequence of necessary, but limiting, assumptions most theoretical models of international trade are 
condemned to making only modest (but powerful) normative arguments.131 Accordingly, the ambitions of this 
Section align with that of the scholarship on the welfare effects of international free trade more broadly. I 
subsequently note that the Arrow-DeBreu conditions for an equilibrium assessment of perfectly competitive trade, 
under full information, of a complete basket of goods under stable conditions are rarely (if ever) observed.132  
 
Rather, to borrow a phrase of Krugman,133 the analysis presented hereunder is an exercise in map-making. This 
work’s argument builds on the third134 wave of thinking on the relationship between economic growth, international 
trade, and the optimal international regulatory framework to govern it: New Development Economics (NDE). In line 
with NDE, my argument is critical of an international economic regulatory framework that emphasizes the 
normative prescriptions of the mature growth model over those of competing (catch up) models of economic 
growth.135 As will be argued, the assumption of preference homogeneity among the Membership of the WTO and 
                                                        
129 See, recently, Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen, The Arrow Impossibility Theorem (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). For a 
considerable older review, see Jacob L. Mosak, General-Equilibrium Theory in International Trade (Bloomington: The Principia Press, 1944). 
130 Non-equilibrium economic approaches are especially advanced in game theory; see, for instance, Vincent P. Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, 
and Nafore Irinerri, “Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications,” 51(1) Journal of Economic 
Literature 5 (2013); see also, W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the Economy (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
131 The assumptions underlying modern equilibrium models of trade have been remarked upon broadly in the (international trade) literature and 
have given rise to many insightful comments; see broadly, Frank Ackerman, et al., eds., The Flawed Foundations of General Equilibrium: Critical 
Essays on Economic Theory (London: Routledge, 2004) and Murray C. Kemp, The Gains from Trade and the Gains from Aid: Essays in 
International Trade Theory (London: Routledge, 1995). 
132 See, for an examination of the various applications of and assumptions behind the Arrow-Debreu theorem; Daniel Bernhofen, et al., eds., 
Palgrave Handbook of International Trade (New York: Palgrave Mamillan, 2011). See also, Murray C. Kemp, International Trade and National 
Welfare (London: Routledge, 2001). As Stiglitz notes in his Nobel Lecture, “[m]odels of perfect markets, badly flawed as they might seem for 
Europe or America, seemed truly inappropriate for [the developing world].” Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in 
Economics,” Nobel Prize Lecture (December 8, 2001). 
133 Paul Krugman, Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 2-3. 
134 The literature on international trade and economic growth generally identifies two previous waves of thinking: associated with Solow and 
endogenous growth models respectfully. While the principal variable of interest in theoretical and empirical ‘second generation’ literature is the 
level of output or long-run growth rate of per capita output, NDE envisions economic growth as transitions across growth phases. In its emphasis 
on the structural transition of the economy toward maturity (i.e. the dynamic process of “catch up”), NDE draws from the proud “structuralist” 
tradition and constitutes therefore a fourth rather than a third wave of thought. See, Sabyasachi Kar and Lant Pritchett, et. al, The Dynamics of 
Economic Growth: A Visual Handbook of Growth Rates, Regimes, Transitions and Volatility, Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) 
Research Centre (June 2013), p. 4. 
135 NDE’s criticism of overextending the prescriptions of the mature growth model resembles Plato’s “Noble Lie.” The “Noble Lie” in the Republic 
is, famously, “devoted to the belief that renders possible the best city as distinguished from the best human being.” Similarly, the prescriptions of 
the mature growth model are based on assumptions that are not borne out in man with all his vagaries and imperfections, but are postulated as 
optimal to govern the (homogenous) collective. See, Plato, The Republic, Book 3, 414e–15c; and Leo Strauss, The Argument and Action of Plato’s 
Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 31. 
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the universal application of the normative prescriptions of the mature growth model is false in a collection of 
heterogeneous countries with incomplete capacity sets (technological as well as institutional). 
 
My critique thus has two sides. First, I am critical of the neo-classic normative assumption that its equilibrium 
conditions determine the optimal structure and growth path for all (open) economies – absent market failures and 
imperfections. In particular, I challenge the prescription of production specialization as an expression of statically 
optimal resource allocation in an open economy. Consequently, I disagree with the theory of “mature” growth when 
it universally emphasizes the normative inter-temporal bootstrapping of static allocation efficiency to maximize the 
“true” (non-distorted) information content of prices. 
 
I argue that the difference between bootstrapped static efficiency and true dynamic efficiency lies in the 
accumulation of ever-increasing productive skills or capacities (learning). While the traded widgets in Sections 2.A 
and 2.B.1, infra, are devoid of production-skill or capacity information, Section 2.B.2, infra, (re)introduces this 
skill-information to products. These product-specific skills consequently give shape to a networked growth model 
that takes export diversity as its central measure of economic development (catch up growth). 
 
This argument gives rise to my central axiom: in the absence of complete convergence, mature and developmental 
theories of economic growth will co-exist in the global economy. The threshold for economic “maturity” is reached 
when a particular sector or industry is at its frontier; i.e. when there is no more “capability information” available to 
strategically direct industrial policies. An economy is at the capability frontier when, in terms of the Product Space 
(Section 2.B.2. infra), there are no more viable edges for it to acquire within a technological region or product 
branch. At that point technological innovation, instead of product diversification, is the only remaining driver of 
long-term economic growth. “Development” is therefore defined as a process of “catch up” with the frontier, 
measured as distance to “maturity” or to completion of an economy’s footprint in the Product Space. 
 
While both mature and catch up models are fundamentally respectful of the macro-economic identities and find 
agreement on many aspects of the micro-foundations thereof, their major difference lies at the sectoral and product-
levels of the economy. It is here that the mature growth model fails to provide a convincing description of and 
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guidance for the process of economic convergence136 (instead postulating frontier or innovation-led growth). Catch 
up models of economic growth provide a more persuasive description of and guide to the process of economic 
convergence as they explicitly draw on skill-proximity measures and make use of the nested structure of the Product 
Space to reveal strategically valuable information to guide industrial policy and efforts at emulation. 
 
Second, I criticize an international economic regulatory structure that is built on the assumption of normative 
homogeneity. In fact, so I argue, countries can rationally prefer a theory of “catch-up” growth to a mature growth 
theory with strong neoclassic characteristics. This preference heterogeneity needs to be more fully recognized and 
incorporated in WTO adjudication; as will be argued theoretically in Chapter 3 and 4, infra, and applied, in Chapter 
5, infra, to the judicial construction of the exemption provision to Article XI:1 GATT 1994, which regulates the use 
and maintenance of export restrictions for the near-universal WTO Membership. 
 
Section 1.A, infra, explores the traditional arguments for and against export restrictive interventions and highlights 
macro-economic stabilization motives in addition to terms-of-trade concerns. Section I.B, infra, will first present 
and thereafter challenge the mature growth model and its relevance to export restrictive measures. At the core of my 
challenge to the hegemony of the mature growth model lies the fundamental insight that “markets, by themselves, do 
not necessarily, or in general, lead to overall dynamic efficiency; and that there are often trade-offs between static 
inefficiencies […] and long-term growth.”137  
 
Section 1.C, infra, summarizes and concludes this Chapter. In particular, it will recall that the (inter-temporal) 
equilibrium of static efficiently allocated resources is not a uniquely optimal approach to economic growth. 
Countries with incomplete skill sets may instead prefer to target “nearby” or “viable” industries to strategically 
complement their existing production basket. In pursuit hereof, emerging markets might want to temporarily enact 
industrial policies. As will be argued throughout this does not mean that these countries intent to defect from the 
international regulatory framework wholesale. Rather, international adjudicatory forums, such as the WTO, are 
                                                        
136 Full convergence was an essential postulate in early growth models, where technology was deemed to be “freely” available; see for example the 
AK-models of economic growth. 
137 Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Helping Infant Economies Grow: Foundations of Trade Policies for Developing Countries,” 96(2) 
AEA Papers and Proceedings 141 (May 2006), p. 141; See also, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruce C. Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New 
Approach to Growth, Development, and Social Progress (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).  
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called upon to weigh and balance conditionally conflicting trade policy preferences in order to moderate between 
them. 
A. Export Restrictions and Static Allocative Efficiency 
 
Compared to a statically efficient resource allocation, the introduction of ad valorem export taxes or import tariffs is 
generally considered distortionary in the absence of externalities and under perfect competition. The resulting 
realignment of the use of factor endowments over productive activities is detrimental and costly in aggregate, as it 
incentivizes over-production and over–consumption of one good in relation to others. This leads to general welfare 
losses. 
 
Abba Lerner is commonly heralded as laying the foundation for the analysis of export taxes in relation to import 
tariffs in his 1936 seminal article, where he explicitly recognizes both instruments as potentially equivalent means of 
protecting domestic production.138 It was John Stuart Mill though,139 who, as early as 1844, formulated the 
understanding that export taxes can work to improve the terms-of-trade of a country in ways similar to import tariffs, 
depending on demand or supply elasticity respectfully.140 
 
The Lerner Symmetry theorem (1) – as it has become known - holds that, under strict conditions,141 there is a 
functional equivalence between across-the-board ad valorem142 import tariffs and similar export taxes. The 
symmetry between import tariffs and export taxes quickly becomes apparent from the below notation of domestic 
                                                        
138 Abba Lerner, "The Symmetry Between Import and Export Taxes," 3(11) Economica 306 (1936). 
139 Many have observed that both Mill and Lerner are British. Abba Lerner was born in Bessarabia, Russian Empire, in 1903, but in 1906 emigrated 
to the U.K. to grow up and study in London and Cambridge. Lerner later emigrated once more, to the U.S. 
140 John Stuart Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy (1844), 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 
1874), first essay, “Of the Laws of Interchange between Nations; and the Distribution of the Gains of Commerce among the Countries of the 
Commercial World,” available at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlUQP.html (last visited April, 7, 2018). 
141 These original 1936 conditions include zero transportation costs, full employment, balanced trade, and perfect competition. See for objections 
to the applicability of the Lerner symmetry: Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya, T. N. Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1998), p. 218; see also Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, “Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs,” 88 Journal 
of Political Economy (1980), pp. 1069-1087. 
142 A specific tariff system, instead of an ad valorem one, is constantly eroded by inflation, while deflation raises the protection afforded to domestic 
industry. This results in a counter-cyclical trend in protectionism, which can compound the countercyclical trend of floating exchange rates; see 
Luis Bertola and Jose-Antonio Ocampo, The Economic Development of Latin America Since Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 133. 
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(d) and world (w) price levels, with import (m) and export (x) tariffs - assuming all original restrictive conditions 
apply, in particular including the necessity to balance trade but in the absence of transportation costs:143 
 
 (1) Without tariffs:   !"#!$# = !"&!$&      (1) 
 
(2) With import tariff:   !"#(()*")!$# = !"&!$& 
 
(3) With export tax:   !"#!$# = !"&!$&(()*$) 
 
(4) Equivalence (2) & (3):   !"#(()*")!$# = !"&!$& 		 , !"#!$# = !"&!$&(()*$)    , where 
 
  (a) Free trade:   	!"#!$# = !"&!$& 
 
(b) Lerner theorem:  !"#(()*")!$# ∶ 	 !"&!$&(()*$) 
 
The Lerner Symmetry thus enlightens the static relationship between import tariffs and export taxes. For a small 
country, with no market power, with perfect competition and complete price equalization (no stickiness), the change 
in one set of prices (world price plus/minus tariff) is reflected by a move along the demand and supply curves 
(Figure 1). These demand and supply responses drive the country to reallocate resources accordingly, leaving the 
world price unaffected. Therefore, in accordance with the Lerner Symmetry, there is no axiomatic difference 
between export restrictions and import tariffs on the domestic level, under strict conditions. 
 
This, for the mercantilist counter-intuitive result, carries strong implications for policymakers, as it suggests that 
import-competing industries can be equally supported by the introduction of export taxes as by the imposition of an 
import tariff. Export sectors gain equally from import tariffs as from export taxes, as long as these taxes are 
permanent,144 applied ad valorem and across the board, and the resultant government revenue is spent in a similar 
                                                        
143 I am grateful to Prof. Bhagwati for suggesting this insightful notation. The condition of balanced trade is pivotal in the analysis as it ensures that 
the imported and exported values move symmetrically (introducing an across-the-board ad valorem import tax contracts imports, and under the 
condition of balanced trade, export values necessarily mirror this contraction). See Blanchard for an extension of the Lerner symmetry with a 
relaxed balanced trade constraint; Emily Blanchard, “Trade Imbalances, International Investment, and a Limitation of Lerner's Symmetry 
Theorem,” Paper (2005). For an alternative proof using the excess expenditure function, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya, and T. N. 
Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 215-216. 
144 Indonesia’s attempt at domestic price control through the banning of exports of palm- and cooking oils in December 1997 was severely curtailed 
by the anticipation of an end to the ban (and led to widespread smuggling); see S. Marks, F. Larson and J. Pomeroy, "Economic Effects of Taxes 
on Exports of Palm Oil Products," 34(3) Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 37 (1998); see also Mohamad F. Hasan, Michael R. Reed and 
Mary A. Marchant, “Effects of an Export Tax on Competitiveness: The Case of the Indonesian Palm Oil Industry,” 26(2) Journal of Economic 
Development 77 (2001). 
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way.145 Although the Lerner Symmetry was initially formulated to apply to a two-country model (domestic and 
foreign), it can be extended to include multiple countries as long as the trade balance is fixed exogenously.146 
 





A further extension of the Lerner Symmetry notes that the rate of tariff protection (or tax) need not be uniform 
across products. A ranking can be obtained for the optimal tariff on differentiated products when cross-substitution 
effects between such products are defined for the (foreign) country.147 Of course, the optimal tariff rate still depends 
inversely on the relevant elasticity,148 as explored in the context of market power in Section 1.A.1, infra. 
 
Despite its limitations, the Lerner Symmetry allows for a formal entry point into the analysis of export taxes and 
directs attention to those conditions that potentially offer redemption for this “dottiest tax.”149 Four conditions are 
most commonly identified and briefly commented on below: (i) the existence of market power; (ii) high external 
                                                        
145 Note that in the absence of transportation costs the equivalence does not hold for negative taxes (or subsidies), despite the symmetry implications 
of the equivalency theorem; see Francois Casas, “Lerner’s Symmetry Theorem Revisited,” 28(1) Keio Economic Studies 15 (1991). 
146 Lopez and Panagariya have extended the equivalence to include multi-period permanent across-the-board tariffs, noting though that the 
equivalence does not hold when the across-the-board tariffs and export taxes are applied to a subset of periods only, in Ramon López and Arvind 
Panagariya, “Temporary Trade Taxes, Welfare and the Current Account,” 33 Economics Letters 335 (1990); and in Ramon López and Arvind 
Panagariya, “Temporary Import and Export Quotas and the Current Account,” 31 Journal of International Economics 371 (1991). They further 
generalized the Lerner Symmetry to include non-traded goods and quotas; see Ramon Lopez and Arvind Panagariya, “The Lerner Symmetry and 
Other Results in the Presence of Quotas and Nontraded Goods.” University of Maryland at College Park Working Paper 11 (1995), where the 
authors show that if a subset of goods is non-traded (or subject to a quota) the Lerner equivalence holds with respect to the remaining set only. 
Application of a quota thus excludes a good from the general equivalence of across-the-board ad valorem import tariffs and export taxes. 
147 Note that when a country is part of the WTO, such uniform cross-substitution becomes exponentially more difficult to assess as one (bound) 
tariff applies to all “MFN”-countries (with potentially different market shares and cross-substitution values), while downward exceptions to the 
tariff can be made through trade instruments such as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). 
148 See, for example, Yoshitomo Ogawa, “The Structure of Optimal Tariff Rates in a Large Country with Market Power,” 33 Economic Theory 273 
(2007). 
149 Leader, “Killing the Pampas's Golden Calf,” The Economist available at: http://www.economist.com/node/10925509. Calling export taxes “A 

















price volatility; (iii) voluntary restrictions in face of external tariff threat; and (iv) domestic redistribution under 
uncertainty. 
1. Strong Theorem: Market Power 
 
In his 1940 article,150 Kaldor notes that a country always benefits from imposing a tariff or tax, provided it is well 
measured, the country has some market power (partial or complete monopsony or monopoly)151 and there is no 
retaliation by other countries. The importance of this argument should be understood in relation to the stern 
opposition of unilateral free traders, who, at the time, favored a general zero-tariff prescription. By taxing its 
imports, or exports respectfully, the imposing country takes advantage of imperfectly elastic foreign supply or 
demand. The implied terms of trade gain, of course, comes at the price of lower trade volumes and possible 
domestic consumption and production distortions. A tariff or export tax is hence only optimal when it maximizes the 
implementing country’s utility152 by extending the degree of gain over its loss.153 
 
Analytically, the domestic response to the introduction of the tariff (the first part of Equation 2), has to balance the 
terms-of-trade effect (the second part of Equation 2). That is, when the world price is determined under market 
clearing conditions and the domestic demand function (Mg)154 is written as a function of the domestic price,155 a 
country maximizes its welfare under a tariff  (T) considering156: 
 /010∗ 345365 − 80 93!5∗:365 = 0          (2) 
 
                                                        
150 Nicolas Kaldor, “A Note on Tariffs and the Terms of Trade,” 7(28) Economica 377 (1940). 
151 Note that in addition to a border measure, countries can take advantage of similar monopsony or monopoly power through their competition or 
antitrust policies.  
152 Social welfare, the object of a country’s utility, is assumed to be the sum of individual utilities; expressed to include income and consumer 
surplus (determined by the marginal product of labor), goods are produced with one good-specific factor and under constant returns to scale, while 
tariff revenue is uniformly redistributed among individuals. With normalized population and wages set to unity, this simple model of national 
welfare (NW) reads: <= = 1 + ∑ AπC910: + D0910: +	ψC(10)]	:0 ; Optimal tariff formula derived from Christian Broda, Nuno Limão and David 
E. Weinstein, “Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence,” 98(5) The American Economic Review 2032 (2008), p. 2035. 
153 Whereas Kaldor’s model focuses on the foreign country offer or demand curve, Lerner shows how to arrive at the same result using conventional 
supply and demand analytics, in The Economics of Control (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 357-59.  
154 And (80∗) at the world export supply with (G0∗) at world clearing price. 
155 Domestic demand as function of domestic price; 10 = (1 + /)10∗  . 
156 I assume standard assumption to hold such as, for example, in Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Protection for Sale,” 84(4) American 
Economic Review (1994), pp. 833-50; including, importantly the assumption of perfect competition. Under imperfect competition, the optimal tariff 
becomes smaller and thus more sensitive, see R. de Santis, "Optimal Export Tax, Welfare, Industry Concentration, and Firm Size:  A General 
Equilibrium Analysis," 8(2) Review of International Economics 319 (2000). 
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If the country has no market power, the elasticity it faces is infinite and the second part of the second term (
3!5∗365) will 
be zero; i.e. the optimal tariff level is zero. 
 
In addition to taking advantage of market power, an optimal tax policy can also be set to combat “immiserizing 
growth,”157 a concept introduced by Bhagwati in 1958. Immiserizing growth occurs when a country with market 
power experiences a growth-induced deterioration in its terms of trade sufficiently large to outweigh the primary 
welfare gain from output growth.158 Application of a well-measured optimum tariff (or a suitable tax-cum-subsidy 
targeted to the distorted factor-use) either pre- and post-, or post-growth alone has the potential to address the (trade) 
distortion that gives rise to the loss. In order for a trade measure to be a first-best response, the source of the 
immiseration needs to be endogenous or policy induced,159 not the result of exogenous shifts in the foreign offer- or 
demand-curve.160 
 
Due to the likelihood of retaliation and considering the complexity of ascertaining the precise degree of a country’s 
market power,161 Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz argue that the terms of trade argument is of little practical 
                                                        
157 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note,” 25(3) The Review of Economic Studies 201 (1958). 
158 The economic growth that gives rise to immiserization is classically understood as an exogenous expansion of the production possibility frontier 
in a standard 2x2 static framework. To a neoclassical mind, this setting conjures up images of steady state growth and confines the analysis of 
immiserization to the structural impact of deadweight losses in transitional phases from autarky to free trade; See for example Alan Deardorff, “The 
Gains from Trade in and Out of Steady-State Growth”, 25 Oxford Economic Papers 173 (1973); and Elias Dinopoulos, “Immiserizing Growth in 
Expanding Economies,” University of Florida Working Paper (2005), p. 2. Similarly Srinivasan and Bhagwati analyze the transition from a fixed 
(akin to a domestic distortion) to an optimal savings rate to conclude that the move to free trade from autarky is dynamically efficient, in Jagdish 
Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan, "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs. " 88 Journal of Political Economy 1069 (1980). The 
advent of endogenous growth theory however brings the structural components of growth into central focus and with it the fundamental conditions 
behind immiserizing growth. Dinopoulos, for example, finds in a Grossman/Helpman quality-ladder approach (infused with a Schumpeterian 
growth model) the possibility that the market rate of expansion of any of the production factors exceeds the social welfare optimum and, if 
sufficiently large, creates an immiserization-effect; Dinopoulos 2005, op. cit., p. 8. 
159 I do not here consider the effects of possible tariff jumping foreign direct investment. Early optimal tariff-studies reached knife-edge results 
when considering the presence of foreign (tariff jumping) investment: all foreign firms were either exporters or multinationals – a result that strongly 
depends on the homogeneity of firms. More recent studies, with heterogeneous firms, find though that the presence of tariff jumping lowers the 
optimal (Nash) tariff. In a Stackelberg scenario though, one country has the lead and can visibly commit – by setting its tax rate or building surplus 
capacity – before the follower countries contemplate their Nash-moves simultaneously. The difference in setting optimal policy for the Stackelberg 
leader vis-à-vis a full Nash-equilibrium depends on its ability to set a higher tax rate for itself without adversely effecting residual demand – 
normally a function of the leader’s market share; see Kamil Yilmaz, “How Much Should Primary Commodity Exports be Taxed? Nash and 
Stackelberg Equilibria in the Global Cocoa Market,” 15(1) Journal of Trade and International Development 1 (2006), p. 7. See generally, Matthew 
T. Cole and Ronald B. Davies, “Optimal Tariffs, Tariff Jumping, and Heterogeneous Firms,” IIIS Discussion Paper (2009), where the Melitz-model 
is used with increasing returns to scale and a monopolistically competitive market with free entry. Further discussion of such optimal tariff models 
goes beyond the scope of the present work, particularly as products in these models are inherently devoid of the type of pairwise skill-proximity 
information that is central to the growth and development mechanics this work examines – they are true widgets. 
160 Immiserizing growth can occur under any kind of distortion, be it endogenous or policy-imposed: “(1) first, where the endogenous distortion 
involves an imperfect factor market, taking the shape of a distortionary wage differential; and (2) second, where the endogenous distortion is 
foreign, involving monopoly power in trade, and where the country has an optimal tariff in the pre-growth situation but this (unchanged) tariff 
becomes sub-optimal in the post-growth situation.” See Jagdish Bhagwati, “Optimal Policies and Immiserizing Growth,” MIT Working Paper 
(1968), p. 2. 
161 Such complexities include identifying with any confidence the relevant product elasticity of demand or supply, correctly anticipating the 
implementation delay of the policy, and the accounting for the various costs associated with misapplication of the correct tariff-band. 
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importance. They observe that “[t]he terms of trade argument against free trade, [...], is intellectually impeccable but 
of doubtful usefulness. In practice, it is more often emphasized by economists as a theoretical proposition than 
actually used by governments as a justification for trade policy.”162 Bagwell and Staiger however find the underlying 
motive for the useful existence of the world trade system in the coordination of tariff policy and in the (frequent) 
existence of (some) market power.163 
 
In recent work,164 Broda, Limao and Weinstein report robust evidence in favor of a strong tendency for countries 
with market power to set high(er) tariffs when unconstraint by the WTO.165 Market power, or the product elasticity 
facing the exporting economy,166 is determinative in shaping tariff policy when it is set unilaterally and 
uncooperatively. Market power should, according to Broda, Limao and Weinstein, be seen as “at least as important 
as the lobbying motive, both in terms of the magnitude and the fraction of tariff variation explained.”167 
 
In addition to economic considerations, such as explored in this chapter, trade policy cooperation has been the 
subject of political economy analysis. The political economy literature extends the theory of methodological 
individualism to the realm of political decision-making to analyze cooperation as a means of achieving reciprocal 
rents (lobbying) rather than realizing macro-economic welfare gains.168 It brushes aside the perspective of the 
benevolent social planner as naïve thinking.169 
 
                                                        
162 Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz more fully observe that “[t]he terms of trade argument against free trade, then, is intellectually impeccable but of 
doubtful usefulness. In practice, it is more often emphasized by economists as a theoretical proposition than actually used by governments as a 
justification for trade policy” in Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy 9th ed. 
(Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2011), p. 226. 
163 See, among other work by the same authors, Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT,” 89(1) American Economic 
Review (1999): 215-48; further corroborated by evidence presented in Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate 
About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12727 (2006). 
164 Christian Broda, Nuno Limão, and David E. Weinstein, “Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence,” 98(5) American Economic Review 
2032 (2008). 
165 Some say that market power was also the primary driver behind China’s export restrictions on certain raw materials and rare earths, where it 
controls over 90 percent of global supply capacity; leading to the WTO cases China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earth. China rather argued 
its need to caution against negative environmental spillovers from extraction and its desire to develop a “clean” industrial capacity. 
166 For more insight into calculations or derivations of the elasticity in international trade see Jean Imbs and Isabelle Mejean, “Trade Elasticities - 
A Final Report for the European Commission,” European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2010); and 
Stephen Tokarick, “A Method for Calculating Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities,” IMF Working Paper, WP/10/180 (2010). 
167 Christian Broda, Nuno Limão, and David E. Weinstein, “Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence,” 98(5) American Economic Review 
2032 (2008), p. 2033. 
168 See, for instance, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Protection for Sale,” 84(4) American Economic Review 833 (1994); and Gene M. 
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Special Interest Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). See also, Dani Rodrik, “Political Economy of Trade 
Policy,” in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., Handbook of International Economics (Amsterdam: New Holland, 1995) 
169 Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 135, fn. 5. 
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It is undisputed that the political economy analysis of trade cooperation offers a powerful explanation of the 
bargaining process, which gives shape to the realized trade commitments. However, due to the theory’s emphasis on 
political decision-making and rent-seeking, rather than describing the normative conditions for optimal economic 
growth, this political economy approach fails to provide a persuasive normative context for the adjudicator beyond 
an apologist for existing power imbalances (see Chapter 4, infra). In the late 20th and early 21st Century there has 
been consistent attention for “institutional economics” in an effort to integrate the political economy effects of 
domestic (and international) institutions into economic growth theory.170 Due to the adjudicative perspective adopted 
by this work, in depth consideration of this promising field of law and economics research falls beyond the scope. 
 
In addition to the situations examined above, involving terms of trade pliability and the threat of immiserizing 
growth, excessive international price volatility of exported commodities poses an independent threat to national 
welfare. Section 1.A.2, infra, examines such volatility for which export restraints in the form of taxes, or commodity 
boards, offers a second-best remedy in the absence of well developed (financial) markets. 
 
2. Weak Theorem: Stabilization and Redistribution 
 
Short- to mid-term commodity price volatility and associated uncertainty of export earnings is generally recognized 
as an obstacle to sustained(-able) economic development. High revenue volatility exacerbates poverty,171 in 
particular in the least developed countries (LDCs) and ill-diversified emerging economies with under-developed 
financial markets.172 In response, border measures in the form of export restrictions have been used to (i) smooth 
domestic consumption and investment patterns through revenue stabilization; and (ii) generate government revenue 
with redistribution effects.173 In addition (iii), a domestic competition policy in restraint of exports has the potential 
to rationalize markets and address overcapacity issues in an orderly fashion. Conversely, the imposition of “beggar-
                                                        
170 The effort to systematically and formally include the political economy effects of institutions into growth theory stands central to the work of 
Daron Acemoglu; see, for instance, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), chapters 22 and 23. 
171 Daniel Lederman Guido Porto, “The Price Is Not Always Right: On the Impacts of (Commodity) Prices on Households (and Countries),” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6858 (2014). 
172 See for example Michael Gavin and Ricardo Hausmann, “Securing Stability and Growth in a Shock Prone Region: The Policy Challenge for 
Latin America,” InterAmerican Development Bank Working Paper 315 (1996); and Gary Ramey and Valerie Ramey, “Cross-Country Evidence on 
the Link Between Volatility and Growth,” 85 American Economic Review 1138 (1995). 
173 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (Geneva: WTO, 2010), p. 127. 
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thy-neighbor” border measures has been identified as a contributing factor to international commodity price 
shocks.174 
 
When considering the implementation of measures to shield domestic producers and consumers from excessive 
world price volatility, it is imperative that the policy does not end up fighting long-term trends, based on shifting 
fundamentals. Distinguishing shifts in “fundamental” aspects from damaging “volatility” can be difficult, and in the 
short-run very murky. Their respective roots in the structural elements of market conditions and the determinants of 
(global) supply and demand, corrected for business cycles, axiomatically determine the difference between them. 
 
World commodity price changes tend to overshoot underlying supply- and demand-shocks, due to innately low 
elasticities of localized demand and supply in the short term. The barter terms-of-trade, as well as the current 
account and the macro-economic growth prospects of commodity-dependent developing countries, could suffer 
amplified shocks as a result. Such concerns grow proportionally more pressing the more concentrated (less 
diversified) an economy is. Piermartini shows that the average export earnings variability for LDCs is significantly 
higher than the world average (when going through the same shock or cycle); and that this variability is even higher 
for the most concentrated economies such as Nigeria and Venezuela.175 
 
Failing a positive identification of fundamental trends, the protective policy could dampen (or even distort) market 
signals to such an extent as to cause significant long-term resource misallocation and loss of competitiveness within 
the favored industry and across the economy as a whole. Efforts to distinguish long-term trends in commodity prices 
from shorter-term volatility, find original inspiration in the work by Singer and Prebisch. In the 1950s, Singer and 
Prebisch postulated a logarithmic function176 from observing the net barter terms of the United Kingdom over the 
period 1876-1947. This function exhibited a linear downward trend suggesting a secular decrease in the price of 
                                                        
174 Hans G. Jensen and Kym Anderson, “Grain Price Spikes and Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Policy Responses: A Global Economy-wide Analysis,” 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 7007 (2014); Jensen and Anderson offer a more precise assessment of the impact of export restrictions on price 
spikes and argue for better control, while providing a brief survey of recent literature. 
175 Roberta Piermartini, “The Role of Export Taxes in the Field of Primary Commodities,” WTO Study Paper (2004), table 3, page 9. 
176 The Singer-Prebisch logarithmic function is functionally equivalent to: H(I) = Γ + Θ(t) 	+ 	M(I) , where t, [1,2,…T], is a linear trend and the 
random variable “M*” is stationary with a zero mean. The slope is therefore determined by “Θ,” which the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis predicts will 
be negative. For this and alternative functions and an instructive exegesis, see David I. Harvey, et al., “The Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis: Four 
Centuries of Evidence,” 92(2) The Review of Economics and Statistics 367 (2010). 
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commodities relative to manufactured products. The Singer-Prebisch thesis thus suggests and explains a secular 
deterioration in the terms-of-trade of primary-commodity exporting economies over time. 
 
Later authors soon criticized the employed method of data gathering as incomplete and inaccurate, summarized by 
Spraos in 1980.177 Work to corroborate or disprove the Singer-Prebisch thesis has however continued and in 1988 
Grilli and Yang published their landmark study,178 offering some support for the original thesis.179 In a recent 
advance, Erten and Ocampo180 argue the presence of commodity super-cycles over the traditional approach of 
identifying trends and structural breaks (as for example Grilli and Yang do in their 1988 contribution). They re-
interpret and find corroboration (for non-oil commodities) of the Singer-Prebisch thesis, pointing to a sequential 
decline in the mean prices of such super-cycles.181 
 
Whereas developed financial markets can blunt a liquidity squeeze that follows a negative export shock, most 
commodity export-dependent economies cannot offer this service to their exporters. In these countries, only firms 
with enough (accumulated) profits have sufficient access to finance to mitigate a liquidity squeeze – putting the cart 
before the horse. Earnings volatility combined with imperfect financial markets thus deprives an economy, 
especially an emerging market, of potentially productive investments.182 In addition, the gradual accumulation of 
knowledge and the emergence of innovation are seriously hindered by the pro-cyclicality of capital flows.183 The 
resulting economic instability is, again, particularly severe for insufficiently diversified developing countries. 
 
                                                        
177 The data used by Prebish and Singer focus on the British terms of trade which are arguably not representative of the developed world as a whole 
over the covered period; Both developed and developing countries have mixed export bags that included manufactured goods as well as 
commodities; Transportation costs were not specifically accounted for (in particular no harmonization was made for f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices); and 
differences in quality were not accounted for – see John Spraos, “The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade,” 90 Economic Journal 
107 (1980). 
178 Enzo R. Grilli and Maw C. Yang, “Commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices, and the Terms of Trade of Developing Countries,” 2 World 
Bank Economic Review 1 (1988). 
179 Grilli and Yang find a 0.6 percent annual downward trend, allowing for a 1921 structural break. 
180 Bilge Erten and Jose Antonio Ocampo, “Super Cycles of Commodity Prices Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” 44 World Development 14 
(2013). 
181 Figure 4 shows super-cycle components for metals, tropical and non-tropical agricultural, as extracted by Erten and Ocampo from the original 
real price series by applying the asymmetric Christiano–Fitzgerald band-pass filter. See Bilge Erten and Jose Antonio Ocampo, “Super Cycles of 
Commodity Prices Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” 44 World Development 14 (2013), p. 22. 
182  Philippe Aghion and Abhijit Banerjee, Volatility and Growth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Ch. 2. 
183 Luis Bertola and Jose-Antonio Ocampo, The Economic Development of Latin America Since Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 18. 
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Although the negative impact of earnings volatility on economic growth has been widely recognized, some related 
economic dynamics are more ambiguous. For example, households may increase the all-important savings rate184 for 
precautionary reasons.185  In a “store-or-sow” model of precautionary savings, “an increase in [income shock] 
variance implies not only a higher saving rate but also a change in the portfolio allocation of saving between risky 
capital and a safe asset.”186 When confronted with high volatility of permanent income, households increase their 
precautionary saving and limit their investment,187 negatively affecting output/income in the next period and leading 
to a “volatility trap.” When variance is moderate however, an increase in the rate of saving might work to bring 
down the risk-adjusted return on capital, which in turn might ultimately work to raise consumption again.188 This 
type of income variance is well known for commodity export dependent economies, when transmitting external 
shocks unmitigated into household income. 
 
The effects of excessive world price volatility189 are, traditionally, especially hard felt in Latin America’s resource-
export dependent economies, as these are generally less able to efficiently reallocate labor inter-sectorally (with 
subsequent effects on the real exchange rate and, probably, interest rates)190.191 A trade measure, such as export 
restrictions, could be considered as a second-best policy alternative, possibly in combination with sovereign funds or 
other buffers. 
                                                        
184 The savings-rate is a key variable in early AK-growth models, which retained their popularity for a long time due to their innate tractability 
(easy to understand and derive policy prescriptions from), see William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002). 
185 For a model of precautionary savings, see Christopher D. Carroll, “A Theory of the Consumption Function, With and Without Liquidity 
Constraints (Expanded Version),” NBER Working Paper 8387 (2001). 
186 Reda Cherif and Fuad Hasanov, “The Volatility Trap: Precautionary Saving, Investment, and Aggregate Risk,” IMF Working Paper WP/12/134 
(May 2012), p. 3. 
187 See for a detailed treatment of the problem with serially uncorrelated returns: Michael Rothschild and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Increasing Risk II: Its 
Economic Consequences,” 3 Journal of Economic Theory 66 (1971). 
188 Philippe Aghion and Abhijit Banerjee, Volatility and Growth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 10-11. 
189 Excessive volatility is a concept narrowly described as higher than average variance for countries with similar per capita GDP in Jose M. Fanelli, 
“Argentina,” in Jose M. Fanelli, ed., Macroeconomic Volatility, Institutions and Financial Architectures. The Developing World Experience (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 236. 
190 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability,” in Narcis Serra and Joseph Stiglitz, The Washington Consensus 
Reconsidered (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
191 Ricardo Hausmann and Roberto Rigobon, “An Alternative Interpretation of the 'Resource Curse': Theory and Policy Implications,” NBER 
Working Paper 9424 (2002); see also Ricardo Hausmann, Ugo Panizza, and Roberto Rigobon, "The long-run volatility puzzle of the real exchange 
rate," 25(1) Journal of International Money and Finance 93 (2006); see also Francisco Costa, Jason Garred, and João Paulo Pessoa, “Winners and 
Losers from a Commodities-for-Manufactures Trade Boom,” London School of Economics Working Paper (2014). 
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a. Consumption and Investment Smoothing 
The first-best policy for addressing excessive volatility of earnings is to allow producers and consumers to take a 
position in negatively correlated, or at least neutral-correlated, financial instruments. Whereas many commodity-
importing countries have the ability to offer their producers and consumers investments in independent revenue 
streams,192 the bulk of poorly-diversified and commodity-export dependent countries do not.193 In fact, the very 
instability of investable earnings creates uncertainty about the viability of future investments, constraining rational 
investment choices and raising the cost of such risk-abating investments. 
 
As noted, this first-best solution is to allow risk to be shifted onto financial markets and away from the spot markets 
through financial engineering and a variety of hedging-operations.194 This policy however simultaneously opens the 
economy up to waves of speculation and the boom-bust cycles of future beliefs.195 Whether or not speculation on 
future markets by non-traditional investors, looking for alternative asset classes, was at the root of recent price 
volatility in commodities cannot here be discussed. It is nonetheless sensible to introduce a word of caution against 
unguardedly advocating opening financial markets as a prima facie first-best solution to earnings volatility (often 
advocated on principle because of their supposed neutral impact on production factors).196 
 
Starting in the 1960s (and generally through to the 1980s) international commodity agreements (ICAs) operated with 
the aim of creating price stabilization through direct market intervention. This market intervention took the form of 
operating actively managed buffer stocks (price stabilization) supported by export quotas (price support).197 
Maintaining sufficient buffer stocks proved expensive though, while free riding, cheating and rent-seeking were 
                                                        
192 Many commodity-importing economies alternatively allow for the re-distribution of risk by means of swaps, options, and futures, through their 
deep financial markets (and possibly open capital accounts). China might be a marked exception to this observation, but it has in turn intersected 
the state between world markets and its consumers in different and pervasive ways. 
193 For a deep insight into the role of the capital account and deep financial markets in developing economies, see the twin volumes Jose-Antonio 
Ocampo and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Capital Market Liberalization and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, et al., eds., Stability with Growth – Macroeconomics, Liberalization, and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
194 Eduardo Borensztein, Olivier Jeanne and Damiano Sandri, “Macro-Hedging for Commodity Exporters,” IMF Working Paper (2009). 
195 Joseph Stiglitz, “Symposium on Bubbles,” 4(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (1990). 
196 See for a larger discussion of financial speculation in commodities and its impact on price volatility, World Trade Organization, World Trade 
Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (Geneva: WTO, 2010), pp. 98-103. 
197 Note that both the Havana and Uruguay Rounds dealt with the question of ICAs, which are current addressed under GATT Article XX(h). This 
importantly qualifies them as exceptions to the free trade paradigm enshrined in the GATT 1994 and under the auspices of the chapeau to Article 
XX, which crucially makes the very exception “[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade […]” (emphasis added). For a negotiation history of ICAs within the GATT/WTO framework, see GATT Secretariat, “Trade Provisions 
Contained in Existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements Vis-à-vis GATT Principles and Provisions: Article XX(h),” WTO Document 
TRE/W/17 (1993), available at: http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91720248.pdf. 
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hard to control across the different stakeholders. Additionally, preferred price- and volatility-levels differed among 
the parties to these agreements, leading to collective action problems. Ultimately, most ICAs collapsed under their 
own, insufficiently supported, weight.198 
 
On the national level, marketing boards without international pricing power continued to provide a buffer well into 
the 1990’s, operating in parallel to international compensatory financial schemes such as STABEX and the IMF’s 
Compensatory Financing Facility. These international financing tools were prone to disbursement time-lags 
however; transforming countercyclical policies into a pro-cyclical reality. They furthermore proved cumbersome to 
operate in developing countries due to the imposition of strict conditionalities on their use.199 In general, the scope 
and resources allocated to the ICAs, marketing boards, and international financial compensation schemes were too 
small and their policy responses too slow to mitigate the impact of price shocks effectively.200 
  
A second best solution consists of a policy of a progressive export-restrictions-cum-reserve201 – possibly in the form 
of a (strategic) commodity stockpile and/or a cash amount managed by a dedicated Sovereign Stabilization or 
Wealth Fund (SWF).202 Such a SWF could then provide national self-insurance203 and provide direct insurance to the 
producers, without immediately running afoul of WTO restrictions on subsidies and restrictions on the use of border 
measures. In this regard, Brazil’s win over the U.S. on its upland cotton protection program204 is highly significant. 
                                                        
198 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2008: Commodity Prices, Capital Flows and the Financing of Investment (New York and Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2008), pp. 41-44. 
199 Idem, p. 43. 
200 Stephany Griffith-Jones and José Antonio Ocampo, “Compensatory Financing for Shocks: What Changes Are Needed?,” Columbia University, 
Initiative for Policy Dialogue (2008); José Antonio Ocampo and Stephany Griffith-Jones, “A Counter-Cyclical Framework for a Development-
Friendly International Financial Architecture,” DESA Working Paper No. 39, ST/ESA/2007/DWP/39 (2007); Stephany Griffith-Jones and José 
Antonio Ocampo, “Global Governance for Financial Stability and Development,”  Columbia University, Initiative for Policy Dialogue (2011).  
201 As a flat export tax ultimately fails to smooth the transmission of price shocks, a progressive tax would be needed that recognizes trends while 
responding to excessive volatility. See Alexander H. Sarris, “Export Taxes Versus Buffer Stocks As Optimal Export Policies Under Uncertainty,” 
11 Journal of Development Economics 195 (1982). Papua New Guinea, for example, established an export tax/subsidy rate for cocoa, coffee, copra 
and palm oil equal to half the difference between the reference price - calculated as the average world price over the previous decade - and the 
actual annual price; see R.M. Bautista, "Export Tax as Income Stabiliser under Alternative Policy Regimes: The Case of Philippine Copra," in E. 
de Dios and R.V. Fabella, eds., Choice, Growth and Development: Emerging and Enduring Issues (Quezon City: University of Philippine Press, 
1996). 
202 See for more on the structure and logic of commodity based Sovereign Wealth Funds, Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, eds., Escaping the Resource Curse (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 2007). 
203 Such a stabilization fund provides a “mechanism designed to reduce the impact of volatile fiscal revenues and/or foreign exchange receipts, 
linked to the pro-cyclical pattern of export prices or volumes.” (p.62) Ocampo and Griffith-Jones give the example of the National Coffee Fund of 
Colombia to illustrate boom-bust taxation and retention policies, while reserving strict self-insurance for responses to volatile capital flows (here 
applied in different form, but with similar logic), in Stephany Griffith-Jones and Jose Antonio Ocampo, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Developing 
Country Perspective,” in Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, eds., Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy 
Reactions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012),  pp. 73-74. See for Brazil’s management of the world coffee market Luis Bertola and Jose-
Antonio Ocampo, The Economic Development of Latin America Since Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 142. 
204 WTO dispute settlement case US – Upland Cotton (DS267); WTO Panel Report (2004) and Appellate Body Report (2005) provided authorization 
for Brazil to retaliate against the US; confirmed Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report (2009). 
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This holding invites more thought on the use financial support systems such as dedicated SWFs (or competition 
policy) to achieve a modicum of protection against violent commodity price shocks, without exercising market 
power internationally and “distorting” or “restricting” international trade.205  
 
b. Revenue and Redistribution 
The second reason to impose border measures in response to price volatility pertains to the government’s ability to 
raise revenue and perceived need for domestic redistribution, toward or away from exporters. In economies 
dominated by the export of agricultural or mining products, landowners often resist direct taxation of land or wealth, 
leaving the central government to indirectly tax the export activities themselves. Applying such customs duties 
though has a distributional impact that is different from direct taxation. Taxing export flows instead of land 
ownership further gives shape to the political economy and potentially retards the emergence of a vibrant primary 
export sector. 
 
When foreign investors hold significant ownership shares in export companies, export taxes can also serve to 
capture some of the foreign-owned company rents; especially when such are thought to be exorbitant following an 
international demand boom. In practice, the protectionist implications of raising export taxes on primary produce 
(benefitting downstream industries) are often considered a corollary and entirely complementary to the main 
concern of raising revenue - contrary to most orthodox economic thought.206 
 
A progressive export tax system, used to generate disposable income and administered at the border, might offer a 
measure of price stabilization to producers, but can simultaneous work to highlight the fragility of government 
revenue. With such a revenue-raising export tax, the government budget is the first to experience the revenue effects 
of international price fluctuations, supply shocks, and real exchange rate volatility.207 Although the collective power 
                                                        
205 See also US Supreme Court, Marvin D. Horne v. US Department of Agriculture (June 22, 2015), 750 F. 3d 1128, reversed. 
206 Luis Bertola and Jose-Antonio Ocampo, The Economic Development of Latin America Since Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 132. A clear counter-example can be found in the WTO Panel Report, Argentina — Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and 
the Import of Finished Leather (2000), where a tanners' representatives during customs procedures was clearly meant to incentivize domestic 
downstream production over exportation of unprocessed bovine hides. The EC however failed to meet the standard of proof necessary to have this 
policy be classified as a trade restrictive export measure. 
207 Roberta Piermartini, “The Role of Export Taxes in the Field of Primary Commodities,” WTO Working Paper (2004). 
57 
 
of the state might be better positioned to handle fluctuations in income, deep and persistent revenue uncertainty 
weakens its ability to drive growth and innovation. The ability of the state to augment, support, and police markets is 
after all crucially dependent on its power to raise revenue consistently.208 
 
The optimal tariff (or export tax) is normally determined non-cooperatively, or as a Nash optimum (in a two 
country, one period model). In reality however there is a high degree of policy interdependence between exporting 
economies in a conscious effort to set appropriate welfare or revenue maximizing rates. Note though that the 
optimum welfare-maximizing rate is classically set lower than a revenue-maximizing tariff, as the latter considers 
domestic monopsony power209 in addition to international monopoly power.  
 
However, when economies sell into the same or connected markets (including insulated markets that are connected 
financially), a higher export tax in country A generates a positive externality for country B through the increase of 
international prices. A cooperatively set revenue-maximizing rate can thus result in an increase in welfare levels 
beyond the original welfare-maximum-tariff.210 This insight carries obvious implications for possible cooperation 
among ill-diversified countries, resembling an oligarchic international market structure where consumers are not 
likely to retaliate. It is important to note though that the very cooperation that could lead to national welfare 
increases does nothing to halt the transmission of exogenous shocks while raising considerable collective action 
problems when export restrictions are used to stabilize domestic prices.211 
 
The political case for the introduction of export taxes is particularly pressing after rapid and substantial currency 
depreciation, as exporters receive temporary windfall gains and the government most often experiences a fall in 
                                                        
208 Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “The Causes and Consequences of Development Clusters: State Capacity, Peace,and Income,” 6 Annual 
Review of Economics 927 (2014), p. 932. A country’s tax-collection capacity comes into question even further when a significant part of the 
economy is informal. A considerable informal economy hampers the effective substitution-interplay between VAT and border measures and, in 
this way, possibly hurts aggregate welfare; see M. Shahe Emran and Joseph Stiglitz, “On Selective Indirect Tax Reform in Developing Countries,” 
89 Journal of Public Economics 599 (2005). 
209 Domestic monopsony power serves as a clear distortion from a welfare perspective; hence the welfare-maximizing tariff is always lower than 
the revenue maximizing tariff. 
210 This intuitive result is proved formally in Arvind Panagariya and Maurice Schiff, “Can Revenue Maximizing Export Taxes Yield Higher Welfare 
Than Welfare Maximizing Export Taxes?,” 45 Economic Letters 79 (1994). However, the game that ensues might be characterized as a prisoner’s 
dilemma where both countries are better off maximizing revenue, but both will maximize welfare in the Nash equilibrium; Roger Clarke and David 
R. Collie, “Maximum- Revenue versus Optimum-Welfare Export Taxes,” Cardiff Business School Working Paper (2006). 
211 See, for agricultural staples, Will Marin and Kym Anderson, “Export Restrictions and Price Insulation During Commodity Price Booms,” 94(2) 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 422 (2012). 
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revenues. An across-the-board, temporary export tax,212 could serve to transfer parts of the exporter’s rents to the 
government. The pattern of outgoing international remittances,213 in the presence of a stock of foreign (direct) 
investment, will further influence government’s preferences over trade policy instruments as well as their 
appropriate levels. This application suggests however a temporary and general, instead of permanent and specific, 
structure to export taxes, which runs against the premises of the Lerner Symmetry.  
 
An interesting historical example of such political economic pressure can be found in the Argentine depression of 
1998-2002. A strong currency devaluation and recession deprived the Argentine government of much needed 
foreign exchange while, as Setser and Gelpern point out, “[f]armers did particularly well: their dollar debts were 
pesified just before the harvest brought in an influx of dollar revenue.”214 The Argentinean government raised export 
taxes to, in part, “redistribute[] gains from devaluation to help those hurting the most.”215 In a waive of “export 
populism,” President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) continued a policy of active devaluation and export taxation on 
soybeans to fund social programs without harming the balance of payments directly or deprive households of 
purchasing power as soybeans were assumed to have no domestic consumption demand at the household level.216 
 
c. Market Rationalization 
The trade effects of export restrictions, administered through border measures, can similarly be accomplished by 
condoning corporate collusion or through the establishment of export cartels.  In general, firm-level collusion seeks 
to take advantage of the same elasticity arguments and pressures that hold for terms-of-trade enhancing border 
measures. Commodity export cartels are therefore often analyzed in conjunction with similar border measures. 
 
                                                        
212 As the windfall generates rents to exporters in general, the export tax should be broadly applied. The longer the export tax is kept in effect 
though, the stronger it will interfere with the purposes of the depreciation; frustrating the realignment of production factors, distorting their returns 
and potentially translating in household purchasing power effects (in the absence of government subsidies and in light of the initial domestic price-
dampening effect due to rigidities of supply). The burden associated with the necessary restoration of the balance of payments could then be shifted 
on the import side more completely, risking a contraction or a recession. 
213 Note that in the face of international remittances a direct tax on such flows is necessary to restore the Lerner Equivalence; see Emily J. Blanchard, 
“Trade Taxes and International Investment,” 42(3) Canadian Journal of Economics 882 (2009). 
214 Brad Setser and Anna Gelpern, “Pathways through Financial Crisis: Argentina,” 12 Global Governance 465 (2006), p. 480. 
215 Idem, p. 481. 
216 Neal P. Richardson, “Export-Oriented Populism: Commodities and Coalitions in Argentina,” 44 Studies in Comparative International 
Development 228 (2009). 
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Export collusion can achieve much the same trade effects as export restrictions, but without the immediate domestic 
distortions, if the repercussions of the collusion can be contained to the targeted export markets.217 Instead of 
introducing a border measure (raising a tariff), the colluding industry raises its export prices. Successful market 
intervention by a cartel therefore requires that the value of the price elasticity of marginal consumer demand is less 
than unity. This, in turn, implies that the marginal revenue function of the cartel’s aggregate supply is negative and 
that curtailing sales will thus raise the cartel’s aggregate revenue.218 
 
Incentivizing the accumulation of additional revenue at the firm level, rather than stimulating inter-firm competition 
to diminish this surplus, could be part of a larger industrial policy aimed at market rationalization; preparation for 
foreign market entry; combatting resource depletion; or part of a government plan to stimulate innovation. 
Government sanctioned or condoned collusion can furthermore be beneficial in markets that are in need of 
controlled rationalization due to an overcapacity in production - developed in response to mistaken beliefs about the 
future or in response to policy-induced overproduction.  
 
Alternatively, export cartels can be useful in markets that suffer from underutilization due to economic recessions or 
shifting fundamentals. In addition to attempting to shift costs internationally, recession-cartels in declining industries 
can help to limit production and wind the industrial overcapacity down without triggering a financial cascade of 
failing loans. The recent U.S. antitrust case against Chinese producers of vitamin C, for government-induced export 
price fixing, could be interpreted in light of a national policy aimed at addressing industrial overcapacity.219 In a 
related U.S. antitrust enforcement procedure, Chinese bauxite producers are accused of similar anti-competitive 
price-fixing schemes as directed by the Chinese Government, only this time with a more overt aim of stimulating 
domestic downstream production.220  
                                                        
217 Clearly, containing the effects of collusion to external target markets invites large-scale efforts at evasion through distribution on the secondary 
markets. Note that some forms of price-discrimination are clearly anticompetitive, while others are tolerated under antitrust enforcement: see, for 
example, the divergence between European and US approaches to loyalty rebates; Hans Zenger, “Loyalty Rebates and the Competitive Process,” 
8(4) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 717 (2012). 
218 Marian Radetzki, “The Potential for Monopolistic Commodity Pricing by Developing Countries,” in G.K. Helleiner, ed., A World Divided: The 
Less Developed Countries in the International Economy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Marian Radetzki, A Handbook of Primary 
Commodities in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 146. 
219 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed and Tilahun Kassahun, “A 
Vitamin C Deficiency? Balancing Economic Transition in China with U.S. Competition Policy – A WTO Perspective,” DISSETTLE Working 
Paper, Graduate Institute (Geneva, forthcoming). 
220 Resco Prods., Inc. v. Bosai Minerals Grp., No. 06-235, 2010 WL 2331069 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2010); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l 
Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 




In addition to questions of cartelization, a lot of attention has been paid in the literature to the corporate and strategic 
implications of stimulating vertical consolidation and the emergence of national champions221 - be they state-owned, 
state-influenced or market-driven.222 An assessment of the interaction of the broad concept of “competitive 
neutrality”223 and the economic growth impacts of export restrictions thereon go however beyond the scope of the 
present work. 
 
As monopolies tend to restrict production volume in a bid to command higher revenue, the use of cartels has also 
been suggested to combat (too) rapid resource depletion. The resource depletion itself could be considered 
deleterious to long-term economic health or the process of depletion could be generating environmental degradation 
that is not properly reflected in the international price (resulting in underpricing and overconsumption with 
domestic, but not international, negative welfare effects). Collusion among producers could, as a clear second best, 
serve to “naturally” slow the pace of extraction– such in the absence of direct regulation or governmental standard 
setting (with oversight). 
 
Finally, government induced collusion could have a direct affect on the pace and direction of firms’ efforts at 
product innovation. Aghion et al. find an inverted-U-shaped relationship between product-market competition and 
innovation, showing that innovation incentives depend upon the difference between post-innovation and pre-
innovation rents of incumbent firms.224 In particular, vigorous competition enhances innovation more in more 
advanced sectors where competition is global and companies are prone to innovate in order to “escape” the 
competition. This work by Aghion et al., could be read so as to compliment Rodrik and Hausmann’s observation 
                                                        
221 Among a broad literature, see recently, Oliver Falck, Christian Gollier and Ludger Woessmann, eds., Industrial Policy for National Champions 
(Boston: MIT Press, 2011); see also Emmanuelle Maincent and Lluis Navarro, “A Policy for Industrial Champions: From Picking Winners to 
Fostering Excellence and the Growth of Firms,” Industrial Policy and Economic Reforms Papers No. 2, European Commission (2006). 
222 Milhaupt and Zheng argue that “state capture” might more accurately describe modern forms of state influence – at least in China – see Curtis 
J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm,” ECGI Working Paper Series in Law No. 251/2014 
(2014). 
223 See among many others; OECD, Competitive Neutrality: A Compendium of OECD Recommendations, Guidelines and Best Practices (OECD 
2012); see also Karl P. Sauvant, Persephone Economou, et. al., “Trends in FDI, Home Country Measures, and Competitive Neutrality,” in Andrea 
Bjorklund, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2012-2013 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). The concept of 
competitive neutrality is central to understanding the prolonged discussions on the status of state-owned enterprises in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) agreement, including the negative-list approach taken to them. 
224 Philippe Aghion, et al., “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship,” 120(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 701 (2005). 
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that, in technologically lagging transition and emerging markets, government induced rents may be “needed to 
stimulate the cost discovery process.”225  
 
3. Counter to Tariff Threats: VERs 
 
Economies have, at times, semi-voluntarily restricted their exports in response to tariff threats from important import 
markets, either pre-emptively (voluntary export restraints) or post-facto (to counter tariff escalation for example). 
While the post-facto restrictions mostly take the form of export taxes, pre-emptively undertaken export restraints 
generally take the shape of quotas or directed (minimum export) price measures (VERs). 
 
The raising of taxes on exports can be an appropriate response for commodity exporters in the face of tariff 
escalation. Import tariffs facing exporting countries are said to be escalating when they are higher on processed than 
on unprocessed goods.226 Tariff escalation in developed countries disincentives economic diversification in upstream 
markets and keeps commodity dependent economies captured in (extractive) industries where lower learning and 
productivity spillovers are prevalent. As tariff wedges have diminished in most up-/down-stream product pairs, the 
second best policy instrument of introducing an export tax is no longer as relevant as it was at the time of and before 
the Uruguay Round – with the possible exception of tropical agricultural produce, such as coffee or cocoa.227  
 
In response to tariff threats from important import markets, exporting economies at times agree to voluntarily limit 
their exported volumes (though, importantly, not their export value).228 By agreeing to VERs, the economy that 
exercises restraint retains the generated premium/rents to allocate domestically. As the rents accrue to the export 
                                                        
225 Rodrik and Hausmann simultaneous warn that “[…] rents can backfire if governments do not complement them with policies that rationalize 
industries and discipline firms that end up with high costs.  We would hypothesize that the absence of such discipline was a hallmark of import 
substitution policies (ISI) in Latin America,” in Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik, “Economic Development as Self-Discovery,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 8952 (May 2002), pp. 7-8. 
226 For a rent-extraction model of escalating tariffs, see Hong Hwang, Chao-Cheng Mai, and Shih-Jye Wu, “Tariff Escalation: A Theoretical 
Foundation,” Working Paper (2011). 
227 Coffee has the biggest differential in the U.S. (7-8 percent), while the EU has a similar wedge for cocoa; Mexico and Turkey have strong 
differentials in their applied rates to coffee, of 120 and 40 percent respectfully – see Piermartini, op.cit, p. 13. For tariff escalation in agricultural 
produce, see Ramesh Sharma, “The Doha Round Agricultural Tariff-Cutting Formulae and Tariff Escalation,” FAO Working Paper (2006). 
228 A famous example involves auto exports from Japan to the U.S. in the 1980s, but use was widespread before the GATT Uruguay Round; in 
1991 nearly 300 agreed VERs were in effect (Alan O. Sykes, The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 24). Other examples include EU-China textile exports in the first decade of the 21st century. See for a recent overview work, Sabina 
Nüesch, Voluntary Export Restraints in WTO and EU Law: Consumers, Trade Regulation and Competition Policy, Studies in Global Economic 
Law Vol. 13 (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2010). 
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restricting economy under VERs, the welfare loss to the importing economy that results from the voluntary export 
restriction is larger than would have occurred under an import tariff or equivalent quota. So, although VERs could 
serve as a preferred second-best response to a tariff threat, the country making such threat is considerably worse off. 
 
While the voluntary limiting of export volumes on certain products offers a measure of protection to the import-
competing domestic industry, limiting export volumes usually induces quality upgrades to existing export-lines in 
order to escape the targeted product designation or to maximize revenue under the quota. Feenstra, for example, 
finds that “about two-thirds of the import price rise following the VER is due to quality improvement, with the 
remaining one-third a de facto price increase.”229  
 
Bhagwati, early on, demonstrated the equivalence between quotas and taxes under perfect competition,230 in the 
sense that both instruments can reduce trade volumes equally.231 Panagariya has explored the possibility of welfare 
rankings under the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas as result of imperfect competition,232 showing the 
superiority of tariffs as they force the monopolist to compete instead of receive quota rents. In the presence of 
smuggling however, the dominance of the ad valorem tariff over quotas becomes unhinged.233 A further non-
equivalence between tariffs and quotas emerges under conditions of uncertainty234 and in the face of tariff jumping 
foreign direct investment.235 
 
This result on smuggling is particularly interesting in light of China’s export restriction cases, China – Raw 
Materials and China – Rare Earth (examined in detail in Chapter 5, infra). China argued in these cases that its 
                                                        
229 Robert C. Feenstra, “Voluntary Export Restraint in U.S. Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment, and Welfare Effects,” Robert E. Baldwin and 
Anne O. Krueger, eds., The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p.36. 
230 Jagdish Bhagwati, “On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas,” in Richard E. Baldwin, Jagdish Bhagwati, R.E. Caves and H.G. Johnson, Trade, 
Growth and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Honor of G. Haberler (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). 
231 Note that the equivalence holds statically as its values do not automatically adjust for changing comparative and competitive advantages; see 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 71-72. 
232 Arvind Panagariya, “Import Targets and the Equivalence of Optimal Tariff and Quota Structures,” 13 Canadian Journal of Economics 711 
(1980); Arvind Panagariya, “Quantitative Restrictions in International Trade Under Monopoly,” 11 Journal of International Economics 15 (1981); 
Arvind Panagariya, “Tariff Policy Under Monopoly in General Equilibrium,” 23 International Economic Review 143 (1982). 
233 Bruno Larue and Harvey E. Lapan, “Smuggling and Bhagwati’s Non-Equivalence Between Tariffs and Quotas,” 10(4) Review of International 
Economics 729 (2002). 
234 See, for instance, Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz, “Tariffs vs. Quotas as Revenue Raising Devices under Uncertainty,” 67(5) The American 
Economic Review 975 (1977). 
235 See, for instance, Peter Neary, “Tarrifs, Quotas, and Voluntary Export Restraints with and without Internationally Mobile Capital,” 21(4) The 
Canadian Journal of Economics 714 (1988); An important incidence of such tariff jumping by foreign investment can be found in the establishment 
of US domestic production capacity by Japanese auto-makers in the 1980s, examined in Jagdish Bhagwati, “VERs, Quid Pro Quo DFI and VIEs: 
Political Economy Theoretic Analyses,” 1(1) International Economic Journal 1 (1987). 
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policy measures were aimed at, among other objectives, the reorganization of the domestic (extractive) industry to 
prevent large-scale smuggling.  
 
It should be noted that the GATT Uruguay Round outlawed the use of VERs and arranged for a controlled phase-out 
of existing agreements by 1999,236 mostly under pressure of developing economies.237 By disavowing the use of 
VERs, protection against potentially damaging import surges was brought back into the fold of WTO-consistent 
contingent protection.238 “Unfair” pricing practices can, in this way, be addressed in a WTO-consistent manner by 
introducing a variety of contingent duties and charges. Wholesale protection from “serious injury” is accounted for 
in the WTO by so-called safeguard measures, while state-subsidy questions are under the purview of countervailing 
duties. 
B. Normative Models of Mature and Catch Up Growth 
 
The high pace and impressive trajectory at which developing economies approach economic maturity, particularly in 
East Asia and Latin America (assuming they successfully avoid the middle income trap), has re-fueled the debate on 
whether, to which level and in what structure openness to trade best fosters national development goals in the long 
run. Commenting on the success of heterodox policies in kick-starting industrial growth Panagariya notes that “these 
critics fail to distinguish between initial catalysts to growth and policies necessary to sustain it. Even if growth is 
initially stimulated by increased investment demand or innovation, growth is unlikely to be sustained if the trading 
environment is autarkic and continues to be autarkic.”239 
 
                                                        
236 While Article XI of GATT banned import quotas, it took until 1999 to permanently deal with VERs; Article 11.1(b) of the 1994 Agreement on 
Safeguards prohibits new voluntary export restraints, while Article 11.2 provides that all pre-existing VERs should be phased out by 1999. A 
separate agreement on textiles and clothing postpones such date until 2005 for apparel; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods-Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M. 28. 
237 In 1988 Brazil, India and Mexico in particular opposed legalization of VERs, fearing the targeting of developing countries while being concerned 
about their relatively weak bargaining position and limited opportunities to retaliate against developed economies – see GATT Secretariat, Synopsis 
of Proposals, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/2 1, at 14-15 (1988); David P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History – Volume 2 (Alphen: 
Kluwer Law International, 1993), p. 1771. These concerns have, of course, somewhat lessened with the meteoric rise of the BRICS and other 
emerging markets. 
238 See Kyle Bagwell, George Bermann and Petros Mavroidis, eds., Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in International Trade (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Petros Mavroidis, Patrick Messerlin, and Jasper Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection 
in the WTO (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
239 Arvind Panagariya, “Miracles & Debacles: In Defense of Trade Openness,” 27(8) The World Economy 1149 (2004), p. 1150. 
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While certainly true, the issue then seems to be at what time “initial catalysts” should give way to “sustained” or 
mature growth policies and whether such opening up should be across the board or differentiated between 
products.240 As I will argue in this Section, the process of mature growth is directed at pushing the capability frontier 
through innovation; “catch up” growth instead operates behind the frontier and draws on available emulation 
opportunities to strategically direct industrial policies toward viable diversification of the production basket. 
 
Conditions of “mature” and “catch-up” growth can, and will, therefore coexist between and within economies in the 
absence of full convergence. Until such time, industrial policies will remain a significant and indeed necessary 
marker in the economic landscape, across countries and industries. Industrial policies, including trade measures, can 
work to direct economic development and provide guidance in the transition period of high- or transformative 
growth that gives shape and profile to an economy’s structural outlook and defines its (weakly path-dependent241) 
development. 
 
It may be pertinent to clarify at this point that when this work envisions “mature” and “catch-up” growth operating 
in parallel, it does so with the aim of clarifying their different policy objectives: efficient resource allocation v. 
production diversification. The distinction is therefore not meant to be reminiscent of a supply side argument, where, 
as Acemoglu reminds us, the “factor proportion differences across sectors, combined with capital deepening, lead to 
nonbalanced economic growth.”242 
 
Rather, policies directed at “catch-up” growth within a network structure of product relatedness purposefully aim to 
get some prices temporarily “wrong” in order to entice entrepreneurial activity to embark on production 
diversification. While world prices are assumed to be unaffected, domestic prices are assumed to be sticky and only 
over the long run responsive to a specific and temporary price distortion.  Market-driven rationalization of resource 
                                                        
240 Studies that differentiate the pace of growth between sectors and products ultimately owe a debt to Baumol’s seminal paper “Macroeconomics 
of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis,” 57(3) American Economic Review 415 (1967).  
241 Most percolation models of economic development assume path dependence; see for example Cristiano Antonelli, ed., Handbook on the 
Economic Complexity of Technological Change (Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 2011) and Gerd Schienstock, “Path Dependency and Path Creation: 
Continuity vs. Fundamental Change in National Economies,” 15(4) Journal of Futures Studies 63 (2011). Weak path dependence in the form of 
product space growth stands central in Section II. 
242 Daron Acemoglu, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) p. 703. For an excellent exposé on 
“primitive accumulation” and unbalanced growth – in the sense not argued for in this paper – see Paul Krugman, “Trade, Accumulation, and Uneven 
Development,” 8 Journal of Development Economics 149 (1981). 
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allocation consequently occurs after the acquisition of the necessary productive skills, or when the entry into new 
product markets has proven viable; i.e. at the moment when capital deepening occurs.243 
 
While it is clear that export restrictions can warp domestic244 resource allocation on at least two levels – under-
incentivizing upstream production and investments, while (over-)stimulating downstream processing industries – the 
policy’s capacity to spur economic development stands or falls with the implementation objective. Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan note that, “one cannot in general compute the pattern of ‘prices’ of value added from the knowledge of 
the tariff structure alone - one needs information on the production functions.”245  
 
This crucial observation emphasizes the importance of both the static and dynamic responses of the disaggregated 
constituents of an economy’s total production function. In order to fully address the dynamic effects of a trade 
measure on an economy’s industrial transformation, one would have to acknowledge the prevailing entry conditions, 
the potential viability of the targeted industry and indeed its proximity to existing export products. A process of 
dynamic emulation246 could then – and only then - have the potential to overwhelm the static efficiency loss 
(assuming transition costs are overcome and realignment happens smoothly). 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of why increased openness to trade is said to lead to enhanced growth performance 
depend in large measure on the growth model employed. A simple neoclassical growth model will, for example, 
                                                        
243 The viability of an industry can be assessed through the level of profits it generates or its continued dependence on the mispricing of the 
production factors – governments thus play “an active role in coordinating investments for industrial upgrading and diversification and in 
compensating for externalities generated by first-movers in the dynamic growth process” (Lin 2012). Such externalities can include free-rider 
problems and demand temporary monopoly profits or subsidies for first movers. See Justin Y. Lin, New Structural Economics: A Framework for 
Rethinking Development and Policy (Washington DC: World Bank, 2012), p. 5. For a historical example of a successful market rationalization in 
a post-industrial policy context, see Santiago Mingo and Tarun Khanna, “Industrial Policy and the Creation of New Industries: Evidence from 
Brazil’s Bioethanol Industry,” 23(5) Industrial and Corporate Change 1229 (2013). 
244 Note that in the presence of international market power, tariffs and export restrictions also affect the benchmark international prices; and in turn 
shape resource allocation through its enhanced, respectfully “corrected,” terms of trade. 
245 Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan, "The General Equilibrium Theory of Effective Protection and Resource Allocation," 3(3) Journal of 
International Economics 259 (1973), p. 278 (emphasis in the original). They go on to note that this stands in contrast to “the traditional model 
where one can predict that, ceteris paribus, the equilibrium output of a commodity will got up consequent on an in-crease in the tariff on this 
commodity without drawing upon any knowledge of its production function.” 
246 Economic emulation is used here in the sense of Justin Lin, New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2012); Erik Reneirt, “Emulation Versus Comparative Advantage: Competing and Complementary Principles in the 
History of Economic Policy,” in Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph Stiglitz, eds., Industrial Policy and Development: The Political Economy 
of Capabilities Accumulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009);  and Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy 
in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press, 2003). 
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emphasize the effect that trade openness has on factor prices,247 while learning-by-doing248 and more advanced 
endogenous growth249 models will emphasize the level of available technology to show that (asymmetrical) 
specialization patterns directly effect the growth rate.250 It is however furthermore conceivable, or even probable as I 
argue, that the very nature of the tradable output – or, similarly, the economy’s revealed comparative advantage - 
determines to a large extend which growth model (and trade policy) should be considered most appropriate.251 
 
Section 1.B.1, infra, will concentrate on a version of the dominant mature growth model that places the terms of 
trade central. This model could, in some form, be said to be tangent to and implicitly applied by the WTO as it 
works to get prices “right” in a terms of trade conscious environment.252 
 
1. Mature Growth and Export Restrictions 
 
The main argument in classic mature growth models is predicated on notions of shared technology, or of 
technological spillovers, affecting the productivity (or available product varieties) of an economy producing under 
diminishing returns. The resulting interplay of diminishing returns to accumulation (of capital) and technological 
progress determines the growth rate in, for instance, the Solow-Ramsey growth model (extended models of the AK-
type)253. In such models, differences in available technology,254 institutional quality255 and household saving 
                                                        
247 Factor prices stand central to the argument in Jaume Ventura, “Growth and Interdependence,” 112(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 57 (1997) 
and Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The World Income Distribution,” 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (2002). Both papers show 
how trade’s effect on factor prices can transform a closed economy with diminishing marginal returns on capital into one with constant marginal 
returns and vice-versa – thus switching the growth engine from capital/labor ratios to differential discount factors (neoclassical AK-model). 
248 In Kenneth Arrow, “The Economic Implication of Learning by Doing,” 29 Review of Economic Studies 155 (1962) learning by doing was 
modeled as increases to cumulative investment, whereas Robert Lucas, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” 22 Journal of Monetary 
Economics 3 (1988) takes the approach to human capital formation directly. 
249 The two canonical models are the expanding product variety model in Paul Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” 98(5) Journal of 
Political Economy 71 (1990), and the quality ladder model in Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991) and Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction,” 60(2) Econometrica 
323 (1992). 
250 Pietro Peretto and Simone Valente, “Resources, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,” 58 Journal of Monetary Economics 387 (2011); 
The benchmark two country model with different productivity levels was set in Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth 
in the Global Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). 
251 Such in contrast to the multi-regional Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model employed by the IMF, see for a cursory description 
Michael Andrle, et al., “The Flexible System of Global Models – FSGM,” IMF Working Paper WP/15/64 (April 2015). 
252 See, Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “Economic Theory and the Interpretation of GATT/WTO,” 46(2) The American Economist 3 (2002). 
253 The most simple expression of an “AK” growth model is as follows: H = N(O)PQ(RP 
254 For a model emphasizing the power of technological spillovers, see, for instance, Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Technological 
Diffusion, Convergence, and Growth," 2 Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1997); and Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti, "Productivity 
Differences," 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 563 (2001). 
255 Institutional quality is a multi-faceted concept that has been the object of much study. Its inputs range from measures of trade openness, to easy 
of doing business indicators, and examination of the prevalence of corruption or extend of elite capture. 
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propensity256 do not lead to long term differences in growth rates, but to differences in capital/labor ratios and 
international wage-differentials. 
 
Under conditions of specialized international trade, Acemoglu and Ventura show,257 for instance, how the terms of 
trade equilibrate several economic variables in an extended AK-model of growth. This approach is exquisitely 
suitable for a description of the (frictionless) dynamics of international trade under the mature growth model. The 
model presented by Acemoglu and Ventura further offers direct normative implications for setting desirable trade 
policies at the international level. In fact, Acemoglu and Ventura hint at the importance of international institutions 
to resolve cooperative and coordination questions among trading partners.258 A formal description of their argument 
is included in the Analytical Annex hereunder. 
 
Some element of specialization259 in international trade is essential to mature growth models, as without it products 
would be perfect substitutes and exports would face a flat international demand, returning the analysis to a state of 
autarky. In a simplified steady state model, I will emphasize the equilibrating effects of the (international or relative) 
terms of trade; assuming that growth happens as a result of capital accumulation only. Scarcity of capital then, 
relative to the world average, serves as a primary expression of the terms of trade in an economy. This domestic 
return to capital is, at the same time, balanced by the household saving rate or “effective rate of time preference.”260  
 
Economies that are capital poor, relative to their available technology and saving rate, consequently accumulate 
capital at a faster pace than the world average. Deteriorating terms of trade effects to some extend offset this element 
of convergence however.261 This dynamic between capital accumulation and the gradual deterioration of the terms of 
                                                        
256 In the Solow growth model a uniform and constant saving rate is assumed, whereas in neoclassical growth models this assumption is re-written 
to allow for the saving rate to be determined by the preference ordering of household consumption and saving decisions (ultimately allowing for a 
discussion on the optimality of an achieved equilibrium or steady state). 
257 Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The World Income Distribution,” 117(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (2002). 
258 Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The World Income Distribution,” 117(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (2002), pp. 667, fn. 
9. 
259 Although trade specialization is essential, some growth models employ a product variety approach to explain trade between similarly endowed 
economies and overcome the seemingly perfect substitution between, for example, high-end German and US cars. 
260 Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The World Income Distribution,” 117(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (2002), p. 662, explain 
that “[i]n the steady state, countries with lower rates of time preference and lower price of investment goods (those with fewer distortions affecting 
investment) will have lower rental rates, hence higher relative capital and income. Countries with better technologies will be richer, in turn, because 
they have higher rental rates for a given level of relative capital and income.” 
261 Acemoglu and Ventura find a 0.6 deterioration for each percentage of faster growth; Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The World Income 
Distribution,” 117(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (2002), p. 662. 
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trade can explain some of the persistent income differentials in the global steady state. Conditional convergence thus 
depends on the strength of the terms of trade effects and not on the capital share of output as in the Solow-Ramsey 
models. The insight that the quality of institutions (including trade openness) and the household saving rate are 
determinative of income differentials, rather than of fundamental influence on the pace of growth, is also 
corroborated by Howitt in a model that relies on spillovers from "leading-edge technology."262 
 
Note that in order to highlight the (dynamic) path of the terms of trade, as driven by international trade and capital 
accumulation, factor price equalization (FPE) is assumed to be absent. With FPE, the return to capital is independent 
of the relative abundance of domestic capital and countries can accumulate without experiencing diminishing 
returns. The FPE-mechanism thus has important implications for economic development policies under any 
endowment model of international trade.263 Under the presently favored terms of trade-centered approach to mature 
growth, cross-country divergences in technology, saving propensities, and institutions translate into differences in 
income levels, not growth rates. The mature growth terms-of-trade model thus showcases that “[c]ountries that 
accumulate capital faster than average experience declining export prices, reducing the rate of return to capital and 
discouraging further accumulation.”264 
 
The strong, and at time virulent, resistance to the use of tariffs and export restrictions as industrial policy tools in 
international trade finds clear expression in equilibrium theories of trade and growth that presume world wide, 
uniform, steady state growth paths. In an optimal steady state, trade measures are “shown” to be at best futile (as the 
terms of trade adjust) and at worst distortionary as the domestic growth rate is anchored to the world (or regional) 
equilibrium rate. Although the diversity of the tradable widgets is determined by the state of technology, the widgets 
themselves are homogenous and carry no additional information and have no notion of peer-wise proximity – 
technological progress is, additionally, made exogenous.  
 
                                                        
262 Peter Howitt, "Endogenous Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences," 90 American Economic Review 829 (2000). 
263 In fact, this is how Ventura analyses the rapid and sustained growth in East Asia, in Jaume Ventura, “Growth and Interdependence,” 112(1) The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 57 (1997). 
264 Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The World Income Distribution,” 117(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (2002), p. 664. 
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Under these conditions “inflating the macro-economic balloon,” a phrase borrowed from Ocampo,265 requires 
growing the economy through the accumulation of production factors in a steady state. Introduction of industrial 
policies that do not perfect the steady-state condition are therefore considered mainly harmful as they distort 
domestic production, stimulate institutional degradation (rent-seeking) and invite retaliation to make everyone worse 
off. 
 
Let it be noted though that this approach to economic growth leaves under-addressed the development conundrum 
that stands central to this work. Whereas no sophisticated theory of trade and development beyond a basic 
understanding of Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS)266 is needed to explain why Kuwait exports oil, there is an 
interesting puzzle in explaining why Kuwait for years exported crude oil instead of developing a refining capacity to 
diversify its export basket. In other words, why are some economies at a sector’s innovative edge without relevant 
natural endowment, while others export unprocessed raw materials?267 The exhaustibility of natural resources, their 
supply volatility and stock uncertainty all surely contribute to production allocation and development paths, in 
addition to historical and institutional reasons. However, economies that find themselves with a comparative 
advantage in the mere extraction of raw materials are (and should be) loathed to acquiesce. Their path toward “catch 
up” is argued for and explored in Section 1.B.2, infra. 
 
2. Catch Up Growth and Export Restrictions 
 
In the theory of mature economic growth, the concepts of market failures and externalities stand central as either the 
boogiemen or good-ferries of growth. Although these concepts are crucial to all models of economic growth and 
development, both market failures and economic externalities are ultimately employed to explain retardations or 
accelerations in the pace of production factor accumulation; in large part through efficiency and productivity 
                                                        
265 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “The Quest for Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” in Jose 
Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.8. 
266 Preference is given to a HOS model of trade over a Ricardian one to allow the interplay between country- and product-characteristics to come 
to the fore more intuitively, particularly when considering a multi-factor, multi-good simulation with friction. 




gains.268 This understanding crucially fails to account for a more fundamental insight: “that markets, by themselves, 
do not necessarily, or in general, lead to overall dynamic efficiency; and that there are often trade-offs between static 
inefficiencies […] and long-term growth.”269 
 
As Ocampo points out,270 dynamic efficiency is best understood to comprise of three parts: the first is the ability of 
the economy to generate new economic activities (to innovate or diversify), the second concerns the process by 
which the newly acquired economic activities generate complementarities, linkages, or networks that result in an 
integrated production fabric. “These two forces are closely interlinked with a third, which is the capacity to reduce 
the dualism or structural heterogeneity that characterizes production structures in developing countries—that is, the 
coexistence of high-productivity and low-productivity economic activities.”271 Together, these three forces instruct 
institutions and associated policy interventions to concentrate on a growth and development strategy aimed at the 
transformation of national production structures. 
 
The dynamics and innate complementarities of production structures and institutions, rather than a sovereign notion 
of market efficiency, are thus the root cause of changes in the momentum of economic growth. “In this sense, 
growth is essentially a meso-economic process, determined by the dynamics of production structures, a concept that 
summarizes the evolution of the sectoral composition of production, intra- and inter-sectoral linkages, market 
structures, the functioning of factor markets, and the institutions that support all of them.”272 A typology of structural 
change that distinguishes between strong (and weak) learning and strong (and weak) complementarities thus follows 
naturally and is insightfully provided by Ocampo.273 
                                                        
268 Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz additionally point out that “the ‘market failure’ language tends to be quite misleading in that, in order to evaluate the 
necessity and efficacy of any policy, it takes as a yardstick those conditions under which standard normative (‘welfare’) theorems hold.  The 
problem with such a framework is not that ‘market failures’ are not relevant. Quite the contrary: the problem is that hardly any empirical set-up 
bears a significant resemblance with the “yardstick” […],” Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi and Joseph Stiglitz, “Industrial Policies in Learning 
Economies,” IPD Working Paper (February 5, 2015). 
269 Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Helping Infant Economies Grow: Foundations of Trade Policies for Developing Countries,” 96(2) 
AEA Papers and Proceedings 141 (May 2006), p. 141; See also, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruce C. Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New 
Approach to Growth, Development, and Social Progress (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).  
270 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “The Quest for Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” in Jose 
Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
271 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “Introduction,” in Jose Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability 
(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. xii. 
272 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “The Quest for Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” in Jose 
Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 
12. 
273 For the purposes of our interest in export restrictions as a developmental policy, we defer the question of industrial embeddedness to a discussion 




The argument presented in this Section consequently emphasizes the nature of skill relatedness and capability 
accumulation in order to shed light on the use of industrial policies as first best tools in growth models of strong 
dynamic learning and product diversification. Useful industrial policies will be said to offer least-invasive guidance 
to the processes of technological learning and innovation, economic coordination, and development. This type of 
pro-active market making should not only occur at the technological frontier, through (infra-structural) R&D 
subsidies, energy feed-in-tariffs, and international intellectual property protection, but should instead be recognized 
as an essential property of economic growth at any stage of development.  
 
Since Solow, technological progress has been recognized as the engine that drives productivity increases.274 The 
“structuralist” tradition, originating in earnest with Schumpeter,275 has rather stressed the diversification potential of 
technological progress. In 1969, Atkinson and Stiglitz recognize that productive capacity and knowledge are 
essentially local and examine the effects of the localization of knowledge on the decisions of firms and governments 
as the production function shifts outward.276 Forty-five years later, Acemoglu extends this insight and offers some 
micro-foundations, connecting the induced-innovation literature to directed-technological change models.277 
 
As a consequence, drivers of innovation and technological adoption are best envisioned relative to the market they 
engage, i.e. creative destruction is a localized process with potentially global consequences.278 Technological 
adoption and innovation is a direct result of profit maximization decisions by firms in light of their present capacity 
set,279 associated (diversification) costs,280 relevant consumer demand and international trade opportunities. 
                                                        
Zhang, “Industrial Structure, Appropriate Technology and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries,” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4905 (2009). For now, we proceed to assume that an economic anchor develops organically if the diversification target is chosen properly.   
274 Note that the causal link between productivity growth and dynamic economic performance has also been insightfully argued to run in the reverse; 
know as the Kaldor-Verdoorn law – see José Antonio Ocampo, Codrina Rada, and Lance Taylor, “Growth and Sectoral Policy,” in Growth and 
Policy in Developing Countries: A Structuralist Approach (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), Chapter 8, p. 121 et seq. 
275 Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
276 Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, “A New View of Technological Change,” 79(315) The Economic Journal 573 (1969). 
277 Daron Acemoglu, “Localized and Bias Technologies: Atkinson and Stiglitz’ New View, Induced Innovations, and Directed Technological 
Change,” NBER Working Paper 20060 (2014). 
278 A proposition that is hotly debated in the context of the Digital Economy, in terms of participation, content creation, and hardware development. 
279 Note that a considerable amount of heterogeneity exists between frontier and lagging firms which translates into long and differentiate penetration 
rates of the adopted or discovered technology; see Diego Comin and Marti Mestieri, “If Technology Has Arrived Everywhere, Why Has Income 
Diverged?,” CEPR Discussion Paper 9466 (2013). 
280 Compare for different approaches to “costs” Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik “Economic Development As Self- Discovery,” 72(2) Journal 
of Development Economics 603 (2003); with Eric Verhoogen, David Atkin, Azam Chaudhry, Shamyla Chaudry, and Amit Khandelwal, 




However, this is not a static assessment as the decision to invest in new technology (be it through adoption or by 
frontier development) takes account of present as well as expected demand and future factor prices.281 This is 
especially so when, as Acemoglu has shown (broadly in line with Heckscher-Ohlin predictions), technological 
progress is endogenously biased against a scarce factor of production.282 
 
The government can thus play a crucial role in “guiding” entrepreneurial innovation by (wisely) influencing the 
expectation structure of future profits and factor prices283 – through subsidies, regulatory rents284 or through trade 
measures such as export restrictions. As similarly argued by Noman,285 it is this form of pro-active coordination and 
encouragement of appropriate learning and innovation that should drive a modern industrial policy to “get prices 
wrong” and, in terms of the growth model specified below, aim to maximize the probabilities of product diversity 
growth at the technological frontier and behind it. 
 
a. Production Sets: Innovation and Diversification 
Vanek, in 1968,286 abstracted from the particular skill-information inherent in the production of specific goods and 
commodities in favor of trade in factor proportions.287 Ever since, the structuralist tradition - that focused attention 
on skill complementarities and linkages in production - has gradually been snowed under or simply bypassed.288 Not 
withstanding the persuasiveness of the mature growth models’ view of economic growth as a smooth process of 
production factor accumulation and incremental technological growth – a process not unlike inflating a balloon, to 
                                                        
281 Atkinson and Stiglitz note that firms cannot be myopic and must “take account of future as well as present factor prices.” Anthony Atkinson and 
Joseph Stiglitz, “A New View of Technological Change,” 79(315) The Economic Journal 573 (1969), p. 575. 
282 Daron Acemoglu, “Equilibrium Bias of Technology” 75(5) Econometrica 1371 (2007). 
283 Atkins and Stiglitz note: “where technical progress is localised, the Government should be concerned not merely with the level of investment or 
output, but must make sure that firms are directed towards the "right" technique on long-run consideration.” Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, 
“A New View of Technological Change,” 79(315) The Economic Journal 573 (1969), p. 575. 
284 For a recent case, see Anupam Chander, “How Law Made Silicon Valley,” 63(3) Emory Law Journal 639 (2014). 
285 Akbar Noman, “Industrial and Trade Policies in Africa: From Unproductive Rents to Learning and Accumulation,” in 
JICA/IPD Africa  Task  Force Working Papers (IPD and JICA, 2013), notes: “A carefully crafted system of protection can help to divert rents to 
productive activities and learning that are the basis for sustained growth” on pages 277-278. 
286 See Jaroslav Vanek, “The Factor Proportions Theory: The N-Factor Case,” 4 Kyklos 749 (1968); see for important extensions emphasizing 
implicit trade in factor services also Elhanan Helpman, “International Trade in the Presence of Product Differentiation, Economies of Scale and 
Monopolistic Competition: A Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach,” 11(3) Journal of International Economics 305 (1981) and Paul Krugman, 
“But For, As If, and So What? Thought Experiments on Trade and Factor Prices,” mimeo, MIT (1996). 
287 For an insightful extension and explanation, see Ronald Findlay, Factor Proportions, Trade and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). Work 
by Dani Rodrik, Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hidalgo, among others, are now (re)creating the product-space by emphasizing cross-relationships 
between products. 
288 Krugman notes that the demise of “high-development” growth theory was, at least in part, due to an inability at the time to analytically reconcile 
economies of scale with a competitive market structure. This difficulty, as well as trying to model circular causation, meant “high development 
theory was not so much rejected as simply bypassed.” Paul Krugman, Development, Geography and Economic Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1997), pp. 25-27. 
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again borrow Ocampo’s apt use of imagery289 - economic growth happens in leaps and bounds and goes 
accompanied by large discontinuities.290 
 
According to the balloon-view, structural changes, i.e. changes to the sectoral composition of output and in the 
patterns of international specialization, appear as a by-product of smooth growth in per capita GDP. To stay viable 
in an open economy, producers will move to adjust their production methods to favor the economy’s evolving 
comparative (and their competitive) advantage,291 in line with the predictions of a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) model of international trade.292 Whereas it is undeniable that factor proportions theory is a cornerstone to any 
HOS explanation of international trade patterns, its prescriptions remain confined to allowing endowments to 
determine optimal trade patterns.293,294 The inter-temporal bootstrapping of comparative advantage-driven static 
equilibriums thus reigns supreme in mature growth models. 
 
As Rodrik correctly stresses though, almost all factor markets are characterized by spillovers and externalities, 
which make it impossible to confidently detect a natural optimal equilibrium. This impossibility is further 
exacerbated in the presence of subsidies. Instead, decentralized price-formation295 combined with demands of 
efficiency maximization, as identified by local profit maximizing entrepreneurs, should direct the organic 
                                                        
289 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “The Quest for Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” in Jose 
Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.8. 
290 See, for instance, Carlotta Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital. The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2002); and Ricardo Hausmann, Fancisco Rodriquez, and Rodrigo Wagner, “Growth Collapses,” Harvard Kennedy School Working 
Paper RWP06/046 (October 2006). 
291 Note that traditional comparative advantage augmenting social technologies will be considered as acting across sectors as the term ζj applies 
universally, favoring all industries equally. 
292 Andrew Bernard et al., “Survival of the Best Fit: Exposure to Low-Wage Countries and the (Uneven) Growth of U.S. Manufacturing Plants,” 
LSE CEP Working Paper (2003), find a reallocation of U.S. import competing manufacturing away from labor intensive plants toward capital 
intensive production. 
293 See Anne O. Krueger and David W. H. Orsmond, “Impact of Government of Growth and Trade,” in Wilfred Ethier, Elhanan Helpman and J. 
Peter Neary, Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); who, unsurprisingly see the 
role of trade policies such as to maximize “the opportunities that trade provides for a developing country to use its abundant factors of production 
effectively” (p. 239). HOS models of international trade are known for their ability to produce quasi-robust structural predictions, making the model 
verifiable. 
294 Including through the maximization of savings that are then recycled as research and development expenditures or contribute directly to capital 
formation. See, for example, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Hysteresis in the Trade Pattern,” in Wilfred Ethier, Elhanan Helpman and 
J. Peter Neary, Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
295 As Charles Sabel notes, “economic actors must almost always make decisions by combining prices with highly detailed, local, or idiosyncratic 
information regarding inputs, production processes, or products” in “Self-Discovery as a Coordination Problem,” in Charles Sabel, et al., eds., 
Export Pioneers in Latin America (Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2012). See also F.A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery 
Procedure,” 5(3) The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 9 (2002). 
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development path Rodrik argues.296 This decentralized process does however allow for, indeed demands, active 
government intervention to shape incentives and to “protect” certain first mover advantages over other interests. 
 
In the alternate view it is the very success of structural change, hereunder approached through progression in the 
“Product Space,” that ultimately drives economic growth and determines the pace of development. An economy’s 
“ability to constantly generate new dynamic activities” — be it through innovations at the technological frontier or 
export diversification as part of catch up growth — “is, in this sense, the essential determinant of rapid economic 
growth. In this view, structural transformations are not automatic or costless. There are always entry costs for new 
activities. The inability to generate new economic activities— that is, to cover entry costs—may thus block the 
development process.”297 
 
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik298 similarly recognize that the range of goods an economy viably produces is not 
only determined by such fundamentals as factor proportions and institutions, but that the process of “cost 
discovery”299 by which entrepreneurs - be they foreign or domestic - explore their dynamic competitive advantage is 
at least of equal importance. The importance of the process of cost discovery in economic diversification and 
structural change thus creates a natural space for industrial policies in addition to those policies that correct for 
market failures and interact with externalities. 
 
Another element of the structure and process of economic growth is sometimes found in increases in product 
quality. When considering the role of goods and production in economic growth, some “natural” heterogeneity in 
the form of quality differences remains even when disaggregating Vanek-style homogenous goods to a very fine 
level. Movements along this quality dimension can be seen as “upgrades” arising from investments and production 
factor accumulation. In line with the predictions of the neoclassic growth model, Lederman and Maloney find a 
convergence dynamic, “that is, within a good, countries further from the frontier will, all things being equal, 
                                                        
296 See Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); see also Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik, 
“Economic Development as Self-Discovery,” Harvard University Working Paper (2003). 
297 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “The Quest for Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” in Jose 
Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.8. 
298 Ricardo Hausmann, Jason Hwang, and Dani Rodrik, “What You Export Matters,” Harvard University Working Paper (2005). 
299 Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik, “Economic Development as Self-Discovery,” Harvard University Working Paper (2003). 
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experience faster growth rates of their export unit values.”300 Such movements are however not intrinsic to the 
(learning-) characteristics of the goods themselves, they rather reflect the ease of production factor accumulation and 
decisions of producers as to where along the quality ladder they produce. 
 
Under the assumption that, at the macro-level, the factor proportion theory for firm-level maximization generally 
holds, trade data at a deeply disaggregated level301 seem to indeed betray a quality-type H-O-type specialization in 
the face of a strong heterogeneity of in-product quality-ladders.302 A burgeoning product-embedded capital/labor-
ratio (K/L) can, with reference to work by Peter Schott,303 indicate the presence of product quality differentiation. In 
fact, per-unit values express the different economy’s relative factor endowments and production techniques quite 
convincingly.304 Note that while increases in labor productivity can thus find ultimate expression in the pace of 
product quality improvements, such quality upgrading is not considered an export diversification for the purposes of 
this work (see Equations 21 and 22 in the Analytical Annex Part B, infra). No sufficiently new productive 
capabilities are acquired in the process of quality upgrading. For if new productive capabilities were acquired, 
product diversification instead of quality upgrading would have occurred. 
 
Whereas the balloon-view and structuralist tradition aim to describe the process and drivers of structural change or 
across-product growth at the margin (be it at the technological frontier or through catch up growth), the quality-view 
presents an account of in-product differences. In the below, and throughout this work, emphasis is placed on the 
importance of skills and productive capacities to direct the process of across-product economic growth. In fact, 
Section 1.B.3, infra, exploits the postulates of the “Product Space” to stress the importance of economic 
diversification over specialization. The relatedness of products (and skills) allows the social planner to map the 
                                                        
300 Daniel Lederman William F. Maloney, Does What You Export Matter? In Search of Empirical Guidance for Industrial Policies (Washington 
DC: The World Bank, 2012), p. 75. 
301 Such disaggregated trade statistics can be found at the NBER Trade Database, following work by Feenstra (1996), available at: 
http://www.nber.org/data/, based on the universal ten digit Harmonized System (adopted in the U.S. in 1989, which supplanted the U.S.-only seven 
digit Tariff Schedule). 
302 A recent study by Amit Khandewal, “The Long and Short (of) Quality Ladders,” 77(4) Review of Economic Studies 1450 (2010), finds substantial 
heterogeneity in a product market’s scope for quality differentiation. 
303 Peter K. Schott, “One Size Fits All? Heckscher-Ohlin Specialization in Global Production,” 93(3) The American Economic Review 686 (2003); 
Peter K. Schott, “Do Countries Specialize?,” Yale School School of Management Working Paper (2001); Peter K. Schott, “Across-Product versus 
Within-Product Specialization in International Trade,” 119(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 647 (2004). 
304 Peter K. Schott, “Across-Product versus Within-Product Specialization in International Trade,” 119(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 647 
(2004); but see critically examined in Mukerji and Panagariya, “Within- and Across-Product Specialization Revisited,” (2009). 
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proximity-structure of his economy’s footprint. This ability in turn informs the normative prescriptions of the catch-
up process.  
 
Industrial policies will be normatively optimal when they aid in the identification of viable diversification 
opportunities and stimulate the dynamic process of cost discovery. In this way export restrictions can be employed 
to stabilize relevant macro-economic conditions305 as well as work to shape factor prices in such a way as to 
incentivize “entry” and enable economic catch up. 
 
It is worth emphasizing here that knowledge, embodied in human capital and best practices, is multidimensional – 
while a country can be said to be at the product diversity frontier in one aspect, a large differentiation in productivity 
and competitiveness might pervade across its sectors and between its corporations (what Ocampo termed 
“dualism”).306 Economies are likely to occupy a spectrum rather than a single point on a technological and 
competitiveness continuum.  
 
Whereas this, prima facie somewhat innocent, observation is rather innocuous in mature markets (giving rise to the 
capitalist dynamics of creative destruction in the form of continuous resource realignments), it has controversial 
implications for the multispectral differentiation of and between developing countries. Such not only in terms of the 
embeddedness (or economic depth) of macro-economic dynamics, but also in relation to the way developmental 
exceptions and exemptions are structured in the regulatory framework governing international trade (Chapter 4, 
infra). 
b. Product Relatedness and the Product Space 
Traditional theories of modern economic growth (mature or unbalanced) assume either the production of relatively 
homogenous products (widgets), such as inhabit a continuously positive sloping and equidistant capital-labor 
                                                        
305 Macro-economic (in)stabilization is understood broadly here as including “not only high inflation and unsustainable fiscal imbalances, but also 
sharp business cycles, volatile relative prices, unsustainable current account disequilibria, and risky private sector balance sheets – see Jose Antonio 
Ocampo, “Developing Countries’ Anti-Cyclical Policies in a Globalized World,” in Amitava Dutt and Jaime Ros, eds., Development Economics 
and Structuralist Macroeconomics: Essays in Honour of Lance Taylor (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 2003). 
306 See for the importance of elements of structural heterogeneity, Jose Antonio Ocampo, “The Quest for Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics 
and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” in Jose Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic 
Vulnerability (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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quadrant (K/L space), or postulate the existence of industrial linkages that are external to the production of the goods 
themselves, such as global value chains307 in a recent incarnation. Economic advancement is thus approached as 
either growing an ever-increasing product-embedded K/L ratio (where specialization occurs in the production of 
frontier varieties, possibly with inverse v-type switching308), or by the continuous diversification of production 
structures through import-substitution, while retaining as much of the value chain as industrial linkages allow 
(outsourcing least rewarding elements in vertical specialization309). 
 
Alternatively, Hausmann and Hidalgo find, in seeming opposition to Ricardian (or HOS) prescriptions of 
specialization and homogenously linear progress, a systematically inverse relationship between the diversification of 
a country’s exports and the ubiquity of those products. The more ubiquitous part a product is of the global export 
basket, the less broadly diversified a country will be and, conversely, the more countries will be competent to export 
the product.310 Obstacles to increased diversification arise from product specific skill-coordination problems; the 
more capabilities are missing or failing, the more constrained an economy’s production basket will be. The distance 
between an economy’s current competitive production output and the next available set of capabilities will thus 
determine an economy’s development path and speed.311 
 
Hausmann and Klinger argue that changes to the revealed comparative advantage of economies are  “governed by 
the pattern of relatedness of products at the global level.”312 Relatedness, or proximity, of products is subsequently 
                                                        
307 The presence of global value chains has shifted focus from trade in (final) goods to transforming an economy’s productive capabilities in order 
to be part of an existing value chain or to further regional economic integration; see Bernard Hoekman, Supply Chains, Mega-Regionals and 
Multilaterism – A Road Map for the WTO (CEPR Press, 2014). 
308 Lin, Ju and Wang provide such a development model with inverse-v switching for a closed backward economy that borrows technology freely, 
where “the economic development process in a developing country is characterized by the continuous upgrading of its endowment structure from 
relatively scarce in capital and relatively abundant in labor or natural resources to relatively abundant in capital and relative scarce in labor/natural 
resources. […] The household’s capital allocation determines the evolution of capital endowment and the intertemporal use of capital in production. 
Then, along the cross-section dimension, the capital allocated for production determines the production structures (industrial choices) as if it were 
a static model. Ultimately, the mathematical problem is reduced to dynamic optimization with switching state equations.” Justin Yifu Lin, Jiandon 
Ju and Yong Wang, “Endowment Structures, Industrial Dynamics, and Economic Growth,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5055 
(2009), pp. 4-5. 
309 Richard Baldwin, “WTO 2.0: Global Governance of Supply-Chain Trade,” 5(2) Review of International Organizations (2014); Bamber, 
Fernandez-Stark, Gereffi, and Quinn, “Connecting Local Producers in Developing Countries to Regional and Global Value Chains – Update,” 
OECD Trade Policy Paper 160 (2013). 
310 Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hildalgo, “Country Diversification, Product Ubiquity, and Economic Divergence,” Harvard Kennedy School 
(2010). 
311 Cesar Hildago, Bailly Klinger, A-L Barabási and Ricardo Hausmann, “The Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations” 317:5837 
Science 482 (2007). 
312 Ricardo Hausmann and Bailey Klinger, “The Structure of the Product Space and the Evolution of Comparative Advantage,” Harvard Kennedy 
School (February 2007), p. 1. 
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defined as the minimum of pairwise conditional probability of exporting one product,313 given that another is 
exported. Connections between countries and products signal the availability of relevant productive capabilities in a 
country (method of reflections)314. The main information about the skill-content of any one product is thus 
determined in relation to the “worst” competitive exporter of the product; presumably the economy for which the 
particular product represents the cutting structural edge of endowments and productive capacities.315 
 
As Pietronero similarly observes, “from a mathematical point of view, the nested structure [of export diversification 
and country characteristics] calls for a strongly non-linear and extremal coupling between the level of sophistication 
of products […] and the competitiveness of countries […].”316 Pietronero, however, notes critically that “while it is 
reasonable to measure the competitiveness and adaptability of a country through the sum of the quality and 
complexity of its products, it is not possible to adopt the same approach to measure the quality and complexity of 
products. In particular the complexity of a product cannot be defined as the average of the fitness of the countries 
producing it.”317 
 
The complexity of a product (as opposed to the direct relationship between the fitness of an economy and the 
complexity of the products it exports), should be inversely proportional to its ubiquity. The relationship between 
country fitness and product complexity should, additionally, be non-linearly bounded, emphasizing the contribution 
of less complex economies in the construction of product complexity. This brings Pietronero to express country 







                                                        
313 Cesar A. Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann, “The building blocks of economic complexity,” 106(26) Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences (PNAS) 10570 (2009). 
314 Insightfully criticized by Luciano Pietronero, et al., in “A Network Analysis of Countries’ Export Flows: Firm Grounds for the Building Blocks 
of the Economy,” 7(10) PLoS One (2012). This point is also made in Guido Caldarelli, et al., “A Network Analysis of Countries’ Export Flows: 
Firm Grounds for the Building Blocks of the Economy,” 7(10) PLoS One e47278 (2012), offering a solution built on Markov chains. 
315 Note that this conception of product-skill relatedness abstracts from quality differences, which are re-introduced in our production function (1) 
as the growth of the K/L ratio, bounded by the product specific quality ladder. Such growth is limited in its contribution to GDP growth due to the 
decreasing returns structure of production.  
316 Luciano Pietronero, et al., Economic Complexity: Measuring the Intangibles – A Consumers’ Guide (March 2014), p. 8. 
317 Luciano Pietronero, et al., “A New Metrics for Countries' Fitness and Products' Complexity,” Nature (Scientific Reports) (2012), p. 1 (italics 
added), available at: http://www.nature.com/srep/2012/121010/srep00723/full/srep00723.html.  







First the intermediate variables S′U(V) and WXY(V) are computed, while Mcp is the weighted country(c)-product(p) 
matrix, these variables are then normalized to come to the standard measure of country fitness SU(V)  and product 
complexity	WX(V). The values associated with country (c) fitness and product (p) complexity are expressions of 
fundamental, non-tradable endowments (capabilities) sufficient to produce a country-product pair. The necessary 
capability set is directly derived from the revealed comparative advantage (theory of reflections) of the weakest 
exporting economy, which includes (but is not limited to) the prevailing institutions, the stock of viable technology, 
physical and human capital.319 Crucially, any capability set is approached as both complex and evolving.320 
 
Economies thus face a non-monotonic relationship between the time-variant aggregate proximity measures of their 
export basket and the probability of developing a revealed comparative advantage in another product. The Product 
Space discourse, despite obvious limitations,321 holds the promise of analytically framing a probabilistic approach to 
the path that economies might take toward full economic development and convergence with the frontier. Economic 
growth thus adheres to a certain measure of path dependence, probabilistically described. 
 
The connected or nested structure of a network informs the path that economies are likely to take while dynamically 
shedding and adding exports. If we assume a large global stock of heterogeneous productive capabilities (a relatively 
                                                        
319 See, for instance, Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: Belkap Press, 2011). 
320 The theory of reflections and capabilities is fundamentally agnostic to the choice of micro-economic model, holding out explicitly the possibility 
that non-equilibrium, evolving or complexity approaches to technology and productive societal interaction might trump classical notions of balanced 
growth; see, generally, W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); W. Brian Arthur, “Complexity 
Economics: A Different Framework for Economic Thought,” Santa Fe Institute Working Paper 2013-04-012 (2013); and W. Brian Arthur, The 
Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves (London: Allen Lane, 2009). 
321 As the product space and theory of reflections relies conceptually on the theory of revealed comparative advantages and draws it data from trade 
databases to form an opinion about the structure of an economy’s total GDP and productive capabilities, problems abound: it accounts too little for 
trade openness, domestic market size, and other related factors; it excludes services altogether; and the actual capability value goes in part obscured 
by the existence of global value chains. 
Their comparison with standardmonetary indices can be interpreted
as the potential for growth. Themethod represents a new approach to
the fundamental analysis of countries’ productive systems and it also
introduces a non-monetary classification of product complexity.
Furthermore we can define an effective measure for the Complexity
of the products filtering out monetary biases from the product com-
plexity definition such as labor cost, price market speculation, eco-
nomical inefficiencies of commodities pricing, etc.
Results
The basic idea is to define an iteration process which couples the
Fitness of a country Fc to the Complexity of a product Qp and then
obtain the fixed point values. For the Fitness Fc it is natural that this is
proportional to the sum of the products exported weighted by their
complexityQp. ForQp the situation is more subtle. To a first approxi-
mation, the complexity of a product is inversely proportional to the
number of countries which export it. In addition, if a country has a
high fitness this should reduce the weight in bounding the complex-
ity of a product, and the countries with low fitness should strongly
contribute to the bound on Qp. These ideas9 are summarized in the
iteration of Eqs. 1.























This iterative method is composed of two steps at each iteration: we
first compute the intermediate variables ~F nð Þc and ~Q
nð Þ
p and then nor-
malize them. The initial conditions are ~Q 0ð Þp ~1 Vp and ~F
0ð Þ
c ~1 Vc.
The elements Mcp are the elements of the binary country-product
matrix M: they are 1 if the country c exports the product p and 0
otherwise (see Methods for the mathematical definition of the
matrix). We have tested numerically that the fixed point of this
coupled maps is stable and not dependent on the initial condition.
Given the fact that we want the less complex exporters to give a
dominant contribution to the product complexity, the non-linearity
of our coupled maps is a fundamental mathematical property that is
unavoidable in view of the economic diversification problem. In
particular, the definition of Q seems to us the simplest and most
natural way to implement the desired behavior: the sum in the
denominator is dominated by the producers with the lowest fitness
and increases as the total number of exporter increases, thus con-
sidering the ubiquity of the product. Finally inverting the summakes
Q coherent with its positive meaning of complexity. In contrast,
previous attempts2 were based on a linear iteration that, by construc-
tion, contracts the information and is inconsistent with the economic
criteria of relating the complexity of a product to the complexity of its
producers. The need of a non-linear framework was also preliminary
indicated in8. At the end of this section we show a detailed compar-
ison between the results of the two methods run on the same dataset,
and discuss how they are in favor of the non linear iterations.
Moving to the results, a preliminary comment is to be made. We
showmainly how our results are more consistent, compared to those
obtained with the linear method, with the framework of economic
complexity whichHidalgo andHausmann proposed. This ismade by
both formal arguments and a qualitative comparison to standard
macroeconomical analysis of the economy of countries. However,
a systematic validation, in terms of the ability of the algorithm to
predict growth as a result of development, is a complex matter which
deals with the heterogeneous dynamics to which economies in dif-
ferent phases are subject. We will enter in the details of such analysis
in future works. The first result that we find through this approach is
that we can more convincingly reproduce the difference between
different countries (Fig. 2d) by broadening the distribution of Fc
and Qp from the initial state towards a Pareto-like distribution as
expected from experimental observations. In fact, as exemplified by
the illustrative Fig. 2c, we expect that the iterative method, which
adds more information about the complexity of products at each
step, will tend to separate countries with respect to the starting point,
differently from the procedure of HH. As an example we can con-
sider USA and Nigeria. USA has a more diversified export basket
with respect to Nigeria and likely, on average, the complexity of its
products is higher than the one of Nigeria. Therefore the next itera-
tion should necessarily increase the gap between Nigeria and USA
with respect to the starting point. This way of reasoning holds for all
the orders of the iterativemethod. On this account in Fig. 2dwe show
the evolution of the distributions of the variable kc (HH) and our
countries’ fitness. It is clear that only our method is consistent with
the expected behavior shown in Fig. 2c.
Another important element is that our method leads naturally to
Pareto-like (power law) distributions which are an epitome of real
Economic Complexity10,11. The fact that this type of results are a
natural outcome of our theory is an important test of its validity.
The Pareto-like features of our metrics are shown in Fig. 3a–b–c
where we report the rank-size laws for the non-monetary fitnesses,
the weighted fitnesses and the complexity of products in the binary
andweighted case. By weighted fitness wemean the weighted version
of our metrics which complements the results of the non-monetary
case. The weighted fitness and complexity are obtained as the non-
monetary partners by iterating eqs. 1 using the matrixW instead of
M. The elements of W are defined as share of the country c of the
world export of the product p (see Materials andMethods for further
discussions). We point out that, while the non-monetary metrics
gives a sort of intensive (or per capita) information on the level of
competitiveness of a country, the weighted one instead partly repre-
sents an extensive piece of information of the country. In detail the
countries are weighted according to the fraction of export within the
set of exporters of a fixed product p, but we are still intensively
treating the total export volume of different products since the
sum of the weights over all the exporters of a product is equal to 1
Figure 1 | Diversification vs Specialization. According to the standard
analysis the specialization of countries on few specific products should be
an optimal strategy but this is valid only in a static situation. The strongly
dynamical situation of the world market suggests that flexibility and
adaptability are even more important to be the most competitive while the
ones specialized on those few products exported by almost every country
are the poorest. On this account mainstream theories would predict an
almost diagonal binary country product matrix while, ordering rows and
columns with respect to our metrics for countries’ fitness and products’
complexity we observe a triangular-shaped matrix. The matrix is built
from the export flows of the year 2010 and the products are categorized
according to theHarmonized System 2007 coding system at 4 digits level of
coarse-graining.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2 : 723 | DOI: 10.1038/srep00723 2
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sparsely populated product field), the progress of an economy’s nested economic structure or dynamic fit can be 
described with a probit model:322 
 NU,X,* = 	Z[U,* + \[X,* + ]9[U,* ∙ [X,*: + _U,X,*        (4) 
 
Where NU,X,* denotes the economy’s adjacency matrix, [U,*  refers to the economy’s footprint in the network and [X,*  
refers to the products’ ubiquity. The term 9[U,* ∙ [X,*: depicts the  interaction between the diversity and ubiquity 
measures, whereas _U,X,* represents the error term. Bustos, et al., find all coefficients highly significant, “meaning 
that a model that would only consider diversity or ubiquity, or both of them without an interaction term, would not 
be as accurate.”323  
 
The central growth equations of the “catch-up” model (23-24), described in the Analytical Annex Part B, capture 
this insight by postulating a time, product and economy specific probabilistic relationship (ϖt,n,j) between exporting 
an additional product (n), given an economy’s current export basket (Nj). This pairwise probability is informed by 
an economy’s existing footprint in the product space, the targeted product’s ubiquity and the relationship between 
these diversity and ubiquity measures. The effective probability of diversification is constrained by country specific 
institutional characteristics and societal learning aspects (ζj). 
 
The familiar concepts of path dependence and pre-structured technological progress have long stood central to the 
notion of technological progress and development, as explored and argued by New Development Economics.324 
Recent developments in network theory, stressing the nestedness of (and thus structural relatedness between) nodes 
                                                        
322 Sebastian Bustos, Charles Gomez, Ricardo Hausmann, and Cesar Hildalgo, “The Dynamics of Nestedness Predicts the Evolution of Industrial 
Ecosystems,” 7(1) PLoS One (2012), p. 3. 
323 Sebastian Bustos, Charles Gomez, Ricardo Hausmann, and Cesar Hildalgo, “The Dynamics of Nestedness Predicts the Evolution of Industrial 
Ecosystems,” 7(1) PLoS One (2012), p 4.  
324 See, for instance, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977); Giovanni 
Dosi, "Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical 
Change," 11(3) Research Policy 147 (1982); Giovanni Dosi, "Sources, Procedures and Micro-Economic Effects of Innovation," 26(3) Journal of 
Economic Literature 1126 (1988). 
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(products), allow for an intuitive grasp of (micro- and structural macro-)economic optimization dynamics, subject to 
societal learning325 and institutional constraints.326 
 
Nestedness is in fact a cornerstone concept of New Development Economics as it connects some defining aspects 
thereof, such as a networked theory of growth, societal learning, and institutional constraints, to Hirschman’s earlier 
analysis of “linkages.” Hirschman emphasized that moving from an (underdevelopment-) equilibrium to a superior 
one required a “minimum critical effort”327 to establish and anchor productive processes through newly realized 
backward and forward linkages. This process of development consequently “depends not so much on finding 
optimal combinations for given resources and factors of production as on calling forth and enlisting for development 
purposes resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or badly utilized.”328 Nestedness, as applied to a techno-
industrial Product Space, allows industrial policies to positively identify some of these missing, suppressed or 
hidden resources and abilities, and to target them accordingly. 
 
In a partial counter-counterrevolution (or as a word of caution), the endogenous growth model by Ju, Lin and 
Wang,329 insightfully captures how an optimal industrial structure, in a world with “free” or “non-descript” 
technology, is endogenously determined by the available factor endowments. This effectively limits the 
opportunities for countries to “defy their comparative advantage.”330 
 
In Ju, Lin and Wang’s model, switching or industrial upgrading occurs naturally in an inverse-v pattern through a 
continuous process of capital deepening that brings down the rental cost of capital and increases the K/L-ratio. If a 
“new” product is targeted prematurely - that is a product that requires a too high K/L-ratio - the economy can be 
                                                        
325 Entrepreneurship and industrial learning are properly thought of as a societal undertaking, where broad collective trends and accommodative 
action are essential; see Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, and Social 
Progress (Columbia University Press, 2014); and Claudia Schoonhoven and Elaine Romanelli, "Emergent Themes and The Next Wave of 
Entrepreneurial Research," in Claudia Schoonhoven and Elaine Romanelli, eds., The Entrepreneurship Dynamic: Origins of Entrepreneurship and 
the Evolution of Industries (Stanford: Stanford Business Books, 2001). 
326 See, for instance, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, “Institutions as A Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” in 
Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, ed., Handbook of Economic Growth: Volume 1A (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing, 2005). 
327 Albert O. Hirschman, “A Dissenter’s Confession: Revisiting the Strategy of Economic Development,” in Gerald M. Meier, and Dudley Seers, 
eds., Pioneers in Development (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1984), p. 105; cited and contextualized in Michele Alacevich, “Early 
Development Economics Debates Revisited,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4441 (2007), p. 4. 
328 Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963 [1958]), p. 5. 
329 Justin Yifu Lin, Jiandon Ju and Yong Wang, “Endowment Structures, Industrial Dynamics, and Economic Growth,” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 5055 (2009). 
330 Ha-Joong Chang, in in Justin Y. Lin and Ha-Joong Chang, “Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries Conform to Comparative 
Advantage or Defy it? A Debate Between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang,” 27(5) Development Policy Review 483 (2009). 
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pushed to exhaust its complete capital stock and fall into a permanent poverty trap.331 Within the present context, I 
interpret the work of Ju, Lin and Wang to show the perils of disregarding equilibrium conditions in active market 
making. Their work underscores that however powerful the concept of nestedness can be heuristically, an integrated 
industrial policy aimed at spurring catch up growth cannot disregard the implementing economy’s particular set of 
macro- and micro-economic conditions. 
 
Although universal, the Product Space is not characterized by homogenous proximity measures. Instead, the Product 
Space is modular; some products are highly interconnected while others are far removed. Despite this modularity, 
there appears to be a core to the network formed by metal products, machinery, and chemicals, whereas the rest of 
the product classes forms the periphery with strong peripheral clusters in garments, textiles, and animal 
agriculture.332 Similarly, lack of external product connectedness within the existing export basket (leading to a low 
probability of diversification (ϖt,n,j)) may explain persistent poverty and lack of transformation in LDCs and certain 
middle income economies. 
 
An economy’s progress toward less-ubiquitous, rarified and more highly connected products is thus path dependent 
and highly concentrated around certain vertices (or central nodes).333 Jankowska, Nagengast and Perea note that 
“[t]he average clustering coefficient provides a network-motivated measure of the similarity and hence 
specialisation of an export profile. It gives some indication of how diversified a country’s exports really are, which 
is not apparent by looking solely at the number of products that are effectively exported.”334 According to this 
measure the clustering coefficient of Bangladesh was 0.77 in 2002, whereas Korea stood at 0.36 in 1968 (the entire 
product space network has a clustering coefficient of 0.36).335 This networked approach to economic growth and 
development has strong implications for the strategic accumulation of productive capabilities.336 
                                                        
331 Essentially, the poverty trap reality emerges when the economy can’t abandon its production of the capital-intensive good while maintaining full 
employment and under rigidity conditions; see Justin Yifu Lin, Jiandon Ju and Yong Wang, “Endowment Structures, Industrial Dynamics, and 
Economic Growth,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5055 (2009), p. 25-26. 
332  Cesar Hildago, Bailly Klinger, A-L Barabási and Ricardo Hausmann, “The Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations” 317:5837 
Science 482 (2007), p. 484. 
333 For clustering in weighted networks (such as the product space), see, Tore Opsahl and Pietro Panzarasa, “Clustering in weighted networks,” 
31(2) Social Networks 155 (2009). 
334 Anna Jankowska, Arne Nagengast and José Ramón Perea, “The Product Space and the Middle Income Trap: Comparing Asian and Latin 
American Experiences,” OECD Working Paper No. 311 (2012), p 25. 
335 Idem, p. 25. 
336 Jankowska, Nagengast and Perea call these strategic industrial policies “Product Development Policies”; in Anna Jankowska, Arne Nagengast 
and José Ramón Perea, “The Product Space and the Middle Income Trap: Comparing Asian and Latin American Experiences,” OECD Working 




The modular structure of pairwise probabilities in the Product Space allows economic policies to dynamically 
address and potentially overcome some of the central problems of path-dependent economic growth. Through 
targeted “Product Development Policies,” better known as industrial policies, a normative alternative to perfecting 
the steady state conditions in mature growth models can be offered and implemented. At the same time, this 
fundamental path dependence of economic development (catch up growth) exposes economies to the risk of 
inefficient product or process lock-ins. Such lock-ins can be the result of resource absorption difficulties, can be due 
to the existence or emergence of vested political economy interests, or due to cognitive rigidities that result in a loss 
of competitiveness and retard economic growth.337 
 
The crucial difference between “neutral”338 and “distortive” policies in shaping the optimal product diversification 
path comes into clear focus when considering the different characteristics of frontier innovation (ωj) and catch up 
diversification (ϖt,n,j). If production factor accumulation and frontier innovation growth are said to be best described 
by a mature process of equilibrium growth, than its (normatively) optimal institutions are mindful to facilitate 
(global) optimal resource allocation in light of market externalities and failures. A full-information, frictionless 
(global) economy, where “the household’s capital allocation determines the evolution of capital endowment and the 
intertemporal use of capital in production,”339 is then naturally postulated as the normative optimum. The steady 
state growth process is thus fully represented by an economy-wide equilibrium innovation notion. Under conditions 
of a globalized free market, the previously geographically contained normative optimum quickly becomes universal 
in scope and assumes a mantle of authority. 
 
A measure of nestedness, however, makes targeted interventions possible by virtue of the non-homogeneity of the 
Product Space where distances are related to an economy’s productive capacity rather than its capital stock. Many 
                                                        
Policies and Institutions for Economic Transformation (Washington: IADB, 2014). Note that the clustered nature of products and productive 
capabilities gives rise to a new network-notion of specialization, different from the original Ricardian or HOS-type specialization.  
337 Gernot Grabher, "The Weakness of Strong Ties: The Look-in of Regional Development in the Ruhr Area," in Gernot Grabher, ed., The Embedded 
Firm: On the Socio-economics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993); Granovetter stresses, in a similar vein, the institutional 
embeddedness of techno-organizational change, see Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” 
91(3) American Journal of Sociology 481 (1985). 
338 Note that very few policies are truly neutral. See, for instance, Dani Rodrik and Ricardo Hausmann, “Doomed to Choose: Industrial Policy As 
Predicament,” Harvard University Working Paper (2006); and Dani Rodrik, “Normalizing Industrial Policy,” World Bank, Commission on Growth 
and Development, Working Paper No. 3 (2008). 
339 Justin Yifu Lin, Jiandon Ju and Yong Wang, “Endowment Structures, Industrial Dynamics, and Economic Growth,” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 5055 (2009), p. 5. 
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equilibrium models of growth often postulate some form of continuous (or free) industrial innovation/diversification 
(ωj), which immediately condemns industrial policies to instruments that either induce distortions or correct market 
failures. Integration of a capacity proximity or skill relatedness component however allows diversification efforts to 
be targeted probabilistically (ϖt,n,j). As a consequence, the process of structural transformation demands different 
optimal institutional bonds – ones that emphasize the trajectory of productive capacity accumulation rather than the 
bootstrapping of periods of static allocative efficiency. 
 
The process of catch-up growth thus allows for, in fact demands, a broader leeway for industrial policy initiatives 
than would be optimal for frontier growth: national and global governing structures are caught between two broad 
paradigms of what it means to “get institutions right” - an observation that finds reflection in work by Acemoglu, 
Aghion and Zilibotti.340 Policy induced factor price distortions might operate detrimentally at the frontier 
(misguiding consumers and producers), but in the presence of pairwise diversification opportunities industrial 
policies work to incentivize firms to enter the targeted product-industry. A government can thus implement 
industrial policies not simply to allow entrepreneurs to better listen to market signals, but to entice them to hear 
Athena’s counsel over Lorelei’s song. 
 
C. Implications of Static and Dynamic Normative Perspectives 
 
The importance of “catch up” growth, the theory of how the accumulation of physical and human capital contributes 
to economic convergence, is undisputed and indeed central to the observed world economy. Productive technology 
is not universally available (or applicable) and human capacities are not equally (nor equitably) distributed. The 
catch up theory of economic growth, as presented in Section I.B.2, supra, builds on this varied and, at times, 
daunting geography of skills and productive abilities to argue a more suitable approach to industrial policies and 
economic convergence. 
 
                                                        
340 Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, “Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth,” 4 Journal of the European 




Instead of postulating a straight-line “distance to the frontier” that is susceptible to (locally) linear predictions of 
accumulation and economic expansion (the balloon model), the Product Space emphasizes the inter-dependencies 
and nestedness of skills and productive capacities. The resulting “complexity” of economic dynamics is however 
eminently susceptible to prediction and manipulation, more so than the classical model of allocative efficiency. In 
particular, the model of economic complexity at the heart of the catch up models presented (both Hausmann and 
Pietronero) allows for a precise description of the opportunities for dynamic emulation. Forecasting of the evolution 
of a dynamical system along non-monetary metrics allows country capacities to determine its unrealized growth 
potential, due to the nested properties thereof.341  
 
Under limited and positively identifiable conditions, industrial policies thus work so as to guide the economy toward 
beatificiation (the completion of its capacity set). In this way, modern complexity-inspired notions of industrial 
policies, such as those rooted in the Learning Society and Product Space geography, have come a long way from 
beneficiation to favor targeted “learning” and “capacity growth” over consumption-based output performance (such 
as ISI, strategic trade policy, or even export-led growth when animated by a Mercantilist spirit). 
 
Whereas the mature growth model and the catch model differ tremendously in their approach to and modeling of the 
pattern (and likelihood) of skill accumulation, there are also similarities between the models. Both are fundamentally 
respectful of the macro-economic identities and find agreement on many aspects of the micro-foundations thereof, 
such as the sub-optimality of discriminatory policies and the applicability of static economic analyses (as presented 
in relevant part in Section 1.A, supra). 
 
The major difference between the models occurs at the sectoral and product-levels of the economy – it is here that 
catch up models of economic growth provide a more persuasive description of and guide to the process of economic 
convergence. For the purposes of rapid convergence, catch up models thus provide a superior “map” to the 
prescripts of mature growth models. In addition, catch up models are normatively satisfying as they let emerging 
markets regain mastery over (elements of) their catch-up development. 
                                                        





In line herewith, Section, 1.B, supra, argued that industrial policies, properly envisioned, should attempt to increase 
an economy’s across-product diversity and spur the accumulation of productive capabilities. An industrial policy 
aimed at increasing the viable diversification of an economy, by (dynamically) maximizing the number of viably 
occupied nodes within the Product Space, I denote as “developmental.” 
 
Importantly, such developmental policies should not be concerned with, or amount to, the picking of “winners” or 
the grooming of national champions. Instead, a developmental policy is aimed at creating and shaping 
entrepreneurial opportunities in the domestic economy at large. Developmental polices are in particular successful if 
they work to incentivize entrepreneurs – whether domestic or international – to steer the economy toward an optimal 
diversification path (one that dynamically optimizes the economy’s footprint in the Product Space and thus overtime 
leads to convergence with the frontier economies). 
 
Industrial policies that are, however, mainly directed at stimulating or strengthening an economy’s position within 
product nodes that are already part of its static footprint – having effects beyond correcting for existing market 
distortions - I denote as “commercial.” Such commercial policies would be presumed to be terms-of-trade driven, 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies and conducive to unproductive rent-seeking that ultimately leads to institutional 
degradation. 
 
This distinction between “developmental” and “commercial” policies draws directly on elements of both static 
allocative efficiency and dynamic growth within a Product Space. To encourage product diversification and 
stimulate economic development it is essential for the industrial policy to encourage certain investments ex ante, 
while allowing for the rationalizing of production ex post.342 Any attempt to get prices and incentives “right” 
therefore depends strongly on what coordination problem the economy is confronted with, both statically (within 
product) and dynamically (across products). 
 
                                                        
342 Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik, “Economic Development as Self-Discovery,” Harvard Kennedy School (2003). 
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Economic policy directed at beatification, or the acquisition (or discovery) of additional productive capabilities, 
should be regulated differently from a policy that tries to expand market share or grow industrial output within a 
product-class or network node. In other words, diversification or developmental efforts should be thought of as 
fundamentally distinct from commercial policies – even though some local factor distorting policies might be 
suboptimal from the frontier economy perspective, especially under the normative conditions of global free trade. 
The international economic regulatory framework should, more explicitly and convincingly, account for this 
preference heterogeneity. 
 
In the absence of complete convergence, neither the mature nor the catch up growth model describes a uniquely 
optimal approach to economic growth. Both theories emphasize the benefit of collaborative trade policy and a 
fundamental openness to trade over autarky and opportunistic defection though. The essential difference, from a law 
and economics perspective, emerges from consideration of the character of and opportunity for multilateral 





Analytical Annex  
Analytical Annex - Part A 
 
 
Part A of this Annex analytically describes a version of the mature growth model that illustrates how the terms of 
trade work to equilibrate several economic variables under international trade. International trade binds economies 
together in a steady state equilibrium growth rate and determines the terms of trade. The model, based on Acemoglu 
and Ventura (2002), holds that, in theories of mature growth, the redeeming features export restrictions need to be 
found in correcting for negative trade externalities or in perfecting the steady state. 
 
 
This Annex will analytically describe a mature growth model with international trade in intermediary goods (but not 
in final products or assets).343 It  shows how the terms of trade, regulated by the domestic rental rate of capital and 
the world price of tradable intermediaries, leads to a world steady state in absence of diminishing returns in 
production and technological spillovers. The dynamics will be such that an initial positive shock to the terms of 
trade (through, for example, export restrictions) will be balanced by changes in the domestic return to capital, 
negatively effecting the pace of capital accumulation and ultimately forcing convergence to the steady state 
equilibrium. As institutions, savings, and technologies determine the world growth rate, this mature growth model 
thus showcases the dangerous futility of imposing trade restrictive measures beyond those that narrowly address 
market failures. 
 
This continuous time model assumes a continuum of equal mass countries (J) that are different in technology, 
savings propensity and/or time preference (ρj) and institutions (ζj). Production happens with capital only, subject to 
some elasticity of substitution (ε). The model allows for two final non-tradable products used for consumption (Cj) 
and investment (accumulation) (Ij) respectfully, and a continuum of freely tradable intermediate products (v).344 
Strong Ricardian specialization in trade is expressed through the introduction of Armington preferences,345 such that 
tradables are differentiated according to their origin and can only be produced by one country. This ensures that 
                                                        
343 The model is derived from Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The World Income Distribution,” 117(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
659 (2002) and highlighted in Daron Acemoglu, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), chapter 
19.4. 
344 For the importance of trade in intermediaries, see, for instance, Robert C. Feenstra and Gary Hamilton, Emergent Economies, Divergent Paths: 
Economic Organization and International Trade in South Korea and Taiwan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); compare Byung-
Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) and 
Alice H. Amsden and Wan-Wen Chu, Beyond Late Development: Taiwan’s Upgrading Policies (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003). 
345 Paul S. Armington, "A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place and Production," 16 International Monetary Fund Stuff Papers 
159 (1969). Also defined as “substitution between goods from different countries” (Feenstra 2014) and here set to an extreme; Robert C. Feenstra, 
Philip Luck, Maurice Obstfeld, and Katheryn N. Russ, “In Search of the Armington Elasticity,” NBER Working Paper 20063 (2014); see also Mika 
Saito, “Armington Elasticities in Intermediate Inputs Trade: A Problem in Using Multilateral Trade Data,” IMF Working Paper (2004). 
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countries are small on the import side, while retaining the potential to influence their terms of trade on the export 
side.346 The level of technology is reflected in the fraction (Vj) of the total amount of intermediaries (N) that are 
exclusively produced by a country (ab ∈ [0,N]).  
 
The national production function reflects the fraction to which the domestic rental rate of capital (rj) in combination 
with the state of domestic technology, partakes in the global economy (ε denotes the elasticity of substitution). 
National production is alternatively constituted by the price and amount of total final investment and consumption, 
which are afforded out of the rental rate in relation to the total capital stock (Kj(t)).  
 Hb(I) = 	abDb(I)(RfH(I) =	1bg(I)hb(I) +	1bijb(I) = 	 Db(I)Ob(I)          (5a) 
          
Where the world is a collection of economies:  H(I) = 	∑ Hb(I)kbl(     (5b) 
 
The total capital stock is, at any time, divided over non-tradable and tradable inputs: 
 [Obi(I) + Obg(I)] + Obm(I) ≤ Ob(I)        (6) 
 
The infinitely lived representative household has the following utility function: 
 obp(I) = ∫ exp	(−uv wx(t))	Log	Cx(I)}I        (7) 
 
This representative household is subject to a budget constraint given by (5a).  
 
                                                        
346 While Armington preferences are consistent with the literature on the use and efficacy of export restrictions, stressing market power on the 
export side, note that the Armington preferences work too restrictively when considering development, defined as the growth in viable export 
product diversity. In fact, when considering technological advances in a product space, the Armington preferences have to be discarded to allow 
each country to export the entire basket of viable products. 
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In order to produce the final goods (jb	, hb), an amount of non-tradable domestic capital347 (Obi	, Obg) and a bundle of 
tradable intermediate inputs (~m) are necessary at time (t). It is important to note here that each intermediate output is 
produced with one unit of capital (Obm). As the number of produced intermediate input varieties is determined by the 
state of technology (Vj) at time (t) the production function for the final goods look like: 
 
jb(I) = Obi(I)(R ÄÅ ~bi(I, Ç)ÉÑv [fR(]f }ÇÖ
ffR(	 
           (8) 
hb(I) = ζxR(	Obg(I)(R ÄÅ ~bg(I, Ç)ÉÑv [fR(]f }ÇÖ
ffR(	 
 
Although these equations look menacing, they in fact merely describe (i) the level of domestic non-tradable input in 
the production, at the rate 1-τ, where τ relates to the level of openness to trade (τ = 0 signaling autarky); and (ii) the 
bundle of intermediate tradable good v needed as input with fraction τ and under the substitution term ε, where ε ≥ 1 
to avoid immiserating growth.348 Different levels of productivity, due to institutional quality, are accounted for in the 
production of investment goods, through the term ζj, as these, rather than consumption goods, are the building 
blocks for capital accumulation or growth.349 
 
From (5a) and (8) it follows that the unit price of these final goods is determined by the domestic rental rate of 
capital and the price of intermediaries, which is set on the world market as a result of their free tradability: 
 
Gbi áDb, 1(~m)à =	 Db(R â∫ 1(~i(Ç))ÉÑv (Rf }Çä ãåçé	  
                                                        
347 Intuitively representing non-tradable services consumed in the production process. Since no international trade in assets is allowed, domestic 
capital stock must be used. If a country is relatively poor in terms of capital stock, its rate of return will be high and less of it will be used in the 
production of consumption good (Cj). 
348 This substitution term is not to be confused with the earlier Arminton preferences; whereas the former pertains to the production inputs for final 
goods, the latter determines ubiquity of production between trading economies. In the present model the substitution term can also serve as elasticity 
measure facing exports. 
349 The term ζj is limited to the production of investment goods to reflect the outsized role that “distortions” or suboptimal market characteristics 




Gbg áDb, 1(~m)à = 	 ζxR(	Db(R â∫ 1(~g(Ç))ÉÑv (Rf }Çä ãåçé	  
 
A world equilibrium is defined by paths of prices, capital stock levels, and consumption levels for each country such 
that all markets clear and the representative household in each country maximizes its utility, given the path for 
prices350: 
 âè1bi(I), 1bg(I), Db(I), Ob(I), jb(I)êbl(k [1(I, Ç)]m∈[v,ë]ä*ív     (10) 
 
The world’s equilibrium steady state consequently requires that all prices are constant (*). 
 
Consumer maximization of (7) subject to (5a) follows the Euler equation, with shifting relative prices between final 
consumption and investment goods, to state that the rate of return to capital must equal the rate of time preference 
plus a correction factor that depends on the slope of the consumption path:351 
 
ìÑ(*))XÑî,∗(*)XÑî(*) − XÑï,∗(*)XÑï(*) =	wx + iÑ∗(*)iÑ(*)        (11) 
 
The transversality condition for an optimal consumption path reads: 
 
lim*	→	u[exp	( − wx	I)	XÑî(*)öÑ(*)XÑï(*)iÑ(*)] = 0        (12) 
 
Combining (11) with (12), one finds that the optimal rule is to consume a fixed fraction of wealth, subject to one’s 
time preference or saving propensity: 
 
                                                        
350 Definition from Daron Acemoglu, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p 667. 




1bi(I)	jb(I) = ρx	1bg(I)	Ob(I)        (13) 
 
Since firms produce all intermediates competitively in equilibrium, they are assumed to set their price to marginal 
cost (domestic rental rate of capital):  
 1b(I, Ç) = 	 Db(I)          (14) 
 
Under the strong assumption that a country is small and exporting most of its production of intermediaries to the 
world market in exchange for a complete basket of tradables, the price equivalence of (14) doubles also as the 
country’s terms of trade.352 
 
Under an ideal price index for all intermediates, we set the joint baskets to unity: 
 (∫ 1(I, Ç)(Rf	}Ç) ååçé = 1ëv  = ∑ ab1b(I)kbl( (Rf      (15) 
  
Integrating the price normalization of (15) with the unit price function of (10) implies that the equilibrium prices of 
the final consumption and investment goods for country j are: 
 1bi(I) = 	 Db(I)	(R   and, similarly,    1bg(I) = 	 ζx	Db(I)	(R     (16) 
 
 
The trade balance condition, subject to (5b), can be written as: 
 Hb(I) = 	ab	Db(I)(Rf	H(I)         (17) 
                                                        
352 This assumes that the country does not seek to take advantage of its market power (as sole producer of a certain variation of intermediary), nor 
that it engages in any form of industrial policy through border measures (export restrictions) – in other words, it does not engage at all with the 
analysis of Section I.A, supra. We nonetheless defend this assumption here in order to highlight the convergence dynamics behind the mature 
growth model. Interestingly, Acemoglu and Ventura implicitly hint at the role of the WTO when they note that “[i]n any case, a cooperative 
equilibrium with free trade policies is superior to a noncooperative equilibrium in which all countries actively use trade policy, so we may think 
that countries have solved this coordination problem and have committed not to use trade policy” in Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura, “The 




The law of motion for the capital stock in each country j at time t in a global steady state equilibrium can be 
obtained from a combination of the conditions (5), (13), (16), and (17): 
 
∆Ob∗(I) = öÑ∗(*)öÑ(*) = ìÑ(*)ãùû − ρx	        (18) 
 
The interdependencies of international trade thus binds the world together in a steady state equilibrium growth rate 
and determine the terms of trade; building of (14) and (18): 
Db(I)Ob(I) = 	ab 	Db(I)(Rf 	∑ Db(I)kbl( Ob(I)     so,   Db∗ = ü†û	)	∆öÑ∗ùû °åã    (19) 
 
Acemoglu and Ventura rightly point out that “in [a] steady state [the] terms of trade and rental rates are constant. 
This highlights that the world income distribution is stable not because of continuously changing terms of trade, but 
because countries that accumulate more face lower terms of trade, reducing the interest rate and the incentives for 
further accumulation.”353 
 
As (16) and (17) make clear, the world economy will growth faster in its steady state when consumers are patient 
(ρx), institutions are good (ζx), and a high technological level is attained (Vj). Importantly, both international trade 
and specialization are crucial to this model as autarky brings τ to zero and shuts the dynamic elements of the model 
down – see the world income distribution in the steady state (H£3,b∗ ) (combing (12), (13), (15), and (17)): 
 
H£3,b∗ = 	ab ü ùû†û	)∆öÑ∗°éçåã          (20) 
 
A measure of openness to trade is thus central and, intuitively, the terms of trade, for a given state of technology Vj, 
are decreasing in an economy’s relative income (20): 
                                                        




1b = ü ÉÑ§•&,Ñ∗ ° åéçå          (21) 
 
So, as long as all intermediates are produced competitively (14), a higher obtained price for an economy's 
intermediate exports (v) raises the value of the marginal product of capital and hence the rate of return to capital 
(22); the price of the final investment good then moves to compensate:  
 
¶ìÑXÑî + XÑî,∗XÑî ß − XÑï,∗XÑï = 91b:	ζx  (all else equal354: 1b ↑	, Db ↑	;	1bg 	 ↑	)  (22) 
 
Not only are there stronger diminishing returns when the volume of trade and the extent of specialization are greater 
(high τ and low ε), when τ is low, the rate of return to capital is less sensitive to changes in the terms of trade. 
Conversely, when ε is infinitely large the model operates as an endogenous growth model without the convergence 
brought about by international trade (21). The mature model of growth thus illustrates the basic premise of what 
Krugman called the “homeostatic” view of international trade, when properly adjusted for comparative 
advantages.355 
 
Lets postulate the introduction of an export restriction and draw on the Armington preferences to translate the entire 
tariff into higher international prices for the traded intermediate. With this elevation in the international price, the 
economy will, temporarily, attract more capital. But as we have seen, the long run terms of trade respond to dampen 
the effect and restore the steady state balance. 
 
The key implication of this model is thus that each country’s terms of trade are endogenous and depend on the rate 
of capital accumulation. The export restriction acts as a temporary accumulation incentive (a temporary boost in its 
                                                        
354 It might be useful to point out here, as obiter dictum, that, had the model included a monetary component, currency manipulation is one of the 
policies available to let the growth in the economy continue by depreciating against the price rise. 
355 Paul Krugman, “The Narrow Moving Band, Dutch Disease, and the Competitive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher – Notes on Trade in the 
Presence of Dynamic Scale Economies,” 27 Journal of Development Economics 41 (1987), pp. 41-42; the ‘homeostatic’ view of international trade 
posits that there is a natural pattern of specialization and trade, determined by the underlying country characteristics, and that automatic forces tend 
to restore this natural pattern. 
95 
 
terms of trade), but as domestic factor prices adjust to the increased capital accumulation the trade policy measure 
has little long run effects356 beyond taking advantage of unused market power or correcting for trade distortions – 
both of which are absent in the model.357 
 
More generally, by raising the international price of the traded intermediary, country j may well come to face 
detrimental structural demand effects through an increased elasticity of substitution, ε, as other production methods 
come online depending on the structure of the (under-utilized) market power of country j. The introduction of trade 
restrictions might additionally spur domestic misallocation effects and possibly awake political economy forces, 
both of which will negatively affect the policy value ζ. 
 
The above model is especially useful in illustrating that the redeeming features of introducing a restriction on 
exports in theories of mature growth need either be found in correcting for negative trade externalities, perfecting 
the steady state, or in the interaction with specific market features. In order for a trade measure to have a lasting 
impact on the growth performance of an economy it has to have a structural effect on the production function of the 
implementing economy – the quintessential development concern of “catch-up” models of economic growth. 
 
 *    *    * 
  
                                                        
356 See also for a detailed analysis of why trade restrictions fail to effect the long run steady state rate of growth in neoclassical production functions, 
T.N. Srinivasan, "As the Century Turns:  Analytics, Empirics, and Politics of Development," Economic Growth Center, Yale University (1997); 
see also Robert C. Feenstra, Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 9-1. Note that 
while in learning-by-doing and non-diminishing return models trade liberalization boosts global output growth, the LDCs or economies with 
specific initial endowment structures might suffer or experience long term retarded growth – a liberalization policy therefore cannot be said to be 
universally first-best in these models. 
357 Bagwell and Staiger discuss the economic rationale for the GATT 1994 and the WTO in similar light, stressing its core reciprocity demand as 
an important tool in the face of domestic political economy pressures; Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “Economic Theory and the 
Interpretation of GATT/WTO,”46(2) The American Economist 3 (2002). 
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Analytical Annex - Part B 
 
 
Part B of this Annex presents a simplified model of economic growth that highlights the structural properties of 
product diversification and innovation growth. Although both “catch up” and “mature”-growth are approached 
probabilistically, the two differ significantly in structure. Whereas mature growth occurs as the result of 
technological innovations at the frontier, catch up growth can benefit from the known pair-wise connections 
between products. This pair-wise connection reflects that the skills needed to produce certain products are related 
to those required for other products. In this way, catch up growth allows for growth-path emulation, or targeted 
diversification. The pace at which a developing economy diversifies is dependent on the nature of their current 
production set and pair-wise diversification opportunities. 
 
 
As with the mature growth model of Part A of the Analytical Annex, supra, we postulate a continuum of equal mass 
countries (j) that are different in technology (Hj) and institutions (ζj). Production rather occurs with product-specific 
labor and capital inputs (L™,x,´(Rα ) (K™,x,´≠ ). These are subject to diminishing returns so that technological progress is the 
ultimate driver of (product variety) growth. Advances in available technologies result in either product-dependent 
labor productivity gains (βt,n) or as increases in the domestic production set (Nj), i.e. the production of more, more 
complex and more highly connected products. Discrete time is preferred over continuous time to allow for the clear 
expression of technological gains as they result in the production of additional products [1 → Ň*], where (Ň*) 
represents the product diversity frontier (Nj ∈ [0, Ň*]). 
 
The country specific production function is given by: 
 
Yj,t = ζj ∑ (K™,x,´≠ 	, \*,VL™,x,´(R≠)ëÑVl(            (23) 
 
Whereas the labor stock is assumed static, the capital stock grows as a function of labor productivity (incorporated 
in Yj), household savings (sn) and capital depreciation (ØV): 
 ∆OV,b = 	 ∞VHb −	ØVOV,b            (24) 
 
This simplified depiction of a product variety production model (21, 22) does not show the maximization decisions 
of economic agents in order to direct attention to the structural properties of product diversification and innovation 
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growth. The employed technological growth equation (25) finds its ground in a product variety358 conception of 
Schumpeterian growth as formalized by Aghion and Howitt.359 Technological gains are subsequently disaggregated 
into (i) labor productivity gains, (ii) innovation that extends the world’s product frontier, and (iii) catch-up360 
diversification that closes the distance to the frontier, and assigned a dedicated probability (ŵj, ωj, ϖt,n,j): 
 ∆±b = 	∆βx +	∆<b = Aŵx9β´,x:¥ + Aωx(ż	 − 	1)Ňt´¥ + [∑*,V,b(Ň´ − <*,b)]   (25) 
 
Note that whereas this growth model focuses on the structure of product innovation and diversification, such as 
expands the viable domestic production set (∆<b), innovations that “shock” the Kaldor-Verdoorn function361 (∆βx) 
might have a direct impact on the link between productivity and production growth that can be equally instructive to 
consider under a “product space”-approach. 
 
The pace of growth in (25) is thus set by the value of the probabilities and the impact thereof: 
  ∏*,b = ŵb + [πx(ż	 − 	1)] + [∑*,V,b(Ň´,xR( − 1)]	      (26) 
 
where ň´,x = ëª,ÑŇº  indicates the distance to the frontier, the structure of which is dictated by the product space (Section 
II.B.2), and (ż) refers to the multiple362 of the innovation’s power in relation to the preexisting value of the frontier 
(Ň). 
 
                                                        
358 Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz, “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,” 67(3) American Economic Review 297 (1977).  
359 Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, The Economics of Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009); Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, Endogenous 
Growth Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction,” 60 
Econometrica 323 (1992). 
360 Preference is given to the term “catch up” or “completion” innovation over the more generally used “imitation” innovation to stress that every 
technology demands some measure of implementation and adaption before it can be successfully embedded in the production structure of the 
economy. The term “imitation” could entice unsuspecting readers to infer conclusions about such imitation-driven economic growth (i.e. “stolen” 
technology, “lazy” imitators, or look for “market failures” prematurely). 
361 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “The Quest for Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” in Jose 
Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.25 
et seq. Ocampo notes that “Indeed, innovations may be seen as ‘spurts’ that shift the technical progress function, but tend to weaken through time 
as innovations spread” (p. 28). This weakening effect over time need not disappoint in the aggregate, under the assumption of multiple equilibriums, 
where “[a]ny displacement from saddle point A will lead the economy to a new, higher stable equilibrium at B or, alternatively, to a low-growth 
trap” (p. 27). 
362 The frontier innovation multiple needs to reflect ż > 1. 
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Whereas the pace of innovations that enhance labor productivity (ŵb) and those that expand the product diversity 
frontier (ωj) are assumed to dictate the mature growth path,363 the innovation probability of “catch up” growth (ϖt,n,j) 
is made dependent on the time-sensitive progression of the acquired product diversity set (Nj,t) for each country 
engaged in developmental growth. Convergence is therefore ultimately made conditional on the difference between 
the non-monotonic probability of “catch up” growth, as determined by country characteristics and the structure of 
the product space, in relation to the pace of frontier innovation. 
 
Note that I treat the two forms of diversity-inducing technological change (ωj, ϖt,n,j) in (25) as different in character 
and uncorrelated to each other. Although this is partly reflective of the empirical properties of the product space 
(future technology cannot be observed and therefore cannot be accorded a pairwise proximity value), a more 
theoretically rich approach stresses that corporate innovation strategies are directly related to the competitive needs 
and conditions of specific product-lines.364  
 
As innovation and diversification incentives are subject to inter-firm productivity differentials and determined by 
meso-economic pressures, the catch up and frontier growth probabilities are variably susceptible to policy measures. 
Additionally, knowledge and know-how spillovers will give rise to (marginally) different interactions (linkages365) 
in catch up industrial ecosystems366 than in those of frontier economies. Obviously, this bifurcated approach is a 
potentially contested description of the actual process of innovation and diversification at the level of national 
innovation/learning systems367 and related entrepreneurial activity,368 running the risk of under-appreciating possible 
spill-over effects between innovation and diversification.369   
                                                        
363 This assumption draws on work by Aghion and Howitt that formalizes the rate of technological progress as determined by forces that are internal 
to the economic system. However, this assumption is not fundamental here, as (i) our focus is on catch-up growth or development, and (ii) the key 
concept of this work, the shape and value of the proximity of products and production technology, is obscured for the future; necessitating the 
(re)introduction of a measure of homogeneity in light of more precise insights into the implication and likelihood for future technological 
developments. See Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction,” 60 Econometrica 323 (1992). 
364 Michael Hobday, Howard Rush and John Bessant, “Approaching the Innovation Frontier in Korea: The Transition Phase to Leadership,” 33 
Research Policy 1433 (2004). 
365 See, Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, and Social Progress 
(Columbia University Press, 2014). 
366 See on the interaction between agglomeration externalities and technical relatedness, for instance, Frank M.H. Neffke, “Productive Places: The 
Influence of Technical Change and Relatedness on Agglomeration Externalities,” Ph.D. Thesis University of Utrecht (2009). 
367 See for a comparative institutional analysis, Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Leaders and Followers: Perspectives on the Nordic Model and the Economics 
of Innovation,” NBER Working Paper No 20493 (September 2014). 
368 In the context of Latin America, see, for instance, Jorge Mario Martínez-Piva, ed., Knowledge Generation and Protection: Intellectual Property, 
Innovation and Economic Development (New York: ECLAC & Springer, 2009); see also, Charles Sabel, et al., eds., Export Pioneers in Latin 
America (Washington DC: IADB, 2012). 




However, strong differentiation between innovation and diversification growth is validated by historical experience 
and exemplified by the considerable differences between these two processes of technological structural change.370 
The benefits of this separation are not limited to descriptive and dogmatic clarity though, but work to highlight the 
differences in the process of product variety growth as it affects the nature of appropriate institutions and policies 
between frontier economies/sectors and those engaged in catch up growth. While frontier economies are by 
definition pursuing (ωj)-type innovation, developing economies can, relative to the extent of their economic dualism, 
engage in either form of innovation and diversification growth. The dominant process of expanding the economy’s 
portfolio of exported product varieties might thus differ between one sector and another. 
 
While the pairwise probability structure of each separate product is of concern for directing industrial policies, the 
shape of the complete product space, as envisioned by Hidalgo and Hausmann,371 and the series of nodes each 
economy occupies therein, calibrates the long-run catch-up dynamics of the production function (21). The pace of 
mature growth, which rather happens at the technological frontier is given by the steady state probability of 
innovation (ωj). This condition of dual non-homogeneity, first in the character of growth and second the density of 
product space diversification field, demands different optimal (industrial) policies. 
 
Growth that happens in accordance with (24), i.e. raw capital accumulation, rather expands the economy through 
growth in the product quality while also increasing the value of (ωj) in the steady state. Figure A illustrates both 
capital accumulation-driven economic growth (inflating the balloon), by showing how an expanding K/L-ratio can 





                                                        
370 Viotti for example differentiates National Learning Systems from National Innovation Systems and argues that while the latter type is relevant 
to the technological change at the frontier, the former is best suited for late-industrializing economies; see Eduardo B. Viotti, “National Learning 
Systems: A New Approach on Technological Change in Late Industrializing Economies and Evidences from the Cases of Brazil and South Korea,” 
69 Technological Forecasting & Social Change 653 (2002). 
371 Cesar A. Hidalgo, Barry Klinger, Albert-Laszlo Barabási, Ricardo Hausmann, “The Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations,” 
317 Science 482 (2007); Cesar A. Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann, “The Building Blocks of Economic Complexity,” 106(26) PNAS 10570 (2009). 
100 
 




Node(3)Q! ! ! ! ! Node(1)Q! ! ! ! ! Node(2)Q
!
Node(3)q! ! ! ! ! Node(1)q! ! ! ! ! Node(2)q
Pairwise Probability
{ωj + ϖt,n,j }
K/L K/L
Pairwise Probability
{ωj + ϖt,n,j }
101 
 
The Multilateral Standard of Review: Export Restrictions, Policy 










Chapter 3: Textualism in the WTO .......................................................................................... 102 
A. The WTO Dispute Resolution Body .................................................................................. 106 
B. Benchmark Interpretation of the GATT and WTO Agreement ......................................... 113 
1. Ordinary Meaning ............................................................................................ 115 
2. Context ............................................................................................................ 125 
3. Object and Purpose ......................................................................................... 136 






Chapter 3: Textualism in the WTO 
 
 
Within the framework of the GATT 1994 the concerns of emerging markets and developing country Member States 
have traditionally been addressed either through the Enabling Clause, granting Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT) to developing countries, or through the height of (negotiated) tariff levels. This understanding however leaves 
a third, crucial, avenue un-examined: the construction and interpretation of existing provisions and commitments in 
the GATT/WTO. The central reason for leaving interpretative methods outside of the traditional scope of discussion 
is the conviction that the provisions of the GATT are both self-evident, their ordinary meaning accessible to an able 
adjudicator, and that such ordinary meaning is reflective of the bargain struck by the Parties. 
 
Both presumptions are, however, not accurate. The language of any document, legal or otherwise, is always 
incomplete and open to different interpretations and although the “spirit” of the GATT 1994 might be largely 
undetermined, its adjudicators are not. Furthermore, the Membership of the GATT is time-inconsistent and holds 
heterogeneous economic policy preferences. It is therefore difficult to assume fundamental homogeneity in 
contracting intent and of implementation preferences among Member States. What is left to the adjudicator is the 
declared intent of the Parties, accessible both in the text of the regulating provisions and in the preambles to the 
GATT 1947 and WTO Agreement. It is the interpretative practice of the WTO adjudicator, assigning meaning to the 
language of the GATT, that I wish to examine and criticize in this Chapter. I take a theoretical approach to the study 
hereof and bracket the empirical consideration of adjudicator’s biases.372 
 
Of course, both the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the GATT/WTO explicitly recognize 
the role of an “object and purpose” analysis in its framing of the interpretative exercise. These treaties however, 
                                                        
372 See, Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman, and Andres Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analyssi of the Federal 
Judiciary (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2006); See also for an application to investment arbitration, Gus van Harten, “The Use of 
Quantitative Methods to Examine Possible Bias in Investment Arbitration,” and, in response, Susan D. Franck, Clavin P. Garbin and Jenna M. 
Perkins, “Response: Through the Looking Glass: Understanding Social Science Norms for Analyzing International Investment Law,” Karl P. 
Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2010-2011 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); also Gus van Harten, 
“Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Examination of Hypotheses of Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration,” 53(2) Osgoode 
Hall Law School (2016, forthcoming). 
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amplified by adjudicatory practice, have deliberately dethroned a “general purpose” analysis of the treaty as primary 
analytical step and replaced it with the adjudicator’s adherence to the “ordinary meaning” of the text. 
 
In order to come to a dispositive declaration on the meaning of the provisions in an international agreement, I will 
argue that the interpreter needs to critically examine her original assumptions as to the character of the 
communicative instrument and its constituent provisions. In this Chapter, I wish to challenge the presumptions of a 
Textualist interpretation of the GATT/WTO and show how a greater understanding of and appreciation for the 
economic “context” in combination with the  “object and purpose” of the GATT and its provisions can help the 
adjudicator reach a less biased and more appropriate decision in “hard cases.” 373 
 
The query central to this work and much practical reasoning by WTO dispute resolution bodies thus becomes: by 
which method are Member States’ economic conditions positively recognized, such that they enlighten the 
contextual interpretation of the language of the provisions of the GATT/WTO in a manner that furthers both the 
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. This question guides the critical examination of the 
current state of affairs on the interpretation of terms in covered agreements in the present Chapter, and will instruct 
the discussion on the possibility for the embedded standard of review to drive an “open” construction of exemption 
provisions in the GATT 1994 in Chapter 4, infra. 
 
In keeping with Chapter 2, supra, genuine differences between Member States in fitting a trade policy measure to 
the provisions of the treaty are deemed to be reflective of their different normative preferences as to economic 
policy. Hard cases therefore raise fundamental questions of justification and legitimacy374 in the adjudication of 
                                                        
373 The notion of a “hard case” is related to, but differently constructed from, the notion of “development disputes” in international law as put 
forward by Tomer Broude, “Development Disputes in International Trade,” in Yong Shik-Lee, Gary N. Horlick, Won-Mog Choi, and Tomer 
Broude, eds., Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Broude suggests 
the following definition: “international development disputes can be understood as a discrete category of international disputes that, in terms of 
jurisdiction and applicable law, arise under fairly ‘hard’ rules of international law, such as trade and investment treaties, but in a more practical 
sense are actually concerned with reviewing the development policies of states, which are regulated on the international level only in very ‘soft’ 
terms, if at all.” (p. 30) He observes that “[m]ost development-related international dispute settlement avoids frontally engaging with development 
dilemmas by resorting to legal tools, rules, and doctrines that are formally and teleologically exogenous to development.” (p. 31). This chapter’s 
argument engages Broude’s excellent piece and explores the role of diverging economic growth preferences (mature v. catch up) with direct 
reference to WTO adjudicatory principles and practice. 
374 Direct confrontation with questions of regime legitimacy and coherence occurs when the DRB decision affects a Party’s industrial or 
developmental policy. Indirect confrontation occurs in the presence of secondary preference conflicts, such as those over “culture.” For discussion 
of the “legitimacy gap” in the context of the difference between mature and industrializing countries, see Rubens Ricupero, “Rebuilding Confidence 
in the Multilateral Trading System: Closing the Legitimacy Gap,” in Gary Sampson, ed., The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global 
Governance (Geneva: United Nations University Press, 2001). In the context of international trade and culture, Howse and Langille note that 
“when we turn to today’s WTO […] it becomes evident that narrowing the kind of rationale permitted as basis for justified regulation under WTO 
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disputes between signatories with competing preferences.375 Such genuine differences will, moreover, often involve 
the construction and interpretation of exception and exemption provisions in combination with a headline rule – an 
insight that stands central throughout this work.  
 
The adjudicator’s normative presumptions and pre-judgments will come to the fore strongest in her consideration of 
policy flexibility provisions as her assessment thereof is directly reflective of her understanding of the regulatory 
structure of the GATT and collaborative intent of the multilateral Membership. In this work I argue that, all-too-
often, the adjudicator’s presumptions of the GATT/WTO as a “free trade” agreement hinder her to fully 
acknowledge the object and purpose of the GATT, which features non-discrimination principles as central 
organizational features around a macro-economically indeterminate core. The recent cases around the GATT 
provisions on export restrictions, centrally querying the relationships between Articles XI:1 GATT, XI:2(a) and 
Article XX GATT, are prime examples hereof.376  
 
The resulting coordination exercise is unique in international law to the extent that the WTO adjudicator has to 
systematically interpret a multilateral international economic agreement with a time-inconsistent and economically 
heterogeneous Membership. It is therefore crucial for the interpreter to be aware of her preconceptions and prior 
understanding of the regulatory structure of the GATT and the interpretative leeway available to the adjudicator to 
impose an “economic structure” on the provisions of the GATT/WTO.  
 
While the joint Membership has a shared interest in the continued “security and predictability” of the multilateral 
trading system, the way in which this rule-based system is constructed and interpreted determines the scope of the 
available policy flexibility of Member States in pursuit of their preferred macro-economic goals. International 
                                                        
law, while the WTO’s diversity broadens and deepens, would be setting the scene for a significant legitimacy crisis.” Robert Howse and Joanna 
Langille, “Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Non-instrumental 
Moral Values,” 37 The Yale Journal of International Law 367 (2012), p. 428; See for a survey of the legitimacy debate in the WTO, Tomer Broude, 
International Governance in the WTO: Judicial Boundaries and Political Capitulation (Folkestone: Cameron May, 2004) (J.S.D. Dissertation, 
University of Toronto). 
375 Ronald Dworkin, in his famous article “Hard Cases,” 88 Harvard Law Review 1057 (1975), differentiates the interpretative work of the 
judge between “fit” and “justification.” Note that our argument does not seek to reintroduce hegemonic power and the projection of “norms” to 
serve such power, although we acknowledge elements of “normative persuasion” - see G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization 
and Hegemonic Power,” 44 International Organization 283 (1990); and Christopher J. Borgen, “Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, 
and Normative Friction,” 32 The Yale Journal of International Law 331 (2007). 
376 In 2011, Article XI:2(a) was interpreted for the first time in the WTO cases China – Raw Materials, and again in China – Rare Earth, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, infra. In these cases, the WTO adjudicator has also been called upon to consider this and other provisions in relation 
to China’s WTO Accession Protocol. 
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economic law, as the study of the legal dimensions of (non-)cooperative relationships between states, shapes and 
constraints the limits and depths of the agreement between Parties to further a secure and predictable trading system 
that is “consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.”377 
 
The task of the adjudicator, as a stabilizing element within the multilateral trading system, is therefore to fit the 
contested policy implementation preferences of Member States to the treaty language in a coherent manner. In other 
words, when confronted with a hard case, the adjudicator needs to strike a balance between the various preferences 
of the Member States and her understanding of the language of the regulating provisions, read against its object and 
purpose and that of the instrument as a whole. 
 
In my argument, I am mindful to not replace one bias with another, i.e. a preference for “mature” growth with one 
that is friendly to “development” – although this may be the (desired) effect. Instead I will come to argue for an 
approach to interpreting exemption provisions that relies on the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, read against 
the preamble of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement. In order to facilitate such interpretation, I will, in this 
chapter set out and criticize the prevalent method of interpretation of the provisions of the GATT: Textualism (as 
aided by a measure of contextualism). The critique will demonstrate how an approach that over-emphasizes the 
“ordinary meaning” of words and provisions falls short theoretically and is inconsistently applied by the Appellate 
Body as it finds contextual support for its decisions on a “case-by-case” basis. 
 
Section A will situate the WTO Panels and Appellate Body in the framework of the multilateral trading regime and 
describe its form and function. In framing the role of the WTO dispute settlement system, I will establish the 
GATT/WTO as a system of law and explicate my assumptions as to the WTO adjudicator therein. Hereby, I identify 
the specific international legal character of the GATT/WTO and stress the collaborative contractual intent of Parties. 
The GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement are of course highly complex, multilayered instruments that are not fully 
captured or reflected by the parameterization of my argument. Nonetheless, I believe these assumptions reflective of 
the dominant characteristics of these agreements. 
 
                                                        
377 WTO Agreement, Preamble. 
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Section B will identify and discuss each of the legal interpretative elements of customary international law, first, as 
applicable to all treaties on a theoretical level and, second, showcase their application in the context of the 
GATT/WTO adjudication of hard cases. As is a familiar insight, the customary international law on treaty 
interpretation, available as Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), disfavors a teleological 
approach to treaty interpretation and instead urges the interpreter to find Parties’ joint intention in the words of the 
agreement. To parse these words, the adjudicator construes them against her understanding of Parties’ effective 
intent as available through a good faith textual, contextual, directional, and ultimately historical analysis. It is 
through the adjudicator’s application of this somewhat tautological statement that her biases are revealed. 
 
A. The WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) in Article 2(1) grants authority to the dispute settlement body of the 
WTO to  “establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of 
rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered 
agreements.” The substantive coverage of Panels and the Appellate Body encompasses, in addition to the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (“WTO Agreement”) and the DSU, the agreements annexed in Appendix 
1 to the DSU (“covered agreements”), which includes the GATT 1994.378 
 
Panels, in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, should “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, 
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant 
covered agreements […].” As noted in Chapter 1, supra, this article establishes the appropriate standard of review 
whereby Panels are to approach the matter before them in law, in fact, and when fitting the facts to the terms of the 
agreement. 
 
The Panels are expected to achieve its goals by “preserv[ing] the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and [by] clarify[ing] the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary 
                                                        
378 Mavroidis discusses the various sources of WTO law to also include subsequent state practice, the secondary law as emerges from Articles 
IX and X WTO Agreement, and law that emerges through the exercise of implied powers by WTO adjudicating bodies; see Petros C. Mavroidis, 
“No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practised by WTO Courts,” 102 American Journal of International Law 421 (2008), p. 422. 
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rules of interpretation of public international law.”379 The appropriate standard of review on interpretation thus finds 
application in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
 
An objective construction of the law, and when fitting facts the terms of the agreement, is limited such that it 
“cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” In international relations 
sovereigns are assumed to be master over and have the ability to agree on both common ends and the means to 
pursue them.380 The resulting collaborative instrument thus has to be assumed to completely capture both ends and 
means in the context of the negotiated equilibrium: as reflected in the treaty’s terms and its object and purpose.381 
Article 3(2) DSU thus stresses the agent-principle382 relationship between Panels and the WTO Members.383 
 
In Article 3(2) DSU the Panels and Appellate Body are furthermore tasked to provide “security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system.”384 As argued in Chapter 4, infra, this is an important normative constraint on the 
judicial decision maker, circumscribing her ability to adopt teleologies that threaten the objective expectations of the 
Member States in objectively construing the provisions of a covered agreement as well as when interpreting the 
terms thereof. 
 
Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement reserves the right to “authentically interpret” the covered agreements for the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council. This is not a unique feature of the GATT/WTO as the power to 
issue an authentic interpretation of a treaty remains with the State Parties themselves as “[i]t follows naturally from 
                                                        
379 Article 3(2) WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, emphasis added. 
380 See, for instance, Joshua Meltzer, “State Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the WTO,” 26(4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law 693 (2005). The consent of Member States to the covered agreements of the WTO is clarified, with respect to the 
operation of the WTO dispute resolution body in Article 3.2 DSU. Its aim is to preserve the balance of rights and obligations in pursuit of the 
security and predictability of the international trading system; as explored in Section 3.B, infra. 
381 As Brotons points out, “[o]bject and ends make up an interpretation criterion in which the first element – the object – plays a role of realism 
and moderation, and the second element – the end – the role of idealism and progress.” Antonio Remiro Brotons, Derecho Internacional Público; 
Vol. 2 Derecho de los Tratados (Madrid: Tecnos, 1987), p. 313, quoted in Evandro Menezes de Carvalho, Semiotics of International Law: Trade 
and Translation (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2011), p. 163, fn. 8. 
382 See for an agent-based system with a focus on monitoring compliance, Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast, “What is Law? A 
Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order,” 4(2) Journal of Legal Analysis 471 (2012). 
383 See Petros C. Mavroidis, “No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practised by WTO Courts,” 102 American Journal of International Law 
421 (2008), pp. 421-422, noting that “the WTO members (principals) have provided WTO "courts" (agents) with the authority to interpret those 
sources of law. And agents must, in turn, perform their tasks without undoing the balance of rights and obligations as struck by the principals” 
(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). A different approach emphasizes the constructivist explanation of international law; see Jutta Brunnee 
and Stephen J. Toope, “Constructivism and International Law,” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, eds., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations – The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). It is also in this sense that a 
system’s supreme court is a regulator; see Frank H. Easterbrook, “The Supreme Court 1983 Term – Foreword: The Court and the Economic 
System,” 98 Harvard Law Review 4 (1984). 
384 Contrast this “system’s view,” with the Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) that limits the role of the 
court “to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it.” 
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the proposition that the parties to a treaty are legally entitled to modify the treaty or indeed to terminate it [as] they 
are empowered to interpret it.”385 In this way, the WTO Agreement has limited the authority of the dicta of the WTO 
dispute settlement bodies to the confines of “judicial” interpretation of the rules, provisions and commitments of the 
covered agreements.386 
 
On such and other grounds, Hart, infamously, characterized the modern incarnation of international law as a 
primitive system consisting mostly of an unstructured collection of primary rules that lack the centrality of an 
accepted rule of recognition.387 Waldron laments this brusque treatment of international law, “because in recent 
decades the nature and status of international law has emerged as one of the issues in jurisprudence with greatest 
importance for real-world political debates.”388 Similarly, Alvarez has voiced his annoyance that “we are still 
discussing this 1960s chestnut of a question.”389 
 
Alternatively, d’Aspremont argues that Hart’s central theory on the concept of law is “germane to the extent that it 
helps international legal scholars to restrict international legal positivism to a mechanism for determining the mode 
of existence of norms; that is, their validity.” An important implication hereof is that “international legal positivism 
is [no longer] about determining the right content of norms and the right adjudicative truth.” Instead, it is “confined 
to a thesis about the validity-condition of legal norms.”390 International legal positivism is therefore concerned with 
the identification and delineation of which sources generate the legal norms of international law and under which 
                                                        
385 See Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), at 136. See also Nguyen 
Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, Droit International Public, 7th ed. (Paris: L.G.D.J., 2002), at 256, holding “L’interprétation réellement 
authentique est celle qui est fournie par un accord intervenu entre tous les États parties au traité.” (The truly authentic interpretation is that provided 
by agreement among all State parties to the treaty.) See further Anthony Carty, “Conservative and Progressive Visions in French International 
Legal Doctrine,” 16(3) European Journal of International Law 525 (2005). Also successfully argued by the United States in their submission in 
Chemtura Corporation v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, (2009). 
386 Given the lack of practice under Article IX:2 WTO Agreement, Howse notes that Appellate Body decisions “are likely to have a kind of 
de facto finality as interpretations of law, even if they lack de jure finality ,” in Robert Howse, “The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate 
Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., The Role of the Judge in 
International Trade Regulation – Experience and Lessons for the WTO, World Trade Forum (2003), IV, at 11, 15. 
387 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994 [1961]), Chapter 10. 
388 Jeremy Waldron, “International Law: ‘A Relatively Small and Unimportant’ Part of Jurisprudence?,” New York University Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Papers No. 427 (2013), calling Chapter X of HLA Hart’s Concept of Law an “embarrassing” chapter. 
389 Jose Alvarez, “But Is It Law?,” Comments, in 103 American Society of International Law Proceedings 163 (2009). See also, Aaron 
Fichtelberg, Law at the Vanishing Point: A Philosophical Analysis of International Law (Delaware: Ashgate, 2008), who stresses that “international 
law can stand on its own as a field of law and as a field of political analysis” (at xiii). 
390 Jean d’Aspremont, “Herbert Hart in Today’s International Legal Scholarship,” in Jorg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, International 
Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 115 (footnote omitted). See also Jean d’Aspremont, 
Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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conditions these are applied. As such, legal positivism in international law seeks to positively identify the legal 
norms and rules reflecting the - rather Euro-centrically approached - common interest of “civilized nations.”391  
 
As the validity condition of the provisions and commitments of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement are not 
truly in doubt, there is no need at present to further deepen the discussion of whether GATT/WTO law is in fact 
“law” at all. The establishment of the DRB, an important development when set against the backdrop of the 
diplomatically oriented392 system of trade policy coordination under the GATT 1947,393 crucially strengthened this 
understanding. Its establishment further allayed concerns that the WTO system does not provide “law” on account of 
the limited possibility of enforcement in the form of (measured) retaliation394 - valid questions as to its efficiency in 
realizing compliance with its dicta notwithstanding.395 
 
From this perspective, it is generally accepted that the regime of the WTO offers a legal system396 of rules and 
obligations that centers on a normative economic core397 that is defined, but not uniformly interpreted or applied by 
its Member States. This leaves undisputed that the pre-contractual rationale for joining the GATT/WTO is 
dominated by domestic political economy concerns, including the level and character of trade divergence for those 
still outside the collaborative block.398 
 
Some have argued political economy approaches that are critical of presuming any normative core to international 
economic agreements: they dismiss the tenet of policy setting by high-minded, welfare-maximizing decision-makers 
                                                        
391 As Emanuel von Ullman put it in his Völkerrecht (Freiburg i. B. [etc.]: J.C.B. Mohr, 1898): “Die meisten Interessen, welche den Gegenstand 
staatlicher Verwaltung bilden, haven sich innerhalb der Gemeinschaft civilisirter Staaten geradezu zu solidarischen und sohin zu internationalen 
Interessen ausgebildet.” (pp. 252-253) A position that is, to some extent, also regretfully reflected in the expression of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, 
which sets out the “sources of international law.” For critical assessment of the role of imperialism in the making of international law, see Antony 
Anghie, Imperalism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
392 Joseph Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Some Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement,” 35 Journal of World Trade 191 (2001). 
393 In particular, the condemned Member State had the ability under the GATT 1947 to politically block adoption of a Panel Report, preventing 
it from having legal effect. 
394 See, among a broad literature, Chad P. Bown and Joost Pauwelyn, eds., The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
395 See for the limits on retaliation in trade disputes, among a broad literature, Chad P. Bown and Kara M. Reynolds. “Trade Agreements and 
Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement,” American University Working Paper (Economics), April 2015.  
396 Such in conscious opposition to Hart who observes that international law consists of rules, which “constitute not a system but a set of 
rules” (H.L.A. Hart, Concept of Law 2nd ed., p. 236). 
397 Buchanan, for example, identifies “free trade” as the non-rival club good enjoyed and nourished by the Member States of the GATT/WTO, 
in James Buchanan, “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” 32(125) Economica 1 (1965). 
398 The locus classicus for this argument is Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free 
Trade (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
110 
 
(“benevolent dictators” or “social planners”) as naïve thinking. Schropp, for instance, extends the premise of 
methodological individualism to hold that “policy is drafted by self-interested government officials who care 
predominantly about maximizing their personal wellbeing, be it in the form of political support, re-election 
endeavors, receiving important information, or maximizing their budgetary discretion.”399  
 
By adopting the position of the adjudicator however, attention switches from the mechanics of achieving 
collaboration to the focal point of such collaboration; the provision, commitment, or entitlement, around which there 
is conflict and is in need of interpretation. Accordingly, while Parties’ outlook and behavior undoubtedly adhere to 
an inherently self-oriented conception of collaboration “for me,”400 with particular reference to appropriating the 
gains of collaboration or defection (acquisition), the adjudicator safeguards the established collaborative object and 
purpose of the instrument. 
 
The adjudicator emphasizes the systemic collaboration “in me” and derives her understanding of the structure of the 
instrument, vital to her adjudicative decision, from her assessment of the substantive goals401 and object and purpose 
of the instrument.402 In this way we subscribe to Judge Simma’s critique of a strong consensualist approach to 
international law, such as apparent in the ICJ’s Lotus decision,403 as “an old, tired view of international law.”404 
Political economy explanations that center on the dynamics of the contractual formation and the compliance405 stage 
are thus of limited relevance. 
 
                                                        
399 Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 135, fn. 5. 
400 For the distinction between cooperation “for me” and “in me,” see I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International Cooperation: 
The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Part I. 
401 Alan Schwartz, “Relational Contracts in the Courts: an Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies,” 21(2) Journal of Legal 
Studies 271 (1992). 
402 Mavroidis, argues complimentarily that a theory of disputes is best derived from a consideration of (i) the reasons for contracting, i.e. the 
“primary law” (entitlements) that signatories have given themselves, (ii) the protection accorded to those entitlements, and (iii) the degree of 
contractual completeness; Petros C. Mavroidis, “Remedies in the WTO: a Framework of Analysis,” Mimeo (2006), quoted in Simon A. B. Schropp, 
Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
403 Permanent Court of International Justice, “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 18. 
404 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports (2010), p. 403, July 22, 2010, Declaration of Judge Simma, ¶ 2 at p. 478. 
405 In a recent paper, Van Aaken and Trachtman develop a method “that integrates [public international law] more holistically in a [political 
economy] model” – viewing public international law both “as explanans as well as explanandum.” (p. 11) Their central unit of analysis however 
remains domestic interests, examined through the dual-layered ability of states to form international law and comply therewith. See Anne van 
Aaken and Joel P. Trachtman, “Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior,” University of St. Gallen 
Law School, Law and Economics Research Paper Series No. 2015-08 (July 2015). 
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Collaboration in the WTO is, from the perspective of the adjudicatory decision-maker, goal-oriented to the extent 
that all Members are assumed to be reasonably rational406 and have agreed to a limited cooperation on and 
coordination of their trade policies in order to enhance the outcome (maximize welfare) of the “trade game.” The 
international trade regime is thus one of multilaterism, not in the sense of collaboration driven by shared empathy 
between the actors,407 but one of rational commitment on particular substantive issues (i.e. domestic measures 
affecting trade policy, including export restrictions).408 
 
Consequently, the DRB is understood to pursue a systemic “internal” view of coherence and legitimacy in the 
GATT, in order to provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. Within these adjudicatory 
goals, the collaborative intent of Parties to the WTO is available to the adjudicator through and delineated by the 
treaty’s object and purpose in its preamble. The WTO Agreement clarifies Parties’ common intent and specifies that 
they recognize: 
 
[…] that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods 
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development, 
 
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development, 
 
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations […] 
(emphasis added) 
                                                        
406 Reasonably rational parties are guided by rational choice, but are aware of transaction costs: they have complete, transitive, and continuous 
sets of individual preferences and engage in thorough cost-benefit analyses, but are not complete utility maximizers. We wish to side step the 
discussion on bounded rationality, as, for some, bounded rationality is equivalent to irrationality (e.g. Daniel Kahnemann, “Maps of Bounded 
Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,” 93(5) American Economic Review 1449 (2003)), while for others it is related to the Bayesian 
updating of otherwise perfectly rational actors (e.g. Ariel Rubinstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” 59(4) Econometrica 777 
(1982)). See generally, Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” 69(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 99 (1955). 
407 A sense of solidarity among the rational actors can work to further stabilize equilibrium behavior and provide additional legitimacy to the 
regulatory framework. As such, the principle of solidarity may be integrated with the contractual obligation to perform and adjudicate in good faith. 
Solidarity among states is however not a sufficient, although to a certain extent necessary, reason for stable international cooperation among players 
with non-homogenous preferences. See, Rudiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima, eds., Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law, Beiträge 
zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 213 (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2010); and Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles, 
eds., A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
408 I do not here differentiate between “multilateral” and “multilateralism” as is sometimes done in the literature to denote the difference 
between cooperation and coordination respectfully. The character of international trade, properly envisioned not as fundamentally antagonistic but 
rather as compliance and outcome-oriented, supports this broader use as pertaining to the commitment between Member States. See, I. William 
Zartman and Saadia Touval, “Introduction: Return to the Theories of Cooperation,” in I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International 




As emphasized, the WTO Agreement declares it should be read so as to recognize Parties’ understanding that they 
conduct their economic relations with an eye to “expanding the production of and trade in goods and services” in a 
manner respective of the Membership’s “different levels of economic development.” The Parties’ further stress the 
need for “positive efforts” to ensure the equitable participation of developing countries. Barriers to trade shall thus 
be brought down through “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.” 
 
For the purposes of adjudicating hard cases, those cases where implementation preferences genuinely conflict 
between Member States, the guidance provided by the preamble as to the character of the communicative 
instrument, its purposes and normative context, is crucial. Whereas the conviction holds common ground among 
WTO treaty interpreters that direct reliance on the preamble is generally the least persuasive argument, this rests on 
the central fallacy this work seeks to address. In fact, as will be argued in Section B, infra, the interpretative 
constraints under which the adjudicator imposes a normative “structure” on the language of the GATT/WTO is 
determined by the contours of the means and ends as provided by the signatories in the provisions, their contextual 
framing, as well as anteriorly in the preamble of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement. 
 
Section II.B, hereunder, proceeds to discuss the interpretative elements relevant to treaty interpretation and to the 
GATT 1994 in particular. In so doing the baseline methodology for reading the GATT is established and, 
subsequently criticized. The analysis is focused on Textual and contextual readings of the GATT, while the 
Mercurial role of good faith is over-emphasized in comparison to GATT interpretative practice.  
 
The central methodological innovation argued for in Chapter 4, infra, is the introduction of a conditional deference 
to Member State economic policy when fitting a disputed policy measure to a GATT exemption provision (such as 
Article XI:2(a)) as opposed to a headline rule (such as Article XI:1) or exception provision (such as Article XX). 
This conditional deference works to re-energize the effectiveness of “catch up” strategies of economic growth (as 
discussed in Chapter 1, supra), and, ex ante, problematize the construction of a Textualist reading of the covered 




B. Benchmark Interpretation of the GATT 1994 and WTO Agreement 
 
It is generally accepted in public international law that treaty texts are incomplete, even more so than domestic legal 
instruments. This distance to the contractual ideal of (neo-)classic economics, the Arrow-DeBreu Pareto-efficient 
complete contingent contract (CCC),  is driven in large part by the considerable transaction costs associated with 
reaching an international consensus (resulting in a rigidity of the language chosen) and uncertainty as to future 
dynamics.409 When a treaty is concluded between Parties with highly diverse interests and economic backgrounds – 
as in the present multilateral context of the GATT 1994 – their understanding of how their respective preferred 
policy responses to these uncertainties fit the contractual language is, in the strongest sense, not homogenous. 
 
These differences between Parties can either be addressed through intra- or extra-contractual ways. As this work 
adopts the perspective of the adjudicator, only intra-contractual solutions are examined.410 Traditionally, policy 
flexibility mechanisms are understood so as to address contractual “regret” and enhance Parties’ ex ante willingness 
to sign up to stronger and broader provisions in the agreement.411 Disagreement between the Parties on the meaning 
of such policy flexibility mechanisms is, according to Schropp,412 largely the result of contractual incompleteness 
and can be either benign (driven by sincere language ambiguity or accidental contract gaps) or more asinine. 
 
The fundamental incompleteness of the treaty and preference heterogeneity among the Parties both creates and 
delineates the interpretative space of the adjudicator. The adjudicator’s understanding of the instrument’s structure 
colors her interpretation, both in the presence or absence of “authoritative” interpretations issued by the Parties to 
the agreement.413 Interpretive decisions in “hard cases” are taken in full face of the spectrum of tensions between the 
“ordinary meaning” of the treaty language and the, conditionally conflicting, preferred implementation policies of 
Parties. 
                                                        
409 Philip Allott, “The Concept of International Law,” 10(1) European Journal of International Law 31 (1999). 
410 For consideration of extra-contractual dynamics, I refer to the international relations (IR) literature and the respective intersections with 
GATT/WTO law explored there. 
411 See, for instance, Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics 
Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
412 Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 69 et seq, identifying six types of contractual incompleteness. 
413 Joost Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig, “The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations across International Tribunals,” in 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, eds., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations – The State of the 




The VCLT is the central document in the modern understanding of the law of treaties and presents a benchmark to 
the interpretation thereof. This holds equally for the GATT 1994 and WTO Agreement, both on their character as 
international treaties and because Article 3(2) DSU instructs the dispute settlement system to “preserv[e] the rights 
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and clarify[] the existing provisions of those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”414 
 
In its first report, US – Gasoline, the WTO Appellate Body established its interpretative method with reference to 
the “fundamental rule of treaty interpretation.”415 The Appellate Body further observed that “[t]his rule has received 
its most authoritative and succinct expression in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties […], which provides 
in relevant part:  
 
ARTICLE 31 
General rule of interpretation 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. ” 
 
The following interpretative elements circumscribe, pursuant to Article 31.1 VCLT, any method of attributing 
meaning to the text of the covered agreements: (1) the ordinary meaning of terms; (2) read in their context; (3) in 
light of the treaty’s object and purpose; and in (4) good faith. Article 31.2 VCLT further notes that the context 
comprises the treaty text, pre-amble and annexes, together with any agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and any instrument which was made by one or 
more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. Article 31.3 adds subsequent practice, subsequent agreements, and any relevant rules of public 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
                                                        
414 Article 3(2) WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, emphasis added. 
415 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), at 16-17.  
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1. Ordinary Meaning 
 
The International Law Commission (ILC), established by the United Nation’s General Assembly to encourage the 
progressive development of international law and its codification, drafted the document that was to become the 
VCLT between 1949 and 1969, when the text was adopted at the Vienna Conference. The preamble to the 1969 
VCLT reaffirms the belief that the law of treaties should promote “the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the development of friendly relations and the achievement of co-operation among nations.”416 
 
The ILC’s Introductory Commentary to its Draft Articles 27 and 28, which comprise, together with Article 29, the 
section on treaty interpretation, stresses that its interpretative principles and maxims should be read as “principles of 
logic and good sense.” Which principles are “valuable only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which the 
parties may have intended to attach to the expression that they employed in a document.”417 The ILC points out that 
“the process of interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of the article [31 VCLT] form a single, closely 
integrated rule”418 which, “when read as a whole, cannot properly be regarded as laying down a legal hierarchy of 
norms for the interpretation of treaties.”419 
 
As further guide to appreciating the meaning that parties may have intended to express through their choice of 
terms,420 the ILC accords significant weight to the object and purpose of the treaty to more fully enlighten the 
cooperative, positive intention of the parties. At the same time it emphasizes “the primacy of the text as the basis for 
                                                        
416 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, No. 18232, Vol. 1155, I-18232, Treaty Series / Recueil des Traites (1980), p. 
333. 
417 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 218, ¶4. 
418 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 220, ¶8. 
419 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 220, ¶9. A hierarchy is established though between the supplementary means of interpretation of Article 32 VCLT 
and the rule formulated in Article 31 VCLT. The ILC notes that “the elements of interpretation in article [31] all relate to the agreement between 
the parties at the time when or after it received authentic expression in the text. Ex hypothesi this is not the case with preparatory work […]” id., 
¶10 (stress in original). 
420 Importantly, and as Gardiner points out, the interpretative rule of the VCLT implies that the true meaning that is to be ascertained through 
treaty interpretation is not that of the parties subjectively, but rather their intention as distilled in and expressed by the treaty text, read as a whole. 
In Richard K. Gardiner, International Law (Harlow: Pearson, 2003), pp. 80-81; see also Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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the interpretation of a treaty” and cautions that teleological interpretations should be careful to respect “the original 
intentions of the parties as expressed in the text.”421 
 
In the words of the ILC, “the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an 
investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties.”422 Parties in turn are “presumed to have that intention which 
appears from the ordinary meaning of the terms used by them.” Good faith and common sense however demand “the 
ordinary meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty and in light of its 
object and purpose.”423 
 
In stressing that interpretation according to the general rule of the VCLT needs to be directed at the elucidation of 
the meaning of the text, instead of a reconstruction of what wise negotiators should have intended, the ILC rejected 
McDougal’s policy centered approach to treaty interpretation.424 
 
In this way, the principles of logic and good sense behind Articles 31-33 VCLT guide the purposeful interpretation 
of treaties, which exercise the ILC acknowledges to be “to some extent an art, not an exact science.”425 It is 
important to note that the interpretative principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat (effectiveness principle) was not 
incorporated separately in the VCLT interpretative principles for fear of inviting “extensive” or “liberal” approaches 
                                                        
421 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 218, ¶2. The International Court of Justice has similarly emphasized that any interpretation needs to be based “above 
all upon the text of the treaty” – ICJ, Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (Preliminary Objections), I.C.J. Reports 
(2004), p. 279, ¶100. 
422 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 220, ¶11. 
423 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 221, ¶12. See also, International Court of Justice, United States Nationals in Morocco, I.C.J. Reports (1952), pp. 
183-184, 197, and 198. 
424 McDougal is an epitome of the New Haven School, an approach to international law that stresses the policy effects of decision alternatives; 
see, for instance, Myres S. MacDougal, “International Law and the Future,” 50 Mississippi Law Journal 259 (1979). In conscious pursuit of 
McDougal, and in the tradition of the New Haven School, I reject the impression of a norm-neutral interpretation of a text and instead postulate an 
idealized public meaning in Chapter 3, infra, that is strengthened by the “realistic” approach of the law and economics strand of critical legal theory. 
The so-argued “idealized” approach to the text is “public”: Not based in popular sovereignty such as the US Constitution’s “We the People” 
however, but on its multilateral character. See also, Jack N. Rakove, “Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning 
Originalism,” 48 San Diego Law Review 575 (2011). 
425 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 218, ¶4. Note however Jennings’ quip: "Certainly the interpretation of treaties is an art rather than a science, though 
it is part of 
the art that it should have the appearance of a science" in Robert Y. Jennings, “General Course on Principles of International Law,” 121 
Recuel des Cours (1967/II) p. 544, quoted in Jan Klabbers, “On Rationalism in Politics: Interpretation of Treaties and the World Trade 
Organization,” 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 405 (2005), p. 406, fn. 2. 
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that go beyond what the terms of any treaty can reasonably be said to express.426 Instead, the ILC held that a good 
faith reading of the treaty’s text within its normative object and purpose sufficiently captures this maxim without 
exceeding the four-corners of the treaty itself. 
 
The WTO Appellate Body, according to its holding in US – Gasoline, asserts that the rule of Article 31 VCLT “has 
attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law”427 and can, as such, be applied to the treaty 
texts of the covered agreements.428 Moreover, this “direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General 
Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.”429 
 
The Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II confirms430 that Article 32 VCLT should be read in addition 
to Article 31 VCLT to fully capture the customary rules of interpretation as it incorporates supplementary means of 
interpretation.431 These supplementary means include the travaux preparatoires of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion, and can be employed in order to confirm a meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 
VCLT, or to determine meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous 
or obscure, or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
WTO dispute adjudication bodies have not relied exclusively on the VCLT in interpreting the covered agreements. 
In addition to the interpretative elements mentioned in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, the doctrine of lex specialis 
derogate lex generalis has been privileged.432 Mavroidis notes that although the lex specialis doctrine “is not 
                                                        
426 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 219, ¶6. The ILC intended no reference to Emer de Vattel’s famous, although circular, dictum: “La premiere maxime 
generale sur l’interpretation est qu’il n’est pas permis d’interpreter ce qui n’a pas besoin d’interpretation” – in Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens 
ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, Vol II (1758), p. 263. In the context of the WTO, this interpretative maxim is generally taken to prohibit a reading 
of the covered commitments “that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility” – see, for example, 
WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (1996), at 21; WTO Panel Report, Chile – 
Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (2002), ¶7.71. 
427 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), at 17 [footnote omitted]. See also, International Court of Justice, Arbitral Award of 
31 July 1989 (Judgment) (Guinea Bissau v. Senegal), ICJ Reports (1991) p. 53, ¶48. 
428 Note that Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has fallen in somewhat disuse by the WTO DRB as its additional prescription 
that “the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations,” 
because, as van Damme puts it, “[t]he Appellate Body seeks the ‘proper’ or ‘correct’ interpretation, not any ‘permissible’ interpretation” in Isabelle 
van Damme, “Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body,” 21 European Journal of International Law 605 (2010), 610. 
429 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), at 17. 
430 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (1996), at 9. See also WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel 
(2003), ¶ 61-62; and WTO Appellate Body Report, EC –Computer Equipment (1998), ¶¶ 86, 92-93. 
431 Note that Article 33 VCLT has also found application in the WTO dispute settlement practice. See for instance the WTO Appellate Body 
Report, US - Softwood Lumber IV (2005). 
432 See, for instance, the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in EC-Trade Description of Sardines (2002). 
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explicitly included as such in the VCLT, [] it is consonant with the principle of effective treaty interpretation (ut 
regis valeat quam paereat), which provides the cornerstone of the VCLT.”433 In this respect, the doctrine of an 
“evolving interpretation”434 is a necessary correlate to an interpretation of the GATT under conditions of an ever-
shifting technology/capacity frontier. 
 
In fulfillment of the DRB’s dual mission to preserve “the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements” and to “clarify the existing provisions of those agreements” the Appellate Body prefers a Textualist 
approach where “the words of a treaty […] are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of 
the treaty's object and purpose [….].”435 It observed in US – Continued Zeroing though that: 
 
“The principles of interpretation that are set out in Articles 31 and 32 are to be followed in a 
holistic fashion. The interpretative exercise is engaged so as to yield an interpretation that is 
harmonious and coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render the treaty 
provision legally effective. A word or term may have more than one meaning or shade of meaning, 
but the identification of such meanings in isolation only commences the process of interpretation, 
it does not conclude it. […] [A] treaty interpreter is required to have recourse to context and object 
and purpose to elucidate the relevant meaning of the word or term. This logical progression 
provides a framework for proper interpretative analysis.”436 
 
The “security and predictability [of] the multilateral trading system” is, according to the Appellate Body, thus best 
safeguarded when the wording of the covered agreements are given their “ordinary meaning” while read in their 
context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Whereas the Appellate Body acknowledges that “[a] word or 
term may have more than one meaning or shade of meaning,” its primary effort at “the identification of such 
meanings” commences by interpreting the word “in isolation.” Abi-Saad, a former Appellate Body member who 
also served as a judge for the International Court of Justice, describes the Appellate Body’s preference for a strong 
Textualist interpretation as bordering on the obsessive.437  
                                                        
433 Petros C. Mavroidis, “No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by the WTO Courts,” 102 The American Journal of International 
Law 421 (2008), p. 444. 
434 See the WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998). 
435 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), at 17. Similarly, the Appellate Body observes in its report in EC - Hormones (1998) 
that “[t]he fundamental rule of treaty interpretation requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret the words actually used by the agreement under 
examination, not words the interpreter may feel should have been used” (¶ 181). 
436 WTO Appellate Body Report, US — Continued Zeroing (2009), ¶ 268 (emphasis added). See also Georges Abi-Saab, “The Appellate Body 
and Treaty Interpretation,” in Fitz-Maurice Malgosia, Olufemi Elias, and Panos Merkouris, eds., Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), pp. 99–109. 
437  Abi-Saad notes that the Appellate Body is “obsédé textuel” (attributing the term to Professor René-Jean Dupuy) in Georges Abi-Saab, 
“The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation,” in Fitz-Maurice Malgosia, Olufemi Elias, and Panos Merkouris, eds., Treaty Interpretation and 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), p. 106. See also, Dongsheng Zang, “Textualism in 
GATT/WTO Jurisprudence: Lessons for the Constitutionalization Debate,” 33(2) Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 393 
(2006); and Douglas A. Irwin and Joseph H. H. Weiler, “Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS285),” 




As first step in its hermeneutic exercise, the WTO Appellate Body professes adherence to a rather strong form of 
Textualism;438 in its report US – Gambling the Appellate Body held that “[i]n order to identify the ordinary meaning, 
a panel may start with the dictionary definitions of the terms to be interpreted.” 439,440 Despite a tepid trend to 
broaden its hermeneutic analysis beyond a reliance on dictionaries, Ortino signals a continued mechanistic, 
compartmentalized and hierarchical approach to the interpretation of the covered agreements by the WTO Appellate 
Body.441 
 
While the Appellate Body has often expressed its conviction that dictionaries are a useful starting point for the 
analysis of the “ordinary meaning” of a treaty term, it does not consider their use “necessarily dispositive.” Instead, 
“[t]he ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be ascertained according to the particular circumstances of each case. 
Importantly, the ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be seen in the light of the intention of the parties ‘as 
expressed in the words used by them against the light of the surrounding circumstances’.”   
 
Dörr explains that, “except where the parties have used a generic term, interpretation must look for the ordinary 
meaning at the time the treaty was concluded.”442 The very indeterminacy of terms, especially when referencing 
concepts that are perceived as general, such as “bay” or “territorial waters,” however allows for a forward-leaning 
meaning attribution that goes beyond what could have been envisioned at the time of drafting.443 Forward-leaning 
                                                        
438 As broadly lamented in the literature, see for instance, Henrik Horn and Joseph H. Weiler, “European Communities – Trade Description 
of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent,” in Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis eds., The WTO Case Law of 2002 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 253. 
439 WTO Appellate Body Report, US — Gambling (2005), ¶164; the Appellate Body further nuanced this stance by its next sentence in that 
paragraph: “But dictionaries, alone, are not necessarily capable of resolving complex questions of interpretation, as they typically aim to catalogue 
all meanings of words – be those meanings common or rare, universal or specialized.” 
440 Note that the linguistic and grammatical analysis of the WTO Appellate Body further extends to encompass consideration of the tense in 
which the provision has been drafted; see, for instance, WTO Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating 
to Certain Agricultural Products (2002), ¶ 206 (footnote omitted); where it held that “[i]n general, requirements expressed in the present perfect 
tense impose obligations that came into being in the past, but may continue to apply at present.” 
441 Federico Ortino, “Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US – Gambling (2005): A Critique,” 9(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 117 (2006), p. 131 – noting that the Appellate Body’s lack of consideration for “context” and “object and purpose” 
shows “an unusual disregard for certain policy considerations surrounding the interpretation of a fundamental and sensitive provision of the GATS. 
(p. 145); See also Michael Lennard, “Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements,” 5 Journal of International Economic Law 17 
(2002). 
442  Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 543; See also Lon L. Fuller, “American Legal Realism,” 82 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 429 (1934), pp. 
445-446, pointing out that generic or broad terms can (and should) be interpreted toward contemporary relevance and often technologically neutral 
or forward leaning. See for the use of period dictionaries to establish “meaning,” Gregory E. Maggs, “A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from 
the Founding Era to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution,” 82 The George Washington Law Review 358 (2014). 
443 Namibia (Legal Consequences), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971), 31: “the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant […] 
were not static, but were by definition evolutionary […]. The parties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such.” 
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interpretation of terms is of course not boundless, nor is it a-historical: it is in fact grounded in the historically 
contingent animating spirit of the agreement.444 
 
As contemporary epitome of the Textualist tradition, the late US Supreme Court Justice Scalia holds that judges 
must do their best to figure out, first, the original meaning of laws and, second, the practical implications given new 
contexts for those original meanings.445 An obvious complication for any Textualist exercise emerges from the 
temporal aspect of “ordinary meaning,” which forces the interpreter to translate their best understanding of the 
historic446 meaning into the present.447 
 
When considering an inter-temporal interpretation of the provisions of the covered agreements in accordance with 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT,448 attention is not only paid to contemporaneous agreements (all relevant rules of 
international law that existed on April 15, 1994), but extends to those rules of international law449 as “applicable in 
the relations between the parties” at the time of interpretation. Waldock further confirms this understanding in his 
draft Article 73.450 The ICJ rather grounds an evolutionary approach to reading treaty texts in the “effectiveness 
                                                        
444 It should, of course, be noted that the use of open-ended terms may be a deliberate drafting strategy, referencing technological neutral 
concepts such as “transmission” and “information” to allow an effective interpretation of their “ordinary meaning” to adjust over time. An 
interpretative inclination that is shared by the proponents of the “living constitution,” who advocate a reading of the constitution where “provisions 
suggest[] restraints on the government in the name of basic rights, yet [are] sufficiently unspecific to permit the judiciary to elucidate the 
development and change in the content of those rights over time.” (p.57) See, Dennis Goldford, The American Constitution and the Debate Over 
Originalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). In this light Pauwelyn observes: “it could [similarly] be submitted that the use of 
broad, unspecified terms - such as ‘exhaustible natural resources’, ‘public morals’ or ‘essential security interests’ in GATT Arts. XX and XXI - is 
an indication that the drafters intended these terms to be interpreted in an ‘evolutionary’ manner” in Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 267. 
445 Antonin Scalia, “Response,” in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999). See for a recent overview, Gary Lawson, “Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation,” 92 Notre Dame Law Review (2017), 
forthcoming. 
446 See for a fascinating exercise in meaning attribution, the construction of the word “recess” in the US Constitution based on the historical 
translations thereof (contemporary translations into Dutch and German describe the word as “gedurende de afweezenthyd van de Senaat” and “da 
der Senat nicht sitzt” respectfully), US Supreme Court, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); see Jack M. Balkin, “The Construction of 
Original Public Meaning,” Draft on file with author (August 31, 2015). 
447 See, Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,” 60 Boston University Law Review 204 (1980); and H. Jefferson 
Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent,” 98(5) Harvard Law Review 885 (1985). See also, Joost Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig, 
“The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations across International Tribunals,” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, eds., 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), pp. 452 et seq. 
448 Note that Article 31(3)(c) originally included a temporal limitation, referring to the rules of international law “at the time of conclusion of 
the treaty,” see WTO Panel Report, Chile - Price Band System (2002), ¶ 7.85. 
449 As pointed out in Section II.A.2, supra, note that “rules” are indicative of a broader legal category than “agreements” (mentioned in Articles 
31(3)(a) and 31(2)(a) VCLT). 
450 Third Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock (16th Session of the ILC (1964)), Doc. A/CN.4/167, ILC Yearbook 
(1964/II), at 61. 
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principle,” which was ultimately subsumed in the workings of (objective) good faith in the VCLT rule of 
interpretation.451 
 
Balkin stresses that “articulating the original public meaning is not a simple job of reporting what happened at a 
certain magical moment in time. It is a theoretical and selective reconstruction of elements of the past, brought to the 
present and employed in the present for present-day purposes.”452 Dworkin similarly points out that even a perfectly 
expressed (and understood) historic intent cannot be successfully applied to a contemporary factual matrix without 
fresh judgment.453  
 
The US Supreme Court, in its efforts to accord a public meaning to the provisions of the US Constitution, 
increasingly relies on dictionaries in its determination of meaning.454, 455 Rubin notes that whereas “in the past the 
[US Supreme Court] would ‘employ[] dictionaries to refresh the Justices’ memory about the meaning of words, or to 
provide potential meanings from which the Court would select based on statutory purpose, legislative intent, 
                                                        
451 Note furthermore that the ICJ stressed that the effectiveness principle and evolutionary interpretation of terms should not lead to treaty 
interpretations that are “contrary to their letter and spirit” – see International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949) 174. See further Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 40-41, Chapter 7. As an example, the Panel in its report, US – Gambling (2004), stressed that “it was also the general 
view that the GATS is technologically neutral in the sense that it does not contain any provisions that distinguish between the different technological 
means through which a service may be supplied.” WTO Panel Report, US –Gambling (2004), ¶6.285 (citing an interim progress report of the E-
Commerce Work Program group (1999)). Whereas China argued that the meaning of “sound recording distribution service” needs to be based on 
the ordinary meaning of the terms at the time of its accession to the WTO (2001), the WTO Appellate Body, in its report China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products (2009), confirmed the technological neutral understanding of GATS commitments, as it held that “the term ‘product’ is used 
to refer to both tangible and intangible goods, as well as services” (¶364). China thus advanced a version of the originalist approach to the “ordinary 
meaning” of a text. A position that is, in some sense stricter than, but related to, Scalia and Garner’s assertion that “[i]n their full context, words 
mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written—with the understanding that general terms may embrace later 
technological innovations. Hence a 2012 statute referring to aircraft, if still in effect in 2112, would embrace whatever inventions the label fairly 
embraces, even inventions that could not have been dreamed of in 2012” (p. 42) in Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul, Mn.: Thomson/West, 2012). But see, Richard A. Posner, “The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia,” New Republic 
(August 24, 2012). 
452 Jack M. Balkin, “The Construction of Original Public Meaning,” Draft on file with author (August 31, 2015), p. 9. 
453 Ronald Dworkin, “Comment,” in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), “It is a matter of complex and subtle philosophical argument what such translations consist in, and how they are possible—how, for 
example, we weave assumptions about what the speaker believes and wants, and about what it would be rational for him to believe and want, into 
decisions about what he meant to say.” (p. 117). 
454 See, Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, “The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of 
Dictionaries,” 47 Buffalo Law Review 227 (1999); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, “The Lexicon Remains a Fortress: An Update,” 5 
Green Bag 51 (2001); and Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use 
of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century,” 94 Marquette Law Review 77 (2010). 
455 In addition to the US Supreme Court, international courts exhibit a textualist bend as well; these include the WTO Appellate Body, the ICJ 
and the ICC. The latter is, however, constrained in its interpretational freedom by Article 22.2 of the ICC Statute, which – understandably - provides 
that the definition of a crime “shall be strictly construed.” See Joost Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig, “The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations 
and Explanations across International Tribunals,” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, eds., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International 
Law and International Relations – The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 452; and Leena Grover, “A Call to 
Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” 21 European 
Journal of International Law 543 (2010). 
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common sense, or some other contextual argument,’ more recent cases have placed dictionaries—rather than policy, 
context, or structure—at the center of the case.”456 
 
The use of dictionaries as gatekeepers and as primary arbiters of meaning demands that the interpreter explicate the 
selection of dictionary and speak to its qualification to resolve the inquiry.457 Dictionaries are, by their very nature, 
not impartial windows into a universally accepted lexicon and “less helpful when the inquiry properly extends 
beyond the word level.”458 The lexicographic analysis that compiles and orders dictionaries aims to accord “word 
senses”459 to each entry, rather than predict (let alone prescribe) its operation within the full sentence or in relation to 
the object and purpose of the communicative instrument the term is part of. 
 
In his dissent in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons US Supreme Court Justice Kennedy made note of the 
"longstanding recognition that a single word must not be read in isolation but instead defined by reference to its 
statutory context." In Ali the majority’s broad interpretation of the word “any” in “any other law enforcement 
officer” relied on Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. The dissent continued to observe that "[t]he word 
'any' can mean 'different things depending upon the setting’."460 
 
US Supreme Court Justice Scalia tirelessly stresses that Textualism need not be pedestrian and unimaginative, but 
rather brings much-needed rigor to the analytical and interpretative process.461 Textualism and Originalism are close 
philosophical companions that guide an interpretative exercise in the recognition that “[a] government of laws, not 
of men, means that the unexpressed intent of legislators must not bind citizens.”462  
 
                                                        
456 Philip A. Rubin, “War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance with Textualist Principles,” 60 Duke Law Journal 
167 (2010), p. 169 (footnote and reference omitted). 
457 See, Jason Weinstein, Note, “Against Dictionaries: Using Analogical Reasoning to Achieve a More Restrained Textualism,” 38 University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 649 (2005). See also Philip A. Rubin, “War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance 
with Textualist Principles,” 60 Duke Law Journal 167 (2010). 
458 Craig Hoffman, “Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary when Interpreting Legal Texts,” 6 New York 
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 401 (2003), p. 406. 
459 Sue Atkins and Michael Rundell, The Oxford Guide to Practical Lexigraphy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 264; Atkins 
and Rundell also point out that dictionaries are often viewed as prescriptive texts, something they note lexicographers are generally uncomfortable 
with (Id., p. 2). 
460 552 U.S. 214 (2008), at 234 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004)). 
461 See for example Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997); 
Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul, MN: Thomson, 2012); and, controversially, in his 
dissent in U.S. Supreme Court, James Obergefell, et al., v. Richard Hodges, 576 US __ (2015), June 26, 2015. 
462 Amy Gutmann, “Preface,” in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1997), p. vii (emphasis in original). 
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According to the Textualist then, the words chosen in any treaty or statute satisfactorily express their authors’ intent 
and have “a limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible.”463 This rule 
presumes that a “thoroughly fluent reader can reliably tell in the vast majority of instances from contextual and 
idiomatic clues which of several possible senses a word or phrase bears.”464 Intervention by the interpreter in 
determining the “appropriate” content for this set of likely word-senses would necessarily detract from the weighing 
and balancing constitutive of Parties’ earlier agreement – the interpreter would substitute her own normative 
preference for those expressed by the Parties. 
 
In retort, Fish takes the position that lexical items and grammatical structures do not, by themselves, yield any 
meaning.465 In fact, the text is a “nonentity” when devoid of an “informing or animating spirit” and can, as such, 
“neither produce nor constrain anything”.466 Therefore, at least theoretically,467 “nothing stands in the way of any 
string of words becoming the vehicle of any intention.”468 The interpretative exercise does however have its rules, 
and a text is not entirely at the “scorer’s discretion.”469 What the treaty or statute interpreter has to clarify, or ideally 
consciously adopt, is a set of assumptions and normative notions with which he or she reads the text. “It is [thus] the 
specification or assumption of intention that comes first; the fact of a text with meaning comes second.”470  
 
Instead of postulating a “faithful agent” that struggles between Textualism and statutory equity in a search to accord 
true meaning to the text at hand,471 Fish emphasizes the primacy of interpretation over any kind of embedded “truth” 
that lies hidden in plain sight. Consequently, Fish concludes that “the plain meaning rule cannot be followed, [for] 
there is no meaning apart from purpose, and purpose cannot be inferred from the words alone […].”472 
                                                        
463 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 24. 
464 Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul, MN: Thomson, 2012), p. 93. 
465 A position loudly decried by Justice Scalia in his dissent in US Supreme Court, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), warning that 
“words no longer have meaning” should a non-textualist approach find application (at 2497). 
466 Stanley Fish, “There Is No Textualist Position,” 42 San Diego Law Review 629 (2005), p. 635. 
467 Fish distinguishes between the interpretative, philosophical, search for and construction of meaning and the “splendid labor” of adjudication 
or legal interpretation. Whereas the former is a theoretical investigation, the latter is an application and has to be concluded in the positive within a 
limited time. For a pluralist and synthetic approach to legal interpretation see, respectfully, Kent Greenwalt, “A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: 
Wills and Contracts,” 42 San Diego Law Review 533 (2005) and see Samuel C. Rickless, “A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication,” 42 San 
Diego Law Review 519 (2005). 
468 Stanley Fish, “There Is No Textualist Position,” 42 San Diego Law Review 629 (2005), p. 634. Fish goes on to answer Wittgenstein’s (no 
doubt rhetorical) question “Can I say 'bububu' and mean 'If it doesn't rain I shall go for a walk?’,” in the affirmative. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscobe, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986 [1953]), part I at 38.  
469 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994 [1961]) – metaphor used throughout.  
470 Stanley Fish, “There Is No Textualist Position,” 42 San Diego Law Review 629 (2005), p. 635. 
471 John H. Manning, “Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,” 101(1) Columbia Law Review 1 (2001). 




The art of adjudicative legal interpretation is therefore, even in most modern guises of positivist formalism,473 
primarily concerned with persuasion474 through acceptable forms of reason and argument.475 Certainly, multilateral 
treaties are never perfect expressions of subjective intent,476 as no communicative instrument ever could be,477 and 
always contain purposeful elements of rational, dogmatic constraint.478 
 
It is in the approach to these structural or purposive elements that the preconceptions and initial understanding479 of 
the interpreter show most clearly and have the greatest effect on the construction of a term’s “ordinary meaning.” 






                                                        
473 See, for instance, Jorg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, eds., International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), where they note that “[m]odern forms of international legal positivism, instead, celebrate the role of politics in 
international reality and, indeed, international legal practice even where they separate the realms of politics and scholarship.” (pp. 6-7). As pointed 
out earlier, this work does not embrace the deconstruction of the experience of international law, but instead grounds its interpretative framework 
in the rational, cooperative realization of the shared norm of social welfare optimization. 
474 Fish emphasizes that validation hinges on the recipient epistemic community, in Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, 
Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press 1989), pp. 488–491. 
475 See, for example, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); see also Joseph Raz, “Engaging Reason: On the 
Theory of Value and Action,” in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson and Thomas W. Pogge, eds., Rights, Culture and the Law – Themes from the 
Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
476 The WTO Appellate Body in its report in US – Gambling (2005) correctly differentiates between unilateral and pluri- or multilateral terms 
(¶160). The latter after all involves identifying the meaning common to all Members or to the instrument (as we argue). 
477 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1992 [1960]), 
Peter Christian Lang, ed., Hauptwerke der Philosophie. 20. Jahrhundert. See for an application to international law, Alexandra Kemmerer, “Sources 
in the Meta-Theory of International Law: Hermeneutical Conversations,” Max Planck Institute, MPIL Research Paper Series, No. 2017-02 (2017). 
478 Jean Koh Peters, “Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Treaties Reflect World Vision,” 23 Harvard International 
Law Journal 71 (1982), p. 74, fn. 14 and 15. 
479 Gadamer successfully employs the term “Vorurteil” to clarify the inevitable pre-judgments we all bring to any epistemic process; Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1992 [1960]), Peter Christian 
Lang, ed., Hauptwerke der Philosophie. 20. Jahrhundert. Gadamer, a student of Heidegger, explores the hermeneutical notion of “understanding” 
(“Verstehen”). Gadamer’s intention is not, as Heidegger’s is, to develop an understanding of human actuality. He rather concentrates on the notion 
of understanding in the human sciences. In the human sciences the interpretative relationship of the text and the interpreter is always a directional 
discourse aimed at the application of the subject matter. Gadamer rejects the notion that to understand is to reconstruct, in a disinterested fashion, 
the meaning of the text according to its author. Instead, the interpreter’s understanding of the text is mediated through a shared basic understanding 
about the subject matter of the text with its author(s). The very existence of the agreement thus presupposes a shared understanding about its object 
and purpose. The interpreter cannot however establish this insight conscientiously without becoming aware of her anterior influences and how they 
distance herself from a genuine approach to the subject matter of the text – and hence its meaning. See for an accessible introduction into Gadamer’s 
analysis of “understanding,” Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of Understanding,” in Robert J. Dostal, The Cambridge Companion 





“Words communicate their meaning from the circumstances in which they are used. In a written instrument their 
meaning primarily is to be ascertained from the context, the setting, in which they are found.”480 As Judge Spender 
eloquently highlights, words are essentially social; that is, they are relational,481 to each other and to the audience. 
 
Article 31(1) VCLT likewise directs the interpreter to seek “the ordinary meaning [that is] to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” (emphasis added). While the context – 
broadly conceived – can serve as a “steering spirit”482 to any reading of a text, Article 31(2) narrows its scope to 
those “elements [that] form part of or are intimately related to the text.”483 The general rule of interpretation thus 
clearly distinguishes between the immediate context of the “terms of the treaty” - as “their” grammatically refers to 
“the terms” - and the object and purpose of the “treaty,” by virtue of the preceding reference “its.”484 
 
The ILC elucidates that once the starting point of the textual analysis is the (plain) meaning of the words this 
suggests that examination of the context and its elements (Article 31(2) VCLT) follow next. Examination of relevant 
extrinsic elements to the text (Article 31(3) VCLT), such as a subsequent agreement on interpretation or subsequent 
practice, logically follows thereafter. This is not to say there is a hierarchy between them however, as “by their very 
nature [they] could not be considered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those which precede 
them.”485 
 
Whereas context relevant to the terms of the treaty will often be found in its vicinity, the Permanent Court correctly 
stresses that “meaning is not to be determined merely upon particular phrases which, if detached from the context, 
                                                        
480 International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the UN (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Separate Opinion Judge Spender, ICJ 
Reports (1962) 182, at 184 (emphasis added). 
481 See, Section II.A.2 above; Martii Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 9; but see contra, Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International 
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 340. 
482 Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 213. 
483 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 220, ¶9. 
484 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶238. 
485 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 220, ¶9. 
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may be interpreted in more than one sense.”486 The proper approach to framing relevant “context,” ex Article 31 
VCLT, is thus textual as well as con-textual. 
 
Within the immediate treaty context, “[i]nterpretative value can be found in the position of a particular word in a 
group of words or in a sentence, of a particular phrase or sentence within a paragraph, of a paragraph within an 
article or within a whole set of provisions, of an article within or in relation to the whole structure or scheme of the 
treaty.”487 Whether, for example, the tense of a related verb is integral to the term under examination, or merely 
provides relevant context thereto, fully depends on the interpreter and consequently on the understanding of the 
commitment’s object and purpose in relation to that of the treaty as a whole.488 
 
Article 31(2) VCLT makes clear that in additional to the treaty text, including its preamble and annexes, (a) any 
agreement relating to the treaty, made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; and (b) 
any instrument which was made between one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty, can serve as interpretative context to the rule laid 
down in Article 31(1) VCLT. 
 
In case of unilateral declarations, the ILC makes clear that whether these are captured by either of the two types of 
context mentioned in Article 31(2) VCLT or form an integral part of the treaty, depends on the joined intention of 
the parties.489 Whether they should be read as part of the context is in the hands of the interpreter and depends on the 
specific elements of each particular case. Van Damme notes that there is considerable doubt as to whether the 
description of the context in Article 31(2) VCLT is correctly read as exhaustive. She finds room in the underlying 
objectives of the article and its preparatory work for a broader, more open-ended interpretation.490 
 
                                                        
486 Permanent Court of International Justice, Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour, P.C.I.J. (1922), Series B, No. 2-3, p. 
23. 
487 Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 543. This includes the practice of cross-referencing the meaning of terms within (and at times across) treaty texts; see 
Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 235-253.  
488 See, for instance, WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages (1999), ¶117; WTO Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price 
Band System (2002), ¶206; WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples (2003), ¶208. 
489 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 221, ¶13. The formalities of Article 31(2)(a) and (b) VCLT need, of course, to be fulfilled in full.  
490 Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 215-216; She 
notes “It is doubtful whether the ILC intended to exclude other elements from possibly qualifying as context.” (Id., p. 218) 
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Relevant context can therefore also be found outside the four-corners of the treaty: in certain extrinsic agreements 
and instruments, as long as these fulfill the conditions of application. Note that “agreements” signify a broader 
notion than “treaties” and may encompass “understandings, commentaries or explanatory reports, which are agreed 
upon by the governmental experts drawing up the text of the treaty and adopted simultaneously with that text.”491  
The term “instruments” may likewise include interpretative declarations.492 
 
Moderated through the application of objective good faith, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT allows for the incorporation of 
non-WTO international law in the interpretation of WTO covered agreements, but in a limited fashion.493 The 
application of non-WTO international law cannot undermine the collaborative structure of provisions and 
commitments Parties agreed upon. The application of non-WTO international law to the multilateral commitments 
of the WTO covered agreements needs to be supportive of or complimentary to the multilateral object and purpose 
of the treaty and not be limited to the general network of expectations and commitments that is effective between the 
parties to the present conflict alone.494 This is further confirmed by the understanding that Parties to the WTO 
Agreement are assumed to have, to the extent relevant, “contracted out”495 of the principles of customary 
international law. Of course, Article 3.2 DSU makes explicit reference to the “customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law” – somewhat limiting this exclusionary effect.496 
 
Incorporation of general principles of (international) law into the adjudicatory process, ex Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, is 
therefore limited.497 At the same time however, the Article makes reference to other treaties possible in the partially 
                                                        
491 Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 551. 
492 Unlike a reservation, an interpretative declaration simply states that the declarant considers or understands provision X to mean Y. It is, 
strictly speaking, not an object of interpretation itself, but merely provides context thereto. Of course, this presupposes complete intentional clarity 
in the declaration itself, something that is most unlikely as I argue in Section II.A.1. 
493 See, for example, WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences (2004), ¶163; and WTO Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (2005), ¶¶310, 312. 
494 As the Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment (1998) notes “The purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention is to ascertain the common intentions of the parties. These common intentions cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective and 
unilaterally determined ‘expectations’ of one of the parties to a treaty” (¶ 84) (emphasis in original). 
495 WTO Panel Report, Korea – Procurement (2000), ¶ 7.96: “[…] Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations 
between the WTO Members.  Such international law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not "contract out" from it.  To put it 
another way, to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of 
the view that the customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty formation under the WTO.” 
496 See Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 57; see also Joost Pauwelyn, “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?,” 95 The 
American Journal of International Law 535 (2001). 
497 Assuming the adjudicator positively identifies relevant obligations of customary international law beyond those of jus cogens. In addition 
to the VCLT, the General Assembly of the United Nations’ resolution on State Responsibility and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea can 
readily be considered customary international law. However, the arbitrator's report in US –FSC (Article 22.6-U.S.) (2002) rather referred to 
resolution on State Responsibility as a supplementary means of interpretation (in accordance with Article 32 VCLT); UN GA, Resolution 56/83, 
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self-contained498 WTO regulatory framework – as long as these are applicable in the relations between the Parties 
jointly.499 The role of external norms as interpretative tools or as sources of law for the WTO system thus remains 
disputed.500, 501  
 
As held early on by the Appellate Body in its report in US – Gasoline, “the General Agreement is not to be read in 
clinical isolation from public international law.”502 Weil, the Rapporteur for the Société Française pour le Droit 
International, similarly concluded that “[s]ur le plan scientifique, le droit international économique ne constitue 
qu’un chapitre parmi d’autres du droit international général.”503 The Panel further clarified the relation between 
WTO law and international law in general in an outlier report in Korea – Procurement, to hold that “international 
law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not ‘contract out’ from it.”504 
 
The Panel and Appellate Body thus differentiate between con-textual interpretation of provisions and a contextual 
reading limited to their direct language: i.e. the application of the regulatory framework of the GATT/WTO to the 
dispute by grace of the commitments of the covered agreements and application of those regulatory elements 
contained in non-WTO international law. These main categories, plus a WTO-specific third category, offer 
potentially relevant context when construing the GATT/WTO’s contractual language. 
                                                        
International Law Commission's Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, reprinted in 21 ILM 1261 (1982). Similarly the WTO Appellate Body Report in EC – 
Hormones (1998) the noted that the status of the precautionary principle in international law is still unsettled, while stressing its importance for the 
interpretation of WTO law. 
498 See, for example, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Domain of W TO Dispute Resolution,” 40 Harvard International Law Journal 333 (1999); but 
contrast with Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); see also Joel P. Trachtman, “Book Review,” 98 American Journal of International Law 855 (2002) 
(reviewing Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law). 
499 Merkouris’ analysis of Article 31(3)(c) points to the adoption of a proximity criterion for proper application of the article, raising questions 
of conflict resolution and of the interpretation of customary international law; see Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle 
of Systemic Integration: Normative Shadows in Plato’s Cave (Leiden: Brill, 2015). 
500 Petros C. Mavroidis, George A. Bermann and Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization: Documents, Cases & Analysis (St.Paul: 
West Publishing, 2010), p. 936; and Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 257-263; noting that “it could be submitted that the criterion is rather that 
the rule can be said to be at least implicitly accepted or tolerated by all WTO members, in the sense that the rule can reasonably be said to express 
the common intentions or understanding of all members as to what the particular WTO term means” (p. 261). 
501 See also Robert Howse, “The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment 
Debate,” 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491 (2002). 
502 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), at 17. 
503 Prosper Weil, Rapporteur, Société Française pour le Droit International, Colloque d’Orléans, Aspects du Droit International Economique 
(1972), quoted in Joost Pauwelyn, “The Case Study: The Law of the World Trade Organization,” in Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: 
How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 25 (fn. 2). That the WTO 
Agreement, together with its covered agreements, is embedded in and part of the body of international law is an uncontroversial position that is 
only sporadically questioned; Judith Bello, “The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More,” 90 American Journal of International 
Law 416 (1996).  
504 WTO Panel Report, Korea- Procurement (2000), ¶ 7.96. The Panel further elucidated this statement by noting: “to the extent that there is 
no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules of 




As Mavroidis observes with regard to WTO sources of law, “[t]he supplementary means [of interpretation, ex 
Article 32 VCLT,] [stand] in a vertical relationship [to] the final agreement […]. By contrast, context points to a 
horizontal relationship.” Which instruments precisely constitute the horizontal environment of the WTO Agreement 
is left largely to the interpreter, whose “only legislative guidance is of a temporal nature: the context, however 
defined, must be in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.”505  
 
Thus, one should not, in the case of the WTO Agreement, regard as a contextual source of law any legal instruments 
that were signed after April 1994, when the Uruguay round package was concluded at Marrakesh. These post-1994 
treaties can nonetheless be of relevance to the multilateral Membership if they are found to be subject-relevant, or 
implicate the entire Membership. A comprehensive study of the fragmentation of international law is however 
outside the scope of the present argument. 
 
In EC – Chicken Cuts, the WTO Appellate Body for example found that the Harmonized Description and Coding 
System (HS) was an agreement that related to the treaty and was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty – even though the HS pre-dates the WTO covered agreements and was not concluded at the 
time of the Uruguay Round negotiations.506 A distinction between this method of invoking treaties as relevant 
context in the sense of Article 31(2) and their usage as interpretative guidance to establish the “ordinary meaning” of 
generic terms is both logical and obvious.507 
 
Sands observes that Article 31(3)(c) VCLT reflects a principle of integration, stressing that rules of international law 
should not be considered in isolation from each other.508 In considering the application of outside treaty norms when 
according meaning to the provisions of WTO covered agreements, it is however essential to note that these outside 
                                                        
505 Petros C. Mavroidis, “No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts,” 102 American Journal of International Law 421 
(2008), p. 450. 
506 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶199; see also Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate 
Body (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 254 and 338 et seq. 
507 Note Lon L. Fuller, “American Legal Realism,” 82 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 429 (1934), pp. 445-446, pointing out that 
generic or broad terms can (and should) be interpreted toward contemporary relevance. In reference to present discussions on the regulation of 
cross-border trade in the digital economy, this can mean that words should often be interpreted technologically neutral or forward leaning, see Alice 
Enders and Amy Porges, “Cross-border Dataflows and their Governance,” E-15 Think Piece (July 30, 2015), on file with author. 
508 Philippe Sands, “Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law,” 10 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 
3 (1998), p. 8. 
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norms cannot work to fundamentally add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements – on principle and following Article 3.2 DSU. 
 
For the purposes of the present study on the interpretation of the GATT/WTO provisions on export restrictive 
measures, the proper scope and effect of countries’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources is particularly 
relevant. Set against its historical background,509 the 1962 resolution510 on the permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources by the United Nations’ General Assembly demands particular attention as “appropriate context” for the 
interpretation of the GATT 1994 obligations. 
 
In the cases China – Raw Materials and China - Rare Earth the WTO Panel and Appellate bodies were invited to 
consider Article XX(g) GATT 1994 in the context of a WTO Member's "sovereign rights over their own natural 
resources." In particular, permanent sovereignty over natural resources was argued by China511 to provide relevant 
context for the interpretation of the conservation term in Article XX(g), especially in light of the object and purpose 
of the GATT to spur “sustainable development,” as mentioned in the Preamble thereof. Complainants rather argued 
that “Article XX(g) GATT does not permit WTO Members to deviate from WTO rules in order to promote and 
realize their own self-interested economic goals.”512 
 
In these “hard cases” the complainants, among whom the US and EU, argued strongly that the measures taken by 
China to restrict the export of certain raw materials had to be considered primarily Mercantilist in character and 
effect. China rather invited the Panel and Appellate Body to an objective good faith reading of the object and 
purpose of the GATT 1994 as directed toward their “sustainable development.” Due to the particularities of the case, 
China is consequently forced to defend their export restrictive measures by invoking Article XX(g) GATT 1994, set 
in the context of each Member’s permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A crucial complication further 
examined in Chapter 5, infra. 
 
                                                        
509 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1 1974, A/RES/3201 (S-VI), paragraph (e). See also the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, December 12, 1974, A/RES/3281 (XXIX), Article 2.1. 
510 UNGA Resolution, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 1803 (XVII), New York, December 14, 1962. See also, Nico Schrijver, 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
511 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶7.364. 
512 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶7.366. 
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The interpretational dispute was, according to the Panel in China – Raw Materials, resolved by a “reading of Article 
XX(g) in the context of the GATT 1994 [to] take into account the challenge of using and managing resources in a 
sustainable manner that ensures the protection and conservation of the environment while promoting economic 
development. As the Appellate Body explained, to do so may require ‘a comprehensive policy comprising a 
multiplicity of interacting measures’513.”514  
 
Resource-endowed WTO Members thus find expression of their (horizontal) right to sovereignty over natural 
resources in Article XX(g) GATT 1994 “precisely by designing and implementing conservation policies based on 
their own assessment of various, sometimes competing, policy considerations, and in a way that responds to their 
own concerns and priorities.”515 For good measure, the Panel goes on to emphasize that it “considers that measures 
the objective of which is to promote economic development are not ‘measures relating to conservation’ but 
measures relating to industrial policy.”516 
 
Had China been able to rely on a GATT commitment with a more overtly developmental objective (such as, 
perhaps, Article XI:2 GATT 1994 – which was interpreted differently by the Appellate Body – or, conditionally, 
Article XX(i)(j) or Article XVIII:3), or been able to invoke the national (economic) security clause (Article XXI 
GATT 1994), this might have given the WTO dispute resolution bodies the opportunity to more directly weigh one 
normative economic preference against another.517  
 
The Appellate Body further draws on the factual context of an interpretative question to elucidate the meaning of 
terms. In EC – Chicken Cuts factual context was posited as a midway category, between Article 31(2) and 31(1) 
VCLT, to examine the ordinary meaning of the term “salted” in the EC’s schedule.518 The Appellate Body seems to 
have relied on McNair’s somewhat confused distinction between the absolute and relative meaning of terms. He 
holds that “while a term may be ‘plain’ absolutely, what a tribunal adjudicating upon the meaning of a treaty wants 
                                                        
513 Referencing the WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (2007), ¶151. 
514 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶7.375. 
515 WTO Panel Report, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶7.459.  
516 WTO Panel Report, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶ 7.460.  
517 Some of these elements are discussed in Chapter IV, infra. 
518 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶148. 
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to ascertain is the meaning of the term relatively, that is, in relation to the circumstances in which the treaty was 
made, and in which the language was used.”519 
 
In its search for the ordinary meaning of a term, the Appellate Body, more than once, held that such “must be 
ascertained according to the particular circumstances of each case.”520 For example, in US – Wheat Gluten,521 the 
Appellate Body held that the dictionary meaning of “immediate” could only be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
relying on factual context such as the burdens of administration, the translation process, the complexity of 
notification, and the type of information submitted, to further clarify its plain meaning. It is important to note that 
the factual context has, in these cases, been employed as an interpretative element – not as part of questions 
pertaining to the application of law.522 
 
A contentious factual element of interpreting WTO law is the weighing and balancing of the respective economic 
conditions under which Member States implement trade restrictive policies and how they operate these. The 
Appellate Body, for instance, held in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, that “[…] it is irrelevant that ‘the trade effects’ 
of the tax differential between imported and domestic products, as reflected in the volumes of imports, are 
insignificant or even non-existent; [GATT] Article III protects expectations not of any particular trade volume but 
rather of the equal competitive relationship between imported and domestic products.”523 
 
The strong stance by the Appellate Body against discrimination between imported products and between imports 
and domestic equivalents cannot however obscure the fact that the GATT is an economic contract, concluded for the 
explicit aim of pursuing (sustainable/economic) development through increased trade volumes and economic 
production. It is, in short, an economic treaty and, as such, replete with references to economic theory, assumptions 
and, indeed, factual observations. 
 
                                                        
519 Arnold D. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 366 (emphasis in original). See further Isabelle van 
Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 269. 
520 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶175; see similarly WTO Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) 
(2001), ¶5.51. 
521 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten (2000), ¶105. 
522 As in WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶¶168-171. 
523 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Certain Alcoholic Beverages (1996), at p. 16. 
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Whereas the “spirit” of the GATT shapes and governs the non-discrimination and competitive equality provisions in 
the GATT, it does not contest the fundamentally normative interplay between law’s hermeneutical (or doctrinal) and 
economics’ social science methodological approaches to construction and interpretation.524 As such, use of 
economic “facts” and “observations” in the interpretation of provisions in the GATT/WTO is not limited to 
establishing cross-price-elasticity of substitution to decide whether products are indeed “like products.”525 In fact, as 
Keynes pointed out: “practical men, who believe themselves to bet quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”526 
 
Developing country Member States have, in this light rather unsurprisingly perhaps, “expressed dissatisfaction with 
the record of interpretation thus far in the jurisprudence of the WTO.”527 This dissatisfaction has focused not only on 
the results of the interpretation, but also on the approach thereto and the methodology employed. Developing 
country Member States have often remarked upon the fact that socio-economic analysis always has bearing on the 
interpretation of a regulatory text – especially when engaging an agreement of international economic law. 
 
In at least partial agreement with this critique, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel in US – Large Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), emphasizing that: 
 
“We do not believe that panels can base determinations as to what would occur in the marketplace 
only on their own intuition of what rational economic actors would do. We recognize that a panel 
confronted with a measure of the kind at issue here may have intuitions as to the consistency of 
the measure with the market, based on economic theory. However, we would expect that in such 
circumstances the panel would at least explain the economic rationale or theory that supports its 
intuition.”528 
 
                                                        
524 See Kantorowicz, Chapter 3, infra. 
525 Pauwelyn considers four possible “uses” of economics in international economic law: 1. As ex ante inspiration; 2. As ex post check; 3. As 
interpretative tool; 4. As empirical data or “facts” - in Joost Pauwelyn, “The Use, Non-Use and Abuse of Economics in WTO and Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement,” in Jorge A. Huerta-Goldman, Antoine Romanetti and Franz X. Stirnimann, eds., WTO Litigation, Investment Arbitration, and 
Commercial Arbitration (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2013). 
526 The well-known quote by John Maynard Keynes reads more fully: “The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they 
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist” – John Maynard Keynes, 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Project Gutenberg, 2003 [Palgrave Macmillan, 1936]), Book VI, Chapter 24, Section V. 
See further, for instance, Ronald A. Cass, “Economic Perspectives on International Economic Law,” in Asif H. Qureshi, ed., Perspectives in 
International Economic Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2002).  
527 Asif H. Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements: Problems and Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
181. 
528 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (2012), ¶643 (emphasis added). 
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The Appellate Body similarly held that to determine whether there is a “detrimental impact” on imports, a Panel 
“must examine the operation of the particular technical regulation at issue in the particular market in which it is 
applied.”529 In doing so, a Panel must account for all the relevant features of the market, including the particular 
characteristics of the industry at issue, relevant market shares, consumer preferences and historical trade patterns.530 
 
When, however, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, together with India, sought to include their 
economic conditions as relevant context for interpreting the Agreement on Agriculture (a covered agreement), the 
Appellate Body readily declined to do so.531 Although the Appellate Body noted the importance of sugar exports to 
the complainants, this economic reality was not regarded as relevant context to inform the consideration of the 
consent or acquiescence at the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
 
Positive examples of the weighing of developmental economic context by the Appellate Body are rare as the 
existence of market imperfections or imbalances are generally not considered relevant context for the interpretation 
of liberalization commitments in WTO covered agreements.532 As Judge Ehrlich pointed out in his dissent in 
Chorzow Factory however, any “interpretation […] must take into account the economic conditions of which legal 
forms are merely an outward expression. Legal forms […] must serve the objects of economic life, but they must not 
obscure economic facts.”533 
 
However, the objects and facts of economic life have, through GATT practice and by Member State consent, been 
brought outside the reciprocal realm of the communicative instrument; but only in so far as these pertain to 
questions of development and “catch up.” This view also permeates the “Functional/Aspirational” perspective of the 
GATT/WTO’ object and purpose, as examined in Section 3.B.3, infra. The establishment of special and differential 
treatment and the workings of the Enabling Clause (examined in Chapter 4, infra) have entrenched a normative view 
of “mature growth”-enabled allocative efficiency in the operation of the GATT 1994.  
                                                        
529 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements, (2012), ¶325. 
530 Id. 
531 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (2005), ¶223, fn 346. 
532 Note for example that when private prices are considered “too distorted due to the predominant participation of the government as supplier 
in the market” to base a subsidy benchmark on, recourse can be had to a third country benchmark (!) – in WTO Appellate Body Report, US – 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (2011), ¶446. 





I argue that the interpreter’s understanding of economic facts and theories has in fact never left the realm of GATT. 
An insightful exception hereto may be found in the Appellate Body Report in Canada – FIT, where governmental 
support is welcomed to create a market: 
 
“a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, government interventions that create 
markets that would otherwise not exist and, on the other hand, other types of government 
interventions in support of certain players in markets that already exist, or to correct market 
distortions therein. Where a government creates a market, it cannot be said that the government 
intervention distorts the market, as there would not be a market if the government had not created 
it.”534 
 
As noted before, the query central to this work and much practical reasoning by WTO Panels thus becomes: “by 
which method are Member States’ economic conditions positively recognized, such that they enlighten the 
contextual interpretation of the language of the provisions of the GATT/WTO in a manner that furthers both the 
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.” 
 
As will be argued in Chapter 4, infra, this methodological question necessarily precedes any understanding of the 
“ordinary meaning” of the words used by the Parties – instead informing the construction of the provisions of 
covered agreements in accordance with appropriate embedded standard of review applicable thereto. The 
sequencing of the different interpretative elements of 31 VCLT, as preferred and applied by the Appellate Body, is 
thus upset to the extent that the “ordinary meaning” of words is logically considered after the determination of the 
character of the provision, set within the covered agreement, and envisioned against the object and purpose of the 
instrument. 
 
The interplay between the relevant factual context and the normative assessment of words needs itself to satisfy the 
criteria of Article 3.2 DSU and support the “security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.” Hard 
cases, those juxtaposing the implementation preferences of developing and developed markets, force the interpreter 
to explicate her understanding of the relevant teleological framework in order to more transparently delineate legal 
                                                        
534 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector; Canada – Measures 
Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program (2013), ¶ 5.188. The Appellate Body continues to note that while “the creation of markets by a government 
does not in and of itself give rise to subsidies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, government interventions in existing markets may amount 
to subsidies when they take the form of a financial contribution, or income or price support, and confer a benefit to specific enterprises or industries.” 
(emphasis in original). 
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doctrine from the sociological object and purpose of the covered agreement. The conditions upon which a direct 
consideration of the economic conditions of Member States rests need themselves to be supportive of the 
collaborative “object and purpose” of the treaty and its provisions, see Section 3.B.3, infra, while safeguarding the 
predictability and security of the multilateral trading system. 
 
It is furthermore important to note that, in addition to intrinsic and extrinsic context, a third, WTO-specific, 
contextual element can be considered by WTO Panels, as “[d]iscussions in committees and other WTO institutional 
fora can inform the Appellate Body that the meaning of a treaty text is particularly sensitive.”535 Advice from an 
institutional body, such as the Monitoring Mechanism,536 could thus be taken into account by the Panels and the 
Appellate Body to informing their understanding of the “developmental context” of certain terms without being 
bound by its dicta. In so far as the travaux preparatoires of the GATT/WTO could have provided such 
contextualization, these have been relegated to supplemental means of interpretation, ex Article 32 VCLT.537  
 
3. Object and Purpose 
 
Whereas the plain or ordinary meaning of treaty terms might not be instructive without a thorough contextual 
reading of the words and expressions used by the parties, their intent is what ultimately “animates” the 
communicative instrument. Historically, Hugo Grotius, Emeric de Vattel, and Christian Wolff, all referred to 
versions of the “object and purpose” in combination with (natural) “reason” to construct and enlighten the meaning 
of treaties.538 
 
In this tradition, Judge Higgins, former President of the International Court of Justice, held that the goal of treaty 
interpretation “is not to discover a mythical ‘ordinary meaning’ within the Treaty,” but rather “to give flesh to the 
                                                        
535 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey – Textiles) (1999), ¶48. 
536 The Monitoring Mechanism currently is to provide a forum for monitoring S&D issues, with the objective of improving beneficiaries' 
ability to utilize them. In particular, it will provide for regular reviews of existing S&D provisions in multilateral WTO agreements and the making 
of recommendations; see the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_monit_mecha_e.htm. 
537 But see Julian Davis Mortenson, “The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?,” 107(4) The American 
Journal of International Law 780 (2013), holding that “The modern view that Article 32 relegated travaux to an inferior position is simply wrong. 
The VCLT drafters were not hostile to travaux. They meant for treaty interpreters to assess drafting history for what it is worth in each case: no 
more, but certainly no less.” (Id., p. 781) 
538 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Kelsey trans., Book II (1925[1625]),  p. 411-431; Emeric de Vattel, The Law of Nations, 
Chittey trans., , pp. 255-257, available: http://lonang.com/library/reference/vattel-law-of-nations/; Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo 
Scientifica Pertractatum, Duke University trans. (1934 [1764]), available: http://fama2.us.es/fde/ocr/2010/jusGentium_Introduction.pdf. 
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intention of the parties, […] [and] to decide what general idea the parties had in mind, and then make reality of that 
general idea.”539 
 
Similarly, while the ILC points out that “the parties are to be presumed to have that intention which appears form the 
ordinary meaning of the terms used by them,”540 Judge Anzilotti of the Permanent Court for International Justice 
notes: 
 
I do not see how it is possible to say that an article of a convention is clear until the subject and 
aim of the convention have been ascertained, for the article only assumes its true import[ance] in 
this convention and in relation[] thereto. Only when it is known what the Contracting Parties 
intended to do and the aim they had in view is it possible to say either that the natural meaning of 
terms used in a particular article corresponds with the real intention of the Parties, or that the 
natural meaning of the terms used falls short of or goes further than such intention.541 
 
Nevertheless, to many the primary guideline of the general rule of interpretation centers on according “ordinary 
meaning” to the terms of a treaty.542 A Textualist approach, as favored by the ILC and some international 
adjudicatory bodies, stresses that “it seems quite natural that the ‘terms’ to which meaning is to be given refer to 
what has been written down by the parties, i.e. the words and phrases used in the treaty, rather than the bargain 
struck by the parties.”543 
 
As Parties’ true intent is, of course, inaccessible to the adjudicator, a faithful interpreter needs a more rigid 
framework than his understanding of the “real” intention of the Parties to construct the “ordinary” meaning of terms 
                                                        
539 Declaration of Judge Higgins in Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) (Judgment) (1999) ICJ Rep 1045, 1114. See also: Rosalynn 
Higgins, “Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law,” in Jerzy Makarczyk, ed., Theory of International Law at the 
Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzystof Skubiszewski (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 181. Further: H 
Waldock, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties: Official Records, First Session, Vienna, 1968: Summary Records 184 at [70]. 
540 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 221, ¶12. 
541 PCIJ, Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women During the Night, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 50 (1932), 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, at 383. Judge Anzilotti continued to, correctly, find the object and purpose of the Part XIII of the Treaty of 
Versailles mostly in its Preamble (at 384-387). 
542 Similarly observed by Detlev F. Vagts, “Treaty Interpretation and the New American Ways of Law Reading,” 4 European Journal of 
International Law 472 (1993), p. 484. 
543 Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 541 at 40; see also, Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 163–
164. See further, Richard A. Posner, “The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,”82 Texas Law Review 1581 (2004); see also Alan 
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,” 113 Yale Law Journal 541 (2003). 
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as a matter of legal adjudication.544 A more “objective” or “dispassionate” approach is thus needed to ascertain the 
subject matter and aim, or “object and purpose,” of the agreement and its terms.545 
 
The contemporary composite “object and purpose” finds it roots in the French language opinion of the International 
Court of Justice in Reservations to the Genocide Convention.546 There, the ICJ ruled on the admissibility of 
reservations to treaties according to “l’objet et le but” of the latter, which appears in the English language ruling as 
“object and purpose.” Taken literally, “l’objet” refers to the substantive content of a treaty, i.e. the rights and 
obligations created by it, whereas “le but” refers to the general result that the parties want to realize with the 
treaty.547 The “object” is therefore immediate, whereas the “purpose” is somewhat more distant.548 
 
The VCLT uses the singular form “object and purpose” in Article 31, paragraph 1, thereby referring to the unity of 
the overarching goal of the treaty and its provisions – jointly and separately. This understanding is further confirmed 
by use of the singular form in Article 41 paragraph 1, lit b cl. ii VCLT. While the object and purpose of the treaty 
and its provisions can be established through contrast with comparable treaties,549 it is more common that the treaty 
lists the object and purpose Parties wish to pursue through their agreement either in the preamble thereof or in the 
first articles.550 
                                                        
544 I propose this is what Howse points to when he holds that “in emphasizing the importance of the exact words, the [Appellate Body] is not 
endorsing narrow literalism and eschewing teleological interpretation; rather it is taking the words as the necessary beginning point for an 
interpretative exercise that includes teleological dimensions. Most importantly, it is rejecting the tendency of the panels to assume a certain purpose 
prior to careful textual interpretation, thereby taking a shortcut to the establishment of treaty meaning that bypasses the exact text.” See Robert 
Howse, “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence,” in Joseph H.H. 
Weiler, ed., The EU, The WTO and the NAFTA (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) chapter 2. 
545 A task the Appellate Body has identified as involving “identifying the common intention of Members” - WTO Appellate Body Report, 
China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, (2009), ¶405, quoting itself approvingly in US –Gambling (2005), ¶160. 
546 International Court of Justice, Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Advisory Opinion) (1951) 
ICJ Reports 15, at 24. Dorr furthermore notes that “[o]n the previous page of the opinion, however, the English ‘objects’ is used to translate the 
French ‘fins,’ which could imply that ‘object’ was meant to have a purely teleological meaning” in Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and 
Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 545, fn. 145. See for further 
variations in the early language, Isabelle Buffard Karl Zemanek, “The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?,” 3 Austrian Review of 
International & European Law 311 (1998), pp. 315-316. 
547 See Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 
(Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 546 at 54; see further, Isabelle Buffard Karl Zemanek, “The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?,” 3 
Austrian Review of International & European Law 311 (1998); See also, P. Weckel, La Concurrence des Traite ́s Internationaux, These Strasbourg 
III (1989), p. 26, where he notes “Le but est la raison de l’objet, la situation en vue de laquelle l’objet est donné; L’objet est l’instrument du but.” 
Our use of the French differentiation is further supported by the International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic 
of Iran v. USA) (1996) ICJ Reports 803–821, passim; see also Isabelle Buffard Karl Zemanek, “The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?,” 
3 Austrian Review of International & European Law 311 (1998), pp. 318-319. 
548 See Elizabeth Zoller, Le Bonne Foi en Droit International Public (Paris: A. Pédone, 1977), p. 74; quoted approvingly in Jan Klabbers, 
“Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties,” 8 The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 138 (1997), p. 145. 
549 The International Court of Justice in its ruling in Oil Platform, contrasted the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) between 
Iran and the United States with other similar types of treaties; ICJ, Oil Platforms (Preliminary Objection) (1996), ¶27 (n 131). 
550 Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 




Dworkin551 distinguishes between different levels of abstraction in determining the intention of Parties (strikingly he 
takes the example of restraints on trade). He differentiates between “abstract” and “concrete” intentions, or between 
“concepts” and “conceptions.” In doing so, Dworkin, perhaps unintentially, partially mirrors the interpretative 
element of “object” and “purpose” in the VCLT.552 An interpreter should thus be aware of the interplay of concept 
and conception, such that she finds that meaning, “which fit[s] the text, […] ennobles [it], [and] makes it the best it 
can be.”553 
 
The WTO Appellate Body set out its approach to the “object and purpose” of covered agreements incrementally, 
finding common ground with the ICJ’s Opinion in Reservations to the Genocide Convention and the ILC’s 
comments, in its report US – Shrimp: 
 
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be 
interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and 
purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the 
text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of 
the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be 
sought.554 
 
The Appellate Body thus establishes a hierarchy of proximity in its application of the “object and purpose,” looking 
at the construction and purported aim of the commitment first (“l’objet”), with the general result (“le but”) 
elucidating that construction. The Appellate Body, in EC — Chicken Cuts,555 further clarified that: 
 
[T]he term ‘its object and purpose’ makes it clear that the starting point for ascertaining ‘object 
and purpose’ is the treaty itself, in its entirety. At the same time, we do not believe that Article 
31(1) [VCLT] excludes taking into account the object and purpose of particular treaty terms, if 
doing so assists the interpreter in determining the treaty’s object and purpose on the whole. We do 
not see why it would be necessary to divorce a treaty’s object and purpose from the object and 
purpose of specific treaty provisions, or vice versa. To the extent that one can speak of the ‘object 
and purpose of a treaty provision,’ it will be informed by, and will be in consonance with, the 
object and purpose of the entire treaty of which it is but a component. 
 
Having said this, we caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the purported ‘object and 
purpose’ of specific provisions, paragraphs or subparagraphs of the WTO agreements, or tariff 
headings in Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty on the whole. 
                                                        
551 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 48-49. 
552 See further Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 62 et seq; and George 
Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 70. 
553 Ronald Dworkin, “On Gaps in the Law,” in Paul Amselek and Neil MacCormick, eds., Controversies about Law’s Ontology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1991), p. 86. 
554 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶114. 




According to the Appellate Body then, the “l’object” and “le but” of the covered agreements need to be in 
consonance and should not be divorced from a reading of the treaty as a whole.556 
 
At the same time, the Appellate Body does allow a reading of the object and purpose of particular instruments and 
commitments that could be said to operate as a temporary exception to the dominant theme of the main 
agreement;557 for in US — Tyres (China) it considered that: 
 
[...] the object and purpose of [China’s Accession] Protocol, as reflected in Section 16 thereof, is 
to afford temporary relief to domestic industries that are exposed to market disruption as a result 
of a rapid increase in Chinese imports of like or directly competitive products, subject to the 
conditions and requirements provided therein.558 
 
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body found the preamble of the GATT 1994 on sustainable development relevant to 
its reading of Article XX(g) GATT 1994: 
 
As th[e] preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we 
believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to 
the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994. We have already observed that Article XX(g) 
of the GATT 1994 is appropriately read with the perspective embodied in the above preamble.559 
 
In its Report in EC – Chicken Cuts the Panel similarly deduced the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and 
the GATT 1994 from those treaties’ preambles and from Appellate Body statements in EC – Computer Equipment  - 
where it held that: 
 
[t]he security and predictability of 'the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements 
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade' is an object and purpose 
of the WTO Agreement, generally, as well as of the GATT 1994.560 
 
The Panel in EC – Chicken Cuts thus determined that: 
 
[t]aken together, the relevant aspects of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 indicate that 
concessions made by WTO Members should be interpreted so as to further the general objective of 
the expansion of trade in goods and the substantial reduction of tariffs. [...] In other words, the 
                                                        
556 A notion further supported in the Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy (1999) ¶81, where it held that “[i]n light of the interpretive 
principle of effectiveness, it is the duty of any treaty interpreter to ‘read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of 
them, harmoniously.’ An important corollary of this principle is that a treaty should be interpreted as a whole, and, in particular, its sections and 
parts should be read as a whole.” 
557 In this respect, note the three interpretative approaches to “object and purpose” identified by Jonas and Saunders: (1) Requiring a process 
of interpretation that oscillates between individual provisions and the treaty as a whole; (2) In case of reservations, as a measure of rule coherence; 
and (3) As a yardstick from extra-contractual defection (non-violation complaints) – see David S. Jonas and Thomas N. Saunders, “The Object and 
Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretative Methods,” 43(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 565 (2010). Our attention goes out to the first 
of these three possible interpretative methods. 
558 WTO Appellate Body Report, US — Tyres (China) (2011), ¶184. 
559 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶153. 
560 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment (1998), ¶82. 
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terms of a concession should not be interpreted in such a way that would disrupt the balance of 
concessions negotiated by the parties. Finally, the interpretation must ensure the security and 
predictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements manifested in the form of 
concessions.561 
 
The European Communities however objected, arguing “the Panel erred in finding that ‘concessions made by WTO 
Members should be interpreted so as to further the general objective of the expansion of trade in goods and the 
substantial reduction of tariffs’.”562 The Appellate Body in its Report rather noted that the Panel did not in fact 
endorse an expansive interpretation of concessions, but qualified the challenged statement by its following sentence, 
which clarified that “such an interpretation is limited by the condition that arrangements entered into by Members be 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous."563 
 
The WTO Appellate Body in EC – Chicken Cuts thus calls attention to their assessment that “[t]his sentence 
underscores the Panel's view that trade liberalization is achieved through negotiations for mutual benefit. Indeed, the 
Panel concluded that its interpretation should be governed by the object and purpose of maintaining the security and 
predictability of reciprocal market access arrangements manifested in tariff concessions, […].”564 
 
The WTO Appellate Body in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel similarly reflects that "a basic object and purpose of 
the GATT 1994, as reflected in Article II, is to preserve the value of tariff concessions negotiated by a Member with 
its trading partners, and bound in that Member's Schedule."565 The Appellate Body thus emphasizes a reading of the 
GATT’s object and purpose that focuses on the raising of the national income through the non-discriminatory 
lowering of tariffs and other barriers to trade in order to maximize market access under national treatment.566 
                                                        
561 WTO Panel Reports, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶7.320, cited by WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶241 (emphasis 
in the Appellate Body Report). See also WTO Appellate Body Report, EC — Bananas III (Article 21.5 — Ecuador II)/EC — Bananas III (Article 
21.5/US) (1999), ¶432, where it held that: “concessions made by WTO Members should be interpreted so as to further the general objective of 
expanding trade in goods and services and reducing barriers to trade, through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements.” See similarly the WTO Appellate Body Report in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel (1998) where it held that "a basic object and 
purpose of the GATT 1994, as reflected in Article II, is to preserve the value of tariff concessions negotiated by a Member with its trading partners, 
and bound in that Member's Schedule." (¶47). 
562 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶242, citing WTO Panel Reports, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶7.320. 
563 WTO Panel Reports, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶7.320, cited by WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶243. 
564 WTO Panel Reports, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶7.320, cited by WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶243 
565 WTO Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel (1998), ¶47. As is immediately obvious from the extensive Accession 
Protocols being negotiated in relation to recent additions to the WTO membership, the value of concessions can only be appreciated in the context 
of the larger WTO-acquis. For an examination of the terms of Accession Protocols in the context of Article XI GATT 1994, see Chapter 4, infra. 
566 Other approaches have however been suggested. See for an alternative theory of WTO negotiations, designed at overcoming domestic 
commitment issues, for instance, Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political 
Pressures." 106(3) Journal of Political Economy 574 (1998). Robert Baldwin rather stresses that, in his view, “maximizing the collective economic 
welfare of individuals making up either a country or the world is, however, not the main policy objective of the GATT.” Rather, “the broad objective 
is to help to maintain international political stability by establishing rules of ‘good behavior’ as well as mechanisms for settling disputes,” cited in 
Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 188-




As Jones recalls, and as was emphasized in Chapter 2.A, supra, the (static efficiency) gains from trade generally 
consist in an optimal combination of terms of trade movements and a growing real volume of trade (for a given 
tariff).567 Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes observe similarly: “[a]lthough some aspects of the GATT […] cast doubt on 
the terms-of-trade theory, the most central motivation […] seems to be along the lines of unwinding the retaliatory 
trade policies and other protectionist measures that had built up during the 1930s. In other words, terms of trade are 
useful in understanding the tariff bargain struck, but does not help us understand each and every provision of the 
GATT.”568 
 
These authors569 however also note that, a frequent criticism of the terms-of-trade rationale for the GATT 
commitments is its failure to effectively constrain the use of export restrictions in Article XI GATT.570 Bagwell and 
Staiger further examine the economic rationale for the GATT 1994 and the WTO and accord central place to its 
reciprocity demand,571 celebrating it as an important liberalization tool in the face of domestic political economy 
pressures.572 
 
As is characteristic of a regime focused on maintaining the security and predictability of the multilateral trade 
system, “both the GATT of 1947 and the WTO Agreement of 1994 lack any reference to […] peace and human 
rights; that is, the core themes of the UN-inspired order of international law. Instead, the issue is the functionality of 
the specific regime to secure international trade.”573, 574 
                                                        
one were to believe that relevant economic reasoning has no part in construing “good behavior.” In fact, whatever economic norms such rules do 
contain, their application will entail an elucidation of the adjudicator’s economic preconceptions – the central point in our analysis. 
567 Ronald W. Jones, “Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium: Comment,” 59 The American Economic Review 418 (1969). 
568 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
198. This functionalist understanding of the GATT’s rationale finds support in Section III.A.3, supra, where the argument was made that “object 
and purpose” consist of two elements, “l’objet” and “le but,” read in consonants with each other and with the words of the treaty. 
569 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
179. 
570 This proposition is examined in detail in Chapter 4, infra, highlighting both functionalist cooperation and developmental coordination 
approaches to the text and context of Article XI GATT 1994. 
571 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “Economic Theory and the Interpretation of GATT/WTO,” 46(2) The American Economist 3 (2002). 
572 For a similar domestic theory of political economy drivers of international trade commitments see Wilfred Ethier, “Trade Policies Based on 
Political Externalities: An Exploration,” PIER Working Paper No. 04-006 (2004).  
573Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p. 85-87. 
574 Howse and Nicolaidis in contrast seek to broaden the interpretative context for the object and purpose of the WTO/GATT by 
“emphasiz[ing] the importance of non-WTO institutions and norms in treaty interpretation that represent values other than free or freer trade,” 
instead of “presupposing that the treaty text is animated by a constitutional telos of freer trade or looking primarily within the WTO for the relevant 
structural principles.” Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?,” 16(1) 




A reading of the object and purpose of the WTO/GATT 1947 and 1994 directed at the “functionality” of the regime 
consequently finds the underlying motive for the world trade system in reciprocal cooperation on lowering tariff 
levels, elimination of discriminatory treatment and in constraining abuse of market power.575 The Appellate Body, in 
its report EC – Tariff Preferences, similarly explicates with reference to the GATT 1947 that: 
 
[w]hen the GATT 1947 entered into force, the Contracting Parties stated that one of its objectives 
was to ‘rais[e] standards of living’. However, this objective was to be achieved in countries at all 
stages of economic development through the universally-applied commitments embodied in the 
GATT provisions.576  
 
A particular understanding of the “object and purpose” of the GATT/WTO, constructed as uniformly functionalist 
by the Appellate Body, therefore determines, at least in part, what is considered relevant (factual) context in an 
economic sense (as examined in Section 3.B.2, supra, and critiqued in Chapter 4, infra). Idiosyncratic issues of 
development, those associated with the “catch up” model of economic growth and highlighting the heterogeneity of 
the economic conditions of and optimal policy responses by Member States, can thus fall by the wayside of 
reciprocal “mature growth”-cooperation as either market- or institutional failures.577  
 
The WTO, in its Panel and Appellate Body findings against China in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare 
Earth, in line with the functionalist reading of the covered agreements’ object and purpose,578 has been quite clear 
when considering the appropriateness of restricting exports as a natural resource conservation measure579: 
 
“the Panel notes that markets respond to signals which are ‘broadcast’, as it were, through the 
price which a commodity commands in a given market. It is precisely through price that signals 
can be sent to and through a market. 
 
                                                        
575 See, Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT,” 89(1) American Economic Review 215 (1999); further 
corroborated by evidence presented in Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence 
from the World Trade Organization,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12727 (2006). 
576 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC — Tariff Preferences (2004), ¶107 (emphasis added). 
577 See for a survey of the development-related provisions of the GATT. In the later years of the GATT 1947 development-specific provisions 
where certainly incorporated, most notably the balance-of-payments exception (Article XVIII:b GATT 1994) and infant industry protection (Article 
XVIII:c GATT 1994), but these never attained centrality and were overtaken by economic events and theory. 
578 See for an example of objectives and principles in WTO covered agreements Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and paragraph 4 and 5 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. See also 
Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, “The (non) Use of Treaty Object and Purpose in Intellectual Property Disputes in the WTO,” Max Planck Intellectual 
Property & Competition Law Research Paper, No. 11-15 (2011); and Marco M. Slotboom, “Do Different Treaty Purposes Matter for Treaty 
Interpretation?,” Proefschrift (Dissertation) University Leiden (2005) (on file with author). 
579 China has consistently argued that its export restrictions can serve to conserve natural resources and mitigate environmental damage caused 
by the toxic process of extraction, such in pursuit of the exemption in Article XX(g) GATT which would then have to apply to its obligations under 
its Accession Protocol (quod non). China even framed its infant industry argument to ultimately benefit the environment, see as related by the Panel 





[T]he Panel considers that export quotas are liable to send a perverse signal to domestic 
consumers. Whereas export quotas may reduce foreign demand for Chinese rare earths, it seems 
likely to the Panel that they will also stimulate domestic consumption by effectively reserving a 
supply of low-price raw materials for use by domestic downstream industries. They may also 
encourage relocation of rare earth- consuming industries to China.”580 
  
“The difficulty with China's contention is that export restrictions generally do not internalize the 
social environmental costs of EPRs' [Energy-intensive, highly polluting, resource-based products] 
production in the domestic economy. This is because export restrictions reduce the domestic price 
of EPRs and therefore they stimulate, instead of reducing, further consumption of polluting EPR 
products.”581 
 
While I agree with the Panel and Appellate Body in their implicit assumption that China’s policies in fact worked to 
further “commercial” or beggar-thy-neighbor ends, the emphasis the Panel places on the power of prices to transmit 
or “broadcast” market signals of cost, supply, and demand (information) is revealing. It is precisely the veracity of 
the price signal that stands central to the EU, Japan, and the US’ political economy goals (and policy 
implementation preferences) of global static allocative efficiency growth; underpinned by theories of mature growth, 
frontier innovation and efficient resource allocation (as examined in Chapter 2, supra). 
 
The legitimate expectations that are thus protected by a functionalist reading of the covered agreements are those of 
certain “competitive” or liberal market conditions; not, as we have seen, expectations of actual economic outcomes 
or trade flows. By adopting an interpretation of the covered agreements that ultimately accords central place to 
expectations of price signal veracity, these legitimate expectations as to market conditions also immediately 
circumscribe the appropriateness of certain developmental exceptions and the construction of exemption provisions 
– that is, the adjudicator’s assessment of Member State’s legitimate expectations co-determine policy “fit.” 
 
Broude finds a dissonance in the WTO between the rules of international trade, as interpreted within the liberal or 
functionalist paradigm, and the rhetos of economic development.582 He argues that the reflexive interaction between 
the functioning of the world trade system and the legitimate (equilibrium) expectations thereof among a 
                                                        
580 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earth (2014),  ¶¶7.442-7.444; further cited in approval in Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earth (2014), 
¶¶5.186, 5.189. 
581 Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶7.586 (footnotes omitted). 
582 Broude proceeds in a conscious parallel to a seminal article by Weiler on the dissonance between increased legalization of the GATT/WTO 
and its diplomatic historical core – see Joseph Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Some Reflections on the Internal and 
External Legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement,” 35 Journal of World Trade 191 (2001). Whereas Broude distinguishes function and 
aspiration, the original work by Weiler drew on the dichotomy between external and internal legitimacy. 
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heterogeneous Membership gives rise to a legitimacy a-synchronicity. Broude argues that “much of the rhetos of 
development […] is at odds with the rule(s) of trade.” 
 
He observes that “[i]t is as if the WTO is not at all a trade organization designed to promote the reciprocal reduction 
of trade barriers with the aim of increasing economic efficiency. […] [For] [t]he untrained eye no longer captures 
the goals of wealth creation advanced through the harnessing of mercantilist self-interest, but rather the more 
idealized goal of global wealth distribution, or, more nakedly, of "north-south" wealth transfer.”583 In line with a 
functionalist approach to the WTO covered agreements, Broude postulates a “zero-sum game […] between the 
functional and aspirational legitimacies related to the evolving relationship between trade and development in the 
substantive law and governance of the WTO.”584 
 
The legitimacy of the integrative aspect of collaboration is, of course, intimately connected with its distributional 
counterpart. Broude’s approach is however informed by the very dichotomy that Chapter 2, supra, challenged; 
between industrial policy and free trade and the universal normative appeal emanating therefrom. He supports trade 
liberalization as “in itself an unqualified progressive agent of development” contrasting it with a conception of 
development as “a non- (or supra-) trade interest.”585 The appropriate institutional and adjudicative approach, within 
this liberal or functionalist paradigm of international trade cooperation, thus naturally leads to a conceptual split 
between “the rule(s) of trade and the rhetos of development.”586 
 
Considerations of “effectiveness” play a large role in the assessment of a treaty’s object and purpose; both in the 
construction of the treaty as a whole against its external normative goals and with regard to internal coherence of the 
provisions set against the preamble and the agreement’s immediate object and purpose. Effectiveness of 
interpretation, the coherence of the treaty text and its application to the factual/policy matrix under dispute, are 
determined and inspired by the adjudicator’s understanding of the object and purpose of the communicative 
instrument. 
                                                        
583 Tomer Broude, “The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the 
WTO,” 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 221 (2006), pp. 238-239 (emphasis in original). 
584 Id., p. 247. 
585 Id., p. 22 




Whereas Dorr holds that “the consideration of object and purpose finds its limits in the ordinary meaning of the text 
of the treaty”587, I argue that the ordinary meaning of the text cannot be established without prior understanding of 
the instruments’ object and purpose. The limits set by the “ordinary meaning” of the words Parties chose to express 
their good faith collaborative intent are themselves delineated by the interpreter’s conceptualization thereof. 
 
This realization opens the door to the consideration of power, be it political or economic, and idealized norms in the 
decision making of the interpreter. Chapter 4, infra, will engage these arguments and show how the collaborative 
intent of Parties is fundamentally irreducible and finds expression through the interpretation of the adjudicator as she 
operationalizes Parties’ collaboration “in me” instead of “for me”. 
 
 
4. Good Faith 
 
The collaborative nature of international law has changed since the end of the Cold War, according to many scholars 
in the field,588 from a set of norms directed at “co-existence” to a normative framework aimed at deeper “co-
operation.”589 This change in collaborative character of international law is visible at bilateral, plurilateral and 
multilateral levels and reflected in the explosive growth of the number of treaties governing the behavior of the 
international community internationally (and increasingly domestically). 
 
Across these different bilateral and multilateral constellations, Franck rightly notes that “[i]n the interstate 
community, the belief that pacta sunt servanda – that treaties, all treaties, are binding, and not just when they are 
convenient or advantageous – is what keeps the bumblebee of international law aloft.”590 Gardiner, more broadly, 
                                                        
587 See Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 
(Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 547 at 56. 
588 Some scholars however find international law unchanged, either as an expression of raw power emanating from the political (economy) 
realm, or as historically determined expressions of imperialist norms and values. 
589 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.17. 
590 Thomas M. Franck, “The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium,” 100 
American Journal of International Law 88 (2006), p. 92. His contention however that “realists” mis-understand this Grundnorm (p. 91) of 
international law, (incorrectly) presupposes a strong myopia in “Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner [sweeping observation] that 
‘international law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what international law can achieve are 
limited by the configurations of state interests and the distribution of state power’." Read through the lens of Realistic Idealism (Chapter III, infra), 
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remarks that the term “treaty relations” embraces both the content of the obligations and the legal commitment of 
one party toward another party to observe the particular obligations in their relationship.591 Interpretation and 
performance are in this way central to the determination of the content of the contractual bonds (“pacta”) in relation 
to the obligation to honor them faithfully. 
 
Faithful adherence to the provisions of a treaty is first of all borne out of the disposition of each of the Parties so 
bound.592 However, when confronted with a dispute between Parties, the adjudicator is rather compelled to have 
recourse to an objective measure of “good faith,” which incorporates systemic notions such as fairness and 
reasonableness. The adjudicator thus construes the meaning of the provisions of the treaty both in (personal) good 
faith and with an eye to safeguarding the systemic collaboration between Parties (emphasizing the systemic 
collaboration “in” me, instead of Parties’ perception of collaboration “for” me). 
 
In contrast to a strong Textualist view of legal interpretation, where a faithful interpreter seeks to “discover” the 
ordinary meaning of a word, a modern theoretical perspective elucidates adjudicatory interpretation as a process of 
continuous norm-application; dictated by the language of the treaty and determined by the collaborative intent of 
Parties. I note that the substantive aspects of the doctrine of good faith, such as abus de droit,593 are relevant to the 
interpretation of WTO law only in so far as they have been codified (and serve as horizontal “context”) or directly 
support the collaborative intent of Parties.594 Extensive consideration is therefore not accorded to substantive aspects 
of good faith and attention is directed at its Mercurial task. 
 
                                                        
Goldsmith and Posner instead make the point that compliance is dependent on the ability of the common norm to overcome a low-level equilibrium 
– which is necessary a long-term strategy, due to the risk of strategic unraveling (but see, p. 93, fn. 16, where Franck qualifies his argument to 
short-term defection). 
591 Richard K. Gardiner, “Treaties and Treaty Materials: Role, Relevance and Accessibility,” 46 ICLQ 643 (1997). 
592 The ILC report on the fragmentation of international law, notes in parentheses the definition of Parties’ good faith at the contracting 
moment, namely “the presumption that States do not enter agreements with the view of breaching obligations” (paragraph 447, p. 226); Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, April 13, 2006. The Appellate Body has similarly observed that: 
“according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith. That means, inter alia, that terms of a treaty are not to 
be interpreted based on the assumption that one party is seeking to evade its obligations and will exercise its rights so as to cause injury to the other 
party.” WTO Appellate Body, US – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures (China) (2011), ¶¶326–327. 
593 See Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation 
and Fair Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), especially chapters 1-6. For an application of the doctrine of good faith and “abuse 
de process” in the context of investment arbitration, see Eric de Brabandere, “’Good Faith,’ ‘Abuse de Process’ and the Initiation of Investment 
Treaty Claims,”3(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 609 (2012). 
594 WTO Panel Report, Korea- Procurement (2000), ¶ 7.96. The Panel further elucidated this statement by noting: “to the extent that there is 
no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules of 
international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty formation under the WTO.” 
148 
 
The obligation to act in good faith rests both on the Parties in their fulfillment of the treaty’s provisions, as on the 
adjudicator in her interpretation thereof. The principle of good faith is thus central to the interpretation of 
international communicative instruments and inherent to the process of adjudicatory decision-making. The notion of 
good faith derives relevance to adjudicators’ interpretative exercise in three ways: as a general principle of law, as a 
principle of customary international law, and as a principle of WTO law. 
 
Powerfully, Judge Lauterpracht held that “[u]nquestionably, the obligation to act in accordance with good faith, 
being a general principle of law, is also part of international law.”595 Similarly, the general principle of good faith 
was recognized as of fundamental importance during the drafting of the Statute to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.596, 597 The principle of good faith, so O’Connor suggests, is derived from “the necessity for a 
minimum of human co-operation and tolerance if group living is to emerge and survive.”598 
 
The principle of good faith is subsequently also a cornerstone concept of customary international law, with a long 
history. Grotius recognized that “good faith should be preserved, not only for other reasons but also in order that the 
hope of peace may not be done away with. For not only is every state sustained by good faith, as Cicero declares, 
but also that greater society of states.”599 Schwarzenberger and Brown furthermore list good faith as one of the seven 
fundamental principles of (customary) international law.600 
 
In its commentary to Article 3 of the Draft Articles of State Responsibility the ILC observes that “[e]very State has 
the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it 
may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.”601 
 
                                                        
595 International Court of Justice, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway) (Jurisdiction) [1957] ICJ Rep 9, 53 (Judge Hersch 
Lauterpacht). 
596 Lord Phillimore, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th–July 24th, 1920, with 
Annexes (1920) 335; see also Andrew D. Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 108. 
597 Note however that Brownlie holds that “good faith is not part of the ‘overriding principles of international law […] forming a body of ius 
cogens’” - Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 515. 
598 John O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), p. 6; See also Robert Kolb, “Principles as Sources of 
International Law (with Special Reference to Good Faith),” 53 Netherlands International Law Review 1 (2006), pp. 17–20. 
599 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (1625), Chapter 25. 
600 Georg Schwarzenberger and Edward D. Brown, A Manual of International Law 6th ed. (Milton: Professional Books, 1976), p. 7. 
601 International Law Committee, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Article 3, Commentary (5), p. 37. 
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Article 26 VCLT similarly observes: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.” The International Court of Justice emphasized that good faith in the context of Article 26 
VCLT should be read so as to allow: 
 
… the purpose of the Treaty, and the intentions of the Parties in concluding it, [to] prevail over its 
literal application. The principle of good faith obliges the Parties to apply it in a reasonable way 
and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized.602 
 
When discussing this cornerstone article, the Soviet Union however observed that “the strict application of treaties 
was essential to stable international relations; the violation of treaty obligations undermined the foundations of peace 
and trust between States, and generated disputes which could lead to military action.”603 Of course, what a “strict 
application” of treaties in the interest of “stable international relations [… and] peace and trust between States” 
precisely involves is ultimately left to the adjudicator’s discretion.604 
 
Moreover, the adjudicator’s understanding of the nature of that discretion, in the interest of international 
collaboration, stands central in the interpretative exercise. Whereas international customary law – based on state 
practice and opinio iuris – tends to follow reality (in degrees of mimicry), treaty language stands in permanent 
tension to the passing of time and changing (economic) circumstances.605  
 
It is in recognition of this bridging function between the dynamism of (economic) reality and the intractable nature 
of treaty language that the ILC stresses the roots of bona fides in effective treaty interpretation.606 Note that this 
connection between economic reality and the interpretation of treaty language is central to the good faith selection of 
relevant “economic context” as examined in Section 3.B.2, supra. 
 
The obligation to peruse the language of a treaty in good faith ex Article 31 VCLT can, perhaps, best be described as 
“a fundamental requirement of reasonableness qualifying the dogmatism that can result from purely verbal or […] 
                                                        
602 International Court of Justice, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Merits)[1997] ICJ Rep 7, 79. 
603 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Twenty-Ninth Meeting (April 18, 1968), Doc. A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.29, 
p. 152 at ¶7. 
604 Compare with Justice Scalia’s insistence that a “text should be construed strictly and should not be construed leniently” in Antonin Scalia, 
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 23; see Section II.A.1, supra. 
605 See, Christina Binder, “Die Grenzen der Vertragstreue im Volkerrecht,” in Beitrage zum auslandischen offentlichten Recht und 
Volkerrecht, Band 245, Max Planck Institut (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2013), p. 617, where she refers in particular to the “legalization” 
(Verrechtlichung) of the necessity defense: shifting from “necessity knows no law” to a strictly construed “law of necessity.” 




excessively teleological analysis.”607 What qualifies as “reasonable” is however in itself a function of what is 
deemed persuasive. In this view (legal) reasoning operates as the handmaiden to normativity,608 while good faith 
operates as its wet-nurse, reconciling the terms of a treaty with their object and purpose as an expression of such 
practical reasoning609.  
 
This capacity of good faith is showcased most clearly in the general reluctance to accept “non-liquet” rulings in a 
system of law directed toward international peace and collaboration (as reflected in Article 3.7 DSU’s direction to 
achieve a positive solution to each case).610 Good faith and “legitimate expectations [thus] ‘maintain the integrity of 
WTO law in the overall system of international law’ generally and ‘increase the linkages’ to non-WTO treaties 
specifically.”611 Koskenniemi and Leino are however reluctant to interpret international law as “complete” 
system.612 They hold that “[t]he Cold War pragmatic consensus was that if international law had not become [a] 
‘complete system’ […] this was due to a hostile political environment.”613 
 
Rosenne reminds that “good faith” directs attention to the close link that is deemed to exist between the obligation 
and its performance: “for […] interpretation […] is not an exercise in abstraction but has an essential functional role 
in the decision-making process of a party or of a court or tribunal as regards the performance of the obligation.” He 
further notes that the essential function of good faith in this context is “to give a broad interpretation of the scope of 
                                                        
607 Oliver Dorr, “Article 31,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 548, ¶61 (stress removed); Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
151, 157. 
608 Where normativity is defined as “the phenomenon of features of the world making certain responses, emotional, cognitive or active, 
appropriate, in conditions in which we have the capacity to respond to them through recognizing that fact.” See Joseph Raz, “Normativity: The 
Place of Reasoning,” King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 8 (2015), p. 28; and Joseph 
Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), chapter 5. 
609 See, Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
610 See, for instance, Lauterpracht, where he explains: “Under the normal rule of law it is inconceivable that a court should pronounce a non-
liquet because of the absence of law. This is certainly not so because the positive law has provided a solution for all possible emergencies. The 
reason for it is that law conceived as a means of ordering human life—cannot without abdicating its function concede that there are situations 
admitting of no answer” – in Hersch Lauterpracht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), 
pp. 64-65. The flexibility of the doctrine of objective good faith to facilitate the application of relevant legal principles to covered “emergencies,” 
inside and outside trade policy flexibility mechanisms, is thus emphasized. I am likewise mindful to avoid the law and economics paradox behind 
an overly-rigid application of legal rules in a “complete” system; see Katharina Pistor, “A Legal Theory of Finance,” 41(2) Journal of Comparative 
Economics 315 (2013). 
611 Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and 
Fair Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 184 (reference omitted). 
612 Interpretation of any system of law as a complete system necessarily emancipates its understanding, to an important extent, from exogenous 
(or rather pre-contractual) power dynamics between the Parties and limits attention to the interaction of the adjudicator with the complete system 
(in this approach, the adjudicator is, of course, not immune to the pressures of real power and normative ideals). 
613 Martii Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law, Postmodern Anxieties,” 15 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 553 (2002), pp. 559, 561. 
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equitable principles, provided that in so doing the treaty is not revised; and in turn to emphasize the flexibility by 
appropriate language in the treaty.”614 
 
Although the Appellate Body, in its report in US – Gasoline,615 partially overlooks the importance of good faith as 
an interpretative element ex Article 31 VCLT, the doctrine certainly serves as a cornerstone principle of the covered 
agreements and of the system of WTO trade law as a whole; substantively,616 interpretational (Article 3.2 DSU) and 
with regard to dispute settlement (Article 3.10 DSU617). The Appellate Body in fact recognizes the principle of good 
faith as “at once a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, [that] controls the exercise of 
rights by states.”618  
 
The Appellate Body has, since its report in US–Shrimp,619 often sought “interpretative guidance” from good faith as 
a “general principle of law and general principle of international law,” rather than as an element of the VCLT’s 
customary rule of interpretation (Article 31).620 In fact, it found the chapeau of Article XX GATT was “but one 
expression of the principle of good faith.”621 Cottier and Schefer,622 as well as Lennard,623 consider that the notion of 
“good faith” as applied by the Appellate Body in its interpretation of the covered agreements does originate in 
Article 31 VCLT, but has become imbued with notions that are potentially broader than those identified by the 
ILC’s Textualist approach. 
  
                                                        
614 Shabtai Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 175, 178-179 – 
cited in Andrew D. Mitchell, “Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement,” 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 339 (2006), p. 347. See further 
Andrew D. Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
615 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), p. 17; where it holds: “Applying the basic principle of interpretation that the words of a 
treaty, like the General Agreement, are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose, […].” 
In its report, reference to “good faith” is only made when citing the rule of interpretation of Article 31 VCLT. 
616 The doctrine of good faith can easily be said to be a general principle of (international) law, and is recognized as such by the Appellate 
Body when it referred to the “general principle of good faith that underlies all treaties” in its Report, United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure 
on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan (2001), at ¶81. 
617 See further Appellate Body Report, US- FSC (2000), at ¶166; and Appellate Body Report, Mexico- Corn Syrup (Article 21.5- US) (2001), 
at ¶ ¶73-74. 
618 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), at ¶158. 
619 The WTO Appellate Body reminds us in its Report, US–Offset (‘Byrd Amendment’) (2003), ¶297, that it has recognized the relevance of 
the principle of good faith in a number of cases, including US –Shrimp (1998),at ¶158, US- FSC (2000), at ¶166, and US – Hot-Rolled Steel (2014), 
at ¶101. 
620 Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and 
Fair Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 200. 
621 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶ 158. 
622 Thomas Cottier and N. Krista Schefer “Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO,” in Marco Bronckers and 
Reinhard Quick, eds., New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honor of John H Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2000), p 64.  




In its report US–Offset (‘Byrd Amendment’) the Appellate Body observes that “Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention directs a treaty interpreter to interpret a treaty in good faith […].”624 Panizzon however finds that “the 
AB has not in addition to text, context, object and purpose, recognised good faith as an interpretative tool, 
specifically not if it is intended to protect the legitimate expectations that a member may claim.”625 She notes that 
“[t]oday, the ‘precept’ reaches beyond the traditional meaning of conditions of competition under Article III 
GATT/Article XVII:3 GATS to more elusive protection of legal security and predictability to plan as the 
preconditions for competition […].”626 
 
Panizzon further clarifies that the doctrine of legitimate expectations, as an expression of good faith, functions to 
“protect the ‘value’ of exchanged trade concessions.”627 This value consists however not in the protection of trade 
volumes, but rather in the “price effect” of concessions628 - that is, “whether the relative conditions of competition 
which existed between domestic and foreign products as a consequence of the relevant tariff concessions have been 
upset.”629 
 
The Appellate Body offers further support for an “objective” interpretation by a reading of the liberalization and 
non-discrimination commitments of the GATT 1994 to include a WTO-specific expression of good faith: the 
protection of legitimate expectations as to the “conditions of [or rather for] competition.”630 Good faith, as employed 
in Article 31 VCLT and as applied by the WTO, therefore is correctly approached by means of an objective rather 
than subjective standard of interpretation. 
 
                                                        
624 WTO Appellate Body Report, US–Offset (‘Byrd Amendment’) (2003), ¶296. 
625 Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and 
Fair Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 366. 
626 Id., p. 129, continues with some examples “such as trade, non-foreseeable changes both as to a member’s tariff schedule or as to competitive 
bidding opportunities assured in the negotiations to the plurilateral GPA but subsequently changed as of the actual schedule of concession.” 
627 Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and 
Fair Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 131; see also the WTO Panel Report, EC–Computer Equipment (1998), ¶¶8.69, 8.71; 
and the GATT Panel Report, EEC–Oilseeds I (1990), ¶148. 
628 See, GATT Panel Report, EEC–Oilseeds I, (1990), ¶¶147-148, 151; see also, WTO Appellate Body Report, India–Patents (1997), ¶40, for 
a list of cases on the issue. The doctrine of good faith is furthermore fundamental to WTO-specific non-violation complaints, which we will not 
examine here. 
629 WTO Panel Report, Japan–Film (1998), ¶10.86. 
630 See, GATT Panel Report, Italy–Agricultural Machinery (1958); GATT Panel Report US–Taxes on Petroleum (Superfund) (1987), ¶5.1.9; 
and the WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan–Alcohol (1996), p 32 (see also WTO Panel Report, Japan–Alcohol (1996),¶¶7.1-7.2). The WTO Panel 
Report, India–Patents (1997), ¶¶7.20-7.22 and fn. 81-84, declared it is a “well-established GATT principle” and provides a list of cases using 
legitimate expectations as a GATT-specific substantive principle protecting the conditions of competition. 
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In this light, and when read in combination with the various of Sections 3.B, supra, it is instructive to note that the 
International Tribunal in Diverted Cargoes determined that “the principle of good faith, which governs both the 
interpretation and the execution of treaties, leads to the search for the common intention of the parties.”631 
Lauterpacht rendered this line of reasoning as meaning that “the principle of good faith impels the assumption of a 
common purpose” and that “good faith and consideration of the general purpose of the treaty may legitimately 
provide a substitute for any lack of common intention.”632 
 
It is subsequently clear from Lauterpacht’s choice of words that Parties’ intention, by necessity, would have to be 
construed as an objective intention. As similarly argued by Lowe, “in international law literal interpretations and 
applications of legal instruments must not be allowed to defeat the evident intentions of those who made them”633 as 
mitigated by “good faith” and determined by the adjudicator’s understanding of the communicative instrument’s 
object and purpose, read against the appropriate context. 
  
                                                        
631 International Tribunal, Diverted Cargoes (Greece v United Kingdom) (1955) 12 RIAA 53, 70 (‘le principe fondamental de la bonne foi 
qui régit, soit l’interprétation, soit l’exécution des conventions et incite à rechercher la commune intention des États contractants’); quoted in Eirik 
Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 69-70. 
632 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law—Collected Papers IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 437–438.  
633 Vaughn Lowe, International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 117. 
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The WTO and its covered agreements, including the GATT 1994, are expressions of Parties’ united collaborative 
intent. This collaborative intent will be argued, theoretically in this chapter and applied to the regulation of export 
restrictions in the next, to be directional – that is imbued with an accessible object and purpose. Whereas it might be 
tempting to understand the entirety of the GATT 1994 against its declared 1947 objective – namely, the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce – the WTO Agreement provides a broader context: “to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with [Member States’] respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.” 
 
In the wake of the Uruguay Round and the adoption of the WTO Agreement, the newly created Appellate Body 
actively pursued the judicialization of the international trading system. The increased legalization of dispute 
settlement under the Appellate Body’s reading of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) found expression in 
several ways, some regarding legal interpretation others concerning institutional relationships. Three aspects are of 
express salience for the present argument: (i) the adoption of textualism and formalism (rejecting teleological and 
functional interpretation), (ii) the adoption of normative benchmarks (integrating, by reference, certain aspects and 
benchmarks anchored outside the immediate GATT/WTO treaties), and (iii) the rejection of an institutional balance 
between the Appellate Body and other parts of the WTO institution.634 
 
Simultaneously, reflecting Uruguay Round negotiations,635 questions on the scope and character of the standard of 
review applied by the Panels and Appellate Body gained markedly in significance. The Appellate Body found 
Article 11 DSU “directly on point,” where it prescribes “an objective assessment” in matters of legal construction – 
this includes both legal interpretation as well as the fitting of facts to the language of a provision. The standard of 
review when assessing facts was determined to be somewhat more deferential, “neither de novo review as such, nor 
‘total deference,’ […].”636 
                                                        
634 See for a fuller list, Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) European 
Journal of International Law 9 (2016), p. 31. 
635 See Chapter 1, supra. 




In subsequent reports,637 the Appellate Body clarified that the standard of review should be understood in light of the 
obligations of the covered agreement under consideration (“embedded standard of review”). The “objective 
assessment” of Article 11 DSU thus receives further color and texture from the provisions of the agreement (i.c. the 
GATT 1994). Application of the embedded standard of review is further informed by the demands of Article 3.2 
DSU – which notes that security and predictability of the international trading system are central values in any 
dispute settlement and that construction and interpretation of the covered agreement cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations of Member States. 
 
Moreover, Article 3.2 DSU provides the instruments by which an objective assessment of the matter under 
adjudication is to be achieved: the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The Appellate Body, 
as Chapter 3, supra, shows, has identified the VCLT as reflective thereof and adopted the treaty’s Textualist bend as 
central interpretative framework. The ordinary meaning of the language of the provisions of the GATT is however 
not plainly accessible (in theory and in practice), even with the aid of a dictionary. Instead, the adjudicator 
necessarily draws on her understanding of the object and purpose of the instrument (and provision) to accord its 
words appropriate meaning. 
 
In accordance with Article 11 and 3.2 DSU the WTO adjudicator is directed to find the ordinary meaning of the 
provisions governing the matter before her in an objective manner. In China – Publications, the Appellate Body 
clarifies the basic structure of the WTO covered agreements by focusing on rules and exceptions: “[Member State 
regulatory requirements] may simply not contravene any WTO obligation. Secondly, even if they contravene a 
WTO obligation, they may be justified under an applicable exception.” In her construction of the scope of the 
provisions of the GATT 1994, in accordance with the applicable standard of review, the adjudicator thus needs to be 
mindful of this structural feature of the GATT.638 
                                                        
637 See in particular, WTO Appellate Body Report, EC –Computer Equipment (1998), ¶89; Argentina – Footwear Safeguard Measures (2000), 
¶122; WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb Safeguards (2001), ¶105; WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation 
on DRAMS (2005), ¶184. See further WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Hormones Suspension (2008), ¶¶590-593; and WTO Appellate 
Body Report, Australia – Apples (2010), ¶¶356-359. See Chapter 1, supra. 
638 Exceptions to the GATT 1994 come, largely, in four forms: General Exceptions (Article XX GATT), National Security Exception (Article 
XXI GATT), Nonapplication (Article XXXV GATT, and Article XIII WTO Agreement), and Waivers (Article XXXV GATT and Article IX WTO 




The balance the adjudicator finds between rule and exception is however furthermore conditioned by a constructive 
third element: exemptions to the “rule-exception” framework. Mavroidis notes that “[e]xemptions” should not be 
confused with “exceptions”: the former term covers transactions that do not come at all under the ambit of the 
relevant legal discipline, the consequence being that parties remain free to act on their own volition (unless, of 
course, if they are bound by another legal discipline).” In contrast to exemptions, “an exception is an agreed 
deviation from an established discipline and signals a shift in the allocation of burden of proof if a WTO member 
wants to avail itself of this possibility.”639 
 
In this three-point balancing act the adjudicator receives instruction from and is circumscribed by her understanding 
of applicable normative, doctrinal and sociological teleologies.640 In relevant part, these three teleologies are 
reflected in GATT/WTO adjudicatory theory and practice by the obligation to rule in good faith (including 
respecting the objective expectations of the Membership), by the power of persuasive precedent (in the absence of 
stare decisis), and by the economic object and purpose of the covered agreements and their provisions. 
 
With respect to the sociological teleology coloring the construction of the GATT’s exceptions and exemptions to 
headline rules, the WTO Agreement is instructive. In its preamble, the Membership declares that the provisions of 
the covered agreements are to be understood so as “to enhance the means for [economic cooperation] in a manner 
consistent with [Member States’] respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.” In 
her “objective assessment” of matters concerning headline and exception provisions, the adjudicator should, in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the agreement, construe such provisions with emphasis on the “integral” 
component of Parties’ collaboration.641 However, when a matter implicates an exemption provision, the adjudicator 
                                                        
639 Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 140. 
640 See Section A, infra; Hermann Kantorowicz, Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie (Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller, 1962 [1911]), cited in Anne van 
Aaken and Joel P. Trachtman, “Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior,” University of St. Gallen 
Law School, Law and Economics Research Paper Series No. 2015---08 (July 2015), p. 3, fn. 6. See also Andrew Jeffrey Spadafora, Freedom from 
Value Judgments: Value-Free Social Science and Objectivity in Germany, 1880-1914, Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University (2013).  
641 In international economic law collaboration among sovereigns occurs to pursue beneficial outcomes that cannot be realized in autarky and 
always consists of “a distributive as well as an integrative aspect […],” see I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “Introduction: Return to the 
Theories of Cooperation,” in I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 7. 
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is called to explicitly acknowledge the diversity of Member State’s directional preferences as part of the 
“distributive” component of the collaborative intent of Parties. 
 
In her construction of exemption provisions – notably Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 – the adjudicator should 
accordingly be actively mindful of existing preference heterogeneity among the Membership as to appropriate 
economic policies, while avoiding the “summum malum of a free fall into beggar-thy-neighbor protective 
discrimination.”642 In crafting a positive decision implicating the distributive component of the collaborative 
document, the adjudicator can fall prey to behaving “as a political body reacting to signs of times.”643 
 
Instead of following a deconstructive reasoning that doesn’t recognize the cooperative spirit of the GATT 1994 in 
the “regulated madness” of decision making, I argue for a contextualized rule of deference to guide the decision 
maker in her interpretation of key terms.644 I find such contextualized rule of deferential interpretation in an 
application of the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem to the GATT/WTO context. In applying this contextual rule of 
deference, the decision maker is however further constrained in her reasoning by the two other elements of the 
teleological triptych: (i) good faith (including objective expectations); and (ii) the force of persuasive reasoning 
emanating from past decisions.  
 
The below Sections will address in (A) the importance of the standard of review to the adjudicator’s understanding 
of the text and teleology of the GATT 1994, highlighting its function in the GATT 1994 (complementary to Chapter 
1.A, supra). Against this framework, judicial decision making by the interpreter comes to stand central; juxtaposing 
the power of political preferences of the adjudicator with her understanding of the collaborative character of the 
multilateral treaty. This understanding is consequently framed as part of and circumscribed by an interpretative 
triptych introduced by Kantorowicz in 1911. 
 
                                                        
642 Paraphrasing Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) European Journal of 
International Law 9 (2016),  p. 45. 
643 Petros C. Mavroidis, “The Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight: The Not So Magnificent Seven of the WTO Appellate Body,” EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2016/31, p. 1. 
644 Mavroidis criticizes the Appellate Body for failing to “develop[] its own understanding of the rationale for, and the objective function of 
the agreements that it is called to interpret.” Rather, the Appellate Body “behaved as a political body reacting to signs of times.” As a consequence, 
“[t]he quest for contextual understanding of the key terms remains […] elusive.” Petros C. Mavroidis, “The Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight: The 
Not So Magnificent Seven of the WTO Appellate Body,” EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2016/31, p. 1. 
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Section (B) explores the interpreter’s understanding of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 and introduces a 
proposed rule of interpretative deference as part of the multilateral standard of review and its open construction of 
exemption provisions. This section then proceeds to anchor the rule of deference in its appropriate context (of law 
and when fitting facts), before arguing how the obligation of good faith – emanating from the VCLT – informs this 
interpretational exercise to find the ordinary meaning of the exemption of Article XI:2(a) GATT. Together, Section 
B forms the central expression of the open construction of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994 and WTO 
covered agreements and provides an anchor to the sociological pane of Kantorowicz’ triptych. 
 
Section (C) addresses the obligation of the WTO adjudicator to safeguard the security and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system. This normative demand of Article 11 DSU is envisioned as the operationalization of the 
second pane of Kantorowicz’ triptych, constraining the constructive and interpretative labor of the adjudicator. 
 
Section (D) examines the interpretation of the “developmental exception” of Article XVIII GATT. This article 
presents a possible mid-point between the exceptions of Article XX GATT and the exemption of Article XI:2(a) 
GATT. The interpretation of Article XVIII GATT is furthermore relevant for the Appellate Body’s relationship to 
“political” bodies of the WTO (those anchored in the “WTO institution” and not in the adjudicative body). The 
Appellate Body’s oppositional stance to such bodies limits the ability of the Doha Round “monitoring mechanism” 
to develop into a strong advisory body informing the Appellate Body on questions of economic growth and 
developmental policies. 
 
Chapter 5 applies the multilateral standard of review – and subsequent “open” construction of exemption provisions 
-- to critique the Appellate Body’s decision in its report in China – Raw Materials. The analysis in the following 
chapter completes the consideration of Kantorowicz’ triptych by examination of the doctrinal constraint (third pane) 





A. The GATT 1994 Standard of Review: Text and Teleology 
 
When a domestic measure is successfully brought before the WTO Panels and Appellate Body for consideration, the 
applicable standard of review determines the intrusiveness of the adjudicatory review to follow. The standard of 
review not merely determines the scope of and relationship between provisions of the covered agreement, but also 
sets the boundaries to the extent that Panels and the Appellate Body can give preference to one interpretation over 
another.645 In other words, the doctrine is broadly related to the “margin of appreciation.”646  
 
The appropriate standard of review is relevant to the interpretation and construction of the legal provisions of 
covered agreements,647 as well as to the determination of facts.648 As argued in Chapter 1, supra, the legal process of 
interpretation and meaning attribution also covers the fitting of “economic facts” to the letter of the provisions. 
Legal construction thus covers both the interpretation of the scope of provisions and terms, as well as the process of 
fitting facts thereto (such in line with the principle iura novit curia). As the present argument concentrates on the 
construction and legal interpretation of exemption provisions in the GATT, the appropriate standard of review for 
the assessment of raw “facts” falls outside the scope of immediate consideration. 
 
The Appellate Body further clarified in EC – Hormones that it considers the application of the appropriate standard 
of review by the Panel also a matter of “law” and therefore within its purview. The Appellate Body held: “[w]hether 
or not a panel has made an objective assessment of the facts before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, is also a 
legal question, which, if properly raised on appeal, would fall within the scope of appellate review.”649 The 
                                                        
645 See, for instance, Steve Croley and John H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National 
Governance,” 90 American Journal of International Law 193 (1996).  
646 See John H. Jackson, “Sovereignty, Subsidiarity, and Separation of Powers: The High-Wire Balancing Act of Globalization,” in Daniel L. 
M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
p. 182. 
647 See, for instance, John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, Constitution and Jurisprudence (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 90. 
648 Whereas the difference between the assessment of facts and determination of the law is long standing in both international as well as 
domestic law, Stuart rightly observes that the distinction “is subject to manipulation in order to achieve what a reviewing court considers to be the 
proper substantive allocation” of decision making power; Andrew W Stuart, “’I Tell Ya I Don't Get No Respect!’: The Policies Underlying 
Standards of Review in U.S. Courts as a Basis for Deference to Municipal Determinations in GATT Panel Appeals,” 23 Law & Policy in 
International Business 749 (1992), p. 760. 
649 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶132; as confirmed in WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon (1998), 
¶264; and again in WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry (1998), ¶133. 
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Appellate Body thus retains mastery over all aspects of the standard of review as applied by both itself and the 
Panels.650 
 
The standard of review is crucial in shaping the jurisdictional competence of WTO adjudicatory bodies651 in relation 
to Member State measures. In EC-Hormones the Appellate Body clearly marked the two extremes of intrusiveness: 
de novo review and “total deference.”652 A de novo investigation into a domestic policy measure offers very little in 
terms of constraints on the Panel, while total deference limits the judicial review to a formal examination of 
procedural requirements for the adoption of any measure. Domestic legal systems have found different measures of 
balance on this scale, whereas dispute settlement in international law is still developing its tradition653 – generally 
and particular to each treaty.654  
 
1. Standard of Review and Deference 
 
The concept of the standard of review is inevitably caught up with questions of legal activism and judicial 
constraint. In considering the appropriate amount of deference accorded by the WTO standard of “objective” review, 
some have looked to the Chevron-doctrine of US domestic administrative law.655 The three central arguments 
presented in favor of adopting Chevron-style deference – namely increased expertise, efficiency and accountability 
at the lower level656 - do not however translate very well to the level of the WTO. 
                                                        
650 In fact, the WTO Appellate Body will even “complete the analysis” when it considers the factual matrix either clear enough (but found the 
Panel erred in the law) or when it feels it can sufficiently efficiently complete the analysis of both law and fact; see, for instance, WTO Appellate 
Body Report, Australia – Salmon (1998); and WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals (1997). Howse finds support for this practice in 
Articles 3.3 and 3.2 of the DSU; in Robert Howse, “The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits 
of the Judicial Power,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and 
Lessons for the WTO (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 18-20. 
651 Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 14. 
652 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶117. 
653 See, for instance, Thomas Cottier and Matthias Oesch, “The Paradox of Judicial Review in International Trade Regulation: Towards a 
Comprehensive Framework,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience 
and Lessons for the WTO (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
654 See, among a burgeoning literature, Lukasz Gruszczynski and Valentina Vadi, “Standard of Review and Scientific Evidence in WTO Law 
and International Investment Arbitration Converging Parallels?,” in Lukasz Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner, eds., Deference in International 
Courts and Tribunals Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
655 Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc, 467 US 837 (1984). As unsuccessfully argued by the United States in the 
Uruguay Round, see Chapter 1, infra, For a critical discussion see Steve Croley and John H. Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of 
Review, and Deference to National Governance,” 90 American Journal of International Law 193 (1996); see also, Ross Becroft, The Standard of 
Review in WTO Dispute Settlement: Critique and Development (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 68-72. 
656 The three arguments in favor of adopting a Chevron-style review are: (i) a higher expertise in the application and interpretation of law at 
the lower level; (ii) democratic accountability is better assured at the lower level; and (iii) efficiency is dispute settlement is not promoted due to 
increased chances of a legal tower of babel (conflicting interpretations of the provisions of the covered agreements); see Steve Croley and John H. 





Panels can readily be said to have more expertise than domestic authorities, both de facto and de lege, in interpreting 
and applying the provisions of the covered agreements. Furthermore, Panels do not restrict democratic 
accountability when considering arguments in full – especially, as argued in this work, when Panels explicitly 
acknowledge prevailing preference heterogeneity among the Membership when completing their construction of 
relevant provisions. In fact, by adopting a standard of review that is explicitly multilateral in character the Panel 
strengthens the connection between WTO dispute settlement and the Membership jointly. 
 
A more procedural approach to identifying the line of deference and to set the appropriate standard of review is 
argued by Zleptnig. He argues for the introduction of a “deliberation test,” such that Panels should inquire into the 
deliberative process of domestic authorities in order to calibrate the appropriate level of intrusiveness. This 
deliberation test will “lead to more deferential treatment of well founded, rational policy choices and less deference 
in the absence of suitable public deliberation.”657 This procedural approach to the standard of review implicates its 
operation in a rich and well defined normative field, akin in scope to the global administrative law project (or 
alternatively offering a venue for international review of the quality of domestic deliberative democracy).658 
 
Spamann rather argues for a full de novo test,659 which he narrows to the assessment of facts in trade remedy cases. 
In positioning the Panel for a de novo review, Spamann emphasizes the adversarial nature of Panel proceedings 
(instead of engaging a Panel’s possible fact-finding powers). A full de novo test would empower the independence 
of Panels and concentrate the reasoning of the Panel on the interpretation of the provisions of WTO covered 
agreements instead of trying to second-guess the reasonableness of the administrative process followed by domestic 
authorities. Furthermore, Panels, so he argues, are tempted to let the grey-scale of the present standard of review 
slide into full review, despite the Appellate Body’s warning in US – Lamb to not substitute their view for that of 
                                                        
657 Stefan Zleptnig, “The Standard of Review in WTO Law: An Analysis of Law, Legitimacy and the Distribution of Legal and Political 
Authority,” 6(17) European Integration Online Papers (2002). 
658 Benedict Kingsburry, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, "The Emergence of Global Administrative Law", 68 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 15 (2005); see also Carol Harlow, “Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values,” 17(1) European Journal of 
International Law 187 (2006). 
659 Holger Spamann, “Standard of Review for World Trade Organization Panels in Trade Remedy Cases: A Critical Analysis,” 38(3) Journal 
of World Trade 509 (2004). 
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domestic authorities.660 Spamann finally observes that despite implicating the sovereignty of Member States, this 
ultimate feature of states cannot much inform the debate around the appropriate standard of review as all obligations 
of WTO law have been voluntarily assumed by its Members.661 
 
The focus on the sovereign ability of states to act and bind themselves finds ground in the tradition of international 
law expressed in the Lotus case (by the ICJ),662 which reserves an absolute scope for the initial ability of the 
sovereign to act. On one hand, the concept of sovereignty in this framework operates as a resistance against legal 
activism and in support of the interpretative assumption of in dubio mitius.663 On the other hand, it is unlikely from a 
contractual point of view664 that the concept of national sovereignty instructs the adjudicator to adopt a generally 
deferential stance as consideration of the vertical separation and balance of power does not explicitly feature (unlike 
as in the domestic context).665 In fact, this approach to contractual cooperation between states places a premium on 
the political reality shaping the cooperation initially and does little to aid the judicial decision maker in delineating 
the appropriate scope of each provision in the absence of her ultimate political sensibility (see Section B, infra). 
 
As however noted, with the judicialization of the international trading system following the establishment of the 
WTO at the end of the Uruguay Round, the Appellate Body moved666 to adopt strict textualism and a matter of 
formalism to distance itself from the political WTO institution (and, to some extent, the free trade teleology 
associated therewith). In this sense, the standard of review as applied by the Appellate Body, at both the level of the 
treaty and the provision, can be read as a conscious move away from Lotus-inspired notions of sovereignty and 
toward a de-politicization and further judicialization of decision making under the DSU. 
 
                                                        
660 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb Safeguards (2001), ¶74; Holger Spamann, “Standard of Review for World Trade Organization 
Panels in Trade Remedy Cases: A Critical Analysis,” 38(3) Journal of World Trade 509 (2004), p. 540. 
661 Holger Spamann, “Standard of Review for World Trade Organization Panels in Trade Remedy Cases: A Critical Analysis,” 38(3) Journal 
of World Trade 509 (2004), p. 553. 
662 The Case of S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of Int’l Justice, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927). 
663 See, for instance, John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). See also, John H. Jackson, “The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the 
Uruguay Round Results,” 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 204 (1997). See furthermore WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones 
(1998), ¶12. 
664 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (1996), Part F (p. 15), where it held that “The WTO Agreement is a treaty 
– the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective national 
interests, the Members of the WTO have made a bargain.” 
665 See also Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.29. 
666 The Appellate Body moved to adopt the textualism of the VCLT as early as its report in US – Gasoline (1996). 
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Ehlermann and Lockhart in turn point out that the standard of review has varied depending on the measures and 
WTO obligations under consideration.667 This argument I have similarly made in Chapter 1, supra, and have 
referred to the resulting standard of review as “embedded” or dependent on the type of provision under review. 
Ehlermann and Lockhart accord special preference to the text of the relevant covered agreement668 – an approach 
that seems to fit well with the practice of the Panels and Appellate Body, as well as with the emphasis placed on 
judicialization of WTO dispute settlement procedures. For example, Panels adjudicating disputes under Article III 
and XX GATT are relatively unconstrained in their adoption of an intrusive standard of review, whereas in trade 
remedy cases the treaty language points to a larger measure of deference.669 
 
Ehlermann and Lockhart point, in addition to the structure and context of the treaty language, to the obligation of the 
adjudicator mandated by Article 3.2 of the DSU to maintain the security and predictability of the multilateral trading 
system. They furthermore stress that the dispute settlement system works to preserve the balance of Member State’s 
rights and obligation under WTO covered agreements.670 The authors note that the Appellate Body in EC – 
Hormones clarified that “the standard of review […] must reflect the balance established in [the particular WTO 
agreement] between the jurisdictional competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional 
competences retained by the Members for themselves […].”671 
 
Similar to Ehlermann and Lockhart, I do not start my inquiry into the construction of the provisions of covered 
agreements with the notion of sovereignty.672 Instead, by adopting the perspective of the multilateral adjudicator, I 
argue that the bounds of legal provisions should be primarily established with full reference to the object and 
purpose of the collaborative multilateral instrument. That is, only with direct reference to the object and purpose of 
the provision and the agreement generally can the adjudicator adopt an embedded standard of review that reflects the 
balance of competences conceded and retained. 
                                                        
667 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, “Standard of Review in WTO Law,” 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 491 
(2004); see also Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) European Journal of 
International Law 9 (2016). 
668 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, “Standard of Review in WTO Law,” 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 491 
(2004). 
669 Id., pp. 508, 520. 
670 Id., pp. 493-494. 
671 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶115, cited in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, “Standard of Review 
in WTO Law,” 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 491 (2004), p. 494. 
672 See for a different approach, for instance, Joshua Meltzer, “State Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the WTO,” 26(4) University of 




In China – Publications the Appellate Body articulated the structure of the GATT as entailing a “rule-exception” 
framework.673 The appropriate standard of review, informed by this structural feature of the GATT and colored by 
the adjudicator’s obligation to maintain the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system, is therefore 
integrative with respect to the construction of headline rules and exceptions thereto. The integrative aspect is further 
bolstered by the preamble to the GATT 1947, noting rather succinctly that the reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements of the GATT are “directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” 
 
In line with this integrative view of the appropriate embedded standard of review is the Appellate Body’s 
clarification, also in China – Publications, that it considers the “right to regulate” as an inherent power of each 
Member State which the provisions of the covered agreements operate to discipline.674 The nature and scope of this 
discipline is provided by the standard of review, as applied by the Appellate Body with respect to the provision 
under consideration and with reference to the object and purpose thereof. 
 
This rule-exception framework is however incomplete without consideration of exemption provisions, such as 
Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. To properly construe the ambit of exception provisions, the adjudicator must account 
for the scope accorded to exemption provisions when finding an interpretation that appropriately balances those 
rights that have been conceded with those that were retained by the Member States.  
 
Instead of relying on the negotiating history to determine the intended balance between rights conceded and 
retained, as supplementary means of interpretation of Article 32 VCLT, I seek to distance the interpretation of the 
GATT 1994 from the politics that dominated the GATT 1947 (and to a certain extent the WTO institution, see 
Chapter 1, supra). In turn, I rely on an object and purpose test, a primary means of interpretation ex Article 31 
VCLT, to calibrate the scope of the embedded standard of review for exemption provisions.  
                                                        
673 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222-223; building on WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), 
p. 30, where it held that “so far as concerns the WTO, [Member State legislative autonomy] is circumscribed only by the need to respect the 
requirement of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements.” 




The appropriate balance between rules-exceptions and pertinent exemption provisions of the GATT 1994, struck by 
application of the embedded standard of review, is informed by the object and purpose of the exemption provision. 
The preamble to the WTO Agreement is in turn clear in its emphasis – postulating that the reciprocal and mutual 
advantageous arrangements of the GATT are to be understood and applied “in a manner consistent with [Member 
States’] respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.”  
 
The judicial decision maker thus finds the preference heterogeneity among the Membership as to optimal growth 
policies circumscribed by two different standards of review. Exceptions are to be construed with emphasis on the 
integral aspect, whereas exemption provisions demand emphasis on the distributive aspect of multilateral 
collaboration on international trade policies. As such, the intrusiveness of the review should be lesser when the 
analysis concerns exemptions; i.e. a higher level of deference is required when construing the legal ambit of 
exemption provisions in relation to both headline rules and associated exceptions. 
 
Were the adjudicator to adopt a blanket integrative perspective and interpret exemptions with an eye toward the 
lowering of barriers to trade, she would not merely violate the balance of rights and obligations but also interpret the 
collaborative agreement toward a pre-selected Truth (the “origin-becoming” or historicism fallacy).675 In the absence 
of preference homogeneity in the Membership (quod non), her acceptance of such pre-selected truth in turn reveals 
her prejudice and subjects her to power-dynamics identified by Mavroidis.676  
 
2. Judicial Decisions: From “Regulated Madness” to Balanced Multilateralism 
 
For the adjudicator to initially attempt any reading of the GATT 1994, she needs to formulate a first conception of 
the multilateral agreement and its Membership. Only by according the constituent Member States with certain 
attributes can she positively determine the character of the multilateral collaboration set out in the pre-amble of the 
                                                        
675 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971); 
see also Michel Foucault, "What is Critique?" in Sylvère Lotringer, ed., The Politics of Truth (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007). 
676 Petros C. Mavroidis, “The Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight: The Not So Magnificent Seven of the WTO Appellate Body,” EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2016/31. 
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WTO Agreement and in the provisions of the covered agreements. To successfully ground her “objective” 
construction of the agreement in an embedded standard of review that is sensitive to the object and purpose of the 
agreement, she needs to clarify her understanding of the “rationale for, and the objective function of the [covered] 
agreements.”677 
 
Not unlike the Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages,678 I assume that Member States, in pursuing their 
policy preferences collaboratively, are guided by rational choice; that is they are aware of transaction costs, have 
complete, transitive, and continuous sets of individual preferences and engage in thorough cost-benefit analyses, but 
are not complete utility maximizers.679 This assumption enables a weakly-Paretian view of collaboration; ensuring 
that signatories strive for maximization of their own welfare and avoid entering into agreements that are 
fundamentally harmful, abusive, or coercive to an individual actor in the short or long term.680  
 
Political economy approaches are often critical of the central welfare assumption of classical and neoclassical 
economics: they dismiss the tenet of policy setting by high-minded, welfare-maximizing decision-makers 
(“benevolent dictators” or “social planners”) as naïve thinking. Schropp, for instance, extends the premise of 
methodological individualism to hold that “policy is drafted by self-interested government officials who care 
predominantly about maximizing their personal wellbeing, be it in the form of political support, re-election 
endeavors, receiving important information, or maximizing their budgetary discretion.”681 
 
As this work adopts the perspective of the adjudicator, political economy explanations for the dynamics of 
contractual agreement at the formation and compliance682 stage are of limited relevance. Such dynamics can only 
                                                        
677 Id., p. 1. 
678 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (1996), Part F (p. 15). 
679 I wish to side step the discussion on bounded rationality, as, for some, bounded rationality is equivalent to irrationality (e.g. Daniel 
Kahnemann, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,” 93(5) American Economic Review 1449 (2003)), while for 
others it is related to the Bayesian updating of otherwise perfectly rational actors (e.g. Ariel Rubinstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining 
Model,” 59(4) Econometrica 777 (1982)). See generally, Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” 69(1) Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 99 (1955). 
680 See also, Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
681 Id., p. 135, fn. 5. 
682 In a recent paper, Van Aaken and Trachtman develop a method “that integrates [public international law] more holistically in a [political 
economy] model” – viewing public international law both “as explanans as well as explanandum.” (p. 11) Their central unit of analysis however 
remains domestic interests, examined through the dual-layered ability of states to form international law and comply therewith. See Anne van 
Aaken and Joel P. Trachtman, “Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior,” University of St. Gallen 
Law School, Law and Economics Research Paper Series No. 2015-08 (July 2015). 
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partially inform the judicial decision-maker of the true collaborative intent of Parties, especially in a multilateral 
context with time-inconsistent (expanding) membership. By adopting the position of the adjudicator, attention 
switches from the mechanics of achieving collaboration (or rather cooperation) to the focal point of such 
collaboration; the provision, commitment, or entitlement, presented to the adjudicator for interpretation. 
 
Accordingly, while Parties operate an inherently self-oriented conception of collaboration “for me,”683 with 
particular reference to appropriating the gains of collaboration or defection (acquisition), the adjudicator safeguards 
the targeted collaborative object and purpose of the multilateral communicative instrument. The adjudicator thus 
emphasizes the systemic collaboration “in me” and derives the interpretative (normative) vector for her decision 
from an understanding of goals and object and purpose of the instrument.684 
 
Collaboration in the WTO is therefore, from the perspective of the judicial decision-maker, goal-oriented to the 
extent that all Members are assumed to be rational (although not perfectly so) and have agreed to a limited 
cooperation on and coordination of their trade policies to enhance the outcome of the “trade game.” Collaboration in 
the WTO is however not unidirectional (or cooperative), but instead subject to conflicting normative or sociological 
preferences. Appropriately, the Appellate Body notes that “the line of equilibrium, […], is not fixed and 
unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up 
specific cases differ.”685  
 
Correspondingly, the appropriate standard of review is “embedded” in the provisions and capable of reflecting the 
different aspects of collaboration (integral and distributive) as the adjudicator seeks to balance the rights and 
obligations of Member States under the multilateral agreement. Note that the international trade regime is therefore 
one of multilaterism, not in the sense of collaboration driven by shared empathy between the actors,686 but one of 
                                                        
683 For the distinction between cooperation “for me” and “in me,” see I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International Cooperation: 
The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Part I. 
684 Mavroidis, argues complimentarily that a theory of disputes is best derived from a consideration of (i) the reasons for contracting, i.e. the 
“primary law” (entitlements) that signatories have given themselves, (ii) the protection accorded to those entitlements, and (iii) the degree of 
contractual completeness; Petros C. Mavroidis, “Remedies in the WTO: a Framework of Analysis,” Mimeo (2006), quoted in Simon A. B. Schropp, 
Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
685 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶¶158-159. 
686 A sense of solidarity among the rational actors can work to further stabilize equilibrium behavior and provide additional legitimacy to the 
regulatory framework. As such, the principle of solidarity may be integrated with the contractual obligation to perform and adjudicate in good faith. 
Solidarity among states is however not a sufficient, although to a certain extent necessary, reason for stable international cooperation among players 
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rational commitment on substantive issues (i.c. domestic measures restricting exports).687 Against this background, 
the adjudicator strives to achieve that interpretation of the provisions of the GATT 1994 “which fit the text, […] 
ennoble[] [it], [and] make[] it the best it can be.”688  
 
In a powerful post-modern critique of the ability of the interpreter to accomplish her task deductively, that is, with 
the pretense of logical necessity,689 Koskenniemi argues that an adjudicator ultimately needs recourse to extra-legal 
concepts in support of her conclusion. The manner in which the adjudicator, but also the practitioner,690 partakes in 
the international legal discourse is said to be determined by structural elements,691 such as power dynamics or 
external values, and is historically contingent.692 
 
According to Koskenniemi, the international legal discourse oscillates interminably and necessarily between two 
poles of argumentation that ultimately force recourse to an external source of validity: abstract utopianism and 
power apologism. These constraints are not “flaws” in reasoning, doctrinal or otherwise, but are constraints inherent 
to language and argument itself. A deconstructive perspective reveals how the apparently dominant term of a 
meaning pair depends in each opposition on a secondary term for its meaning or force.693 Only a political choice can 
                                                        
with non-homogenous preferences. See, Rudiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima, eds., Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law, Beiträge 
zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 213 (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2010); and Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles, 
eds., A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
687 I do not here differentiate between “multilateral” and “multilateralism” as is sometimes done in the literature to denote the difference 
between cooperation and coordination respectfully. The character of international trade, properly envisioned not as fundamentally antagonistic but 
rather as compliance and outcome-oriented, supports this broader use as pertaining to the commitment between Member States. See, I. William 
Zartman and Saadia Touval, “Introduction: Return to the Theories of Cooperation,” in I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International 
Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 2. 
688 Ronald Dworkin, “On Gaps in the Law,” in Paul Amselek and Neil MacCormick, eds., Controversies about Law’s Ontology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1991), p. 86. 
689 Deconstruction is a technique that aims to reveal structural – as opposed to a causal or logical – explanations for the incompleteness or 
indeterminacy of a (international legal) discourse. 
690 Koskenniemi takes care to emphasize, overly modest, that he does not seek to (re)establish a general theory of law, but rather that he aims 
to clarify the practice and discourse of international lawyers. Rather than grounding the validity of an international legal argument in a priori 
ideological self-justification, Koskenniemi maintains that “[i]nternational law is what international lawyers do and how they think.” Martti 
Koskenniemi, “Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline for a Theory of International Law as Practice,” in Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics 
of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
691 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia; the Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005 [1989]). Note that “[a]lthough this work unquestionably reflects the influence of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement in the United 
States, it draws, in doing so, directly on the source of French structuralism, borrowing its analytical method from the work of Levi-Strauss; it is 
thus less influenced by the ‘Derridean’ strands of CLS so popular in the United States.” E Jouannet, “Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction,” in 
Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 2. 
692 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial 
Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). See also, Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration,” 
17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197 (2004). 
693 A concept related to Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ and language as performance acts in Austin. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, G.E.M. Anscobe, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986 [1953]); and John Langshaw Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
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determine a solution;694 in this way “international law reproduces the paradoxes and ambivalences of a liberal theory 
of politics.”695 
 
As a result of Koskenniemi’s deconstruction of the international legal argument, “the [adjudicatory] decision always 
comes about, […], as a kind of ‘regulated madness’, never reducible to any structure outside it.”696 The untamed 
decision maker thus engages in legal adjudication by making distinctions in much the same way as they are made 
between “kitsch and non-kitsch.”697 A good judge is therefore someone with good taste (gusto), a thoroughly 
contingent metric – and one that is highly susceptible to the political economy pressures of personal utility 
maximization (or advancement). 
 
This deconstructive argument is quite separate from, although not hostile to, the realization that norms and words are 
indeterminate in themselves. While the struggle of sign-indeterminacy is part of the application of legal reasoning, 
examined in Chapter 3, supra, Koskenniemi’s critique targets the structure of the international legal discourse. In 
Koskenniemi’s approach to international law, the aporia of law to satisfactorily complete and positively attain 
meaning attribution is limited through “cultures of formalism.” Such formalism is not positivistic, rather as “against 
the particularity of the ethical decision, formalism constitutes a horizon of universality, embedded in a culture of 
restraint, a commitment to listening to others’ claims and seeking to take them into account.”698 
 
In his execution of the deconstructionist technique, and ultimate introduction of cultures of formalism, I posit 
Koskenniemi overlooked a fundamental, non-reducible, element internal to the legal universe: Parties’ desire to 
                                                        
694 See, for instance, Serio Dellavalle, “Law As a Linguistic Instrument Without Truth Content? On the Epistemology of Koskenniemi’s 
Understanding of Law,” Max Planck Insitute, MPIL Research Paper Series, No. 2016-08. 
695 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia; the Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005 [1989]), p. xiii. Note though that Koskenniemi does not simply invert the relationship between law and politics; in fact, “law and politics 
seem[]coherent and separate, yet [are] related to one single reality.” Martti Koskenniemi, “The Place of Law in Collective Security,” 17 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 455 (1996). 
696 In this sense Koskenniemi’s “decisionism” comes closer to Carl Schmitt’s conception of decisions in the legal discourse, than to Hannah 
Arendt’s description of the “action” in public sphere; see Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law as Political Theology: How to Read the Nomos 
der Erde,” 11 Constellations: An International Journal for Critical and Democratic Theory 492 (2004); and Martti Koskenniemi, “Carl Schmitt, 
Hans Morgenthau and the Image of Law in International Relations,” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of Law in International Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 17–34; and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
697 Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal,” 16(1) European Journal of International Law 113 
(2005), p. 123. 
698 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law,” 65 The Modern Law Review 
159 (2002); reproduced in The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 128. 
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collaborate.699 As Descamps noted, “deconstruction is not destruction”;700 rather, as Jouanet puts it: “it is to bring to 
the surface meanings that the play of language and the structures of thought have hidden or forbidden.”701 While 
Koskenniemi only retains an immediate sense of power from his deconstruction, he, arguably, accords insufficient 
weight to the decisive role that practical reason and inter-subjectivity play in the adjudicator’s effort to achieve 
coherent meaning attribution. 
 
By sensitizing the standard of review with which the adjudicator approaches the provisions of covered agreements to 
the collaborative inter-subjectivity of the multilateral agreement, I allow the interpreter to partly avoid the 
deconstructive trap of reductionism. Certainly, multilateral treaties are never perfect expressions of subjective 
intent,702 as no communicative instrument ever could be,703 and always contains purposeful elements of rational, 
dogmatic constraint.704 It is in the approach to these structural or purposive elements that the preconceptions and 
initial understanding, prejudices and biases,705 of the adjudicator show most clearly and have the greatest effect on 
the construction of a term or provision’s “ordinary meaning.” 
 
Gadamer rejects the notion that to understand is to reconstruct, in a disinterested fashion, the meaning of the text 
according to its author (mens auctoris).706 Instead, the interpreter’s understanding of the text is mediated through a 
shared basic understanding about the subject matter of the text with its author(s). The very existence of the 
agreement thus presupposes a shared understanding about its object and purpose (and consequently its integral and 
distributive aspects). The interpreter cannot however establish this insight conscientiously without becoming aware 
of her anterior influences and how they distance herself from a genuine approach to the subject matter of the text – 
and hence its meaning. 
                                                        
699 A full argumentation hereof goes beyond the scope of the present work. See however, Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech 
and Language in Psychoanalysis” (1953) and also, Lewis Call, Postmodern Anarchism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002). 
700 Christian Descamps, Quarante Ans de Philosophie Française (Paris: Bordas, 2003), p. 150: “déconstruire n’est pas détruire”. 
701  E Jouannet, “Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction,” in Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011), p. 6. 
702 The WTO Appellate Body in its report in US – Gambling (2005) correctly differentiates between unilateral and pluri- or multilateral terms 
(¶160). The latter after all involves identifying the meaning common to all Members or to the instrument (as I argue). 
703 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1992 [1960]), 
Peter Christian Lang, ed., Hauptwerke der Philosophie. 20. Jahrhundert. 
704 Jean Koh Peters, “Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Treaties Reflect World Vision,” 23 Harvard International 
Law Journal 71 (1982), p. 74, fn. 14 and 15. 
705 Gadamer successfully employs the term “Vorurteil” (prejudice) to clarify the inevitable pre-judgments all bring to any epistemic process; 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1992 [1960]), Peter 
Christian Lang, ed., Hauptwerke der Philosophie. 20. Jahrhundert. 
706 See for an accessible introduction into Gadamer’s analysis of “understanding,” Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of 




Whenever the adjudicator is confronted with hard cases in multilateral treaties, those where Parties’ preferences 
rationally clash, she should be mindful that, as coordination substitutes cooperation among the Parties, her 
interpretative exercise not merely works to reveal her biases. In determining the legal scope of both exception and 
exemption provisions in relation to each other and to the headline rule, she should consciously construct exemption 
provisions considering the agreement’s distributive aspect and object and purpose. Likewise, exception provisions 
should be interpreted with reference to the integral aspect of Parties’ collaboration. The adjudicator thus derives 
form and function from the collaborative experience of international law and its objectified desire: i.e. rational 
(multilateral) collaboration toward a common object and purpose – for ubi societas, ibi ius.707 
 
Out of this ancient sociability of law and language, I extract the inter-subjectivity and anchor the adjudicative 
exercise of interpretation and decision making therein. Interpretation of a multilateral agreement by an adjudicator is 
concerned with safeguarding Parties’ collaborative intent as available from the communicative instrument, set in the 
appropriate context of international law. The adjudicator thus pursues the systemic notion of collaboration “in” me, 
instead of Parties’ collaboration “for” me (which remains mired in questions of power and, to a lesser extent, 
Utopia). This differentiation is consistent with the Appellate Body’s description of the WTO Agreement, together 
with the covered agreements, as contractual instruments embedded in international law. 
 
Note however that the characterization of law and language as sociable and relational does not therefore translate 
into a “constitutional” system,708 nor does it form a broad platform of “public authority.”709 While adjudicators 
“generate and stabilize normative expectations”710 – “not only those of the contending parties, but of all subjects 
under international law”711 – they do so not under the guise of a Neo-Kantian cosmopolitan citizenship, but as a 
                                                        
707 The longer maxim, attributed to Aristotle, reads: “Ubi homo, ibi societas. Ubi Societas, ibi ius. Ergo ubi homo, ibi ius.” Aristotle, in his 
Nichomachaen Ethics, extracts from this sociability the virtue of deep normative ties between “friends.” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics trans. 
Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012 [350 BCE], Book 8. 
708 See, for example, the contributions in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, eds., Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2006). Obligations that work erga omnes, or are fundamental to the system 
(inviolable), might warrant capitalization in so far as they provide essential support to the international market. By their very nature though, I doubt 
these values and norms are suitable to support constitutionalization in the absence of a parliamentary body. See also, Jean D’Aspremont, 
“International Legal Constitutionalism, Legal Forms, and the Need for Villains,” in Andrew Lang and Andrew Weiner, eds., Handbook on Global 
Constitutionalism (Forthcoming, Edward Elgar, 2017). 
709 Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, “In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication,” 23(1) European Journal 
of International Law 7 (2012).  
710 Id., p. 101. 
711 Id., p. 207. 
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result of precise, rational, goal-oriented cooperation and coordination of identified trade policies between Member 
States.712 The stabilization of normative expectations, as generated by the adjudicator’s decision, appears in light of 
her understanding and application of the treaty’s object and purpose. As States are assumed to be master of both 
ends and means, it is, in that sense, that international law “can be binding and robust […][only] when it is rational 
for states to comply with it.”713 
 
Bogdandy and Venzke however postulate adjudication under international law as an exercise in public authority that 
cannot be “sufficiently justified [] on the traditional basis of state consent, nor by a functionalist narrative that 
exclusively clings to the goals or values courts are supposed to serve.”714 Instead, as autonomous actors wielding 
public authority, adjudicators need democratic justification. While it is tempting to situate collaboration in a value-
rich international public sphere, akin to those constructed on popular sovereignty, I do not believe state practice in 
the international realm to be genuinely reflective hereof. Such a normatively homogenous, value rich, public realm 
is indeed an aspirational utopia. 
 
This is however not to say that the adjudicator is unrestrained in her construction of exemption provisions. The 
description by the Appellate Body of the covered agreements as obligations of international law and as contractual 
expressions of collaborative intent,715 demands that the adjudicator’s perspective is sufficiently sensitized to the 
relevant teleologies of international law.716 As teleologies can be generated externally as well as internally to public 
international law it is helpful to be reminded of Kantorowicz’ triptych.717 Kantorowicz insightfully distinguishes 
                                                        
712 For a constitutional perspective on the moderating role of proportionality in international cooperation, see Anne Peters, “Proportionality 
as a Global Constitutional Principle,” Max Planck Institute, MPIL Research Paper Series, No. 2016-10. 
713 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 202. Of course, 
Goldsmith and Posner make a general point about international law with which we cannot agree, such that “states cannot bootstrap cooperation by 
creating rules and calling them ‘law’,” – In so far as this observation pertains to the status of international law, it is nowadays largely undisputed 
that international law is indeed law; the open question is to its substance and operation, not its formal validity condition; see, for instance, Jorg 
Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, eds., International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), where they note that “[m]odern forms of international legal positivism, instead, celebrate the role of politics in international reality and, 
indeed, international legal practice even where they separate the realms of politics and scholarship.” (pp. 6-7) 
714 Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, “In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication,” 23(1) European Journal 
of International Law 7 (2012), p. 8. 
715 See Chapter 3, supra. 
716 See Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline for a Theory of International Law as Practice,” in Martti 
Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011); Martti Koskenniemi’s “A History of International Law Histories,” 
in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds., The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
reminds us that the historic progression of theories of international law have all revolved around one teleology or another. Koskenniemi thus points 
out that, when adopting a historical perspective, one “cannot know international law […] without understanding it as the transformation of 
humankind’s collective experience into a redemptive future.” (p. 944) Note though that the historiography of international law fell victim to 
philosophical indeterminacy; each conviction can readily point to supportive aspects within legal history’s determining force. 
717 Hermann Kantorowicz, Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie (Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller, 1962 [1911]), cited in Anne van Aaken and Joel P. 
Trachtman, “Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior,” University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and 
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between normative (Wertwissenschaft), sociological (Realwissenschaft) and doctrinal (Normwissenschaft) sources 
of teleologies. 
 
Kantorowicz’ differentiation is particularly useful when seeking to parse out an interpretative method rooted in 
codified, or rule-based, international law that incorporates notions from economic theory into a normative and 
doctrinal science. The GATT/WTO is exemplary of a codified system of international economic rules, unified by an 
institutional dispute settlement mechanism. The interpreter of the regulatory structure of the GATT/WTO is thus 
compelled to consider applicable doctrinal, sociological/economic and normative teleologies as constructive, 
directional elements to her adjudicatory decision. These directional elements each circumscribe and inform her 
application of the embedded standard of review as she construes the provisions under consideration either narrowly 
or in an open manner. 
 
For the decision of the adjudicator to be accepted as an authoritative expression of legal interpretation in the matter 
before her, it needs to supersede mere “regulated madness” and fit not merely the text of the provisions but primarily 
engage the prevailing teleologies as identified by Kantorowicz. Within this framework, the adjudicator works to 
achieve an objective assessment of the matter through application of the embedded standard of review, in 
accordance with Article 11 of the DSU. Article 3.2 of the DSU subsequently provides hermeneutic boundaries and 
points to the customary rules of interpretation of public international law as appropriate means to preserve the 
balance of rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements.718 The adjudicator thus comes to this 
balance not directly, through her presuppositions and prejudgements, but by applying the appropriate standard of 
review in a manner cognizant of prevailing teleologies. 
 
In this sense, the notion of “applying the law” is not to be confused with the, almost diametrically opposed, notion of 
“finding the law.”719 Whereas the latter notion posits judicial decision-making as an act of pure deduction from 
external first values and principles, the former emphasizes the limited indeterminateness, or malleability, of the 
                                                        
Economics Research Paper Series No. 2015---08 (July 2015), p. 3, fn. 6. See also Andrew Jeffrey Spadafora, Freedom from Value Judgments: 
Value-Free Social Science and Objectivity in Germany, 1880-1914, Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University (2013). 
718 Contrast this “system’s view,” with the Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) that limits the role of the 
court “to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it.” 
719 See Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, “Key Elements of a Public Law Theory of Adjudication,” in, In Whose Name?: A Public Law 
Theory of International Adjudication (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 102 - 105. 
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interpretative exercise.720 When the interpreter fits a contested domestic trade policy to the provisions of the 
GATT/WTO, she necessarily invokes her understanding of the object and purpose of the GATT/WTO to reconcile 
her application of the embedded standard of review with her (con)textual interpretation of the provisions of the 
treaty. 
 
The three sources of teleology identified by Kantorowicz are each reflected in GATT/WTO theory and practice: (i) 
sociological teleology is captured in the economic object and purpose of the covered agreements and their 
provisions (See Section B, infra); (ii) normative teleology is expressed in the obligation to rule in good faith (“bona 
fides”) and respect the objective expectations of the Membership (see Section C, infra); and (iii) doctrinal teleology 
is captured by the power of persuasive precedent (See Chapter 5, infra). Together these points in the triptych set 
limits to the embedded standard of review and color the interpretational space within which the adjudicator 
confronts exemption provisions with the headline rule and exceptions thereto. 
 
B. Exemption Provisions: An Open Construction 
 
Confronted with a hard case that references an exemption provision, the GATT/WTO adjudicator is compelled to 
apply the embedded standard of review such that she constructs the exemption provision in light of the distributive, 
instead of the integral, aspect of the collaborative intent of the Membership. In a time-inconsistent Membership of 
rational contracting states, the adjudicator finds, as noted, the collaborative intent of Parties in the preamble to the 
agreements721 read against the demands of international law. This approach to the construction of exemption 
provisions receives added urgency in the presence of incomplete economic convergence between the Member 
States.722  
 
Ethier however points out that each contracting party faces a reciprocal conflict problem: “Every country knows that 
it might turn out to be either the accuser or the accused. Thus it is in no country’s best interest, ex ante, to agree that, 
                                                        
720 This dichotomy is obviously not straightforward, with elements of each recurring in the other. Furthermore, a third approach to “finding” 
or “applying” the law might be said to be presented by the inductive reasoning offered by the common law; distinguishing case from precedent. 
721 The adjudicator thus avoids the historicist fallacy of imbuing the dynamic collaborative agreement with a singular purpose derived from a 
reading of the negotiating history. 
722 See Chapter 2, supra. 
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ex post, either the accuser should be unconstrained in its ability to punish or the accused should be unconstrained in 
its ability to proceed without punishment. This generates a role for a dispute settlement mechanism.”723 Ethier, 
referencing this puzzle, thus cautions against reading exception and exemption provisions broadly in the absence of 
express language or instruction to that extent. 
 
Schropp, in response, examines intra-contractual policy flexibility mechanisms as they are designed by Parties to 
account for economic “shocks” that give rise to “regret” under incomplete contracts.724 He distinguishes between 
primary, or headline, GATT/WTO rules, which include provisions on non-discrimination, national treatment, and 
tariffication; and policy flexibility, or secondary, rules.725 He thus places a concept of “efficient intra-contractual 
breach” central in his analysis of the WTO as a “multi-issue, multi-entitlement contract of highest complexity.”726 
 
Correspondingly, Schropp differentiates between welfare-enhancing good faith trade disputes and those that are not, 
leading to a two-tier system of enforcement: one concerned with textual ambiguity, the other with opportunistic 
extra-contractual breach.727 He considers that the former needs to be resolved “amicably,” whereas the latter invites 
“punitive and collective punishment.”728 The present work is only concerned with the former, as hard cases are 
assumed to erupt from genuine preference heterogeneity among the Membership.729 
 
                                                        
723 Wilfred J. Ethier, “Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements,” EPRU Working Paper No. 2001–14 (2001), p. 5. 
724 Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). He finds that “when it comes to trade policy flexibility, an unconditional liability rule backed by 
expectation damages clearly Pareto-dominates both a rule of inalienability and a renegotiation requirement.” (p. 19) 
725 Id., pp. 2-3, 33-39. 
726 Id., p. 18. 
727 “Tier one, an inner protective belt of contractual entitlements, is aimed at dealing with welfare-enhancing good faith trade disputes (that 
emerge due to contractual ambiguity, interpretative problems, or unintentional contract infringements), and at solving them in an amicable manner. 
Remedies at this stage are strictly commensurate to the damage caused. Tier two, the outer layer of protection, mandates punitive and collective 
punishment.” Id., p. 20. 
728 The classic cooperative trade game is given by an infinitely played Prisoner’s Dilemma. Scholars of the GATT/WTO have used this formal 
approach to highlight the intrinsic relationship between (self-)enforcement and ex ante commitments. The assumptions behind this type of argument 
draw on efficient and complete contracting between reasonably rational Parties, such that commitments are Pareto-efficient and not – over the life 
of the contract - in need of renegotiation. Deviation, or defection, is therefore always assumed to be opportunistic and optimally punished by the 
“grim-tricker”-strategy of continued reciprocal defection. Schropp criticizes this approach to trade policy analysis as overly simplistic. He notes 
that the assumption of contractual (self-)enforcement in fact relies on a process rather than on a single act of punishment. Enforcement is conditioned 
by the adjudication and remediation phases. He centrally argues that previous literature in particular overlooked “the beneficial character of escape 
clauses in capturing contractual regret in incomplete contracts and how these provisions consequently shape the ex ante willingness of government 
to liberalize trade in the first place.” (p. 24), Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A 
Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W. Staiger, “The 
Case for Tradeable Remedies in the WTO,” in Simon Evenett and Bernard Hoekman, eds., Economic Development and Multilateral Trade 
Cooperation (Washington, DC: Palgrave/Macmillan and World Bank, 2005); Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “Enforcement, Private Political 
Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape Clause,” 34 Journal of Legal Studies 471 (2005). 
729 Also note that Chapter 2, supra, differentiates between “commercial” disputes involving opportunistic defection and those disputes 
reflective of genuine differences in implementation preferences, or which are “developmental.” 
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Schropp’s focus on intra-contractual policy flexibility provisions resonates with the analytical point made in the 
present work with regard to its under-recognized corollary: exemption provisions. The Appellate Body, in China – 
Publications, held that the WTO Agreement and its Annexes operate to discipline Member State’s inherent power to 
regulate in a rule-exception manner.730 The extent to which Member States retain “policy flexibility” to account for 
“regret” is determined by the interpretation of exception provisions. The appropriate ambit of these exception 
provisions is in turn provided by the adjudicator’s understanding of the integrative aspect of Member State 
collaboration. 
 
Exemption provisions however stand tangential to the rule-exception framework and derive their ambit and meaning 
from the application of the appropriate standard of review, interpreted with reference to the distributive elements of 
the object and purpose of the covered agreement and its provisions. As the WTO Agreement specifies, the relations 
between Member States in the field of trade and economic endeavor, and thus by extension the obligations of the 
GATT 1947, are to be understood “in a manner consistent with [Member State’s] respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development […].” 
 
Whereas policy flexibility provisions, embodying the “right to regulate,” are to be interpreted narrowly in line with 
the integral aspect of collaboration (directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to 
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce), exemptions invite a standard of review that 
construes them broadly. The “open” construction of exemption provisions against the rule-exception framework of 
the GATT 1994 consequently allows the adjudicator to more easily accord a high measure of deference to the 
defendant in fitting disputed policy measures to the terms of the provision – provided the Member State can 
reasonably show the developmental intent and effect of the disputed measure in its domestic economy. 
 
In addition to satisfying the sociological/economic teleology of the GATT/WTO, the adjudicative interpretation of 
exemption provisions nevertheless simultaneously must satisfy the conditions set by applicable doctrinal and 
normative teleologies. Article 3.2 of the DSU specifies the normative teleology as directed toward providing 
“security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.” Furthermore, the doctrinal teleology, emanating out 
                                                        
730 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222-223; 
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of the power of persuasive precedent, instructs the adjudicator to be mindful not to “add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 
 
The rights and obligations expressed in the provisions of the GATT 1994 should thus be clarified, in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. To find the appropriate equilibrium the Appellate 
Body reminds that “the standard of review […] must reflect the balance established in [the particular WTO 
agreement] between the jurisdictional competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional 
competences retained by the Members for themselves […].”731 The open construction of exemption provisions in the 
GATT 1994, following application of the multilateral standard of review, reflects these aspects and facilitates 
application hereof through the different interpretative elements of the VCLT. 
 
1. Object and Purpose 
 
As recognized in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, the covered agreements should be read against the condition 
of a heterogeneous Membership – especially in terms sociological and economic conditions. The DSU in turn places 
emphasis on the continued legitimacy, security and predictability of the multilateral trading system that is to be 
provided through the WTO dispute settlement system. Hurrell captures this balance when he points out that “the 
rule-following that results from a sense of legitimacy is ‘distinguishable from purely self-interested or instrumental 
behaviour on the one hand, and from straightforward imposed or coercive rule on the other’.”732 
 
The font of this legitimacy switched at the Uruguay Round, when the diplomacy- or power-oriented international 
trading system of the GATT733 was replaced with a ruled-based system under auspices of the WTO. For the reasons 
explored in the above, reference to the original bargain of the GATT 1947 is to be eschewed when constructing 
exemption provisions (or even interpreting the GATT more broadly). Instead, positive identification of the object 
                                                        
731 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶115, cited in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, “Standard of Review 
in WTO Law,” 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 491 (2004), p. 494. 
732 Andrew Hurrell, “Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?” Review of International Studies 31 (special issue, 
December 2005), p. 16; cited in Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” in Rudiger Wolfrum 
and Volker Roben, Legitimacy in International Law (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2008), p. 30 (emphasis added). 
733 Matsushita sees the diplomatic or power relationship of the GATT-years “exemplified by the voluntary export restraints that were common 
in the 1980s and also the unilateral application of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974” – see Mitsuo Matsushita in transcript of ASIL WTO 
Appellate Body Roundtable (2005), published as part of the ASIL Proceedings (2005), p. 180. 
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and purpose of covered agreements and associated forms of persuasive reasoning734 come to stand central to the 
interpretative exercise of the GATT 1994 and other covered agreements. Increased attention for the object and 
purpose of rule-based international collaboration is rooted in the inter-subjectivity of the rights and obligations of 
the Membership. In the absence hereof, that many litigants may find themselves feeling bereft, standing as a 
stranger,735 in face of the interpretation given to the provisions of the GATT 1994 by Panels and the Appellate Body. 
 
The Appellate Body will, in almost all cases, seek to apply the revealed “common intention” of Parties. Crucially, it 
is in its assessment of the “colour, texture and shading”736 of the object and purpose of covered agreements that the 
Appellate Body reveals its interpretative bias most strongly (in full view of the actual terms used737). As Lavoie 
points out however, “our prejudices need not imprison us or distort, and in fact [] are what enable us to see anything 
at all.”738 
 
To make practical use of these biases in her judicial decision making, the adjudicator consciously creates a barrier 
between Parties’ direct experience of the international legal practice, fraught with power relations, and the legitimate 
interpretation of the multilateral treaty rooted in Parties’ inter-subjectivity and declared collaborative aims. In this 
way the adjudicator directs her construction of the treaty’s terms toward the systemic collaboration “in me” (as 
opposed to trying to assess Parties’ sense of collaboration “for” me).739 Parties to an agreement in international law 
can, after all, be said to have an inter-subjective desire to collaborate toward a certain goal and be able to pursue this 
objective in a reasonably rational manner.740 In this way Parties’ objectified (or Idealized) desire is accessible to an 
                                                        
734 Fish emphasizes that validation hinges on the recipient epistemic community, in Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, 
Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press 1989), pp. 488–491. 
735 See Plato, “Apology of Socrates,” Louis Dyer, transl., (Gorgias Press, 1885), at 17 c-d; “Atekhnoos oun xenos ekho tes enthade lexeos” (“I 
stand utterly bereft as a stranger to the language here”). 
736 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶153. 
737 As Lavoie points out: “It is one of the central points of hermeneutics to stress that we are always shaped by the intellectual traditions we 
come from, and that such ‘prejudices’ are not a contamination of an otherwise pure and objective view,” in Don Lavoie, “Introduction,” in Don 
Lavoie, ed., Economics and Hermeneutics (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 6. 
738 Don Lavoie, “Introduction,” in Don Lavoie, ed., Economics and Hermeneutics (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 6. 
739 Similar to Lacan‘s critique on radical deconstruction, which focuses on theories of desire and subjectivity to rescue the individual 
experience of meaning attribution; see Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” (1953); see also, Lewis 
Call, Postmodern Anarchism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002). 
740 As touched upon in in the above, methodological individualism questions these assumption and points to the (self-interested and rather 
myopic) political economy drivers behind the decisions of and decision makers within States. In response Realistic Idealism does not postulate an 
idealized social planner or benevolent dictator, but argues the difference between cooperation for me and the systemic cooperation in me. From 




adjudicator through her assessment of the treaty’s object and purpose – perhaps despite Parties’ best intentions to be 
entirely selfish and myopic. 
 
The adjudicator’s assessment of the instrument’s object and purpose is, of course, part of the persuasive reasoning 
(logos)741 fundamental to the adjudication of conflicts rooted in communicative instruments. The faithful 
preservation of the rights and obligations of a diverse Membership under the covered agreements, ex Article 3.2 
DSU, demands a transparent discussion of the treaty’s object and purpose. A rule-based approached, as proposed in 
this work, on the standard of review appropriate for the construction of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994 is 
both transparent and works in service of the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. 
 
As argued in Chapter 3, supra, the Appellate Body establishes a hierarchy of proximity in its application of the 
“object and purpose,” looking at the construction and purported aim of the commitment first (“l’objet”), with the 
general result (“le but”) elucidating that construction.  The “object” is therefore immediate, whereas the “purpose” is 
somewhat more distant.742 According to the Appellate Body, the object and purpose of the covered agreements need 
however to be read in consonance and should not be divorced from a reading of the treaty as a whole.743, 744 
 
This hierarchical approach by the Appellate Body to the application of an “object and purpose” finds support in the 
“embedded” nature of the standard of review. Consequently, the standard of review and the object and purpose 
analysis work in tandem in a manner that is sensitive to the character of the exemption provision as tangential to the 
rule-exception framework of the GATT and subject to the distributive aspect of Parties’ collaborative intent 
according to the WTO Agreement. An open construction of exemption provisions satisfies both elements and 
provides a measure of rule-based transparency to its operation in the GATT 1994. 
                                                        
741 Although one may be tempted to read the ancient distinction between “logos” and “nomoi” (or between “persuasive reason” and “the 
laws”) in the application of the interpretative element “object and purpose” this is best resisted (in order to avoid Platonic Idealism altogether; see 
Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 [1945]). 
742 See Elizabeth Zoller, Le Bonne Foi en Droit International Public (Paris: A. Pédone, 1977), p. 74; quoted approvingly in Jan Klabbers, 
“Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties,” 8 The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 138 (1997), p. 145. 
743 A notion further supported in the Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy (1999), ¶81, where it held that “[i]n light of the interpretive 
principle of effectiveness, it is the duty of any treaty interpreter to ‘read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of 
them, harmoniously.’ An important corollary of this principle is that a treaty should be interpreted as a whole, and, in particular, its sections and 
parts should be read as a whole.” 
744 Hermann Kantorowicz, Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie (Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller, 1962 [1911]), cited in Anne van Aaken and Joel P. 
Trachtman, “Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior,” University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series No. 2015---08 (July 2015), p. 3, fn. 6. See also Andrew Jeffrey Spadafora, Freedom from Value Judgments: 




In order for the exemption provision to provide a measure of rational deference to locally optimal industrial policies, 
its open construction has to exhibit sensitivity to the demands of judicial construction in accordance with the DSU, 
at both the syntax level as well as in relation to the rule-exception structure of the GATT. Note that the concept of 
deference employed is distinct from a measure of policy “flexibility,” when envisioned as (sub-optimal) deviations 
from a uniform understanding of the cooperation in the GATT/WTO. Such policy flexibility deviations are 
traditionally understood in relation to ex post “contractual regret,”745 whereas deference refers to the rational policy 
heterogeneity associated with the ex ante condition of incomplete economic convergence within the Membership. 
 
Recognition of Member States’ economic conditions is thus central to the adjudicator when pursuing an open 
construction of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994. The embedded standard of review should allow the 
contextual interpretation of the language of exemption provisions of the GATT/WTO to enlighten the multilateral 
collaborative intent of the Membership, without prescribing a single directional “truth” to its terms. Differences 
between Member State cultural and (non-economic) consumptive preferences however fall outside the present scope 
of consideration and are better dealt with under exception provisions (as they presently are).746 
 
To facilitate a transparent and rule-based open construction of exemption provisions, I propose two distinct (though 
interrelated) methodological steps that aid the adjudicator to accomplish her task. 
 
First, the adjudicator must verify that the matter before her is indeed a “hard case.”747 Verification hereof 
entails a judicial assessment whereby “developmental” or “genuine” policies are distinguished from “commercial” 
or “opportunistic” preference conflicts. Should the contested policy fail to qualify as developmental, then the 
defendant cannot avail himself of the protection offered by the exemption clause. Instead, the matter should be 
                                                        
745 See, Simon A.B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the WTO: A Law and Economics Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 87 et seq. See also, C. Goetz and R. E. Scott, “Principles of Relational Contracts,” 67(2) Virginia Law Review 
1089 (1981). 
746 See, recently, the decision of the WTO Appellate Body, EC – Seal Products (2014); Among many comments in the literature, see recently, 
American Journal of International Law, Symposium on WTO EC – Seal Products Case (June 2015). 
747 This distinction, although different in character, is not unlike the one purposed by Schropp, whereby he separates those conflicts rooted in 
textual ambiguity from others pursuing an opportunistic extra-contractual breach. Simon A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement 
in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); “Tier one, an inner protective 
belt of contractual entitlements, is aimed at dealing with welfare-enhancing good faith trade disputes (that emerge due to contractual ambiguity, 
interpretative problems, or unintentional contract infringements), and at solving them in an amicable manner. Remedies at this stage are strictly 
commensurate to the damage caused. Tier two, the outer layer of protection, mandates punitive and collective punishment.” (p. 20). 
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addressed under the exception provisions, governed by the integrative aspect of the collaborative intent of the 
multilateral trade agreement. 
 
Instead of entering into a fully subjective assessment of the regulatory intent of the disputed measure, the GATT, in 
Article III:1 for example, favors an approach concerned with the economic effects thereof (“so as to afford”).748 
While the declared intent of the legislator can add color and shading,749 the economic effects of the contested policy 
measure elucidate the protectionist or Mercantilist character thereof. This approach finds further ground in the 
contextualized interpretative practice of the GATT/WTO (see Section B.2, infra), that favors reading terms of 
provisions considering the circumstances of the case; envisioned on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The Panel adjudicator cannot, furthermore, unilaterally opine on the applicable economic theory and effect, for the 
Appellate Body clarified it does “not believe that panels can base determinations as to what would occur in the 
marketplace only on their own intuition of what rational economic actors would do.” Instead, it “would expect that 
in such circumstances the panel would at least explain the economic rationale or theory that supports its intuition.”750 
Reliance on the use of the social sciences method of economics is however problematic, generally and when applied 
to exemption provisions specifically, if envisioned as capable of providing a fully neutral or “objective” response.  
 
As argued by Stiglitz and Ocampo, and as examined in Chapter 2, supra: “for an understanding of macroeconomic 
systems, the[] [macro-economic] identities need to be combined with an economic analysis of [the] determinants of 
the behavior of firms, households, and governments. Here is where the differences arise [between mature and 
developing markets]. The nature of the relationships between variables and the direction of causation (what 
determines what) are both a function of the setting and context.”751 This localization of dynamic economic effects is 
                                                        
748 The Appellate Body Report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (1996), clarifies that: “it is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended 
objective if the particular tax measure in question is nevertheless, to echo Article III:1, ‘applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production.’” (at 29). Confirmed by WTO Appellate Body Report, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages (1999), ¶61 f, 71; and in 
WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages (1999), ¶149.  
749 The Panel in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, noted that “the declared intention of legislators and regulators of the Member adopting the 
measure should not be totally disregarded.” (8.91) Similar allowances for regulatory intent were made by the Appellate Body in Chile – Alcoholic 
Beverages (1999), ¶71; and the Panel in Indonesia – Autos (1998), ¶14.115. 
750 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (2012), ¶643 (emphasis added). 
751 Joseph Stiglitz, Jose Antonio Ocampo, et al., Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization, and Development (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 52. 
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important to fully appreciate the difference between policies directed at “catch up” growth or those that betray a 
“commercial” (beggar-thy-neighbor) bend.  
  
The “developmental” component in question is anchored in the “nested” quality of the Product Space, which is at 
the center of “catch up” growth. Whereas the footprint of Member States in the Product Space is readily observable, 
its dynamic progress can be approached probabilistically for those lagging the technological frontier.752 Under 
limited and positively identifiable conditions, industrial policies can work to guide the economy toward 
beatificiation (the completion of its capacity set).753 In this way, modern complexity-inspired notions of industrial 
policies, such as those rooted in the Learning Society and Product Space geography, have come a long way from 
beneficiation to favor targeted “learning” and “capacity growth” over consumption-based output performance. 
 
It is worth recalling that similar observations were voiced by developing countries at the genesis of the GATT 1947, 
in particular highlighting the intellectual differences between a trade liberalization regime directed toward the 
expansion of trade volumes (expressed in the current interpretation of the GATT 1994 as a dedicated “free trade” 
instrument) and one committed to the expansion of production and product variety.754 (see Section D, infra). 
 
Second, upon verification that the matter before her qualifies as a “hard case” that references an exemption 
provision, the open construction of the provision and its terms invites her to accord a measure of deference to the 
implementing Member State when fitting the measure to the terms of the provision. To facilitate this part of the 
adjudicatory exercise, I propose a method whereby the appropriate measure of interpretative deference can be paid 
to the implementing Member State’s contested policy. 
 
                                                        
752 For Member States at the technological frontier, the remaining viable growth technological growth paradigm is incorporated in mature 
growth which operates its own probabilistic metric. 
753 See, in addition to Chapter 2, supra, Jose-Antonio Ocampo, “Dynamic Efficiency: Structural Dynamics and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries,” in Akbar Noman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Efficiency, Finance, and Varieties of Industrial Policy: Guiding Resources, 
Learning, and Technology for Sustained Growth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). 




In a coordination game between collaborative players with different preferences, it has been suggested in the 
literature that social norms,755 more specifically fairness norms,756 can act as focal points of the decision.757 
However, the problem in heterogeneous groups, at least in the short run, is that there may be multiple plausible 
fairness norms, which differ between the Parties in their primary salience (ex-ante normative disagreement), and this 
may lead to coordination failure.758 Instead, the adjudicator can moderate the collaborative problem among Parties 
with heterogeneous preferences through use of a public (or private) expressive759 signal or interpretative rule. 760 
 
The interpretative rule proposed is adopted from the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem. Oates’ Theorem on 
Decentralization holds that, in a Membership with heterogeneous preferences, the decentralization of certain 
functions increases welfare as a result of increased policy sensitivity and economic alignment at the lower level. 
“The basic point [of the Decentralization Theorem] is simply that the efficient level of output of a ‘local’ public 
good […] is likely to vary across jurisdictions as a result of both differences in preferences and cost differentials. To 
maximize overall social welfare thus requires that local outputs vary accordingly.”761 The Oates’ Theorem 
furthermore assumes (a) the absence of cost savings from centralization (including those generated by 
environmental and “market-preserving” forces) and (b) no inter-jurisdictional spillovers. 
 
The “functions” which the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem considers, are reflected in the GATT/WTO structure by 
analogy in three inter-related ways. The first function is provided by the GATT 1947 preamble as the “substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
                                                        
755 See for example, John N. Drobak, ed., Norms and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also Herbert Gintis, The 
Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) and Samuel Bowles 
and Herbert Gintis, A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
756 See Mark Bernard, Ernesto Reuben, and Arno Riedl, “Fairness and Coordination: The Role of Fairness Principles in Coordination Failure 
and Success,” Mimeo. Although inter-subjectivity is a fertile ground for normative theories, of fairness or otherwise, the argument here is not made 
dependent on such analysis and in fact abstracts from it in the international realm in favor theories of rational cooperation among sovereign states. 
See for a normative theory based on inter-subjectivity, Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, trns. Nidra Poller (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2005 [1972]); see further Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
757 See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and recently Therese 
Lindahl and Magnus Johannesson, “Bargaining Over a Common Good with Private Information,” 111 Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 547 
(2009). 
758 See, Mark Bernard, “Conflict, Cooperation and Coordination Essays in Game Theory and Experimental Economics,” Stockholm School 
of Economics, Dissertation (2012), p. 4. 
759 See, Richard H. McAdams, “The Expressive Power of Adjudication,” University of Illinois Law Review 1043 (2005); Richard H. 
McAdams, The Expressive Powers of Law: Theories and Limits (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
760 See, for example, Peer Zumbansen and Gralf-Peter Calliess, eds., Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2011). 
761 Wallace E. Oates, “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” 37(3) Journal of Economic Literature 1120 (1999), 1122.  
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commerce.” The second function is given by the WTO Agreement, such that economic endeavor should be directed 
at “expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, […] in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.” Third, the DSU postulates that the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO should work to provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. 
 
The embedded standard of review, as applicable to exemption provisions, should consider these three “functions” in 
calibrating the efficient level at which output is delivered. Or, in other words, the embedded standard of review for 
exemption provisions recognizes a considerable level of deference to the implementing Member State when fitting 
contested policies to the terms of the provision. In this way, the applicable standard of review implies the vertical 
allocation of power in a manner that finds the equilibrium between the rights and obligations conceded and retained 
by Member States in a way sensitive to local economic conditions. 
 
Crucially, such deference is subject to the two validity conditions of the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem: 
(a) The absence of centralized cost-saving is a fundamental notion in the GATT, operationalized through 
its core provisions on non-discrimination, national treatment, and tariffication, in light of the exception 
provisions of the GATT. Other aspects of centralized “cost-saving” include environmental and market 
preserving (or legitimate expectations reinforcing) measures. Examples of centralized cooperation on 
such measures include the Environmental Goods Agreement762 and the recent deliberations around the 
maintenance and security of international trade in the digital economy763. Cost–saving is furthermore 
supported by programs of technical assistance and the recent Trade Facilitation Agreement (“TFA”) 
(concluded at the 2014 Ninth Ministerial Conference at Bali).764 
(b) The “no jurisdictional spill-over” condition is central to the GATT/WTO. Spill-overs are however, 
logically, always present in an interconnected system of trade. As is often observed by Stiglitz, among 
others, “all trade policies have distributive impacts on the economy.” This implies that every 
                                                        
762 The Environmental Goods Agreement, will build on the commitment governmental leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) made to reduce tariffs on a list of 54 environmental goods by the end of 2015, by taking the next step of eliminating tariffs on these 54 
goods and expanding product coverage to include additional environmental technologies. See USTR, website: https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/other-initiatives/environmental-goods-agreement and the E15-Initiative, Climate Change (James Bacchus, Theme Leader), available 
at: http://e15initiative.org/themes/climate-change/. 
763 See, for instance, E15-Initiative, Digital Economy (Merit Janow, Theme Leader), available at: http://e15initiative.org/themes/digital-
economy/. 
764 WTO, Agreement on Trade Facilitation (15 July 2014), WT/L/931 
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interpretation given to the integral aspects – the rule-exception framework – of the GATT/WTO has 
distributional consequences in the economies of Member States. Consequently, the Oates’ Theorem of 
Decentralization, as adapted here, tests for the presence of those spill-overs that are “excessive,” carry 
beggar-thy-neighbor implications, or are zero-sum by design. 
 
The DSU does not explicitly set out a rule specifying who carries the burden of proof in Panel proceedings. The 
Appellate Body however recognized that the concept of a burden of proof is implicit in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. The Appellate Body has endorsed the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether 
complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defense.765 Panels and Appellate Body 
have confirmed this practice in relation to Article XX, XI:2(c)(i),766 and recently also in relation to Article XI:2(a) 
GATT 1994. 
 
However, while the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 could be read as an affirmative defense, 
with the implication that the burden of proof lies with the defendant, alternatively, its character as an exemption 
provision would “suggest that the complainant would have to show that a measure is a QR, in the sense of Article 
XI.1 of GATT, and is not a measure featured in Article XI.2 of GATT.”767 
 
The open construction of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, pursuant to the appropriate (multilateral) embedded standard 
of review, and ensuing deferential interpretation according to the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem formulate a yard 
stick against which to interpret the burden of proof.768 The deference called for when fitting the contested policy to 
the terms of the provision switches the burden of proof to the complainant, in accordance with character of the 
provision as an exemption, but mitigates this switch by postulating two positive conditions that the defendant must 
meet to rely on Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
                                                        
765 See, WTO Appellate Body Report, US —- Wool Shirts and Blouses (1997). 
766 See, WTO, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 10, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c10s6p1_e.htm (last visited, April 6, 2017). 
767 Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 140. 
768 Such “yard stick” is an expression of persuasive reasoning, rather than a strict “burden of proof” as familiar in civil and criminal cases in 
the domestic context; see, John Barcelo III, “Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Case, and Presumption in WTO Dispute Settlement,” 42 Cornell 
International Law Journal 23 (2009); see also, David Unterhalter, “Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings,” 42 
Cornell International Law Journal 209 (2009); and Joost Pauwelyn, “Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement,” 1 Journal of 




2. Contextual Interpretation 
 
When fitting contested policies to the terms of the exemption provision, the multilateral standard of review draws 
most heavily on the interpretative element of “context,” ex Article 31(1) VCLT, for its application. The adjudicator 
needs to be continuously mindful of having reference to the VCLT and the associated doctrinal constraints, so as not 
to violate the two other teleologies of Kantorowicz’ triptych (doctrine and normative, in addition to sociological). In 
this sense, the adjudicator can find refuge in the reports of the Appellate Body where it, more than once, held that 
the ordinary meaning of terms “must be ascertained according to the particular circumstances of each case.”769, 770 
 
Accordingly, the Permanent Court of International Justice confirmed that “meaning is not to be determined merely 
upon particular phrases which, if detached from the context, may be interpreted in more than one sense.”771 The 
proper approach to framing relevant “context,” ex Article 31 VCLT, so it held is textual as well as con-textual. In 
the process of according meaning to the language of exemption provisions, I favor explicit recognition of the 
economic conditions of the challenged Member State, such that increased transparency can be brought to the 
construction of covered terms. 
 
As Koskenniemi however notes, the fundamental unity of the interpretative labor means that any identification of 
the “ordinary meaning” is itself already contextualized.772 Inclusion of the “context” as an interpretative element 
merely serves as positive reinforcement and validation of what is otherwise naturally done.773 A hermeneutic 
preference774 to have recourse first to internal inference before turning to interpretative elements that are technically 
                                                        
769 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶175; see similarly WTO Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) 
(2001), ¶5.51. 
770 Similarly, the Appellate Body drew on the factual context to elucidate the meaning of terms in EC – Chicken Cuts; WTO Appellate Body 
Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶148. 
771 Permanent Court of International Justice, Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour, P.C.I.J. (1922), Series B, No. 2-3, p. 
23. 
Martii Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp. 333-334, where he notes the ordinary meaning of term “assumes what has to be proved.” 
773 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke 
University Press 1989). 
774 See for substantiation of this preference for instance, Georges Abi-Saab, “The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation,” in Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris, eds., Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010). 
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external to the instrument is thus fatally pretentious.775 This pretense in the methodology, which artfully separates 
“social theory” from “legal doctrine,” is uncovered by the deconstructive exercise that shows that ultimate recourse 
to power (making law apologetic) or to norms (making law utopian) is necessary to complete the interpretative 
exercise.  
 
As in the above, I resist this powerful critique by Koskenniemi by emphasizing the adjudicator’s understanding of 
the irreducible desire of Parties to collaborate, as reflected in the preamble and provisions of the agreement. In fact, 
where Koskenniemi separates social theory from legal doctrine, Kantorowicz adds a third element of consideration 
in the normative obligation to construe the GATT/WTO in good faith to safeguard the security and predictability of 
the multilateral trading system. The relationship between the adjudicator and the collaborative intent, her 
“understanding” of the GATT 1994, requires of her to engage positively with the teleological demands of 
sociology/economics. Article 3.2 DSU consequently delivers her the means to do so in the customary rules of 
international law on interpretation – the VCLT. 
 
As with any component of Kantorowicz’ triptych, the adjudicator’s engagement with the sociological/economic 
teleology of the GATT/WTO requires the contextual interpretation of the terms of the provision to adopt the breadth 
of the embedded standard of review. In other words, if the multilateral standard of review favors an open or broad 
construction of the provision in light of its object and purpose, then the contextual interpretation should initially be 
equally open or broad. This initial condition is of course further moderated by the other interpretative elements of 
Article 31 VCLT and share the stage with the doctrinal and normative constraints that rest on the interpreter. 
 
The Appellate Body fruitfully obliges the adjudicator in reading the terms of any provision contextually. In its report 
in US – Large Aircraft (Second Complaint) the Appellate Body held, as noted, that when the Panel makes a 
determination as to what would happen in the “marketplace,”776 it expects that the “panel would at least explain the 
                                                        
775 Lauterpracht similarly recognized that a tribunal’s interpretative method may have little more to offer than an ex post justification or facade 
for an interpretative outcome reached on other grounds, in Hersch Lauterpracht, “Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties,” British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 26 (1949), noting that “[a]s a rule ... [the rules of interpretation] are not the 
determining cause of judicial decisions, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means.” (p. 53) 
776 Note that the “marketplace” is a central notion in the application of the headline provisions of the GATT, such as Article III GATT on 
non-discrimination, that does not go uncontested; see Christian A. Melischek, The Relevant Market in International Economic Law: A Comparative 
Antitrust and GATT Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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economic rationale or theory that supports its intuition.”777 As one would expect from any legal decision, the choice 
of theory and fact cannot be led by intuition alone, but must be reasoned and argued. In line with the embedded 
standard of review applicable to the provision, I argue for conditional deference to the implementing Member State 
in construing exemption provisions. 
 
Note that although the choice for the “marketplace” as an original focus of analysis is itself highly problematic, it is 
the reigning adjudicatory concept within the GATT for “real world” references.778 Reference to the “real world,” 
“market place,” or other economic ontology derives its relevance to the interpretation of provisions under the 
GATT/WTO from the importance of “the particular circumstances of each case.”779 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, supra, and argued in the above, a developmental approach to fitting a contested policy to the 
terms of the provision need not result in degradation of regime predictability. A good faith application of the 
economic notion of “nestedness,” which is at the core of the Product Space, allows the for a probabilistic assessment 
of the “commercial” or “developmental” nature of the policy. 
 
 
3. Good Faith Construction 
 
In the application of the object and purpose and context analysis, the WTO adjudicator is torn between the nature of 
international customary law, which tends to follow reality (in degrees of mimicry), and the treaty language, which 
stands in permanent tension to the passing of time and changing (economic) conditions.780 It is in recognition of this 
bridging function between the dynamism of (economic) reality and the intractable nature of treaty language that the 
ILC stresses the roots of bona fides in effective treaty interpretation.781 
                                                        
777 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (2012), ¶643. 
778 See, Christian A. Melischek, The Relevant Market in International Economic Law: A Comparative Antitrust and GATT Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
779 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶175; see similarly WTO Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) 
(2001), ¶5.51. 
780 See, Christina Binder, “Die Grenzen der Vertragstreue im Volkerrecht,” in Beitrage zum auslandischen offentlichten Recht und 
Volkerrecht, Band 245, Max Planck Institut (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2013), p. 617, where she refers in particular to the “legalization” 
(Verrechtlichung) of the necessity defense: shifting from “necessity knows no law” to a strictly construed “law of necessity.” 





The WTO adjudicator is tasked with the “objective” assessment of the matter before her, ex Article 11 of the DSU. 
This “objectivity” extends to and governs her use “good faith” as an interpretative element ex Article 3.2 DSU and 
Article 31 VCLT. Koskenniemi, however, finds that the interpreter’s subjective intent trumps her understanding of 
any applicable notion of objective good faith, because: “[a]ppealing to principles which would pre-exist man and be 
discoverable only through faith or recta ratio [is] to appeal to abstract and unverifiable maxims which only 
camouflage[] the subjective preferences of the speaker.”782 The motivation to adopt any interpretation would, 
according to Koskenniemi, be found in the interpreter’s appreciation of real world power balances or of a particular 
inspirational utopia. 
 
Here again I resist Koskenniemi and subscribe to an objective approach to good faith put forward by the Appellate 
Body, in so far as the doctrine is rooted in the obligation to accord an “effective” interpretation to the provisions of 
the WTO covered agreements.783 Objective good faith, as applied in the GATT 1994, allows the adjudicator to 
extend her understanding of the collaborative object and purpose beyond the language of the provision to inquire 
into the “effects” or economic reality to which the term refers in the matter before the adjudicator. Objective good 
faith, as an element of interpretation, thus serves to bridge the gap between letter and reality, as the ILC intended. 
 
In her effort to discern the balance of the rights and obligations, the adjudicator is aided by objective good faith to 
maintain the systemic collaboration of Members States.784 The inter-subjectivity of Parties’ collaborative intent 
propagates the existence of the agreement and shapes the conditions for its meaning attribution, which objective 
good faith allows the interpreter to understand. The doctrine of good faith should objectively anchor Parties’ desire 
to achieve mutually beneficial, rational collaboration through participation in a system of international (economic) 
law, based on full reciprocity. The interpreter’s understanding of the treaty, set within an interpretational framework, 
gives weight and content to the (ordinary) meaning of the terms of the agreement – not her subjective interaction 
                                                        
782 Martii Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law,” 1 European Journal of International Law 4 (1990), p 5; see also Martii 
Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later,” 20 European Journal of International Law 7 (2009). 
783 Howse argues that the WTO’s institutional structure furthermore favors the construction of objective expectations over the parties’ 
subjective intent, in Robert Howse, “The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial 
Power,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for 
the WTO (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), p. 11. 
784 See similarly, Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Fundamental Principles of International Law,” in 87 Recueil des Cours 270 (1955, vol II). 
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with a Member’s disappointed expectations of a particular benefit. Objective good faith thus also allows the 
adjudicator to adopt the systemic “cooperation in me” rather than the “cooperation for me.”  
 
Koskenniemi however argues, in the context of an international law that is perennially over- and under-
legitimizing,785 that a reconciliation of competing deep-axioms is ultimately impossible. Consequently, there does 
not emerge any one criterion for “legality” beyond the “political.” In this sense, the political is properly conceived as 
“the principle which predictably resolves […] indeterminacy in legal practice”786 and does so by “demonstrat[ing] 
the emergence and operation of structural bias.”787  Adjudicative bodies are empowered (and instructed) by the 
“politics of redefinition, that is, the strategic definition of a situation or problem by reference to a technical idiom so 
as to open the door for applying the expertise related to that idiom, together with the attendant structural bias.”788  
 
While I take particular issue with any framing of preference heterogeneity in the Membership as external to the 
functionality and legitimacy of the GATT/WTO rules, I expect to agree with Koskenniemi if he were to point out 
that the provisions of the GATT/WTO and its jurisprudence are replete with structural biases. Problematically, this 
realization can point to a differentiation between function and aspiration in any approach to the WTO covered 
agreements, and seems to immediately invoke a political way of legitimizing or criticizing state behavior. This 
deductive structure and its apologist consequences are however not inescapable. 
 
Sourgens points out though that instead of deductively organizing the discourse of international law, deriving 
validity from the battle of propositional syllogisms, the grammar of international law could operate inductively, 
taking full advantage of its very non-monotonicity789 as it disrupts the deductive exercise. By positioning 
international law as an inductive process, Sourgens argues that persuasive reasoning relies upon overlap of multiple 
sources of validation.790  
                                                        
785 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), “it is overlegitimizing as it can be ultimately invoked to justify any behavior (apologism), it is underlegitimizing because incapable of 
providing a convincing argument on the legitimacy of any practices (utopianism).” (p. 67) 
786 Frederic Sourgens, “Reconstructing International Law as Common Law,” 47 The George Washington International Law Review 101 
(2015), p. 129. 
787 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 65. 
788 Id., p. 67. 
789 Non-monotonictiy is here understood as the nature of a system that is fundamentally open to diversity and context, rather than have 
conclusions proceed monotonically; i.e. without the ability to be influenced by external operators. 
790 Frederic Sourgens, “Reconstructing International Law as Common Law,” 47 The George Washington International Law Review 101 




Instead of offering a unitary truth, the core goal of international law conceived of inductively lies in the “protection 
of the legitimate differences in interest, experience, and perspective of the subjects international law intends to 
govern.”791 Sourgens protects his Mercurial “good faith”-principle from desolving back into the political by virtue of 
its ability to fundamentally recognize diversity and tolerate duality.792 Deakin,793 arguing similarly, highlights how a 
common law approach to adjudication and interpretation allows a system of law to retain its “cognitive openness,” 
or its responsiveness to a variety of economic and political signals. 
 
This inductive form of interpretative good faith operates much in line with the conceptualization of the ILC and 
operationalization by the Appellate Body, with the added – but crucial – ability to recognize the non-monotonicity 
of the “real world” or “market place” and allowing the interpreter to bring that duality to the text of the 
agreement.794 By placing the notion of “viability”795 central to the good faith application of object and purpose and 
contextual interpretation, the multilateral trading system can accommodate a diverse and heterogeneous Membership 
without recourse to concepts of “power” and “utopia” precisely because of its duality.796 
 
 
4. The Ordinary Meaning of Exemptions 
 
As argued throughout, words first receive the contours of their meaning from the interpreter’s understanding of the 
object and purpose of the communicative instrument. The linguistic and grammatical context in which words are 
used provides an immediate control on meaning attribution. Article 3.2 of the DSU sets further hermeneutical 
                                                        
791 Id., p. 102. 
792 Whereas there is no single measure or method of establishing “good faith” this is not considered self-defeating, instead, this multiplicity 
of form prevents a trivialization of difference or the domestication of the “Other.” “Instead of defining difference as “violation” of a pre-ordained 
normative order, international law takes the radically opposite approach of placing difference at the center of its normative process.” See Frederic 
Sourgens, “Reconstructing International Law as Common Law,” 47 The George Washington International Law Review 101 (2015), pp. 152-153; 
See also Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2003), trans. Nidra Poller. 
793 Simon Deakin, “Law as Evolution, Evolution as Social Order: Common Law Method Reconsidered,” Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge, Working Paper N. 43/2015 (August 2015). 
794 Frederic Sourgens, “Reconstructing International Law as Common Law,” 47 The George Washington International Law Review 101 
(2015), p. 153. 
795 Justin Lin, Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy, and Viability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); see 
for the impact of a “getting tough on trade” attitude, with which Alice Amsden credits the Second American Empire, Alice Amsden, Escape From 
Empire: The Developing World’s Journey Through Heaven and Hell (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), p. 11. 
796 See more generally, Ulf Linderfalk, “Good Faith and the Exercise of Treaty-Based Discretionary Powers,” (2016), on file with author. 
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boundaries to the “objective” assessment by the adjudicatory of the matter before her (Article 11 DSU). The process 
by which the adjudicator applies the appropriate standard of review to the agreement and its provisions in turn 
receives its color and texture from the interpreter’s approach to the three elements of Kantorowicz’ triptych, set 
against her understanding of the collaborative intent of Parties. 
 
Orwell famously implored the author/interpreter to “let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way 
about.”797 However, even in a “culture of formalism”798 one cannot positively ascertain the meaning of a term 
without first examining the object and purpose of the commitment at hand, read in good faith and with reference to 
the context of the total agreement. Textualism, as a theory of judicial interpretation, can therefore be only one 
among many methodological topoi.799 It is most usefully employed to constrain the range of possible meanings that 
can reasonably be attributed to the choice of words ex post – not, however, as a dispositive indexation mechanism of 
the range of ex ante possible meanings.800  
 
The interpreter is however further constrained in her efforts at persuasive reasoning: first through her implied 
deference to genuine policy preference heterogeneity among the Membership (embedded standard of review), 
second through her understanding of the factual and legal context (contextual interpretation and good faith), and 
third by the doctrinal and normative demands of the treaty (Kantorowicz). 
 
                                                        
797 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, eds., The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters 
of George Orwell; In Front of Your Nose, 1945-1950 (Vol. 4) (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), p. 138; in Petros C. Mavroidis, “No Outsourcing 
of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts,” 102 American Journal of International Law 421 (2008), p. 447. 
798 Martii Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 502–509; the culture of formalism serves as an interpretative safeguard to preserve the communicative audience, or 
epistemological body of international law, against the destructive effects of Koskenniemi’s de-construction thereof; see Jason Beckett, “‘Rebel 
Without a Cause?’ Martti Koskenniemi and the Critical Legal Project,” 7 German Law Review 1045 (2006), p. 1070. 
799 Herman Philipse, “Antonin Scalia’s Textualism in Philosophy, Theology, and Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution,” 3(2) Utrecht 
Law Review 169 (2007). 
800 As Scalia and Garner point out “it should not be forgotten that not all colloquial meanings appropriate to particular contexts are to be found 




The art of adjudicative interpretation remains, even in most modern guises of positivist formalism,801 primarily 
concerned with persuasion802 through acceptable forms of reason and argument.803 When Panels or the Appellate 
Body engage in a constructive exercise, fitting a contested domestic policy to the terms of a provision, its efforts at 
preserving the rights and obligations of the Member States are accordingly best envisioned as a function of the 
adjudicator’s understanding of Parties’ multilateral systemic collaboration, or her (objective) good faith 
understanding of collaboration “in” me. 
 
C. Safeguarding Security and Predictability 
 
The interpretational process of exemption provisions by the WTO adjudicator consists conceptually of two 
elements: (i) delineating exemption provisions from relevant headline rules and exceptions thereto according to the 
applicable standard of review (see Section A, supra); and (ii) according appropriate meaning to the terms of the 
exemption provision, in line with its object and purpose (see Section B, supra). This process of interpretation is, as I 
have argued in the above, only part of the adjudicatory exercise of construction.  
 
As analyzed, Koskenniemi finds the contours of judicial construction in his conception of power and Utopia, which 
he constraints by the application of “cultures of formalism” in the judicial labor. I however argue that the contours 
of judicial construction instead emanate from the adjudicator’s understanding of the collaborative intent of Parties. 
This understanding of the adjudicator is subsequently constrained in application to the judicial decision through each 
of the three elements of Kantorowicz’ triptych of teleologies: normative, doctrinal and sociological. 
 
Whereas in the previous sections I argue how the sociological element of the triptych should feature in the judicial 
construction and interpretation of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994, this section address the normative 
                                                        
801 See, for instance, Jorg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, eds., International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), where they note that “[m]odern forms of international legal positivism, instead, celebrate the role of politics in 
international reality and, indeed, international legal practice even where they separate the realms of politics and scholarship.” (pp. 6-7). As pointed 
out earlier, this work does not embrace the deconstruction of the experience of international law, but instead grounds its interpretative framework 
in the rational, cooperative realization of the shared norm of social welfare optimization. 
802 Fish emphasizes that validation hinges on the recipient epistemic community, in Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, 
Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press 1989), pp. 488–491. 
803 See, for example, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); see also Joseph Raz, “Engaging Reason: On the 
Theory of Value and Action,” in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson and Thomas W. Pogge, eds., Rights, Culture and the Law – Themes from the 
Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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teleological constraint on the adjudicator. Article 3.2 of the DSU instructs the adjudicator to acknowledge the 
dispute settlement system as a “central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system.” The adjudicator is thus obliged to apply his judicial labor in a manner that (1) safeguards the predictability 




The relationship between the WTO adjudicator and the Membership is characterized by an agent-principle dynamic, 
where the adjudicator “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements” 
(Article 3.2 DSU). In fact, by reserving the right of “authentic” interpretation to the Membership, the WTO 
Agreement squarely confines WTO dispute resolution bodies to the “judicial” interpretation of the covered 
agreements. 
 
Predictability in WTO dispute resolution is a normative virtue of the adjudicator and works to legitimize the 
adjudicatory decision. It is therefore crucial for the adjudicator to provide the utmost transparency as she fits a 
contested domestic policy to the terms of the covered agreement. The predictability at the core of the judicial 
application of the rules and regulations of the WTO, as reserved for the WTO-adjudicator, is closely related to the 
formal aspects of the rule of law. Importantly, the rule of law dictates predictability of process in decision making 
and transparency of reasoning, not a predictability of outcome.804 The World Bank similarly observes that “a 
judiciary independent from both government intervention and influence by the parties in a dispute provides the 
single greatest institutional support for the rule of law.”805, 806  
                                                        
804 Note that the Appellate Body in its Report in US –Stainless Steel (Mexico) (2008) concluded that ensuring security and predictability in 
the dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same 
legal question in the same way in a subsequent case (¶160). That this does not guarantee (or even imply) a predictability of outcome is clear by the 
condition “absent cogent reasons” – instead, the AB emphasizes the importance of persuasive reasoning; a core aspect of the predictability of 
process in decision making. 
805 World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2002), p. 129. See 
also, Steve Charnovitz, “Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization,” in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare Romano and Ruth 
Mackenzie, eds., International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 
806 The independence of the WTO judiciary has not seriously been challenged and is enshrined in the WTO Rules of Conduct. Although the 
expertise and ability of individual adjudicators has, at times, been criticized, the independence of the Appellate Body and Panels from political 
influence went broadly accepted. Note though that the judicial branch of the WTO is governed by the DRB, which adopts reports by (negative) 
consensus and upon which Member States sit. It is however only after the reports are circulated that review by the board allows Member States to 
express their view (Articles 16.4 and 17.14 DSU). In May 2016, the United States however moved to unilaterally block the reappointment of a 
South Korean Appellate Body member. In an open letter of May 31, 2016, 13 former Appellate Body members expressed grave concern about the 




The independence of the judiciary from political influence, irrespective of its manifestation (internal as well as 
external to her decision), and its commitment to the formal aspects of the rule of law are important to achieve 
predictability of process. I however caution against a wholesale adoption and application of the substantive aspects 
of the “rule of law”-concept as propagated by the World Bank as it remains susceptible to the arguments associated 
with critical legal studies (CLS).807 
 
The constructive critique put forward in this work targets the methodology of applied reasoning in judicial decision 
making; the associated concept of predictability thus implicates the predictability of process. The Appellate Body, in 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, describes the demands on the adjudicator set forth by Article 3.2 DSU in clear 
connection to the economic circumstances of each case:  
 
“WTO rules are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting 
the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They [the WTO 
rules] will serve the multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that [the circumstances of 
each case] in mind. In that way, we will achieve the ‘security and predictability’ sought for the multilateral 
trading system by the Members of the WTO through the establishment of the dispute settlement system.”808 
 
In US – Section 301 Trade Act the Panel connects the protection of the security and predictability of the multilateral 
trading system to the functioning “of the market-place and its different operators.”809 This alignment of the 
multilateral trading system with the functioning of the marketplace focusses the attention of the adjudicator squarely 
on the economic theories and preferences she chooses to adopt and let inform her understanding of optimal cause 
and effect in the marketplace. The Appellate Body, from an interpretational perspective, also demanded as much 
from the Panel, noting it “would expect that in such circumstances the panel would […] explain the economic 
rationale or theory that supports its intuition.”810 
 
                                                        
807 See, for instance, Katharina Pistor, Antara Haldar, and Amrit Amirapu, “Social Norms, Rule of Law, and Gender Reality,” in James J. 
Heckman, Robert L. Nelson, and Lee Cabatingan, Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law (London: Routledge, 2010). 
808 WTO Appellate Body Reports, Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II (1996), p. 31 (emphasis added). 
809 WTO Panel Report, US – Section 301 Trade Act (1999), ¶ 7.75. 
810 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (2012), ¶643. 
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The choice for economic ontology to understand the working of the marketplace is,811 as agued, a non-neutral choice 
when fitting domestic policies to the text of the multilateral agreement. It is a choice that must be supported by 
“basic” reasoning.812 Appropriately, the obligations of Article 3.2 DSU have furthermore been read by the Appellate 
Body in consonance with those of Article 12.7 DSU. This combined reading clarifies the obligation of the 
adjudicator to provide “basic” reasoning, i.e. engage in persuasive reasoning, as a function of the predictability of 
multilateral trading regime.813 
 
The Appellate Body further characterized the maintenance of the security and predictability of the multilateral 
trading system as an object and purpose of the WTO Agreement generally, as well as of the GATT in particular.814 
The “security and predictability” of the multilateral trading system is, according to the Appellate Body, clearly 
rooted in the circumstances of each case and serves the reasoned interpretation of the rules and regulation of the 
GATT as an expression of the “object and purpose” thereof. 
 
The argued deference required of an adjudicator when fitting contested policies to the terms of an exemption 
provision, in light of the applicable standard of review, is therefore naturally constrained by the object and purpose 
thereof. As Oesch furthermore points out, “Panel deference in well-chosen circumstances and towards subject-
matters which predominantly constitute national policy perogatives does not necessarily contradict the promotion of 
the rule of law. A deferential standard of review in certain circumstances can itself become part of the system, either 
                                                        
811 Note that the adjudicator has to guard against automatically rooting her choice for economic ontology in the tradition of “embedded” (neo-
)liberalism, where the power of the (international) price mechanism to universally achieve weak Pareto optimal market outcomes by inducing static 
allocative efficiency is expressed in the GATT/WTO through the protection of the legitimate expectations of Parties as to the conditions of 
competition. See, Panel Reports, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶¶7.442-7.444; further cited in approval in Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare 
Earth (2014), ¶¶5.186, 5.189. Note also, that the legitimate expectations that are protected are those of certain “competitive” or liberal market 
conditions; not, as we have seen, expectations of actual economic outcomes or trade flows; See, John Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism and the 
Postwar Economic Regimes,” in Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998); see also, 
Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and Fair 
Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006). See furthermore, Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks, eds., Legitimate Expectations in the 
Common Law World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017). 
812 See, Peter-Tobias Stoll, “Article 3 DSU,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, and Karen Kaiser, eds., WTO – Institutions and Dispute 
Settlement – Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2006); noting that “[a]t this point, it because 
clear that the multilateral trading system, although based on intergovernmental institutions and agreements, at least indirectly takes into 
consideration the real world of markets, traders and their needs and expectations.” (p. 286) 
813 WTO Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US) (2001) noting that: “Article 12.7 also furthers the objectives, 
expressed in Article 3.2 of the DSU, of promoting security and predictability in the multilateral trading system and of clarifying the existing 
provisions of the covered agreements, because the requirement to provide “basic” reasons contributes to other WTO Members’ understanding of 
the nature and scope of the rights and obligations in the covered agreements.” (¶ 107) 
814 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC — Computer Equipment (1998), ¶ 82. As such, application of the object and purpose to maintain the 
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system to domestic policies extends not only to present trade flows, but also incorporates 
concern for the system’s “security and predictability needed to conduct future trade; see WTO Appellate Body Report, US — Corrosion-Resistant 
Steel Sunset Review (2003), ¶ 82. 
199 
 
by explicit stipulation in the legal texts or developed by case law. Then, it does not, if applied consistently and in a 




The Panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act explicitly recognized the provision of security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system as a central object and purpose of the system and thus of the adjudicatory labor. While 
“predictability,” in terms of meeting the demands set by rule of law, carries the most weight for the adjudicator, the 
implied focus of the system on the marketplace and its participants (firms) identifies the realm of “security” 
concerns in Article 3.2. DSU.  
 
Providing “security” to the multilateral trading system at the level of market-participants is closely related to the 
exercise of “good faith” in recognizing the legitimate expectations as to the “conditions of competition”816   – 
including the principle of non-discrimination. As Panizzon observes, “[t]he principle of protecting legitimate 
expectations ensures that the level of negotiated reductions of trade barriers is not offset by actions consistent with 
positive rights and obligations, but inconsistent with the overall level of multilaterally negotiated liberalization 
commitments.”817 In this way the “security” of the international trading system is enhanced. 
 
At times, the Appellate Body has favored an understanding of the “legitimate expectations” inherent to the 
multilateral trading system that furthered trade liberalization over competing normative preferences.818 This critique 
                                                        
815 Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 32-33. 
816 See, GATT Panel Report, Italy–Agricultural Machinery (1958); GATT Panel Report US–Taxes on Petroleum (Superfund) (1987), ¶5.1.9; 
and the WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan–Alcohol (1996), p 32 (see also WTO Panel Report, Japan–Alcohol (1996), ¶¶7.1-7.2). The WTO 
Panel Report, India–Patents (1997), ¶¶7.20-7.22 and fn. 81-84, declared it is a “well-established GATT principle” and provides a list of cases using 
legitimate expectations as a GATT-specific substantive principle protecting the conditions of competition. See for the development of the concept 
of substantive legitimate expectations in the common law, Mark Elliott, “From Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate Expectations in 
English Public Law,” Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper No. 5/2016 (January 2016). 
817 Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and 
Fair Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 128. 
818 See, for example,  WTO Appellate Body Report Australia –Subsidy (2005); the GATT Panel Report, EEC – Oilseeds (1990); the WTO 
Panel Report, Korea – Procurement (2000), and WTO Panel Report, India – Patents (1997), See further Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the 
Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and Fair Dispute Settlement (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008), pp. 370-371. See critical of that conclusion, Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance 
by Judiciary,” 27(1) European Journal of International Law 9 (2016), p. 33, where he observes that in the Appellate Body in its report in EC – 
Computer Equipment (1998) and India – Patents (1997) “rejected the pro-liberalizing doctrine that WTO commitments should be read in light of 
the legitimate or reasonable expectations of those seeking the benefit of liberalizing disciplines.” Howse however concentrates on the use of 
legitimate expectations as an interpretation method, rather than as a constraining factor in the judicial construction as emphasized in this section. 
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however should not be construed so as to argue for discriminatory policies – the best industrial policies do not 
include picking winners – rather it stems from the realization that market supporting institutions (should) vary 
within the heterogeneous Membership and unilateral expectations of the conditions for/of competition need not be 
decisive.819 
 
In providing “security” to the multilateral trading system, the decision maker should not find a back-door to 
implement her vision of the appropriate balance between “power” and “utopia”. Market participants’ legitimate 
expectations and the security of the multilateral trading system are inextricably linked, but should not work to 
frustrate the case-by-case analysis in hard cases. 
 
The institutions that support market participants achieve a satisfactory equilibrium or enact a transaction are not 
singular, nor are they uniform or time-invariant.820 The inductive reasoning that is central to the case-by-case 
analysis, and demanded from the adjudicator in “hard cases,” instructs a measure of interpretative deference to the 
implemented policy. In the absence of normative homogeneity, excessive spill-over effects, and without 
centralization gains, the modified Oates’ Theorem of Decentralization emphasizes the optimality of interpretative 
deference and policy devolution. 
 
As the adjudicator provides “security” to the multilateral trading system, she balances her perception of the 
“legitimate expectations” of market participants with the structural preference heterogeneity of the Membership. 
This process of interpretative balancing should be subjugated to the demands of predictability of process and the 
discipline of providing cogent reasons. In light of the time-inconsistency and preference heterogeneity of the 
multilateral Membership, an approach to “security” that favors predictability of outcome should be avoided; on 
ethical and logical grounds.  
 
In providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system it is clear that multilateralism is a boon: 
providing legitimacy and the highest level of trade in and production of goods and services. The open construction 
                                                        
819 See, Petros C. Mavroidis, “Come Together? Producer Welfare, Consumer Welfare, and WTO Rules,” in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., 
Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
820 See Chapter 2, supra. 
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of exemption provisions provides a methodology to the adjudicator to support multilateralism, through a theory of 
contextual interpretation that emphasizes the adjudicator’s ability to enforce Parties’ systemic collaborative intent. 
 
D. Developmental Exception 
 
In the words of Keck and Low, “the battle to establish the principle that a set of uniform multilateral rights and 
obligations among a deeply diverse set of nations could not serve the best interests of all parties”821 has been won a 
long time ago. In this sense, multilateral international economic collaboration implies, in the ideal, that policies are 
set and provisions interpreted in the understanding that “national efforts [at development] can fully succeed at the 
global level only if they are complemented by international [collaboration] designed at gradually overcoming the 
basic [economic] asymmetries of the global order.”822 
 
The open construction of exemption provisions, following application of the multilateral standard of review, aims to 
contribute to this goal by stressing the importance of rational sociological preference heterogeneity among the 
Membership. In the context of the GATT 1994, these sociological varieties have an explicit economic character, 
emanating from the preferred economic growth framework of Member States. I thus cannot agree with Hoekman 
where, in a discussion on “safety valves” in the WTO, he groups as “noneconomic objectives” policies serving such 
concerns as public health, national security, and the protection of vulnerable industries.823 The classification of 
concerns for the industrial structure of an economy as “noneconomic” can only make sense in a strong version of the 
mature growth theory (see Chapter 2, supra, which explains that under the “inflating balloon”-theory of mature 
growth the structure of an economy is a resultant endogenous variable only). 
 
                                                        
821 Alexander Keck and Patrick Low, “Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How?,” in Simon Evenett and Bernard 
Hoekman, eds., Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2006), p. 147. 
822 Jose Antonio Ocampo, “Rethinking Global Economic and Social Governance,” 1:1 Journal of Globalization and Development 1 (2010), 
p. 9. See also, Jose Antonio Ocampo, “Globalisation and the Development Agenda,” in Jan Joost Teunissen and Age Akkerman, Diversity in 
Development Reconsidering the Washington Consensus (The Hague: Fondad, 2004). 
823 Hoekman notes “[t]here are three types of provisions in this connection: (a) articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain 
noneconomic objectives; […] category (a) includes provisions allowing for policies to protect public health or national security and to protect 
industries that are seriously injured by competition from imports.” Bernard Hoekman, “The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles,” in Bernard 
Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, and Philip English, eds., Development, Trade and the WTO (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2002), p. 44. 
202 
 
The protection of vulnerable industries has played a prominent role throughout the various negotiation rounds over 
the life of the GATT 1947 and again, in different ways, under the WTO covered agreements. This section will first 
summarily examine Special and Differential Treatment (SDT), a GATT/WTO program aimed at creating non-
reciprocal policy space for developing countries.824 At the collapse of the Doha-Round, the SDT-program was 
reincarnated in the Monitoring Mechanism. Thereafter, I will examine Article XVIII:C GATT 1994, as it provides a 
“developmental exception,” which conceptually shares constructive similarities with exception provisions, while 
substantively gravitating toward the notion of an exemption for industrial policy. Examination of Article XVIII:C 
GATT 1994 is especially relevant in light of the Appellate Body’s report in India – Quantitative Restrictions, where 
it distanced itself from political compromises concluded in WTO special committees (directly referencing balance of 
payment issues under Article XVIII:B GATT), implicating the role and function of the Monitoring Mechanism. 
 
1. Special and Differential Treatment 
 
The 1973 Ministerial Declaration explicates that the Tokyo Round negotiation’s aim was to “secure additional 
benefits for the international trade of developing countries so as to achieve a substantial increase in their foreign 
exchange earnings, the diversification of their exports, [and] the acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade, 
taking into account their development needs […].”825 
 
Whereas the liberalization agreements that were the subject of negotiations during the Tokyo Round were held 
intentionally optional - and most developing countries decided against participation therein - the mood had turned at 
Uruguay. Indeed, the preamble to the WTO Agreement stresses Member State’s desire to contribute to the growth of 
international trade and economic development “by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements 
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international trade relations.” 
                                                        
824 Note that the WTO distinguishes six categories of SDT. The Secretariat produced a number of studies relating to mandatory and non-
mandatory SDT provisions (WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.1); a review of mandatory special and differential treatment provisions 
(WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.2), non-mandatory SDT provisions (WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3), information on the utilization of SDT 
provisions (WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4). See for an overview of the SDT and the general system of preferences, including discussion of the 
Appellate Body Report in EC – Tariff Preferences (2004), Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), 
Section 5.2 et seq. 





While in the 1980s and 1990s (international) economic law lost most of its active instrumental value under pressure 
of the (Modified) Washington Consensus,826 during the 1950s and 1960s post-colonial economic development 
focused on the industrialization of “traditional” societies through active – and often invasive - management of the 
economy by the state.827  At the time of pre-Uruguay Round tariff negotiations, developing countries were pre-
occupied with the pursuit of import-substitution industrialization and (for some new found) sovereignty.  
 
Under pressure of falling export earnings in relation to import demand,828 import-substitution industrialization 
theory de-emphasized increased external market access through Most-Favored-Nation tariffs while stressing the 
need to exempt developing countries from offering reciprocal access on the import-side. Further allowances were 
made for infant industry and balance-of-payment restrictions.829 This system of thought informed, to a large extent, 
the historic development of SDT (and the later Enabling Clause830) as integration mechanism for developing 
countries in the GATT and the global economy as a whole. 
 
In line with the (neo-)liberal critique of import-substitution industrialization and strong governmental involvement 
in the economy, the Uruguay Round trade negotiations transformed the character of the SDT privileges.831 Under 
pressure of the Single Undertaking-doctrine and the changing winds of economic orthodoxy, developing countries 
were urged to ultimately implement the entire “liberalization” package as a Single Undertaking while SDT 
provisions were reformulated to offer longer implementation periods and higher threshold values instead of 
exemptions to reciprocity.832 
                                                        
826 Signaling the shift away from state intervention toward the free operation of markets. Economic law became foundational to the efficient 
operation of markets, correcting for externalities and market failures, and to serve as a limit on state interference. 
827 Legal rules were used to operate broad and complex elements of society by means of state-owned enterprises and through import regulations 
and exchange controls; often as much with an eye to spurring development as to effectuate the newly gained rights to sovereign self-determination. 
828 See the 1958 authoritative “Habeler Report” – Trends in International Trade (October 1958, Sales No. GATT/1958/3). 
829 See for example, Alexander Keck and Patrick Low, “Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How?,” in Simon 
J. Evenett and Bernard Hoekman, eds., Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006). 
830 The Enabling Clause was introduced in 1979 to enable developed member states of the GATT/WTO to give differential and more favorable 
treatment to developing countries; officially called the “Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries.” 
831 See Sylvia Ostry, “The Uruguay Round North--South Grand Bargain: Implications for Future Negotiations,” in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and 
James D. Southwick, The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
832 T. Ademola Oyejide, “Special and Differential Treatment,” in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, and Philip English, eds., Development, 
Trade, and the WTO – A Handbook (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002),  p. 506. At the same time, the multilateral trading system was trying to 
confront the challenge of contingency protection as arranged bilaterally between Member States; especially the heavy use of voluntary export 
restraint arrangements were object of concern and led to their ban; see Alexander Keck and Patrick Low, “Special and Differential Treatment in 




In line with a functionalist approach to trade liberalization and related understanding of the object and purpose of the 
GATT/WTO, the special provisions granted to foster economic growth and development in the GATT/WTO thus 
radically changed character to be more fully supportive of the newly minted functional regime. 
 
“In other words, when the trade agenda was basically confined to reduc[ing] border barriers, the [SDT] instruments 
provided some pro-active, positive measures designed to help the national development policies, such as 
preferences, policy spaces and non-reciprocity. When the trade agenda shifted towards trade rules that involve 
constraints to the national development policies, the [SDT] provisions tend to be concentrated on the adjustment to 
the new standards through negative measures such as temporary exceptions.”833 
 
Acceptance of the Single Undertaking meant the discontinuing of a previous style of development programming. As 
Low notes, “[t]his explosion in additional obligations has clearly been a problem for many developing countries. In 
retrospect (and doubtless at the time as well), many would argue that it was erroneous to impose the single 
undertaking on all countries, regardless of their development status.”834 
 
Special and Differential Treatment has, in this way, evolved from being a development tool (until the Uruguay 
Round) to being an adjustment tool (in the WTO legal framework).835 In this context, the provision of technical 
assistance is certainly a positive, pro-development measure,836 but it cannot provide changes in the economic 
structure, the supply constraints and the competitiveness of specific developing country industries, such as are 
needed to create an optimal environment for (targeted) economic diversification.837 
                                                        
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 151. Article 11.1(b) of the 1994 Agreement on Safeguards prohibits new voluntary export restraints, while 
Article 11.2 provides that all pre-existing VERs should be phased out by 1999. A separate agreement on textiles and clothing postpones such date 
until 2005 for apparel; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 28. 
833 Manuela Tortora, “Special and Differential Treatment and Development Issues in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Skeleton in the 
Closet,” UNCTAD, No. WEB/CDP/BKGD/16 (2003), pp. 5-6. 
834 Patrick Low, “Is the WTO Doing Enough for Developing Countries?,” in George A. Bermann and Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., WTO Law 
and Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 330. 
835 Manuela Tortora, “Special and Differential Treatment and Development Issues in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Skeleton in the 
Closet,” UNCTAD, No. WEB/CDP/BKGD/16 (2003), p. 6. See also Alexander Keck and Patrick Low, “Special and Differential Treatment in the 
WTO: Why, When, and How?,” in Simon J. Evenett and Bernard M. Hoekman, eds., Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2006). 
836 See Robert Holler, et al., A Comprehensive Approach to Trade Facilitation and Capacity Building: Connecting Developing Countries to 
Supply Chains (USAID, March 2014). 
837 Note that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) does provide some pro-development accommodation in Articles IV 




Following the disastrous Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, the Doha Ministerial declaration was quick 
to reaffirm the importance of SDT as an integral part of the world trade system, calling for a review of all SDT 
provisions with the objective of “strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational.”838  
The Doha declaration also reaffirmed the Marrakesh Agreement’s pledge to “continue to make positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” In that context the declaration 
notes that “enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and 
capacity-building programmes have important roles to play.”839 
 
Relatedly, the Special Session of the Committee of Trade and Development reached, in 2002, agreement on the need 
to establish a "Monitoring Mechanism" that would be mandated to evaluate the utilization and the effectiveness of 
the SDT provisions.840 This Monitoring Mechanism would likewise be empowered to offer recommendations on 
how to ensure implementation of SDT provisions. No common ground could however be found on the terms of 
reference for this mechanism.841 Another area where agreement fell short was on the development of appropriate 
benchmarks against which to assess the development impact of the very privileges the Monitoring Mechanism was 
supposed to evaluate and strengthen.842 
                                                        
States over Electronic Payment Systems (EPS), China – Electronic Payment Systems (2012). Rachel Block, “Market Access and National Treatment 
in China – Electronic Payment Services: An Illustration of the Structural and Interpretative Problems in GATS,” 14 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 652 (2013-2014). Whether the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) will maintain these pro-development exceptions and 
facilitations is highly doubtful though, especially as the agreement is negotiated plurilaterally (with India and Brazil, among many others, not 
participating) and as China’s economic power now far exceeds that of a “developing country” as classically understood.  
838 WTO Fourth Ministerial Declaration (Doha), adopted on November 14, 2001, paragraph 44. This language reflects concerns that are 
carried-over from pre-Seattle negotiations; the SDT obligations suffered from implementation issues on both developed and developing country 
side. The WTO distinguishes between the SDT clauses implying "obligations of result" and "obligations of conduct." The “best endeavor” category 
was and is of understandable concern to developing countries. For a list of "best endeavour" provisions as classified by the WTO, see inter alia: 
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.2, WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1.  
839 WTO Fourth Ministerial Declaration (Doha), adopted on November 14, 2001, paragraph 2. See also Krista Lucenti, “Trade Facilitation 
and the WTO,” in Simon J. Evenett and Bernard M. Hoekman, eds., Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation (Washington DC: 
World Bank, 2006). 
840 See, Francis Mangeni, “Strengthening the Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agreements: Some Reflections on the Stakes 
for African Countries,” ICTSD Resource Paper, No. 4 (February 2003). 
841 A US proposal (TN/CTD/W/19) concentrates the terms of reference of the Monitoring Mechanism on four main areas: (a) the 
implementation of WTO agreements by all Members; (b) developments in the Doha negotiations and working groups; (c) development and delivery 
of identified technical assistance needs; (d) relationship between the WTO and other international organizations contributing to the broader 
development agenda and supply-side interests. Of particular concern for developing countries was the possibility that the Monitoring Mechanism 
would be used to assess their utilization of the SDT privileges, rather than provide a forum for the strengthening thereof.  
842 The development of appropriate benchmarks is a vexing problem in most, if not all, social sciences. While graduation criteria in GSP 
schemes are mostly country and product specific, it is much harder to devise meaningful “behind-the-borders” assessment tools or reasonable 
measures of institutional capability. See, for example and with a focus on legal institutions, Katharina Pistor and Curtis Milhaupt, Law and 





In early December 2013, at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Bali, the first multilateral trade deal was struck 
since the Uruguay Round. The main agreement concentrates on technical trade facilitation,843 totaling an expected 
gain of about US$ 960bn.844 Middle ground was furthermore found on how to best balance developed countries’ aim 
of avoiding the creation of a permanent negotiating forum in the Monitoring Mechanism versus developing 
countries’ desire for a forum that is empowered to go beyond transparency issues. The resulting Bali Round 
Monitoring Mechanism is, at present, a timid beast that analyzes and reviews the implementation of SDT provisions, 
with a view to facilitating the integration of developing and least-developed countries into the trading system.845 
 
Although the Monitoring Mechanism is not precluded from making recommendations, it can only do so to other 
relevant WTO bodies, which are not bound or limited in their final conclusions by the recommendation. As such, the 
mechanism fits – de minimis – in the reigning system of the WTO institution, which emphasizes functional 
legitimacy and is guided in principle by the mature growth model’s approach to “integrating” economies into the 
global economy. 
 
2. Article XVIII:C GATT 1994 – A Developmental Exception 
 
At the apex of WWII the UK and the US embarked on discussions toward the Atlantic Charter,846 the forerunner of 
the GATT 1947. During  negotiations, Keynes mounted an increasingly dire defense of the UK’s imperial trading 
privileges847 against the US’ desire to ensure “access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the 
                                                        
843 Trade facilitation was first added to the Doha Round agenda as part of the Single Undertaking, but was separated therefrom following the 
deadlock of negotiations on the Doha Round during the Eighth Ministerial Conference. Negotiations on trade facilitation aim to clarify and improve 
three articles of the GATT 1994: Article V (freedom of transit); Article VIII (limiting border fees and formalities); and Article X, (publication and 
administration of regulations). 
844 Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, “Payoff from the World Trade Agenda 2013,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Report 
to the ICC Research Foundation (April 2013). 
845 Ministerial Decision, “Monitoring Mechanism on Special and Differential Treatment,” WTO, Ninth Ministerial Conference, December 7, 
2013, WT/MIN(13)/45. 
846 The Atlantic Charter is a declaration of an understanding between the UK and the US of August 14, 1941, that set the tone for a number 
of post-war international (economic) institutions and rules. 
847 Keynes was concerned with a harmful limiting of the policy freedom of the UK to achieve full employment in the post-war economy; in 
particular he was concerned with the UK’s ability to retain the use of exchange controls or currency depreciation (should trade remedies be taken 
off the table entirely). Keynes, preferring trade policies, questioned the ability of depreciation to spur the total value of exports sufficiently to offset 
the associated deterioration in the terms-of-trade. 
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world […].”848 Keynes, with characteristic flair, accused Meade and Fleming of having “laissez-faire 
appendicitis.”849 Fleming’s reply is illustrative for the US position in these early modern trade negotiations: 
 
Perhaps I am just a relic of a by-gone age, but I certainly retain a strong attachment to the price system, not 
because I think it works perfectly, but because the alternative appalls me. In the past few years I have 
attended a good many meetings where people were engaged in allocating scarce resources between 
alternative uses; and no matter how high-minded and intelligent the allocators, I have always felt that the 
most imperfect of markets would have made a better and more sensitive job of it.850 
 
After the WWII, the UK, still worried about its balance-of-payments, found common ground with developing 
countries in maintain recourse to quantitative restrictions to spur economic development, protect the wartime 
industrial base and relieve critical shortages.851 India submitted an ultimately successful proposal for an amendment 
to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions for development reasons. This amendment is currently reflected in 
Article XVIII:c GATT 1994.852 
 
Article XVIII:13 observes that “if a contracting party [which is in the early stages of development] finds that 
governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the 
general standard of living of its people, but that no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement is 
practicable to achieve that objective, it may have recourse to the provisions and procedures set out in this Section 
[C].” The requirements on developing countries according to Section C of Article XVIII GATT is to notify the 
Contracting Parties (Membership) and enter into consultations before expiration of certain time limits. 
 
                                                        
848 The fourth principle of the Atlantic Charter still includes a reference to the imperial preferences, and reads: “they will endeavor, with due 
respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the 
trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;” available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.  
849 In John M. Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Donald Moggridge, ed. Vol. 26, Activities 1941–1946 , Shaping the 
Post-War World: Bretton Woods and Reparations (London: Macmillan, Cambridge University Press, for the Royal Economic Society, 1980), p. 
289, quoted in Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 46, fn. 52. 
850 In John M. Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Donald Moggridge, ed. Vol. 26, Activities 1941–1946 , Shaping the 
Post-War World: Bretton Woods and Reparations (London: Macmillan, Cambridge University Press, for the Royal Economic Society, 1980), p. 
291, quoted in Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 46, fn. 52. 
851 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
121, fn. 82 and section 2.7.10, p. 151 et seq. See also Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and the Other Agreements Regulating Trade 
in Goods, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 59-60; and Nico J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 4-5. 
852 See Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting - Held at Lake Success, New York, at 10:30 AM, on Friday, January 24 1947, Doc. 
E/PC/T/C.6/17, p. 2; available at: http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/1946_50.htm. See also Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, 
The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 153. Note that Pakistan successfully pushed for the consultation 
obligation of Article XVIII.5 GATT in case of strong terms-of-trade deterioration and the exception for intergovernmental commodity agreements 
in Article XX(h) GATT; see, Ninth Session - Report of Review Working Party IV on Organizational and Functional Questions, held on February 
22, 1955, Document No. L/327, at p. 34. 
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The language of this provision has not been subject to interpretation by Panels or the Appellate Body. In fact, this 
Article has been invoked only three times thus far under the GATT 1994.853 In all three cases, the issue turned on the 
relevant body that has jurisdiction over the notification and consultation process: either the Commission on Trade 
and Development (CTD), or the Commission for Trade in Goods (CTG). Issues concerning the Balance of 
Payments, under Article XVIII:B GATT 1994, find their exclusive forum in the Committee on Balance-of-Payments 
(BoP). 
 
The relationship between these Committees, rooted in the WTO institution, and the dispute settlement system was 
the central topic in the Appellate Body report in India – Quantitative Restrictions.854 In that case, the Appellate 
Body was faced with the demand that it should adopt a measure of deference to the (political) decision in the 
relevant WTO institutions as to the considerations of macro-economic and development policy. India had 
successfully obtained the agreement of many of its trading partners in the Committee on Balance-of-Payments to a 
delayed timeline for phasing out its BoP-based import restrictions. The US however disagreed, blocked consensus in 
the Committee and took India to dispute settlement.855 
 
More specifically, this dispute is a result of the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments 
Provisions, which affirms the availability of dispute settlement challenges in the case of “application” of BoP-based 
restrictions to trade, while maintaining the Committee’s jurisdiction for policing the phasing out of these restrictions.  
India argued that “application” should be read narrowly to implicate only those issues directly related to the 
application of the trade restrictive measure, but not broadly to extend to the underlying policy justifications thereof. 
These policy justifications, so India argued, were under purview of the Committee on Balance of Payments and not 
made subject to dispute settlement.856 
 
                                                        
853 World Trade Organization, “Application of Article XVIII, Section C, of GATT 1994,” WT/COMTD/39 (July 24, 2002), Committee on 
Trade and Development, identifies: Malaysia – Polypropylene and Polyethylene (1995), Colombia – Imports of Salt (1998), and Bangladesh – 
Chicks, Eggs, Cartons and Salt (2002). 
854 WTO Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions (1999). 
855 Uruguay Round “Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994” (WTO, 
1995), affirming the availability of dispute settlement challenges in the case of “application” of BoP-based restrictions to trade, while the 
Committee’s process for policing the phasing out of these restrictions was also maintained. See, Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 
20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) The European Journal of International Law 1 (2016), p. 34. 
856 WTO Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions (1999), ¶80; “According to India, the Panel erred in law by failing to take 
into account that each organ of the WTO must exercise its power with due regard to the powers attributed to the other organs of the WTO.” 
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The Appellate Body, in constructing Article XVIII:B GATT 1994, had to determine the appropriate nature of the 
horizontal relationship between it and the “political organs of the WTO.”857 These political organs generally have 
wide latitude to make determinations and issue recommendations as to the compliance of relevant Member State 
measures with WTO covered agreements, but lack enforceability (they function by consensus, an inherited feature 
from the GATT 1947; see Chapter 1, supra).858 While this latitude to make recommendations does not prejudice 
Member States’ ability to request the establishment of a Panel (invoke Article XXIII.2 GATT 1994), the Panel than 
needs to assess the matter before it “objectively” (Article 11 DSU). This, as argued, involves an assessment of the 
appropriate balance “established in [the particular WTO agreement] between the jurisdictional competences 
conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for themselves 
[…].”859 
 
Despite the political and developmental nature of the assessment in the Committee’s, the Appellate Body summarily 
rejected India’s arguments. The Appellate Body categorically rejected the notion that institutional balance is a 
“principle of WTO law.”860 Neither did the Appellate Body find that the institutional balance of power dictated a 
measure of “judicial restraint” on part of the Panel and Appellate Body. In fact, “the Appellate Body suggested that, 
where the dispute settlement organs had competence, ‘judicial restraint’ would be inconsistent with the obligation to 
exercise this competence when requested to do so by a claimant.”861 The Appellate Body affirmed its understanding 
in its report in Turkey – Textiles.862 
 
                                                        
857 Frieder Roessler, "The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the WTO" in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard 
Quick, eds., New Directions in International Economic law: essays in honor of John H. Jackson (Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 
2001), p. 325. 
858 See generally, Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 37. 
859 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶115, cited in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, “Standard of Review 
in WTO Law,” 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 491 (2004), p. 494. See also, Petros C. Mavroidis, “Judicial Supremacy, Judicial 
Restraint and the Issue of Consistency of Preferential Trade Agreements with the WTO: The Apple in the Picture,” in Dan Kennedy and James 
Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of the International Trade Law: Essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
860 WTO Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions (1999), ¶¶99, 100-105. 
861 Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary,” 27(1) The European Journal of 
International Law 1 (2016), pp. 34-35. 
862 WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles (1999), at 22. 
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Note that both the language of Article XVIII:9 GATT 1994,863 and Article XVIII:13-14 GATT 1994,864 uses the 
conditional form “may” to describe the type of deviation from the headline rule contained in those provisions. This 
is indicative of its character of an exception provision, instead of an exemption. Also, despite the explicit reference 
to developmental concerns its drafting history, as well as reference to the Committee on Trade and Development 
(Article XVIII:C GATT), the Appellate Body approaches its construction of Article XVIII GATT 1994 in the course 
of its “normal” assessment. The standard of review applied by the Appellate Body is strict and does not allow for 
deference or judicial restraint – this is in line with the conceptualization of the standard of review for exception 
provisions I argued for in the above. 
 
In contrast, Article XI:2 GATT 1994 uses imperative language, instructing the interpreter that the obligations of the 
Article XI:1 “shall not extend” beyond the limits set by Article XI:2 GATT 1994. As argued, application of the 
appropriate (multilateral) standard of review to exemption provisions such as Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 leads to a 
construction that is both open and broad, ultimately allowing for a deferential interpretation of its terms. Further 
research might be required to postulate how an evolving Monitoring Mechanism could aid the Panels in their 
assessment of economic facts when fitting contested policy measures to the terms of the exemption provision. It is 
unclear whether the Appellate Body would, under an “open” standard of review, be more lenient in yielding to the 
recommendations of an extended Monitoring Mechanism sometime in the future. This however may be the logical 
continuation of the, now defunct, Doha Development Round. 
 
  
                                                        
863 9. “a contracting party […] may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control the general level of its imports by restricting the 
quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported; Provided that the import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified shall not exceed 
those necessary,” (emphasis added) 
864 13. “If a contracting party […] finds that governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular industry […] it 
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Chapter 5: Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994: An Open Construction 
 
 
In 1975, Dworkin introduced the concept of a “hard case” as a dispute where the adjudicator’s discretional space is 
not univocally dictated by statute or precedent. The judicial labor in such a case is squarely focused on the 
adjudicatory interpretation of the text; the process of fitting the dispute to the letter of the text. Dworkin postulated 
that in these cases “a proper decision could be generated by either policy or principle.”865 In Law’ s Empire, 
Dworkin clarified that judges must strive in hard cases to instantiate a “community of principle” in a society.866 
Critical Legal Studies however strongly contend that such “community of principle” is always and necessarily rife 
with conflict. 
 
Waldron notes that “a certain critique from the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement pushes Dworkin to be a 
constructivist regarding the background elements of a legal system. Dworkin must argue that the legal background 
of a legal system is constructively coherent: it is capable of being made coherent at the hands of a sufficiently 
resourceful interpreter.” 867 In an analysis of the “background elements” of international legal disputes, Broude finds 
a discrete category in “development disputes.” 
 
Broude postulates that “international development disputes can be understood as a discrete category of international 
disputes that, in terms of jurisdiction and applicable law, arise under fairly ‘hard’ rules of international law, such as 
trade and investment treaties, but in a more practical sense are actually concerned with reviewing the development 
policies of states, which are regulated on the international level only in very ‘soft’ terms, if at all.” 868 He observes 
though that “[m]ost development related international dispute settlement avoids frontally engaging with 
                                                        
865 Ronald Dworkin, 88(6) Harvard Law Review 1057 (1975), p. 1060. 
866 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1988); see also, Frederic R. Kellogg, “What Precisely Is a “Hard” Case? 
Waldron, Dworkin, Critical Legal Studies, and Judicial Recourse to Principle,” Discussion Paper for University of Edinburgh Legal Theory 
Research Group (April 2013). 
867 Jeremy Waldron, “Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?,” in Scott Hershovitz, ed., Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald 
Dworkin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
868 Tomer Broude, “Development Disputes in International Trade,” in Yong Shik Lee, Gary N. Horlick, Won Mog Choi, and Tomer Broude, 
eds., Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 30. 
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development dilemmas by resorting to legal tools, rules, and doctrines that are formally and teleologically 
exogenous to development.” 
 
The previous chapters aim to offer a theory whereby such developmental background elements can be made 
endogenous to the adjudicatory decision in a matter other than through an uncontrolled expression of power or 
Utopia. I have sought to argue that, within the framework of the GATT 1994, the adjudicator can overcome the 
“regulated madness”869 of her judicial decision through her understanding of the collaborative nature of the treaty 
before her. 
 
In her construction of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, the adjudicator is guided by Article 
11 of the DSU, that demands of her an “objective assessment” of the matter before her. This standard of review is, 
through the persuasive reasoning found in Appellate Body reports, made susceptible to the character of the 
agreement and the object and purpose of the provision under examination. The “embedded” standard of review 
applicable to the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, is not identical to the one guiding the 
construction of the exception provisions of Article XX GATT 1994, for example. In fact, the rule-exception 
framework the Appellate Body identified in its report China – Publications870 militates against such uniformity. 
 
It is in the application of the embedded standard of review that the adjudicator becomes aware of her teleological 
constraints. Kantorowicz identified these teleological constraints as sociological, doctrinal, and normative in nature. 
I argue that, based on the sociological preference heterogeneity that exists in the Membership of the WTO, the 
adjudicator must apply a standard of review to exemption provisions in the GATT 1994 that allows for an “open” or 
broad construction thereof. Such in accordance with the multilateral character of the GATT 1994. 
 
The interpretation of the terms of the provision are an expression hereof, guided by their object and purpose. The 
adjudicator, when construing the terms of exemption provisions in accordance with the multilateral or “open” 
                                                        
869 Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law as Political Theology: How to Read the Nomos der Erde,” 11 Constellations: An International 
Journal for Critical and Democratic Theory 492 (2004); and Martti Koskenniemi, “Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau and the Image of Law in 
International Relations,” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of Law in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 17–34. 
870 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222-223; building on WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996). 
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standard of review, creates interpretational space to fit a wider range of contested measures to the language of the 
provision. The implied measure of deference to developmental policies expressing domestic sociological/economic 
preferences is informed by application of the modified Oates’ Theorem of Decentralization. 
 
More broadly, the leeway of the adjudicator in constructing and interpreting exemption provisions broadly is 
circumscribed by the other two elements of Kantorowicz’ Triptych: doctrinal and normative teleology. The latter 
element finds expression in the adjudicator’s realization that the dispute settlement system serves to further the 
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. The doctrinal element comes to expression in the 
present chapter through an examination of relevant cases and the persuasive reasoning of Panels and the Appellate 
Body as regards the construction of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
 
A. Export Restrictions in the GATT: A Concise History 
 
In 1927, the World Economic Conference, sponsored by the League of Nations, called for multilateral negotiations 
in an effort to scale back then-existing tariff levels and other trade barriers.871 The Convention aimed to “abolish 
within a period of six months […], all import and export prohibitions or restrictions and not thereafter to impose any 
such prohibitions or restrictions” (Article 2). The Convention however failed to deliver a permanent resolution and 
was superseded by world events (such as the Great Depression, the ensuing collapse of trade volumes, and the 
outbreak of WWII). 
 
In the midst of WWII, US and UK embarked on discussions to revive the international trade architecture and agree 
on post-war import tariff cuts (including UK Imperial preferences). Instead of abolishing all import and export 
prohibitions, Contracting Parties followed a reciprocal, most-favored-nation (MFN) approach of across-the-board 
                                                        
871 Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, 25(3) The American Journal of International Law 121, 
Supplement: Official Documents (1931). The Convention sometimes features in dispute resolution pleadings to provide interpretation guidance, 
see, for instance, the WTO Panel Report, US-Shrimp (1998), ¶ 3.187 et seq. See also, Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation 
of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 83, 84, 220. See for an assessment of existing and 
modified tariff-levels; Chad P. Bown and Douglas Irwin, “The urban legend: Pre-GATT tariffs of 40%,” VOXEU, December 19, 2015. 
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incremental reductions.872 On export taxes however, the US continued to prefer outright abolishment (similar to the 
approach favored in the Convention) to negotiated, and thus incremental, tariff cuts on MFN basis.873 
 
In an apparent compromise, the section on the “Understanding on the Interpretation of Art. II:1(b) GATT” of the 
Interim Report of the (US) Special Committee on Relaxation of Trade Barriers (1943),874 expresses the opinion that 
all objectionable export taxes should be abolished.875 This US Special Committee seems to have carved out the use 
of export taxes for revenue purposes, in lieu of international agreements, to control military supplies, or imposed 
under conditions of famine – but, crucially, not for commercial purposes. 
 
Article 25 of the “London Draft” of 1946, similarly limited its provision on the elimination of quantitative 
restrictions by excluding “prohibitions or restrictions on imports or exports imposed or maintained during the early 
post-war transitional period […]” for three circumscribed policy goals on shortages and pertaining to foodstuffs.876 
These two policy areas are reflected in Article XI:2 GATT 1947, likely as an exemption provision rather than as 
exception to Article XI:1 GATT 1947.877 When Contracting Parties considered non-objectionable quantitative 
restrictions in the early post-war period of the London Draft, these categories would be deemed permissible.878  
 
                                                        
872 Instead of bilaterally negotiated, product-specific cuts, which would then be multilateralized through application of the MFN principle – 
an approach that was not administratively feasible for post-war European countries, but that has won the day as negotiation practice. 
873 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
70. 
874 Interim Report of the (US) Special Committee on Relaxation of Trade Barriers (December 8, 1943), International Trade Files, Lot File 
57D-284, pp. 34, 35 et seq. 
875 See pp. 35ff of the report of the US Special Committee on Relaxation of Trade Barriers (Report of 8 December 1943, International Trade 
Files, Lot File 57D-284); as noted by Petros C. Mavroidis, George A. Bermann and Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (WTO): 
Documents, Cases & Analysis (St. Paul, Mn: West Publishing, 2010), p. 98.  
876 The text of Article 25.2 London Draft reads in relevant part: “The provision of paragraph 1 shall not extend to the following: (a) prohibitions 
or restrictions on imports or exports imposed or maintained during the early post-war transitional period, which are essential to (i) The equitable 
distribution among the several consuming countries of products in short supply, where such products are owned by private interests or by the 
government of any member; (ii) the maintenance of wartime price control by a country undergoing shortages subsequent to the war; (iii) the orderly 
liquidation of temporary surpluses of stocks owned or controlled by the government of any Member or of industries developed in the territory of 
any Member owing to the exigencies of the war, which it would be uneconomic to maintain in normal conditions; […].” See, United Nations, 
Economic and Social Council, E/PC/T/C.5/14, January 24, 1947. 
877 See the early debate around the exclusions pertaining to the elimination of quantitative restrictions; 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/1946_50.htm - for example, document E/PC/T/C.6/W/43 or E/PC/T/141. See also, Petros C. Mavroidis, The 
Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 127. 
878 This included restrictions on the post-drought export of merino sheep from Australia, as discussed and agreed during the Geneva and 
Hanava meetings. The emphasis on foodstuffs is clear from the Havana Conference Sub-Committee on Articles 20 and 22, which ““was satisfied 
that the terms of paragraph 2(a) [...] are adequate to allow a country to impose temporary export restrictions to meet a considerable rise in domestic 
prices of foodstuffs due to a rise in prices in other countries.” Similarly, the Report of the Review Working Party on “Quantitative Restrictions” 
recorded the view that “to the extent that the rise in prices was associated with acute shortages of the products in question, as it normally would be, 
[temporary export restrictions applied to meet a considerable rise in domestic prices of food-stuffs due to a rise in prices in other countries], whether 
affecting foodstuffs or other products, was clearly covered by that sub-paragraph [2(a)]” – see WTO, GATT Analytical Index, Article XI; available 
at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art11_e.pdf (last accessed April 2, 2017). 
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The New York Conference of 1947, which produced a formal draft of the GATT, did not produce a major change to 
the language regulating the obligations,879 but rearranged provisions dealing with the non-discriminatory 
administration of exceptionally permitted export quotas/quantitative restrictions. Member States meanwhile 
continued to propose limitations or extensions to this exclusion in early meetings.880 Interestingly, the UK proved a 
useful interlocutor for developing country Member States in this process, as it continued to be worried about its 
balance-of-payments.881 
 
This profound worry about the balance-of-payments (BoP) among central negotiation partners in part explains the 
focus of the language and structure of the eventual GATT 1947 on lowering import tariffs: from a Mercantilist or 
BoP point of view, export restrictions would be impractical tools to alleviate such stresses.882 For such reasons, apart 
from the war-time economy and Imperial Privileges, experience with export restrictions was generally minimal in 
the “modern” economy. Mavroidis finds that “significant lack of practice in the field of export taxes […] is probably 
the single most important reason explaining why the founding fathers did not spend time and effort designing a 
mechanism for negotiation of export tariffs à la Article II of the GATT.”883 Although it should be noted that 
quantitative export restrictions have a long history as strategic policy to enforce hegemony or as industrial policy.884  
 
India, concerned with its industrial development, tabled a proposal for an amendment to the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions for development reasons.885 Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes observe that “in [India’s] view, 
                                                        
879 See E/PC/T/C.6/14 of January 24, 1947, and E/PC/T/C.6/W.4 at pp. 3ff; see also Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, 
The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 151. 
880 As Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes point out, Belgium-Luxembourg unsuccessfully offered the following amendment: “Restrictions imposed 
under this exception should be strictly limited to the period during which the aforementioned circumstances occur, and should not be imposed on 
seasonal commodities at a time when like domestic products are not available.” The authors opine that “[h]ad it been adopted, a serious proxy to 
detect protectionist behavior would have been added to the legislative arsenal.” Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The 
Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 152, fn. 242. 
881 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
121, fn. 82 and section 2.7.10, p. 151 et seq. See also Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and the Other Agreements Regulating Trade 
in Goods, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 59-60; and Nico J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 4-5. 
882 See, Petros. C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and the Other Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods, 2nd edn (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), pp. 59–60, citing the Report of the US Committee on Relaxation of Trade Barriers of 8 December 1943, International 
Trade Files, Lot File 57D-284. Export duties were, however, used much more intensively during wartime. Ibid. See also N. J. Schrijiver, Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 4-5. See also, Ilaria Espa, Export 
Restrictions on Critical Minerals and Metals: Testing the Adequacy of WTO Disciplines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 128. 
See further, Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). 
883 Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 56. 
884 See, for instance, Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press, 
2003). 
885 See Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting - Held at Lake Success, New York, at 10:30 AM, on Friday, January 24 1947, Doc. 
E/PC/T/C.6/17, p. 2; available at: http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/1946_50.htm. See also Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, 
The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 153. Note that Pakistan successfully pushed for the consultation 
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Members should be free to choose any measure they thought was necessary for their development and, to that effect, 
they should not be constrained by the prohibition of import and export quantitative restrictions.”886 Especially 
developing countries, such as Cuba which offered support in the Geneva Conference for the Indian proposal on 
industrial policies, felt that a broader scope of exemptions would be appropriate, whereas mature markets sought 
limitations to such exemptions. 
 
Discussion during the Geneva Conference suggests that domestic quotas were not meant to be captured by the 
prohibition on quantitative export or import restrictions887 – as one would, perhaps, expect from a document that 
purports to regulate trade, products have to become part of the economy to be captured by its scope (i.e. yet-to-be-
produced goods and unmined resources are beyond its scope).888  Australia, furthermore, successfully proposed 
language to clarify and carve-out an exemption from the prohibition on quantitative restrictions to relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs (currently Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994).889  
 
The Havana Round (1947) did not produce further changes in the language pertaining to the rule on export 
restrictions. The Havana Charter, meant as vehicle to incorporate negotiated policy constraints into the International 
Trade Organization (ITO), failed. It was only after this definitive failure of the ITO that the negotiated policy 
provisions role originally intended for the newly established organization was taken on by the GATT 1947. 
 
In the Review Session of 1954, India continued to push the differentiation between quantitative restrictions 
maintained for industrial policy reasons and those with commercial or ordinary purpose. Ultimately, some of the 
                                                        
obligation of Article XVIII.5 GATT in case of strong terms-of-trade deterioration and the exception for intergovernmental commodity agreements 
in Article XX(h) GATT; see, Ninth Session - Report of Review Working Party IV on Organizational and Functional Questions, held on February 
22, 1955, Document No. L/327, at p. 34. 
886 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
152 
887 See, E/PC/T/174, at p. 8. 
888 The Panel in its report in China – Rare Earth (2014) observes that “once resources are extracted and have entered the market, it is neither 
China's nor any other Member's ‘responsibility’ or right to allocate the available stock between different users; once extracted and in commerce, 
rare earth’s trade is subject to WTO law. Therefore, a priori, trade in natural resources should not be restricted without justification.” WTO Panel 
Report, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶7.462.In addition, Mavroidis notes that Article XI:1 GATT refers to restrictions on importation/exportation 
and does not broaden its scope to include measures “in connexion” with importation/exportation, as Article I GATT does. Mavroidis furthermore 
points to the production quotas maintained by OPEC; see Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), 
p. 143, section 2.2.5.3. 
889 See, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Report of Fourteenth 
Meeting of Commission "A" (1) held 15 August 1947 Document E/PC/T/A/PV/40(1), p. 18; available at: 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/1946_50.htm. See further Julia Y. Qin, “Reforming WTO Disciplines on Export Duties: Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, Economic Development and Environmental Protection,” 46 Journal of World Trade 1147 (2012), p. 1152. 
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language of India’s proposals was adopted during the negotiations on “Part IV” of the GATT in 1965.890 This 
section is currently reflected in Article XVIII:c GATT 1994. 
 
Note that around this time, the Panel system that was introduced in 1952 grounded to an effective halt under the 
stresses that surfaced between mature and developing countries. All the while, tariffs continued to be negotiated 
down through various rounds of negotiations. Particularly salient was the Tokyo Round (1979), where a number of 
“codes” were adopted, which the developing countries decided not to sign. Furthermore, a new Understanding on 
Dispute Settlement was introduced in 1979 and the appropriate standard of review in dispute settlement began being 
an explicit “discussion topic.”891 (see Chapter 1, supra) 
 
The Contracting Parties to the GATT reached a momentous consensus on the shape and character of future 
collaboration on international trade policy in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). There, the Membership decided to 
Annex several agreements, among which the reinvigorated GATT 1994, to the WTO Agreement. The WTO 
Agreement not only served as anchor vehicle to the new agreements, but also iterated the newly expressed 
collaborative intent of the Member States in its preamble. 
 
Article XI of the GATT 1947 became the Article XI of the GATT 1994, the object and purpose of which agreement 
is reflected in both the preamble to the GATT 1994 (similar to the preamble in 1947) and the preamble to the WTO 
Agreement. The provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XI, thus gained a new life, object, and purpose. 
The 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement was similarly supplanted by the DSU, reinforcing the different 
constructive and interpretational perspective of the Membership through the applicable standard of review. 
 
Whereas Article XI has been subject to various disputes in the GATT/WTO, its exemption provision Article XI:2(a) 
GATT 1994 was constructed and interpreted for the first time by the Panel and Appellate Body in China – Raw 
                                                        
890 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 
127. 
891 See, 1976 Report of the Consultative Group of Eighteen, BISD 23S/42 (1977). 
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Materials (2012). Since, the Appellate Body report in China – Raw Materials has been cited as persuasive authority 
in China – Rare Earth (2014) and will likely be central to the pending case China – Raw Materials II.892 
 
In the below, I shall first explore the construction and interpretation of Article XI:1 GATT 1994 which presents the 
rule that prohibits quantitative restrictions. Thereafter, I examine the approach taken by the Panel and Appellate 
Body to the construction and interpretation of the exemption provision in Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 and argue that 
it has wrongly construed it in direct opposition to the exception provision of Article XX GATT 1994. Instead, I will 
argue that application of the appropriate embedded standard of review should have led the Appellate Body to 
construct Article XI:2(a) broadly or “open” and not narrow its meaning in favor of the scope of the Article XX 
GATT 1994. In this way, India’s long standing desire for a developmental exemption to quantitative restrictions 
may yet, but with a narrower scope, be vindicated in relation to Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
 
B. The Rule: Article XI:1 GATT 1994 
 
The introduction and maintenance of custom duties, taxes and other charges on exports is not prohibited per se by 
the GATT. In the absence of applicable exception or exemption provisions, quantitative restrictions are however not 
allowed. Member States are encouraged to negotiate barriers to trade down, having declared themselves to be 
“desirous of […] entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
trade relations.”  
 
While the ability of the Membership to negotiate down custom duties, taxes and other charges restricting exports is 
undisputed, the scope of the provisions providing legal effect to such negotiated reductions is somewhat ambiguous. 
Reductions in tariff ceilings are to be negotiated in accordance with Article XXVIII:1(bis) GATT, labeled “Tariff 
                                                        
892 On 19 July 2016, the European Union requested consultations with China regarding China's duties and other alleged restrictions on the 
export of various forms of antimony, chromium, cobalt, copper, graphite, indium, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum and tin. A Panel was established 
as of November 23, 2016, jointly with Canada, Mexico and the United States. 
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Negotiations,”893 but legal effect accrues to the outcome of such tariff negotiations by force of Article II GATT. It is 
however not immediately obvious that negotiated reductions in custom duties, taxes and other charges restricting 
exports are covered by Article II GATT as it fails to explicitly mention “exports” in conjunction with “imports.” 
 
Irrespective of whether reductions in the custom duties, taxes and other charges on exports can be negotiated down 
with legal effect, there remains some meaningful ambiguity in relation to the scope and nature of the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions in Article XI:1 GATT 1994. According the proper ambit to the rule in Article XI:1 GATT 
1994 is important to subsequently appropriately construe the exemption provision to Article XI:1 GATT in the next 
section. 
1. Tariff Concessions: Article II GATT 1994 
 
Article II:1 GATT 1994 -- Schedules of Concessions 
(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that 
provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement. 
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, […], shall, on their importation into the 
territory to which the Schedule relates, […], be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and 
provided therein […]; 
(c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting party […] shall, on their importation into such 
territory,[…], be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part II of that 
Schedule. […].      (emphasis added) 
 
While export tariffs are, in principle, legal (unless constrained), the language of Article II GATT only seems to 
mention tariff concessions on the import side, as included in Schedules 1 (MFN) and 2 (Preferential).894 This 
imbalance seems limited to Article II GATT, as the before mentioned Article XXVIIIbis GATT calls for 
negotiations “directed to the substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and other charges on imports and 
exports.” Practice furthermore seems to have sided with Article XXVIIIbis GATT.895 This seeming lacuna in the 
language of Article II GATT nonetheless brings some ambiguity to the interpretation of this provision.896 
 
                                                        
893 Article XXVIII:1(bis) GATT reaffirms that Parties will engage in “negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, directed 
to the substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports […].” Article XXVIII:2(a)(bis) further clarifies 
the modalities available to such negotiations, such as they “may be directed towards the reduction of duties, the binding of duties at the then existing 
levels or undertakings that individual duties or the average duties on specified categories of products shall not exceed specified levels.” 
894 See, among others, Lothar Ehring and Gian Franco Chianale, “Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy,” in Yulia Selivanova, ed., 
Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2012), pp. 113-114. 
895 See the Australian Uruguay round schedule of concessions. Furthermore, export restrictive policies have been the subject of negotiations in 
accession protocols to WTO; see §184 of the Working Party Report on the accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO (WTO Document 
WT/ACC/SAU/61 of 1 November 2005). 
896 Mavroidis credits Bergsten for being one of the first who argued that the GATT post-Tokyo round need to complete its legislative arsenal 
by introducing disciplines not only on export taxes, but in general on export controls; see Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International 
Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 141, fn. 19. 
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The GATT-era Panel in US – Restrictions on Imports of Sugar suggests a reading of Article II GATT that broadly 
enables “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade.” The Panel extends its reading further however to support the assumption that “Article II gives 
contracting parties the possibility to incorporate into the legal framework of the General Agreement commitments 
additional to those already contained in the General Agreement and to qualify such additional commitments, not 
however to reduce their commitments under other provisions of that Agreement.”897 
 
A committed Textualist reading of Article II GATT would observe that commitments on the exportation of products 
cannot be considered “tariff” Concessions in the sense of Article II GATT. The article after all explicitly fails to 
mention measures relating to the exportation of products in consonance with the importation thereof. As such, so 
Jackson argues, 898 export concessions do not bind Member States ex Article II GATT. Jackson sees no reason to 
further “fill” this gap or read the text of Article II GATT extensively and supports this reasoning by claiming lack of 
Party practice to the contrary (in fact Australia has filed export concessions in its Uruguay Round schedule). 
 
In contrast, Matsushita argues that the language of Article II:1(b) GATT is “merely indicative of the fact that the 
negotiators of the GATT 1947 were preoccupied with the elimination and reduction of import tariffs, and […] 
cannot be interpreted to necessarily imply that their intention was to exclude export duties altogether from the scope 
of Article II:1(b).”899 Matsushita thus implicitly reads Article II GATT in the context of Article XXVIIIbis and 
accords interpretative control thereto. This is a convincing possibility. 
 
Matsushita’s reading of the preoccupation of the early negotiating partners furthermore seems to be broadly in line 
with a 1943 report by the US, which notes that “[e]xcept during wartime, governmentally-imposed export duties, 
and prohibitions and quantitative restrictions on exports have had relatively little influence in limiting the overall 
                                                        
897 GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Sugar (1989), ¶¶5.2-3. 
898 Jackson furthermore proceeded on the wrong assumption that no Member State had ever scheduled a Concession on the export side; see 
John Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Lexis Law Publications, 1969), p. 499. See also, Melaku G. Desta, “OPEC, the WTO, 
Regionalism and Unilateralism,” 37 Journal of World Trade 523 (2003), p. 533. 
899 Mitsuo Matsushita, “Export Control of Natural Resources: WTO Panel Ruling on the Chinese Export Restrictions of Natural Resources,” 
3 Trade Law and Development 267 (2011), pp. 273-274; see also Frieder Roessler, “GATT and Access to Supplies,” 9(1) Journal of World Trade 
25 (1975), pp. 33-35. 
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movement of commodities in world trade, although they have seriously affected the movement of specific 
products.”900 
 
A competing interpretation of Article II GATT, suggested by Ehring and Chianale, relates the term “commerce” in 
paragraph II:1(a) to the term “appropriate” to the effect of shifting the interpretative focal away from “importation” 
in paragraphs II:1(b) and II:1(c). By interpreting “commerce” broadly, they read Article II:1(a) to merely require a 
filing of negotiated concessions to an “appropriate” part of the Schedules. While the authors overcome the 
asymmetry of Article II:1(b) and (c) GATT by postulating a stand-alone legal effect for Article II:1(a) GATT, this 
reading does not satisfactorily resolve the recurring mention of only “importation” in Article II:2 and II:4 GATT. 
 
Espa rather observes that scheduled export duty concessions are incorporated in the GATT as per Article II:7 
GATT.901 She argues however that this route limits the applicability of GATT-specific adjustment procedures (such 
as renegotiation or revocation under Article XXVIII GATT). In support of her conclusion that Concessions on 
export taxes should be effectuated under Article II:1(a), she subscribes to the independent normative character of 
Article II:1(a) – arguing for the explicit recognition of Schedule 3-type Concessions (non-tariff barrier), as is EU 
practice. 
 
Mavroidis powerfully reflects the consensus interpretation of Article II GATT however where he holds that “[t]here 
should be no doubt […] that export duties are treated symmetrically with import duties in the GATT-system.” He 
relies, in part, on a GATT Secretariat study during the Uruguay Round, which “states in clear language that GATT 




                                                        
900 US, Report of December 8, 1943, International Trade Files, Lot File 57D-284, p. 34, cited in Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of 
International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 141.  
901 See Ilaria Espa, Export Restrictions on Critical Minerals and Metals: Testing the Adequacy of WTO Disciplines (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), p. 134; such in agreement with Lothar Ehring and Gian Franco Chianale, “Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy,” in 
Yulia Selivanova, ed., Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2012).. 
902 Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 141, fn. 20, citing GATT Document 
MTN.GNG/NG2/W/40 of August 8, 1989. 
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2. Prohibitions or Restrictions: Article XI:1 GATT  
 
Article XI:1 General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting 
party.    (emphasis added) 
 
The term “quantitative restrictions” lends its description to Article XI GATT only through the title and is replaced in 
paragraph 1 with “prohibitions or restrictions.” These “restrictions” are qualified to include all measures “other than 
duties, taxes or other charges.” It is informative that the Panel in Colombia – Ports of Entry, does “not consider the 
limited language appearing in the title of Article XI ("General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions") as 
determinative in interpreting the ensuing specific provisions.”903 The Appellate Body in its report China – Raw 
Materials however notes the use of the word "quantitative" in the title of Article XI of the GATT 1994 does inform 
the interpretation of the words "restriction" and "prohibition" in Article XI:1; suggesting that the coverage of Article 
XI includes those prohibitions and restrictions that limit the quantity or amount of a product being imported or 
exported.904  
 
For completion, note that “quantitative restrictions” consist of quotas, import or export licenses, and other measures. 
“Quotas” and “QRs” are therefore not synonymous; import or export licenses rather condition trade upon the prior 
granting of a license. An Ad Note to the GATT furthermore clarifies that “the terms ‘import restrictions’ or ‘export 
restrictions’ include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations.”905 
 
Crucially, the scope attributed to prohibitions and restrictions in Article XI:1 determines also the ambit of the 
exemption provision of Article XI:2(a), as it immediately references paragraph 1. The terms “prohibitions or 
restrictions” are often used in conjunction, when consultations are requested (preceding the establishment of a 
Panel). Both terms point to the restrictive effect expressed in the title of article and Panels have, generally, 
understood the scope of these terms collectively. What follows is a brief overview of relevant reports indicates the 
broad scope accorded to these terms in Article XI:1 GATT 1994. 
 
                                                        
903 WTO Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry (2009), ¶7.243. 
904 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶320. 
905 WTO GATT, Note Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII.  
224 
 
The GATT panel in Japan – Trade in Semi-conductors constructed the wording of Article XI:1 in a comprehensive 
fashion, noting it applies “to all measure instituted or maintained by a [Member] prohibiting or restricting the 
importation, exportation, or sale for export of products other than measures that take the form of duties, taxes or 
other charges.”906 
 
The WTO Panel report in India – Quantitative Restrictions concurred and observed that “[T]he text of Article XI:1 
is very broad in scope, providing for a general ban on import or export restrictions or prohibitions 'other than duties, 
taxes or other charges'.” The Panel furthermore interpreted the scope of “restrictions” according to its ordinary 
meaning, noting that “the scope of the term 'restriction' is also broad, as seen in its ordinary meaning, which is 'a 
limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation'."907 
 
The WTO Panel report in India – Autos further endorsed this broad interpretation of the scope of Article XI:1 
GATT, such that a measure which imposes a "limiting condition" or imposes a "limitation on action" constitutes a 
"restriction" within the meaning of Article XI:1. It observed:908 
 
On a plain reading, it is clear that a 'restriction' need not be a blanket prohibition or a precise numerical 
limit. Indeed, the term 'restriction' cannot mean merely 'prohibitions' on importation, since Article XI:1 
expressly covers both 'prohibition or restriction'. Furthermore, the Panel considers that the expression 
'limiting condition' used by the India – Quantitative Restrictions panel to define the term 'restriction' and 
which this Panel endorses, is helpful in identifying the scope of the notion in the context of the facts before 
it. That phrase suggests the need to identify not merely a condition placed on importation, but a condition 
that is limiting, i.e. that has a limiting effect. In the context of Article XI, that limiting effect must be on 
importation itself. 
 
The Panel in India – Autos furthermore stated that "it is clear that a 'restriction' need not be a blanket prohibition or a 
precise numerical limit."909 
 
Panels have furthermore considered the meaning of “restriction” against the protection of “competitive opportunities 
of imported products”910 as opposed to actual trade flows.911 This “no-effects-cum-no-intent” test is however 
                                                        
906 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors (1988), ¶104. 
907 WTO Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions (1999), ¶5.128. 
908 WTO Panel Report, India – Autos (2001), ¶¶7.269-7.270. 
909 WTO Panel Report, India – Autos (2001), ¶¶7.270. 
910 WTO Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather (2000), ¶11.20.  
911 A GATT Panel made a similar holding in Japan – Leather, noting that “the existence of a quantitative restriction should be presumed to 
cause nullification or impairment not only because of any effect it had had on the volume of trade but also for other reasons, e.g. it would lead to 
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controversial, especially as the Panel in Japan – Semiconductors extended it from its original application scope of 
discriminatory taxation912 and quota administration,913 to encompass “other measures” as well.914 
 
In Argentina – Hides and Leather a nexus was demanded between the challenged measure and the effective 
quantitative restriction. This nexus was found in the presence of a down-stream industry interests in customs 
controls was interpreted as de facto restrictive of exports. Similarly, the Panel in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres found a 
violation of Article XI:1 where fines did not impose a per se restriction on importation, but acted as an absolute 
disincentive to importation by penalizing it and making it "prohibitively costly."915  
 
The Panel in Colombia – Ports of Entry summarized its understanding of the wide scope of Article XI:1 GATT as 
follows:916 
 
Thus, […], a number of GATT and WTO panels have recognized the applicability of Article XI:1 to 
measures which create uncertainties and affect investment plans, restrict market access for imports or make 
importation prohibitively costly, all of which have implications on the competitive situation of an importer. 
Moreover, it appears that findings in each of these cases were based on the design of the measure and its 
potential to adversely affect importation, as opposed to a standalone analysis of the actual impact of the 
measure on trade flows. 
 
In China–Raw Materials, the Appellate Body observed that the term “prohibition” is defined as a “legal ban on the 
trade or importation of a specified commodity.”917 Import bans were judged to be incompatible with Article XI:1 
GATT in, for instance, Canada–Periodicals, US–Shrimp and EC–Asbestos.918 The Panel in Canada–Herring and 
Salmon similarly struck down an export ban on unprocessed forms of salmon and herring.919 The Appellate Body in 
China – Raw Materials referred to the term “restriction” as “[a] thing which restricts someone or something, a 
limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation.”920 
                                                        
increased transaction costs and would create uncertainties which could affect investment plans.” GATT Panel Report, Japan – Leather II (US) 
(1984), ¶ 55. 
912 GATT Panel Report, US – Superfund (1987). 
913 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Leather II (US) (1984). 
914 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semiconductors(1988). 
915 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (2007), ¶¶ 7.370-7.372. 
916 WTO Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry (2009), ¶7.240. 
917 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶319, finding support in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, 
W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 2363. 
918 See, WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada–Periodicals (1997), WTO Appellate Body Report, US–Shrimp (1998), and WTO Appellate 
Body Report, EC–Asbestos (2001). 
919  See, GATT Panel Report, Canada–Herring and Salmon (1988). 
920 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶319, finding support in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn, 




In its report in Argentina – Import Measures, the Appellate Body summarizes that “in our view, not every condition 
or burden placed on importation or exportation will be inconsistent with Article XI, but only those that are limiting, 
that is, those that limit the importation or exportation of products. [footnote omitted] Moreover, this limitation need 
not be demonstrated by quantifying the effects of the measure at issue; rather, such limiting effects can be 
demonstrated through the design, architecture, and revealing structure of the measure at issue considered in its 
relevant context.”921 
 
The Panel in Argentina – Import Measures furthermore discussed the relationship between Article XI:1 and Article 
VIII of the GATT 1994. It held that “irrespective of whether the [challenged measure] is considered to be a customs 
or import formality subject to the obligations contained in Article VIII of the GATT 1994, this fact per se does not 
exclude the applicability of Article XI:1 to the examination of the measure. Therefore, there is no impediment that 
prevents the Panel from examining the complainants’ claims against the [challenged measure] under Article XI:1 of 
the GATT 1994.”922 The Appellate Body upheld this part of the Panel’s reasoning.923 
 
Howse and Josling rather argued for a doctrinal approach to limiting the functional scope of export restrictive 
measures by introducing a “purpose and effect”-test rooted in Article VIII GATT.924 In their view, Article XI:1, 
when read in combination with Article VIII GATT, “clarifies that the disciplines in Article VIIII on fees and charges 
do not prevent the use of export taxes as permitted by Article XI:1, but it also suggests that what was understood by 
an export tax was a measure imposed for fiscal (e.g. revenue-raising) purposes.”925 
 
These authors support their doctrinal reading of a narrow “purpose” of Article XI GATT, by a reading of India – 
Autos, such that “[t]he broad scope of Article XI as identified in the jurisprudence (India–Autos, report of the panel) 
and the application of purposive interpretation to Article XI (also endorsed in India–Autos) provides a basis for 
                                                        
921 WTO Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import Measures (2015), ¶5.217. 
922 WTO Panel Report, Argentina – Import Measures (2014), ¶6.444. 
923 WTO Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import Measures (2015), ¶5.264. 
924 Robert Howse and Tim Josling, “Agricultural Export Restrictions and International Trade Law: A Way Forward,” International Food and 
Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC) Position Paper, 2012. 
925 Id., p. 17. 
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interpreting the meaning of export taxes narrowly, excluding those with predominantly trade-restricting as opposed 
to revenue-raising purposes.”926 
 
However, as Ehring and Chianale observe that “[n]othing in the negotiating history or practice of the GATT 
suggests that the words ‘duties, taxes or other charges’ in Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 should be read 
narrowly.”927 Moreover, the introduction and maintenance of export taxes is legal, unless constraints by further 
bindings, as long as they satisfy the MFN condition – that is, they cannot operate discriminatory to confer an 
advantage to one party over another. 
 
Espa furthermore adds that, even if such differentiation were practically possible,928 “a purposive differentiation 
between permitted and non- permitted custom duties does arguably not exist for import tariffs, and Article XI:1 is 
structured entirely symmetrically on the import and export sides.” She notes that “[a]s per Article II:1(b), WTO 
Members are free to impose import duties, irrespective of their rationale, insofar as they are not in excess of levels 
set forth in their GATT Schedules.”929 
 
I concur and argue that the embedded standard of review for the construction of Article XI:1 GATT 1994 should be 
mindful of its object and purpose to maximize the scope and effect of tariffication, such that trade nations can 
predominantly protect themselves through operation of tariffs only. The preamble to the GATT 1947 makes such 
sufficient clear, where it dictates that the arrangements of the GATT are “directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.”  
 
This integral reading of the scope of Article XI:1 GATT 1994 is furthermore supported by all three elements of 
Kantorowicz’ triptych. Doctrinally, there seems broad support in both persuasive reasoning by the Appellate Body 
                                                        
926 Id., p. 17. 
927 Lothar Ehring and Gian Franco Chianale, “Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy,” in Yulia Selivanova, ed., Regulation of Energy in 
International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2012), p. 120; see also, Ilaria Espa, Export 
Restrictions on Critical Minerals and Metals: Testing the Adequacy of WTO Disciplines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 142. 
928 Note that, in Chapter 2, supra, I argue that such differentiation is not only practical at the domestic level, but scientifically possible. I take 
advantage of the nested nature of the patterns of economic diversification (ϖt,n,j) and innovation (ωj,). 
929 Ilaria Espa, Export Restrictions on Critical Minerals and Metals: Testing the Adequacy of WTO Disciplines (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), p. 142, fn. 56. She further observes that “[m]oreover, on the import side, developing countries enjoy greater flexibility in 
the use of import duties in that they are not required to make concessions inconsistent with their ‘development, financial and trade needs’.” (fn. 56), 
see GATT Doc. L/4903, BISD 26S/203, Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries 
(The Enabling Clause), November 28, 1979, ¶5. 
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and Panels, as well as in the structure and object and purpose of the GATT 1947 and GATT 1994. Normatively, a 
broad construction of the scope and ambit of Article XI:1 GATT 1994 clearly supports the security and 
predictability of the multilateral trading system. And, while the interpretation is expansive, it is not clear that the 
Appellate Body has exceeded its mandate not to diminish or add to the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements. 
 
Lastly, also economically, a broad interpretation of Article XI:1 GATT 1994 is sensible. Tariffs have marked 
economic benefits over quantitative restrictions, both in terms of the allocation and size of the surplus associated 
with trade (see Chapter 2, supra). Further support for interpreting Article XI:1 GATT broadly, aimed at purposive 
tariffication of trade restrictive policies, can be found in the labor of the Working Party to Article XI GATT; which 
concluded in 1950 that the GATT: 
 
[…] does not permit the imposition of restrictions upon the export of a raw material in order to protect or 
promote a domestic industry, whether by affording a price advantage to that industry for the purchase of its 
materials, or by reducing the supply of such materials available to foreign competitors, or by other means. 
However, it was agreed that the question of the objective of any given export restriction would have to be 
determined on the bases of the facts in each individual case.930 
 
This approach to the headline rule of Article XI:1 GATT 1994 corresponds to a contextualized rule/exception 
interpretation of the framework of the GATT 1994, as clarified by the Appellate Body in China – Publications. As 
Article XI:2(a) inherits the initial scope of Article XI:1, its characterization as an exemption provision (rather than 
an exception) in the GATT 1994 determines application of the appropriate standard of review. This embedded 
standard of review furthermore directs the adjudicator’s understanding of the provision’s object and purpose in the 
GATT 1994, which is informed by the preambles of both the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement. 
 
C. Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994: Exception v. Exemption  
 
 
Article XI:2 General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
1. […] 
 
2.The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following: 
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products 
essential to the exporting contracting party; […] 
 
                                                        
930 Report of the Working Party “D” on Quantitative Restrictions, GATT/CP.4/33, (March 28, 1950), pp. 1-2, 4. (emphasis added) 
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Pre-contractual or political collaboration among sovereigns occurs to pursue beneficial outcomes that cannot be 
realized in autarky. Once such collaboration is transformed into a multilateral treaty, such as the GATT 1994, the 
political imperatives for collaboration are transformed into legal obligations of collaboration (regardless of the 
strength or efficiency of the enforcement mechanism). As argued throughout, the adjudicator of the multilateral 
agreement is to construct the provisions and interpret the terms thereof in accordance with her understanding of the 
collaborative intent of Parties that is internal to the document: its object and purpose, informed by relevant 
declarations of intent in the preamble(s). Any other approach leaves the decision maker exposed to the vagaries of 
Power and Utopia, or, in the absence of homogeneity among the Membership, invites her to commit the historicism-
fallacy of imposing an origin-becoming narrative on a multi-directional document. 
 
Exception and exemption provisions ensure that the “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” of the 
GATT/WTO headline rules are given effect so as to contribute to the agreement’s underlying collaborative 
objectives of “expanding the production of and trade in goods and services […] in a manner consistent with 
[Member States’] respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.” The adjudicator, in 
her construction and interpretation of provisions such as Article XI:2(a) GATT, thus needs to be mindful of the 
“distributive as well as [the] integrative aspect […]”931 of the multilateral treaty. 
 
The language of Article XI:2(a) GATT was only recently interpreted by the WTO DRB, first in China – Raw 
Materials and thereafter in its delayed-twin, China - Rare Earth. Both cases concern export restrictive policies on 
raw materials and strategic commodities maintained by China. In July 2016, a third challenge to China’s export 
restrictive regime, China – Raw Materials II, was initiated by the European Union and the United States in 
parallel.932 In line with these cases and the argumentative focus in this work, I will only consider export restrictive 
policies impacting industrial products, or products other than foodstuffs. 
 
                                                        
931 I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “Introduction: Return to the Theories of Cooperation,” in I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, 
eds., International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 7. 
932 Reuters, “EU Launches WTO Challenge to Chinese Raw Material Duties,” July, 19, 2016; See, WTO, China – Raw Materials II (US/EU), 
DS508/DS509, Panel established November 23, 2016, but yet composed (as of April 5, 2017). 
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In all three cases complaints challenged China’s maintenance of export restrictive measures on different raw 
materials. The measures instituted by China run the gamut: (i) export duties; (ii) export quotas; (iii) export quotas 
management (iv) minimum export price requirements; (v) export licensing requirements; and (vi) administration and 
publication of trade regulations. The WTO challenge of these measures rely, in relevant part, on China’s presumed 
violation of Article XI GATT 1994 and Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. China defended against these 
challenges by invocation of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, the exemption provision to Article XI:1, and, in the 
alternative the general exception provision of Article XX(b) and XX(g) GATT 1994 – the latter in relation both to 
its alleged Article XI:1 GATT 1994 violation as well as its alleged violation of Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession 
Protocol. 
 
In its interpretation of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, the Panel broke the language of the provision into three key 
elements: "essential products," "temporarily applied," and "critical shortage." Of course, the way any provision is 
broken down betrays, to some extent, a preference for the interaction, or lack thereof, between particular phrases or 
the sequence of the words chosen – nonetheless I will follow Panel’s ordering as it does not materially prejudice the 
substantive interpretation thereof. 
 
Accordingly, this section centrally examines the relationship between Article XI:1 and Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994. 
It will argue that the Panels and Appellate Body have misconstrued the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) 
GATT 1994 by reading it in the context of the exception provision Article XX GATT. Furthermore, this section will 
seek to apply the construction-cum-interpretation theory argued in Chapter 4, supra, such as to read the scope of the 
terms of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 broadly. This section will furthermore include an observation on the contextual 
importance of Member State’s permanent sovereignty to its natural resources,933 as well as indicate the scope for a 
national security-based defense. 
 
The next section explores the relationship of the Accession Protocol to the provisions of the covered agreements. 
 
 
                                                        
933  WTO Panel Report, China–Raw Materials (2011), ¶¶7.377–7.381; WTO Panel Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶¶7.262. 
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1. Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994: Essential Products 
 
In its assessment of “essential products,” the Panel embarks on a case by case analysis where “a product may be 
‘essential’ within the meaning of Article XI:2(a) when it is ‘important’ or ‘necessary’ or ‘indispensable’ to a 
particular Member.” Importantly, “[t]his may include a product that is an ‘input’ to an important product or 
industry.”934 While the Panel found comfort in its observation that “the phrase ‘to the exporting’ Member appears to 
have been added to the initial draft of Article XI:2(a) to clarify that ‘the importance of any product should be judged 
in relation to the particular country concerned’,”935 it noted that a Member “may [not], on its own, determine 
whether a product is essential to it.”936 
 
In the Panel's view, “the determination of whether a product is ‘essential’ to that Member should take into 
consideration the particular circumstances faced by that Member at the time when a Member applies a restriction or 
prohibition under Article XI:2(a).”937 If complete discretion was intended, so the Panel considered, the drafting 
would have included the “it considers”-language of the national security exception of Article XXI(b) GATT.938 
 
In an attempt to further widen the scope of “essential products” in Article XI:2(a), China noted pro-development 
passages in the preamble of the GATT 1994. In particular, China argued that the preamble’s emphasis on the 
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development and in a manner 
consistent with Members respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, was well 
placed to offer additional interpretative guidance. It offered additional support for a “pro-development” reading of 
“essential products” in Article XI:2(a) by pointing to the principles and objectives of Part IV GATT, in particular 
Article XXXVI:5 GATT.939 
                                                        
934 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.282. 
935 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.275. 
936 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.276. 
937 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.276. 
938 The “it considers” language has been examined in a slightly different context in relation to the international investment arbitration 
proceedings following the Argentine economic crisis of 1998-2002, see for example, Jose E. Alvarez, “The Return of the State,” 20(2) Minnesota 
Journal of International Law 223 (2011); and Stephan Schill and Robyn Briese, “’If the State Considers’: Self-Judging Clauses in International 
Dispute Settlement,” 13(1) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online, 61 (2009); See Section IV.B.4, infra. 
939 Article XXXVI:5 GATT 1994 reads: “The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-developed contracting parties will be facilitated 
by a diversification* of the structure of their economies and the avoidance of an excessive dependence on the export of primary products. There is, 
therefore, need for increased access in the largest possible measure to markets under favourable conditions for processed and manufactured products 
currently or potentially of particular export interest to less-developed contracting parties.” [*] The Note Ad on “diversification” in Article XXXVI:5 




The Panel summarizes China’s argument thus “that Article XXXVI:5 and its Ad Note support the view that Article 
XI:2(a) may be applied to address a product that is important to domestic processing industries. China submits that 
Article XXXVI:5 shows that the essential nature of a "primary product" for a developing country may derive from 
the product's role in securing economic diversification through the development of domestic processing 
industries.”940 
 
The Panel however, agreeing with the European Union, held that Article XXXVI:5 GATT should not be read such 
that it would create different obligations for developing and developed countries; especially as Article XXXVI:5 
focuses on market access as opposed to the imposition of quantitative restrictions under consideration in Article 
XI:2(a) GATT.941 The Panel held that “an assessment of whether a product is ‘essential’ under Article XI:2(a) would 
[…] call for a case-by- case analysis.”942 
 
The complainants in China – Raw Materials furthermore put forth that the inclusion of "foodstuffs" in the scope of 
the provision is relevant to convey the level of importance of the other products that are contemplated by the 
provision, such that those products can be considered “indispensable to” or “pertaining to the essence of” the 
exporting Member. Complainants thus argue that a broad reading of the notion of “essential products” in Article 
XI:2(a) could exceed the confounds of Article XI GATT and make the general exception of Article XX(i) 
redundant.943 
 
The Appellate Body summarily discusses the importance of “essential” in its Report in China – Raw Materials, by 
means of a Textualist examination of the word. It concludes that the term "essential" is defined as "[a]bsolutely 
                                                        
development of manufacturing industries, taking into account the situation of the particular contracting party and the world outlook for production 
and consumption of different commodities.” 
940 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.265. 
941 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶¶ 7.271 and 7.280. 
942 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.279. 
943 Article XX(i), together with the Chapeau to Article XX GATT, observes that Members are otherwise free to adopt measures “involving 
restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during 
periods when the domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; Provided that such 
restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart from the provisions 
of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination.” 
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indispensable or necessary."944 Accordingly the Appellate Body observes that, “Article XI:2(a) refers to critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or otherwise absolutely indispensable or necessary products.” It however moderates this 
position by arguing that “by including, in particular, the word ‘foodstuffs’, Article XI:2(a) provides a measure of 
what might be considered a product ‘essential to the exporting Member’ but it does not limit the scope of other 
essential products to only foodstuffs.”945 
 
In its summary of China’s argument, the Panel seems to have only acknowledged two of the three arguments China 
made: 1. Read Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 against the preamble of the WTO Agreement; 2. This reading is 
supported by Part IV, in particular Article XXXVI:5 GATT 1994; and 3. Any assessment of “essential products” is 
subject to a case-by-case analysis. While the Panel accepted the necessity for a case-by-case reading, it rejected 
reliance on Part IV on grounds that it would infuse Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 with different obligations for 
developing and mature markets. It however ignored the first element of China’s argument, which points to relevant 
language in the preamble. 
 
As argued in Chapters 1 and 4, supra, the first and central analytical step in constructing any provision is 
clarification of the embedded standard of review. I argue that the appropriate standard of review applicable to 
exemption provisions should be sensitive to the developmental (or distributive) components of the collaborative 
intent of Parties, as found in the preamble. China, correctly, started its argumentation here, which should have led 
the Panel to adopt the multilateral standard of review, leading to an “open” construction of the exemption provision. 
Furthermore, even a plain reading of the text of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 should lead to the conclusion that it 
inherits the broad scope attributed to Article XI:1 GATT 1994. 
 
Note that such “open” construction does not, of itself, create separate obligations for developing or mature markets, 
but merely recognizes the sociological/economic preference heterogeneity that is inherent to the Membership. Both 
mature and developing countries should, under exemption provisions, be provided leeway to pursue locally optimal 
economic policies – fitted to the terms of the provision on a case-by-case basis. The Panel’s rejection of an overt 
                                                        
944 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶326; citing W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson, eds, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
6th edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 865. 
945 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶326. 
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development context and its insistence that a Member “may [not], on its own, determine whether a product is 
essential to it”946 is therefore unproblematic.  
 
The adjudicator in construing exemption provisions in an “open” manner, pursuant their assessment of the 
multilatreal standard of review, needs to be mindful of the additional doctrinal and normative constraints that guide 
her judicial decision. 
 
The Appellate Body stresses the doctrinal constraints by reading “essential” in a Textualist manner. However 
constraining its reading is, both theoretically and in practice, it does not unequivocally close the door on inclusion of 
industrial products in the category of “essential products,” but sets a high bar. The Appellate Body’s doctrinal 
reading furthermore contents well with the possible meaning of “essential products” in the GATT 1947, but with the 
advent of the WTO Agreement and the establishment of the GATT 1994, such historical teleology is less compelling 
in the present case. Instead, I plead that the Appellate Body should have given more weight to the object and 
purpose analysis of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 when interpreting its terms. This would have led the Appellate Body 
to recognize the provision as providing an exemption to Article XI:1 GATT 1994 early on in its analysis. 
 
Normatively, both the Panel and Appellate Body’s reading of “essential products” can be considered in line with the 
objective expectations of the Membership, as determined by the language of the provisions, the object and purpose 
of the GATT 1994, and generally by the obligation to maintain the security and predictability of the multilateral 
trading system. 
 
Adjudication of conflicting policy preferences occurring under exemption provisions should not turn on the decision 
maker’s unidirectional socio/economic preference as applied to the factual matrix.947 Instead, a considerable degree 
of deference is appropriate when fitting locally optimally policies to the terms of the exemption provision. In order 
to present a true “hard case” though, it is essential that the Member State’s policy preference should itself be applied 
temporarily and be particular to the developmental coordination problem it addresses.948 
                                                        
946 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.276. 
947 See Daniel Lovric, Deference to the Legislature in WTO Challenges to Legislation (The Hague: Wolters Kluwer, 2010). 




2. Article XI:2(a): “Restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages” 
 
After delineating the meaning of “essential” products, the analytical emphasis falls on the construction of 
“temporarily” in relation to “applied,” and of “temporarily” to “critical.” The scope of these relationships needs, so I 
argue, to be construed with reference to the appropriate context, such that the object and purpose of the provision are 
clarified. Instead of reading the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) in broad harmony with the GATT 1994, to 
which it does not apply generally, I argue that its appropriate understanding is tied to Article XI:1 GATT 1994 
alone. By stressing this close relationship, the adjudicator maintains her flexibility to account for the sincere 
preference heterogeneity of the Membership when confronted with hard cases. 
 
In line with the Appellate Body’s favored interpretative method, Textualism, it examines the words “temporarily,” 
“critical” and “shortages” with the aid of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.949 When giving meaning to the 
language of Article XI:2(a), the Appellate Body considers however that words are not to be read in isolation and that 
in their context they “impart meaning to each other,” in such a way as to “define the scope of Article XI:2(a).” 
 
The Panel and Appellate Body both recognize, in their reports in China – Raw Materials, that “temporarily” is the 
pivotal term in the sentence “restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages.” Within the 
syntax of the sentence, “temporarily” unambiguously informs the term “applied.” The Appellate Body’s Textualist 
analysis reveals that the phrase “temporarily applied” is indicative of “a measure applied for a limited time, a 
measure taken to bridge a ‘passing need’.” As the Appellate Body holds: “the definitional element of ‘supply[ing] a 
passing need’ suggests that Article XI:2(a) refers to measures that are applied in the interim.”950 This is a fairly 
uncontested reading of the phrase “temporarily applied.” 
 
                                                        
949 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶¶ 322-329; Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edn., W.R. Trumble, 
A. Stevenson, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
950 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 323. 
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The Appellate Body however extends the interpretative range of “temporary” beyond “applied” to inform “critical” 
as well.951 This linguistic extension is facilitated either through use of the words “relieve” and “prevent,” as argued 
by the European Union, or to clarify the duration of the critical shortage, as argued by the Appellate Body.  
 
China submits that the term “critical” relates to shortage and refers to "a deficiency in quantity that rises to the level 
of decisive importance or crisis, or that raises uncertainty or risk of the same."952 Complainants rather argue that in 
so doing China conflates the "essentialness" and "critical shortage" questions, the effect of which is to read "critical 
shortage" out of Article XI:2(a) GATT. The complainants accept China's definition of "shortage" as referring to "a 
deficiency in quantity", but add that the term "critical" means "in the nature of or constituting a crisis or of decisive 
importance."953 
 
Complainants subsequently argue that, for a shortage to be "critical", it must rise to "a level beyond mere 'relative 
scarcity'," and that the existence of "supply constraints,” […], would not suffice to establish the existence of a 
"critical shortage" under Article XI:2(a).954 The complainants point to a statement by a representative of the United 
Kingdom that, "if you take out the word 'critical', almost any product that is essential will be alleged to have a 
degree of shortage and could be brought within the scope of this approach."955 
 
The European Union further argued that the words "critical shortage" must be read within the context of the entire 
provision of Article XI:2(a), such that a restriction must be "temporarily applied", and must be "relieving" the 
critical shortage, or "preventing" its occurrence. In other words, for a "shortage" to be "critical" in the sense of 
Article XI:2(a), that shortage must be, inter alia, temporary, i.e., limited in duration.956 If there is no possibility for 
the shortage ever to cease to exist, the European Union submits that it would not be possible to "relieve or prevent" 
it through an export restriction applied only for a limited period of time.957 
                                                        
951 This extension of the interpretative realm of “temporarily applied” to include “critical” is driven in large part by the Appellate Body’s 
perceived necessity to distinguish the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a)GATT from the General Exceptions of Article XX(g) and (j) (see 
Section V.A.4, infra). 
952 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.284 
953 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), 289; fn. 481; Complainants' joint opening oral statement at the first substantive meeting, 
¶ 140. 
954 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), 289 
955 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.292, fn 486; Complainants' joint opening oral statement at the first substantive 
meeting, ¶ 143, referring to Exhibit CHN-181; United States' second written submission, ¶ 231; Mexico's second written submission, ¶ 236. 
956 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.290. 




The Appellate Body rather comes to the conclusion that “whether a shortage is ‘critical’ may be informed by how 
‘essential’ a particular product is.”958 More importantly perhaps, the Appellate Body observes that “[i]n addition, the 
characteristics of the product as well as factors pertaining to a critical situation, may inform the duration for which a 
measure can be maintained in order to bridge a passing need in conformity with Article XI:2(a).”959 Taken together 
the Appellate Body notes that “critical shortage" should be read so as to refer “to those deficiencies in quantity that 
are crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or a 
turning point.”960 
 
The Appellate Body however proceeds to read its “critical shortage” in relation to Article XX(j) GATT to 
distinguish the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a)GATT from the General Exceptions of Article XX(g) and (j). 
When considering the provision of Article XI:2(a) in the framework of the entire agreement, the Appellate Body 
finds appropriate context to the construction of “critical shortage” in “the words ‘general or local short supply’ in 
Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994.”961  In fact, the Appellate Body relates Article XI:2(a) even more directly to 
Article XX(j) GATT, when it holds that “[c]ontrary to Article XI:2(a), however, Article XX(j) does not include the 
word ‘critical’, or another adjective further qualifying the short supply. We must give meaning to this difference in 
the wording of these provisions. To us, it suggests that the kinds of shortages that fall within Article XI:2(a) are 
more narrowly circumscribed than those falling within the scope of Article XX(j).”962 
 
I disagree with the reasoning of the Appellate Body on two grounds: First, I submit that the Appellate Body 
effectively collapses the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) into a “critical shortage”-test, which; second, the 
Appellate Body contextualizes with the exception provision Article XX(j) GATT. Instead, I will argue that the 
constructive context of Article XI:2(a) is determined by its scope and character alone, as appropriately determined 
by the embedded standard of review. The interpretative context is, as a result, limited to the Article XI GATT 1994 
                                                        
958 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 328. 
959 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 328. 
960 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 324. 
961 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 325. In interpreting the use by WTO Members of policy preference 
provisions and General Exceptions in the GATT, the Panel furthermore found guidance “in marking out the line of equilibrium by the requirement 
that exceptional measures be ‘applied temporarily’ to address ‘critical’ shortages under Article XI:2(a).” 
962 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 325 (emphasis added). 
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alone. It is also here that the permanent sovereignty to natural resources can play an informative role as further 
context to this exemption provision in the GATT 1994. 
 
The decision maker, in her construction and interpretation of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, must balance her open 
construction of the exemption provision with the constraints imposed on her by applicable doctrinal and normative 
teleologies. Hereunder I first examine the fit of an open construction of the analytical components examined in this 
section (note that construction of “essential” products in accordance with the multilateral standard of review was 
found to be beneficial). Thereafter I confront the construction with applicable doctrinal and normative constraints. 
Lastly, an alternative interpretation of the terms “restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages” is given. 
 
An open construction of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 follows the multilateral standard of review, such that it 
recognizes both the object and purpose of provision set against the context of the GATT 1994 and accords meaning 
to the character of the provision as an exemption to the rule/exception framework of the GATT/WTO.963 The 
character of Article XI:2(a) GATTT as an exemption provision is confirmed by a reading of its opening sentence: 
“The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following.” The scope of the provision is thus 
both determined by and limited to the provisions of “paragraph 1 of this Article.” It is thus expressly tied to and 
contained by Article XI:1 GATT 1994. Furthermore, the language instructs in an imperative way that the provisions 
of paragraph 1 “shall not extend” to the provisions of the following paragraphs – these are “exempted” from 
coverage of the bindings of Article XI:1 GATT 1994. 
 
As Mavroidis observes, “indeed, exemptions could in principle, be left out not only from the coverage of Article 
XI.1 GATT, but from the coverage of GATT altogether. […]It seems that panels have adopted two different 
solutions with respect to exemptions simply because some of them are disciplined in the body of Article XI of 
GATT (food shortages), whereas, some others in a different provision, namely in Article II of GATT (customs 
                                                        
963 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222-223; building on WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), 
p. 30, where it held that “so far as concerns the WTO, [Member State legislative autonomy] is circumscribed only by the need to respect the 
requirement of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements.” 
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duties). Case law has been treating the exemptions embedded in Article XI.2 of GATT as if they were 
exceptions.”964 
 
As noted above, the appropriate standard of review for exemption provisions emphasizes the distributive element of 
the preamble. This understanding of the appropriate character of the embedded standard of review is further 
reinforced by the Appellate Body’s understanding that “With respect to trade, the WTO Agreement and its Annexes 
[] operate to, among other things, discipline the exercise of each Member's inherent power to regulate by requiring 
WTO Members to comply with the obligations that they have assumed thereunder.”965 Naturally, an exemption 
provision relieves the Member State of specific bindings upon its inherent powers to adopt locally optimal policies – 
it is by its very nature an exemption to the integral rule/exception framework. 
 
Where the Appellate Body construes the scope of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 in relation 
to the General Exceptions of Article XX, or, arguendo, the developmental exception provision in Article XVIII(c) 
GATT 1994, it first violates the scope of the exemption provision and, second, applies a uniform standard of review 
across provisions that have a different application structure and scope (for example Articles VIII and XX GATT 
1994).966 The Panel in China – Raw Materials similarly observes that “the reach of Article XI:2(a) would not be the 
same as that of Article XX(g); they are intended to address different situations and thus must mean different 
things.”967 
 
The adjudicator engages in an open construction of exemption provisions in the GATT 1994, not to favor one 
implementation preference over another, but to positively recognize the heterogeneity that exists in the Membership. 
In this way, the adjudicator seeks to do justice to sincere sociological/economic conflicts between the Member 
States in the matter before her. Her constructive and interpretational space is critically contained not merely by her 
desire to find a balanced outcome to the economic conflict, but also by the demands of normative and doctrinal 
teleology that circumscribe her ability to come to a judicial decision in the hard case before her. 
                                                        
964 Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 140. 
965 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222 
966 WTO Appellate Body, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.64. 




Doctrinally, Article XI:2(a) accepts its original scope from Article XI:1 GATT, to which it closely relates. I argued 
for a broad reading of this scope and will proceed on that basis here. Similarly, the concept of “essential” products 
was found to be fairly broad and within the purview of defendant. As Article XI:2(a) is an affirmative defense, the 
party that invokes it carries the initial burden of proof. Although this allocation of the burden of proof comports to 
the practice of the Panel and Appellate Body, it is nonetheless controversial. An exemption provision might be said 
to shift the burden of proof to complainant, as Mavroidis observes: “This would suggest that the complainant would 
have to show that a measure is a QR, in the sense of Article XI.1 of GATT, and is not a measure featured in Article 
XI.2 of GATT.”968 
 
As I argue in Chapter 4, supra, when the multilateral standard of review commands an open construction of Article 
XI:2(a) GATT 1994, the implied deference when fitting the contested policy measure to the terms of the provision 
has to satisfy the conditions of Oates’ Decentralization Theorem: 1. no centralization gains; and 2. limited inter-
jurisdictional spill-over. The Oates’ Decentralization Theorem thus serves to yard stick to the burden of proof of the 
defended, or, to mitigate the deference suggested by the switching of the burden of proof to the complainant. 
 
Rather uncontroversial however is the idea that “temporary measures” are those measures that are restricted in time 
and related to a “passing need.” This “passing need” consequently has to reach the level of a “critical shortage.” The 
disagreement that exists about the economics hereof I will address under the “economics” heading hereunder. 
 
The European Union reads Article XI:2(a) to take the measures themselves as center of gravity. It tests whether the 
contested measures are capable of the prevention and relief of a “critical shortage” when temporarily applied. As 
such, this reasoning offers a contrast in the effective duration of measures that correctly fall under Article XI:2(a) 
and those that target conservation of resources, ex Article XX(g) GATT. 
 
                                                        
968 Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade (Boston: MIT Press, 2016), p. 140. 
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The Panel agrees and concludes that “an interpretation that Article XI:2(a) permits the application of a measure for a 
limited time under limited circumstances would be in harmony with the protection that may be available to a 
Member under Article XX(g), […].”969 
 
The Appellate Body however lets the characteristics of the products and the factual matrix directly inform the 
duration of the “critical shortage.” It thus instructs “temporarily” to speak to “critical” without the facilitative benefit 
of the object and purpose of the measures (and indeed of the provision): to prevent or relieve such critical 
shortage.970 This crucial and consequential difference in construction not only changes the character of the 
exemption provision, but also constricts the scope of the provision in relation to Article XI:1 GATT. 
 
While the constructions of the EU and the Appellate Body are closely related, they crucially invite a different 
context: The EU reads the different elements of Article XI:2(a) within the provision as a whole and as a function of 
the object and purpose of the measure itself, whereas the Appellate Body’s focus rests on the character of the critical 
shortage which compels it to read the provision in relation to the General Exception of short supply in Article XX(j) 
GATT. I resist extending the appropriate substantive context (the disputed measure, as applied to relieve or prevent 
a critical shortage) of Article XI:2(a) beyond its relationship with Article XI:1 GATT971 and argue that the scope of 
the provision follows the context thereof (i.e. essential products). 
 
In a subsequent case, India – Solar Panels, the WTO Panel is called on, for the first time, to interpret Article XX(j) 
GATT as a General Exception. In construing the term “in general or local short supply” the Panel revisits the 
Appellate Body holding in China – Raw Materials,972 where it read the term “critical shortage” in Article XI:2(a) 
GATT in the context of Article XX(i). 
                                                        
969 WTO Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.257. 
970 Against this background it is noteworthy that the Panel in China – Raw Materials considers the submissions from Brazil and Canada in its 
report. Brazil submits that situations “where the shortage of products [can] not be overcome, but only managed over time, [these] are better 
addressed under Article XX(g).”  Similarly, Canada in her submission observes that “measures may not be applied under Article XI:2(a) for an 
indefinite period, but may only be applied for a fixed time.” Canada further notes that, “while Article XI:2 is subject to the particular requirements 
set out in each paragraph, Article XX is subject to additional requirements, specifically, those contained in the chapeau to Article XX.” See, WTO 
Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.254; and see fn. 432 433 thereto: Brazil's third party oral statement, ¶ 9; Canada's third party oral 
submission, ¶17. 
971 Note that The Appellate Body, in its report US – Shrimp, explicated that Article XX GATT sets forth “limited and conditional exceptions 
from the obligations of the substantive provisions of the GATT.” (WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶157). The Panel, in China 
– Raw Materials, however explicitly acknowledges that “Article XI:2(a) operates as an exception, but only with respect to the obligations contained 
in Article XI:1, and not with respect to GATT obligations more broadly” (WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶ 7.300). 




The Panel in India - Solar Panels considers that “the terms ‘products in general or local short supply’ refer to a 
situation in which the quantity of available supply of a product, from all sources, does not meet demand in a relevant 
geographical area or market.”973 This is in line with the Appellate Body’s Textualist reading of “shortage” in Article 
XI:2(a) GATT to refer to a “deficiency in quantity.”974 
 
In determining the scope of the products considered by Article XX(j), the Panel notes “that in contrast to Article 
XI:2(a), which refers to ‘essential products’, Article XX(j) refers to ‘products’ without any such qualification. We 
therefore consider that the terms ‘products in general or local short supply’ includes not only any situation, but also 
any product, in respect of which the quantity of available supply, from all sources, does not meet demand.”975 
 
While I argue that, doctrinally, the appropriate substantive context of Article XI:2(a) is found in Article XI:1 GATT 
1994 and its scope determined by a broad interpretation of “products essential” to the exporting Member State, I 
note that the determination of what constitutes a “critical shortage” requires economic conviction. 
 
The sociological/economic argument, centers on the understanding of a “critical shortage” within the scope of 
Article XI:2(a) GATT (i.e. “products essential to the exporting contracting party”). While both complainants and 
defendants agree that a critical shortage refers to “a deficiency in quantity that rises to the level of decisive 
importance or crisis,” complainants offer three additional perspectives. 
 
First, complainants argue that an interpretation that emphasizes “quantitative deficiency” conflates the “critical 
shortage” and “essential product” elements. In so far as this argument depends on the doctrinal discussion above it is 
not applicable here. The remaining economic aspect of this argument suggests that while the designation of any 
product as “essential” is rooted in the domestic context, its limits should be provided by market signals. That is, the 
                                                        
973 WTO Panel Report, India – Solar Panels (2016), ¶7.234 (emphasis added): “our view is that a product is "in general or local short supply" 
when the quantity of available supply of that product, from all sources, does not meet demand in the relevant geographical area or market in 
question. This includes all available sources of supply, including both foreign and domestic sources. Domestic manufacturing capacity is therefore 
one variable that must be taken into account to assess whether solar cells and modules are products in short supply in India. In other words, our 
view is that a lack of domestic production in the products at issue is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for finding that supply of that product, 
from all sources, does not meet demand in the relevant geographical area or market in question.” 
974 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 324. 
975 WTO Panel Report, India – Solar Panels (2016), ¶7.232. 
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affirmative arguments of the invoking Member State are conceptually bound by signals of the market place. As the 
underlying market mechanics similarly constrain the meaning of “essentialness” and “critical shortage,” they are – 
essentially – similar concepts from an economic principles perspective. 
 
This argument however reflects a mature growth perspective on markets and their operation. A Developmental or 
catch-up growth perspective rather emphasizes the importance of the non-unique mapping of markets to optimal 
policies (these categories rationally differ between markets and growth models). Most importantly however, 
adoption of a catch-up growth perspective re-introduces the additional skill information that was lost in the 
“inflating balloon” perspective on economic growth (see Chapter 1, supra). A “case-by-case” assessment of 
“essentialness” that is explicitly susceptible to the plight of downstream industries captures this difference and 
translates it elegantly to the text of Article XI:2(a). 
 
Second, the complainants make a related argument based on the operation of the market and – implicitly – the 
operation of the price mechanism. Their argument to give enhanced meaning to the word “critical” draws on the 
operation of “supply and demand,” such that "if you take out the word 'critical', almost any product that is essential 
will be alleged to have a degree of shortage and could be brought within the scope of this approach." As noted in the 
doctrinal discussion, the Panel in India – Solar Panels extends the meaning of Article XX(j) GATT to all products 
on precisely this ground in light of the omission of “critical” in that provision. 
 
Reliance on the fundamentally limited nature of “supply” to narrow application of Article XI:2(a) to those situations 
of extreme misalignment between demand and supply on account of an external shock or calamity, crucially seeks to 
re-impose the limitations Howse and Josling argued in relation to Article XI:1 GATT, supra. It is not clear, 
economically nor doctrinally, that the object and purpose of Article XI GATT 1994 excludes export restrictive 
policies temporarily maintained as industrial policy (note that the relationship to Article XVIII(c) GATT 1994 is 




Indeed, a policy-induced temporary glut or shortage can have structural effects, provided firms shift their production 
accordingly. This, in fact, anchors the proposed difference between “commercial” and “developmental” policies, as 
argued for in Chapter 1, supra, and adopted throughout. 
 
Third, the doctrinal construction put forth by the European Union has the benefit of directly addressing the possible 
effectiveness of the measure to prevent or relieve the “critical shortage.” I agree with this approach as it closely 
follows the distinction between “commercial” and “developmental” policies. A policy incapable of bringing about 
the desired result is not suited and cannot find the protection of a policy flexibility provision – especially 
considering the object and purpose of Article XI and the GATT/WTO as a whole. 
 
The adjudicator, when construing the exemption provision and fitting the contested domestic policy to the text of the 
multilateral agreement, is constrained by her normative teleology; namely to safeguard the security and 
predictability of the multilateral trading system (Article 3.2 DSU). As noted in Chapter 4, supra, the predictability 
demanded in 3.2 DSU points to a predictability of process, rather than a predictability of outcome. The concept of 
security in the GATT/WTO is closely related to the maintenance of the objective expectations of Member States and 
is informed by the adjudicator’s understanding of the balance of rights and obligations that are conceded and 
retained by the Membership. 
 
Recognition of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 as an exemption provision, limited in scope to Article XI:1 GATT 1994, 
adds to the predictability of the adjudicatory process. By according the exemption provision its proper place, the 
rule/exception structure of the GATT 1994 is reinforced. In fact, the scope accorded to the exemption provision 
calibrates, as a third element, the balanced construction of GATT and other covered agreements. An open 
construction of the exemption provision in Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 furthermore shields the Panel from having to 
engage the economic preferences of Member States in an ad hoc fashion;976 i.e. trying to positive determine when 
                                                        
976 The Appellate Body in its Report, US – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (2012), for example noted 
that it “would expect that in such circumstances the panel would […] explain the economic rationale or theory that supports its intuition” (¶643). 
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the integrity of the market-based977 price mechanism is of central importance (such as in China – Raw Materials and 
China - Rare Earth)978 and when not (such as in Canada – FIT).979 
 
The security of the multilateral trading system at the level of market-participants is closely related to the exercise of 
“good faith” in recognizing the legitimate expectations as to the “conditions of competition”980   – most prominently 
the principle of non-discrimination. Clearly, the construction of the exemption provision and the interpretation of its 
terms must abide by this fundamental principle of the GATT 1994 and the WTO. As Chapter 1, supra, illustrates 
though, the temporary manipulation of prices in the market place for developmental reasons can be accomplished in 
a non-discriminatory fashion. In fact, a variety of policy measures have been found to be GATT-consistent which 
involve non-discriminatory price effects. 
 
The fitting of disputed policies to the terms of the provision is accomplished on a case-by-case basis. As argued, a 
good faith interpretation of the relationship between “temporarily applied” and “critical shortage” in Article XI:2(a) 
GATT needs be mindful of the heterogeneous implementation preferences among the Membership and shy away 
from favoring one economic policy outlook over another. Therefore, the bottleneck in the interpretation of the terms 
of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 is the appropriate assessment of “critical shortages,” such that it limits inter-
jurisdictional spill-overs and does not violate clear centralization gains. 
 
                                                        
977 In its Report in US – Section 301 Trade Act  the Panel, for example, connects the protection of the security and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system to the functioning “of the market-place and its different operators.” WTO Panel Report, US – Section 301 Trade Act 
(1999), ¶ 7.75. 
978 WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.156; citing WTO Panel Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶ 7.444; the 
Appellate Body concurred with the Panel in China – Rare Earth that the Chinese export restrictive regime under consideration might work to 
provide “perverse signals” to Chinese domestic consumers. It observed that “[w]hereas export quotas may reduce foreign demand […], they will 
also stimulate domestic consumption by effectively reserving a supply of low-price raw materials for use by domestic down- stream industries. 
They may also encourage relocation of rare earth-consuming industries to China.” 
979 In its Report in Canada – Feed-in Tariffs (2013), the Appellate Body notes that “[f]inal consumers at the retail level may not distinguish 
between electricity on the basis of generation technology, because all electricity fed into the grid is blended regardless of the energy generation 
technology used. However, at the wholesale level, the government's purchase decisions are shaped by its definition of the energy supply-mix.” In 
fact, so the Appellate Body observes, “[t]he decisions taken by the government on the energy supply-mix [...] necessarily dictate its electricity 
purchase decisions at the wholesale level. In this respect, where government decisions require a certain supply-mix, electricity from different 
generation technologies is not substitutable at the wholesale level.” (¶7.176) In its decision the Appellate thus recognizes that there might be 
information content (such as capacity information or skills, see Chapter 2, supra) attached to a “product” that the household does not take into 
account when formulating its demand composition – a demand composition which in turn shapes the course of the economy according to mature 
market theories of equilibrium growth. 
980 See, GATT Panel Report, Italy–Agricultural Machinery (1958), GATT Panel Report US–Taxes on Petroleum (Superfund) (1987), ¶5.1.9; 
and the WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan–Alcohol (1996), p 32 (see also WTO Panel Report, Japan–Alcohol (1996), ¶¶7.1-7.2). The WTO 
Panel Report, India–Patents (1997), ¶¶7.20-7.22 and fn. 81-84, declared it is a “well-established GATT principle” and provides a list of cases using 
legitimate expectations as a GATT-specific substantive principle protecting the conditions of competition. See for the development of the concept 
of substantive legitimate expectations in the common law, Mark Elliott, “From Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate Expectations in 
English Public Law,” Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper No. 5/2016 (January 2016). 
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The measure of deference I argue for preserves the predictability and security of the multilateral trading system, by 
introducing clear interpretative rules and reinforcing the legal structure of the GATT 1994. This method supporting 
the judicial decision maker further promotes the rule of law, where the “deferential standard of review [] itself 
become[s] part of the system, [] by explicit stipulation in the legal texts [and as] developed by case law. Then, it 
does not, if applied consistently and in a predictable manner, amount to legal uncertainty.”981 
 
3. Context to Exemption Provision: Permanent Sovereignty to Natural Resources 
 
As emphasized by the Appellate Body in US –Gasoline, the provisions of the GATT should not be interpreted “in 
clinical isolation from public international law.”982 In the context of China’s export restrictive policies on certain 
raw materials and rare earths the Panel and Appellate Body were invited to consider Article XX(g) GATT 1994 in 
the context of the GATT/WTO object and purpose of spurring “sustainable development” and a WTO Member's 
sovereign rights over their own natural resources.983 
 
Although I challenge the constructive connection between the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 
and the exception provision of Article XX(g) GATT 1994, the context provided by Member States’ permanent 
sovereignty to their natural resources remains instructive in interpreting “products essential” to the exporting 
Member State. 
 
In an examination of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body in China – Rare Earth held that the interpretative element 
“relates to” has to be construed with reference to the “rational connection” test, developed in US –Shrimp. 
Accordingly, for a measure to “relate to” conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g) GATT, it must 
demonstrate a “close and genuine relationship of ends and means”984 which is to be assessed on a case-by-case 
                                                        
981 Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 32-33. 
982  WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), at 17. 
983 UNGA Resolution, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 1803 (XVII), New York, December 14, 1962. See also, Nico Schrijver, 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
984 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶136. 
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basis.985 In particular, the “design and structure” of the contested measure, set “in their policy and regulatory 
context,” is considered informative (but not of itself decisive) by the Appellate Body.986 
 
The adjudicator is subsequently held to weigh these measures against the appropriate object and purpose of the 
GATT as it understands its operation in light of Article XX(g) GATT and the Member State’s permanent 
sovereignty to its natural resources.987 According to the Panels in China  - Raw Materials and China – Rare Earth, 
the term “conservation,” the pivotal term in Article XX(g) GATT, should be construed to allow Member States a 
measure of policy flexibility to determine their own conversation policy.988 However, conservation policies cannot 
be invoked to “excuse export restrictions adopted in aid of economic development if they operate to increase 
protection of [a] domestic industry.”989 
 
According to the Panel in China – Raw Materials, a “reading of Article XX(g) in the context of the GATT 1994 
[should] take into account the challenge of using and managing resources in a sustainable manner that ensures the 
protection and conservation of the environment while promoting economic development. As the Appellate Body 
explained, to do so may require ‘a comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures’.”990 
 
Resource-endowed WTO Members thus find expression of their (horizontal) right to sovereignty over natural 
resources in Article XX(g) GATT 1994 “precisely by designing and implementing conservation policies based on 
their own assessment of various, sometimes competing, policy considerations, and in a way that responds to their 
own concerns and priorities.”991 For good measure, the Panel goes on to emphasize that it “considers that measures 
the objective of which is to promote economic development are not ‘measures relating to conservation’ but 
measures relating to industrial policy.”992 
 
                                                        
985  WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.113; WTO Panel Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶7.292. 
986  WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.108; WTO Panel Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶7.289. 
987  WTO Panel Report, China–Raw Materials (2011), ¶¶7.377–7.381; WTO Panel Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶¶7.262. 
988 This policy space includes a deliberate comprehensive policy consisting of multiple interacting measures that pursue Member State specific 
economic and sustainable policy needs; WTO Panel Report, China–Raw Materials (2011), ¶¶7.375, and 7.381; WTO Panel Report, China–Rare 
Earth (2014), ¶¶7.265–7.267. 
989 WTO Panel Report, China–Raw Materials (2011), ¶7.386; WTO Panel Reports, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶7.270. 
990 WTO Panel Report, China – Raw Materials (2011), ¶7.375; Referencing the WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(2007), ¶151. 
991 WTO Panel Report, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶7.459.  
992 WTO Panel Report, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶ 7.460.  
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While removing industrial policies from application of Article XX(g) is sensible, especially as the policies that fall 
under its scope can be held in place for a long duration and are bound by additional application requirements. The 
exclusion of industrial policies furthermore comports to the integral understanding of the object and purpose of 
Article XX(g) GATT 1994. 
 
Consideration of the treaty guaranteeing permanent sovereignty to natural resources in the context of Article XI:1 
and XI:2(a) GATT does, principally, not run into these limitations however. Instead, the treaty can inform the 
understanding of Article XI GATT on at least two additional grounds. 
 
First, the scope of Article XI:1 GATT does not exclude export restrictive measures maintained for industrial policy 
reasons. As argued, Article XI:2(a) adopts its scope from Article XI:1 GATT and as such also adopts a broad 
concept of “measure.” The “perverse” signals the Appellate Body identified in the context of a resource-conserving 
export restriction therefore do not limit the scope and construction of Article XI. 
 
Second, the permanent sovereignty to natural resources bolsters the broad scope of “essential” products in Article 
XI:2(a) GATT. While the Panel and Appellate Body already brought the breadth of “essential” products within the 
purview of the Member State, Member State control over this concept is fortified by application of the treaty 
granting permanent sovereignty to natural resources. Interpretative deference, as applied to the exemption provision 
of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, furthermore offers a functional methodology to appropriately translate Member 
State’s rights to define its raw materials as “essential products” to those down-stream industries that rely on their 
commercial availability. 
 
D. Accession Protocol 
 
Since the Marakesh Declaration, 29 countries have successfully acceded to the WTO “on terms to be agreed 
between it and the WTO” – as stipulated by Article XII of the WTO Agreement. Out of these 29 countries, nine 
countries have been required to commit to additional restrictive language on their ability to introduce and maintain 
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export restrictions.993 Of these nine, China is subject to the broadest set of WTO-plus commitments.994 The most 
extensive bonds have however been placed on Russia, as it committed to bind export duties on more than 700 tariff 
lines.995 
 
Accession protocols are particular vexing to the interpretation of GATT/WTO: while they are bilateral agreements 
between the acceding Member State and the WTO as an international organization,996 accession protocols are 
designed to serve as bargaining solutions between the Membership and the acceding Member State. While not by 
necessity, Accession Protocols most often include provisions to curtail the rights and expand the obligations the 
acceding Member derives from the multilateral treaty.997 In this sense, the terms of Accession Protocols strictly 
inform the political balance of concessions as they pertain to acceding Member in relation to the Membership. For 
example, in US — Tyres (China) Appellate Body considered that: 
 
[...] the object and purpose of [China’s Accession] Protocol, as reflected in Section 16 thereof, is to afford 
temporary relief to domestic industries that are exposed to market disruption as a result of a rapid increase 
in Chinese imports of like or directly competitive products, subject to the conditions and requirements 
provided therein.998 
 
                                                        
993 These countries are: Mongolia (1997), Latvia (1999), Croatia (2000), China (2001), Saudi Arabia (2005), Viet Nam (2007), Ukraine (2008), 
Montenegro (2012) and Russia (2012). The accession packages of the acceding countries are available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm. See, Julia Ya Qin, “Reforming WTO Discipline on Export Duties: Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Economic 
Development and Environmental Protection,” 46(5) Journal of World Trade 1147 (2012), p. 1152 et seq., for insight analysis. 
994 Julia Ya Qin, “‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System – An Appraisal of the China Accession 
Protocol,” 37 Journal of World Trade 483 (2003). 
995 The Report of Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization, WT/ACC/RUS/70 (2011), 
para. 638. Wu notes that while Russia has committed to strict restraints on its ability to impose and maintain export taxes, no commitments were 
won by the WTO Member States on Russia’s practice of dual energy pricing (leading Saudi Arabia to withdraw similar commitments). Chien-Huei 
Wu, “Access to Raw Materials: The EU’s Pursuit of Trade Disciplines on Export Control,” in Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans, and Jan 
Wouters, eds., The EU's Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 158 and Section 2.3. 
See also Sergey Ripinsky, “The System of Gas Dual Pricing in Russia: Compatibility with WTO Rules,” 3(3) World Trade Review 463 (2004); 
David Tarr and Peter Thomson, “The Merits of Dual Pricing of Russian Natural Gas,” The World Bank Working Paper (2003); Reinhard Quick, 
“Export Taxes and Dual Pricing - How to Tackle Trade Distortive Government Practices?,” Graduate Institute, Centre for Trade and Economic 
Integration, Working Paper (2009). 
996 The rules governing agreements between a State and an international organization are set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (21 Mar. 1986) (VCLTIO) (not yet in force). The 
VCLTIO was developed by the International Law Commission and opened for signature in 1986. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15. See also, Julia Y. 
Qin, “The Challenge of Interpreting WTO-plus Provisions,” 44(1) Journal of World Trade 127 (2010). 
997 For this reason, excessive use of Accession Protocols has been critiqued on the perceived broad and invasive reach of the reservations in 
some WTO Accession Protocols. Some commentators have in fact argued that strenuously binding Accession Protocols could be considered 
“impermissible reservations” in the sense of the International Law Commission’s Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (International Law 
Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, adopted by at its 63rd session (2011), and submitted to the United Nations General 
Assembly (A/66/10, para 75). See, Mitali Tyagi, “Flesh on a Legal Fiction: Early Practice in the WTO on Accession Protocols,” 15(2) Journal of 
International Economic Law 391 (2012). See for a topology of different conceptual categories of whether the accession protocol adds or diminishes 
the obligation of the acceding Party, the incumbent Parties, or the WTO itself; Steve Charnovitz, “Mapping the Law of WTO Accession,” in Merit 
E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson and Alan Yanovich, WTO at Ten: Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries (Huntington: Juris 
Publishing, 2008). 
998 WTO Appellate Body Report, US — Tyres (China) (2011), ¶184. 
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The Appellate Body determined that as the prospective Member State accedes to the WTO Agreement (ex Article 
XII:1 Marakesh Agreement), the accession protocol can become an integral part thereof999 – depending on its 
wording. The Appellate Body stresses, in China – Rare Earth, that the WTO Agreement is understood as a “single 
package of rights and obligations,”1000 for: 
 
Paragraph 1.2 of China’s Accession Protocol, and in particular its stipulation that the Protocol is to be an 
‘integral part’ of ‘the WTO Agreement’, essentially serves to build a bridge between the package of 
protocol provisions and the existing package of WTO rights and obligations under the Marrakesh 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. The bridge created by Paragraph 1.2 between the 
protocol provisions and the existing package of rights and obligations under the WTO legal framework, 
however, is of a general nature. The fact that such a bridge exists does not in itself answer the question as to 
how individual provisions in China’s Accession Protocol are related or linked to individual provisions of 
the other WTO agreements. More specifically, this bridge does not dispense with the need to analyse, on a 
case-by-case basis, the specific relationship between an individual provision in the Protocol, on the one 
hand, and provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, on the other 
hand.1001 
 
The nature of the specific linguistic link between the Accession Protocol and individual provisions of the GATT has 
been examined in a series of cases involving China. 
 
In China - Publications, China relied on the opening phrase of Paragraph 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol, 
“without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement,” to argue its 
“right to regulate” trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement. It argued that to interpret the "without 
prejudice" clause differently would fail to give meaning to all the terms in paragraph 5.1.1002 The US rather made 
two more technical arguments on the language of China’s Accession Protocol, namely that the scope of Paragraph 
5.1 already limits China’s “right to regulate” to certain products not excepted in relevant Annexes; and that 
Paragraph 5.1 pertains to “traders” instead of to the goods “being traded.”1003 
 
Whereas the Panel had first examined the possible success of reliance on Article XX GATT 1994,1004 the Appellate 
Body examines the connection between Paragraph 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol and the exception provision of 
                                                        
999 See, Article II:2 Marrakesh Agreement, as examined by the Appellate Body in its Report, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.53. 
1000 WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.74. 
1001 WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.50. 
1002 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2009), ¶206. 
1003 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2009), ¶207. 
1004 WTO Panel Report, China – Publications (2009), ¶¶7.745, 8.2(2)(ii); The Appellate Body notes that while using an arguendo assumption 
is a valid legal technique, it “could be at odds with the objective of promoting security and predictability through dispute settlement, and may not 
assist in the resolution of this dispute, in particular because such an approach risks creating uncertainty with respect to China's implementation 
obligations.” (WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2009), ¶215) 
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Article XX in the GATT 1994 head on. First, the Appellate Body observes that “paragraph 5.1 […] contains a 
commitment, or obligation, undertaken by China, namely, to progressively liberalize the right to trade […],” but 
notes that this obligation is qualified by the introductory clause of the first sentence. The Appellate Body identifies 
the “right” that is not to be impaired as China’s “right to regulate trade,” which is itself qualified by the phrase “in a 
manner consistent with the WTO Agreement.” 
 
As noted before, the Appellate Body sees “the ‘right to regulate’, in the abstract, as an inherent power enjoyed by a 
Member's government, rather than a right bestowed by international treaties such as the WTO Agreement. With 
respect to trade, the WTO Agreement and its Annexes instead operate to, among other things, discipline the exercise 
of each Member's inherent power to regulate by requiring WTO Members to comply with the obligations that they 
have assumed thereunder.”1005 The Appellate Body proceeds to interpret “reference to China's power to regulate 
trade ‘in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’ [] to encompass [] China's power to take regulatory action 
provided that its measures satisfy prescribed WTO disciplines.”1006 
 
 
In the twin cases China–Raw Materials and China - Rare Earth, the Appellate Body examined, for the first time, 
whether Article XX GATT 1994 could equally be available to justify the use of export duties in breach of China’s 
obligations under Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. The Appellate Body first sets out the relationship 
between the different terms of the covered agreements and accession protocols in relation to the Marrakesh 
Agreement, such that:1007 
 
“the specific relationship among individual terms and provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and 
between such provisions and the Marrakesh Agreement, must be determined on a case-by-case basis 
through a proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of these agreements. In other words, this specific 
relationship must be ascertained through scrutiny of the provisions concerned, read in the light of their 
context and object and purpose, with due account being taken of the overall architecture of the WTO 
system as a single package of rights and obligations, and any specific provisions that govern or shed light 
on the relationship between the provisions of different instruments […].” 
 
                                                        
1005 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2009), ¶222. (emphasis in original) 
1006 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2009), ¶228. It furthermore held that “whether China may, in the absence of a specific 
claim of inconsistency with the GATT 1994, justify its measure under Article XX of the GATT 1994 must in each case depend on the relationship 
between the measure found to be inconsistent with China's trading rights commitments, on the one hand, and China's regulation of trade in goods, 
on the other hand.” (¶229) 
1007 WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶¶ 5.55, 5.57. 
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In effect, this means that neither obligations nor rights may be automatically transposed from one part of the legal 
framework into another. Rather, the link between a particular provision and specific obligations under the Marrakesh 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements has to be established in an “objective” manner (i.e. with 
reference to the appropriate standard of review), on the basis of the customary rules of treaty interpretation, as well 
as the circumstances of each dispute.1008 
 
The bridge, constructed earlier, was found only to be the starting point when examining the question as to whether 
an objective link exists between the specific obligations under China's Accession Protocol and the relevant covered 
agreement. Whereas the Appellate Body found in China – Publications that this close relationship is confirmed by 
the text of Paragraph 5.1 itself, in China – Raw Materials the Appellate Body noted that reference to Article VIII 
GATT alone, while leaving out other GATT provisions, could not be read to infer reference to the general 
exceptions of Article XX GATT 1994.1009 
 
China, supported by a dissenting panelist in China – Rare Earth,1010 rather argues that the nature of the enhanced 
obligation on China, as per its Accession Protocol, expands its obligations under Articles II and XI:1 GATT 1994. 
This in turn compels, so it argued, that Paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol be read “cumulatively and 
simultaneously” with Articles II and XI GATT 1994.  
 
The Appellate Body however limits the extrapolation from an explicit mention of Article VIII to Article XX GATT 
1994 by observing that: 
 
as China’s obligation to eliminate export duties arises exclusively from China’s Accession Protocol, and not 
from the GATT 1994, we consider it reasonable to assume that, had there been a common intention to 
provide access to Article XX of the GATT 1994 in this respect, language to that effect would have been 
included in Paragraph 11.3 or elsewhere in China’s Accession Protocol.1011 
 
                                                        
1008 WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.57. 
1009 WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Raw Materials (2012), ¶¶290-291.  
1010 See WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.7; Furthermore, “the panelist opined that ‘the defences provided in the 
GATT 1994 are automatically available to justify any GATT-related obligations, including border tariff-related obligations – unless a contrary 
intention is expressed by the acceding Member and the WTO Members.’ The panelist thus concluded that, ‘unless China explicitly gave up its right 
to invoke Article XX of GATT 1994, which it did not, the general exception provisions of the GATT 1994 are available to China to justify a 
violation of Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol’.” (references omitted). 
1011  WTO Appellate Body Report, China–Raw Materials (2012), ¶293 (emphasis added). 
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The Appellate Body thus reinforces the separation of China’s rights and obligations arising out of the Accession 
Protocol, from those it might derive under the GATT 1994 or other multilateral agreements. The way the Appellate 
Body argues this separation is particularly instructive as it connects its assessment of the pre-contractual “common 
intention” of the Membership and China to attribute meaning to the absence1012 of an explicit reference to Article 
XX GATT 1994. Such attribution is only possible in a bilateral relationship and bespeaks a true political 
(power/Utopia) assessment by the Appellate Body. Qin rather critically observes that this reading approaches 
Accession Protocols in the spirit of “self-contained agreement[s], independent from the rest of the WTO 
Agreement.”1013 
 
The carefully constructed interpretative bridge, connecting China’s Accession Protocol generally to the WTO 
Agreement, is not meant to allow indiscriminate traffic between the two regimes. In fact, the Membership explicitly 
distanced China from certain rights and obligations of the multilateral trading system; putting it at arm’s length of 
certain provisions of the multilateral collaborative framework. Accession Protocols are, from the perspective of the 
WTO adjudicator, a relic from the pre-contractual political process of accession. Failing to give meaning to the 
separation of the two regimes, connected as they might be through the proverbial bridge of the accession protocol, 
damages the multilateral character of collaboration that is at the core of the GATT/WTO.  
 
Accession Protocols allow the Membership to achieve customized solutions by a careful threading of the needle. 
The language of Accession Protocols determine, with a high matter of precision, which provisions of the covered 
agreements the acceding Member gets knitted into and which provisions remain at arms-length. The language of 
                                                        
1012 Note that the observation of an “omission” itself presupposes an interpretative act, such that the remaining language did not “cure” the 
omission; preventing it from materializing. As observed, a textual reference, per omission or expressed, might not be dispositive in itself; WTO 
Appellate Body Report, China–Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.61. See further for an application of the effectiveness principle in WTO case law, Appellate 
Body Report, US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (2011), ¶¶138, 567, citing Appellate Body Report, Japan — Alcoholic 
Beverages II (1996), p. 18. Interestingly, Russia submitted in their Integrated Executive Summary of Arguments before the Panel in China – Rare 
Earth that it received assurances by the EU and U.S. that omission of specific reference language would not adversely impact Russia’s rights to 
treaty defenses. In fact, Russia submits, “[i]nclusion of such language in [the view of the Members] might have been interpreted as the opposite, 
thus undermining the rights of those Members whose Protocols of accession became effective before the accession of the Russian Federation and 
did not contain similar language.” Integrated Executive Summary of the Arguments of the Russian Federation, Annex C-9 to the Panel Report in 
China - Rare Earths (2014), ¶. 5. Although both the U.S. and EU dispute Russia’s account of the negotiation history in this matter, Russia’s position 
resonates well with the partially dissenting opinion of one of the Panelists in China – Rare Earth, who opined that "the defences provided in the 
GATT 1994 are automatically available to justify any GATT-related obligations, including border tariff-related obligations – unless a contrary 
intention is expressed by the acceding Member and the WTO Members." See Julia Ya Qin, “Russia’s Account of Negotiation History: Reason for 
Deletion Further Explained,” International Economic Law and Policy Blog (August 19, 2014); WTO Panel Reports, China – Rare Earth (2014), 
¶7.137 and cited in WTO Appellate Body Reports, China - Rare Earth (2014), ¶5.7. 
1013 Julia Y. Qin, “Reforming WTO Discipline on Export Duties: Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Economic Development and 
Environmental Protection,” 46 Journal of World Trade 1147 (2012), p. 1170. 
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accession protocols can thus be determinative in a single case, but do not influence the construction and 
interpretation of the multilateral treaty. The two regimes are separate and should be treated as such in order to avoid 
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Epilogue: The Multilateral Standard of Review 
 
In this dissertation I argue for the adoption of a new interpretative standard that urges the adjudicator to explicitly 
take account of the rational (economic) heterogeneity of the WTO Membership when construing a provision of the 
covered agreements. In particular, I posit that the judicial decision maker should construe and interpret exemption 
provisions using the embedded standard of review, such that the Member States’ economic conditions enlighten the 
contextual interpretation of the language of the provision. Instead of reading her preconceptions, of power or Utopia, 
into the construction of the provision under examination, I argue the judicial decision maker should allow for a 
measure of conditional deference to Member State’s developmental policies in exemption provisions. In this way, 
the proposed “multilateral” standard of review leads to a superior expression of the Membership’s collaborative 
intent as captured by the WTO Agreement and the Marrakesh Declaration. 
 
The multilateral standard of review makes explicit how the adjudicator uses economic theories to craft the judicial 
lens through which not only “facts” are determined, but agreements are construed and provisions are interpreted. A 
judicial decision, when delivered within the scope of a multilateral agreement with heterogeneous Member States, 
invariably is an expression of the adjudicator’s structured reliance on her preconceptions. Application of the 
multilateral standard of review to the construction and interpretation of exemption provisions compels the 
adjudicator to accord conditional deference to developmental policies as a method to limit prejudicial reliance on the 
adjudicator’s preconceptions. For as Stiglitz observes: “[m]odels of perfect markets, badly flawed as they might 
seem for Europe or America, seemed truly inappropriate for [the developing world].”1014  
 
However, introduction of an interpretative standard that mandates the adjudicator to recognize economic 
heterogeneity among the Membership can lead to a weakening of the predictability of the multilateral trading 
system.1015 In order for the adjudicator to reach a dispositive decision in a reasoned and predictable manner, I 
                                                        
1014 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics,” Nobel Prize Lecture (December 8, 2001). 
1015 Note that Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) tasks the judicial decision to contribute to the security and 
predictability of the multilateral trading system. A focus on predictability is warranted as, in the words of Weiss, “[s]ecurity and predictability of 
the trading system and through it that of the market place and its different operators depend on to what extent legal certainty and predictability can 
be reached in the reports of panels and the Appellate Body” in Wolfgang Weiss, “Security and Predictability under WTO law,” 2(2) World Trade 
Review 183 (2003), p. 183 (without footnote); see for criticism on the performance of WTO adjudicators, for instance, Bernard Hoekman and Petros 
Mavroidis, “The Dark Side of the Moon: ‘Completing’ the WTO Contract through Adjudication,” European University Institute (2012). 
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emphasize the formal aspects of predictability over the substantive predictability of the decision. Instructively, the 
Appellate Body observes that the judicial decision’s “line of equilibrium, [...], is not fixed and unchanging; the line 
moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.”1016  
 
An affirmative judicial decision, following application of the multilateral standard of review, strikes an appropriate 
balance between predictability and deference. The judicial space for striking an adjudicatory balancing between 
predictability and deference is determined by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Within the adjudicatory 
scope of review set by the DSU, I argue the adjudicator needs to anchor an appropriate balance between 
predictability and deference in her understanding of the object and purpose of the agreement.1017  
 
Instead of placing substantive predictability at the core of the dispositive judicial decision, which could re-introduce 
concepts of a “beneficial” outcome (Utopia) or those associated with the historic pre-agreement bargaining of 
between then-prospective Member States (Power), I introduce formal conditions to adjudicatory deference. The 
tenets of the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem serve to provide these formal conditions. The Theorem’s demands 
further provide for a clear assignment of the burden of proof and fit well with the agreement’s object and purpose. In 
addition, the adjudicator remains disciplined by the applicable normative and doctrinal constraints as developed in 
judicial practice. 
 
My examination concentrates on the construction and interpretation of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) 
GATT 1994. In my analysis, I pay particular attention to the object and purpose of both the provision and the 
agreement as a whole and deploy the concept of an “embedded” standard of review to facilitate critical consideration 
hereof by the adjudicator. As a function of my analytical approach, the adjudicator’s construction of the scope of the 
exemption provision is of critical importance. Application of the multilateral standard of review consciously 
expands the ambit of exemption provisions to restore a tripartite balance in the GATT 1994 (of “rules-exemptions-
                                                        
1016 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, ¶¶158-159. 
1017 By placing emphasis on the inter-subjectivity of the agreement, in opposition to Koskenniemi’s “cultures of formalism,” I ensure the 
judicial decision remains anchored in the agreement and parties collaborative intent. See, Martti Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest too Much: 
Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law,” 65 The Modern Law Review 159 (2002); reproduced in The Politics of International Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 128 
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exceptions”) in furtherance of a judicial construction that is “consistent with [Member State’s] respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development.” 
 
The embedded multilateral standard of review allows the adjudicator to accord full meaning and scope to exemption 
provisions, on par with exception provisions (such as Article XX GATT 1994) and headline rules (such as Article 
XI:1 GATT 1994). The envisioned standard of review aims to construct exemption provisions in an “open” manner 
that maximizes Member State’s ability to pursue developmental policies as a function of the rational heterogeneity 
within the Membership.  
 
As argued in Chapter 1, supra, adjudicatory practice under the GATT 1947 oscillated between a narrow and a more 
invasive application of the standard of review without actually formulating a steady doctrine. Parties eventually 
settled on a negotiated compromise in the context of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA): formal incorporation of 
a deferential standard of review into the ADA centered on the standard of “permissible” instead of “reasonable.” 
 
After the Uruguay Round, the Appellate Body finds the appropriate standard of review, in its report EC – Hormones, 
in “an objective assessment”1018 of the matter before it when discussing legal interpretations and for factual matters 
it sets “the applicable standard [as] neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference,’ but rather [as] the objective 
assessment of the facts.”1019 The Appellate Body in subsequent case law clarified that “objective assessment” under 
Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) must be considered “in the light of the obligations of the 
particular covered agreements at issue in order to derive the more specific contours of the appropriate standard of 
review.”1020 
  
In an effort to better derive the contours of an objective assessment of exemption provisions in the particular 
covered agreement, Chapter 4, supra, argues for an open construction thereof in the GATT 1994. I argue that, in 
                                                        
1018 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶117. 
1019 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), ¶118 (footnotes omitted). 
1020 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS (2005), ¶184. See further WTO Appellate Body Report, 
US – Continued Hormones Suspension (2008), ¶¶590-593; and WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples (2010), ¶¶356-359. 
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order to properly contextualize the applicable object and purpose of both the agreement and provision under 
consideration, the adjudicator reasonably assumes collaboration at the WTO to be goal-oriented. 
 
This goal orientation is however explicitly not derived from the adjudicator’s understanding of the communal or 
Utopian spirit of the covered agreements. Neither is the adjudication by the decision maker in conflicts between 
multilateral treaty partners properly envisioned as a “completion” of the “contract,”1021 especially with a time-
inconsistent heterogeneous Membership. Rather the goal orientation of the covered agreements is established only to 
the extent that all Members are assumed to be rational (although not perfectly so) and have agreed to a limited 
cooperation on and coordination of their trade policies to enhance the outcome of the “trade game.” 
 
Conditional on the existence of rational (economic) heterogeneity among the Membership, 1022 I argue that the 
proper interpretation of exemption provisions should balance (i) the maximalist demands of “developmental” 
policies (thereby showing judicious restraint when identifying implicit cooperation and coordination) with the 
constraints set by (ii) legal doctrine and by (iii) normativity. In this dissertation I have argued it possible to apply an 
open-ended standard of review to exemption provisions, while maintaining the security and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system in good faith.1023 However, several perspectives deserve additional attention. 
 
A. Reaching Dispositive Decisions 
 
An objective judicial construction of the rules and provisions of covered agreements finds its limit in accordance 
with Article 3(2) DSU, such that it “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.” The dispute settlement system is furthermore mandated to provide “security and predictability” to the 
“multilateral trading system.” The judicial decision maker thus has to be mindful of the limits to her interpretative 
powers, but also make her decision fit with the needs of a secure and predictable multilateral trading system. The 
                                                        
1021 As argued in Chapters 3 and 4, supra. For a contract completion approach to adjudication under the GATT/WTO see, for instance, Simon 
A. B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 69 et seq, identifying six types of contractual incompleteness; see also Giovanni Maggi and Robert W. Staiger, “The 
Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements,” 126(1) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 475 (2011). 
1022 As detailed in Chapter 2, supra. 
1023 Chapter 5, supra, seeks to apply an “open” standard of review to critique the Panel and Appellate Body’s reports in China – Raw Materials. 
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judicial decision by the WTO adjudicator thus needs to contribute to legal certainty in service of “the market-place 
and its different operators,”1024 such that the provisions of the covered agreements work to “expand[] the production 
of and trade in goods and services” in a manner “consistent with [Member State’s] respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development.”1025 
 
From the perspective of the decision maker however, an interpretative standard needs to first and foremost directly 
serve the finality of the dispositive decision. In a legal sense, a decision can be considered “dispositive” simply 
because no appeal is possible – ending the conflict as a legal proceeding – or because the decision resolves the 
conflict by providing a singular outcome. It is in this last sense that an open-ended construction of exemption 
provisions could defer to domestic developmental policies at a too early stage; depriving the judicial decision from 
an essential quality. 
 
1. Resisting “Eunomia”: The Oates’ Theorem 
 
In (post)modern theories of adjudication, conclusive meaning attribution is unlikely to follow from a deductive 
approach by means of legal positivism and textualism. As d’Aspremont notes, “international legal positivism is [no 
longer] about determining the right content of norms and the right adjudicative truth,”1026 rather international legal 
positivism is restricted to a theory about the mechanism by which the validity of sources (of legal norms) is 
recognized. Textualism is, in important ways, an application of the earlier theories of legal positivism (see Chapter 
3, supra). 
 
In one version of contemporary positivistic theory, normativity is identified by and recognized in connection with 
supporting concepts that can be juxtaposed. As such, “relative normativity” can, classically, be found in the 
juxtaposition “Natural Law v. Sovereignty” and, in contemporary times, in direct relation to conceptions of 
                                                        
1024 WTO Panel Report, US – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974 (2000), ¶¶7.73-7.75. 
1025 First Preamble to the WTO Agreement, cited approvingly in WTO Panel Report, US – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974 (2000), 
¶7.74. 
1026 See Jean d’Aspremont, “Herbert Hart in Today’s International Legal Scholarship,” in Jorg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, 
International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 115 (footnote omitted). See also Jean 




globalization.1027 It is a similar view on the adjudicator’s power to assess the validity of norms that moves 
Petersmann to argue “that […] governments, judicial bodies and civil society can, and should, use WTO law for 
resisting intergovernmental power politics so as to defend ‘public reason’ […] vis-à-vis 'populist protectionism' - 
with due respect for legitimate ‘legal pluralism’.”1028 The purposeful juxtaposing of concepts, which themselves are 
external to the agreement under consideration, is argued as a necessary to allow adjudicators to overcome 
Koskenniemi’s post-modern deconstructive critique “that law is incapable of providing convincing justifications to 
the solution of normative problems.”1029  
 
Whereas this judicially activist approach correctly prioritizes the adjudicator’s constructive task in service of the 
multilateral trading system, I cannot agree with Petersmann’s conception of the public realm as thick with readily 
identifiable, shared values and legal norms. Instead, I argue that to overcome Koskenniemi’s aporia, the adjudicator 
has to emphasize the inter-subjective collaborative intent of the parties: as evidenced by their participation in the 
Membership and its goal-oriented collaboration in the “trade game” by means of the agreements under consideration 
(see Chapter 4, supra). 
 
Parties’ inter-subjective collaborative intent is apparent to the adjudicator from her understanding1030 of the object 
and purpose of both the agreement and the provision under examination, aided by the declarations in the preamble. 
In this analysis though, it is crucial for the adjudicator not to impose her beliefs about what the agreement “should 
have been.” Rather, the adjudicator is to take a more formalized approach that is substantively agnostic; that is, the 
adjudicator is deliberately transparent in her advancement of the purposive elements in her construction and 
interpretation, such that she avoids to preclude rational heterogeneity among the Membership. 
 
                                                        
1027 See Matthias Goldmann, “Relative Normativity,” in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh, eds., Fundamental Concepts of International 
Law (forthcoming, 2018). 
1028 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Between ‘Member-Driven’ WTO Governance and ‘Constitutional Justice’: Judicial Dilemmas in GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement,” European University Institute, Working Paper Law 2018/04 (2018), p. 2. 
1029 Martii Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 69. 
1030 See Chapter 4, supra; reference is intended to Gadamer’s concept of “mens auctoris.” See also, Alexandra Kemmerer, “Sources in the 
Meta-Theory of International Law: Hermeneutical Conversations,” Max Planck Institute, MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2017-02. For an 
accessible introduction into Gadamer’s analysis of “understanding,” see Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of Understanding,” in 
Robert J. Dostal, The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 40  
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For the decision of the adjudicator to be accepted as an authoritative expression of judicial interpretation in the 
matter before her, it needs to supersede mere “regulated madness.”1031 The decision maker accomplishes this not 
only by attending to the “fit” of her decision with the text of the provisions, but primarily by satisfying the doctrinal, 
normative and sociological teleologies as they pertain to the provision under consideration (Kantorowicz’ triptych). 
In this respect, it is important to observe that Member State collaboration in the WTO is not unidirectional or 
cooperative, but instead subject to conflicting normative and sociological preferences (as I have argued in Chapter 2, 
supra, with respect to economic theories of growth). 
 
When applying the embedded standard of review of the exemption provision Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, the 
adjudicator accordingly needs to be mindful of: (i) the doctrinal constraints as developed by GATT 1994, noting that 
the WTO does not recognize the doctrine of “stare decisis” but rather relies in its adjudicatory practice on the 
reasoned persuasion and judicial fit of the judicial decision; (ii) the normative constraints emerging from a 
contextual analysis of the provision and the agreement; and (iii) the constructive constraints that emerge from the 
heterogeneity of the Membership, such that space for rational divergence of economic teleology is maintained. 
 
Within this framework, the adjudicator works to achieve an objective assessment of the matter through application 
of the embedded standard of review, in accordance with Articles 11 and 3.2 of the DSU which provide the 
hermeneutic boundaries. This process does not leave the adjudicator short of a dispositive decision, but rather opens 
a delineated interpretative space within which she can decide to defer to the policies of the defendant or deny 
deference to explicitly further the goals of the multilateral trading system. The obvious risk in so denying a measure 
of deference to the defendant is that the adjudicator enforces her concept of the “good order” (Eunomia) instead of 
respecting the rational heterogeneity of the Membership as it exists. 
 
Above all, the decision of the adjudicator needs to contribute to the security and predictability of the multilateral 
trading system. Whereas the decision maker can close the “open” multilateral standard of review by offering an 
affirmative decision, by drawing on her material preconceptions or by relying on teleologies that are external to the 
                                                        
1031 See for the importance of the “decision” Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law as Political Theology: How to Read the Nomos der 
Erde,” 11 Constellations: An International Journal for Critical and Democratic Theory 492 (2004). 
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agreement,1032 I argue the adjudicator can also advance the predictability of the trading system by emphasizing the 
formal contours that regulate her decision. These formal conditions should emerge directly from goal-orientation of 
the Membership and serve as an applied framework for deference in service of the agreement. Unlike 
Koskenniemi’s “cultures of formalism,”1033 my conception of formal predictability immediately services the 
adjudicatory decision and remains anchored in the adjudicator’s understanding of Member State’s inter-subjectivity. 
Such concept of formal predictability is rooted in and contained by the object and purpose of the agreement, while 
resisting aspects of Power and Utopia in the judicial decision. 
 
The precise judicial balance between the demands for predictability and the argued for constructive deference to 
developmental policies will be found through the application of the formal demands of the Oates’ Decentralization 
Theorem. The Oates’ Decentralization Theorem holds that, in a Membership with heterogeneous preferences, the 
decentralization of certain functions increases welfare as a result of increased policy sensitivity and economic 
alignment at the lower level. In order to recommend decentralization or “deference,” the Theorem introduces certain 
conditions which work as formal constraints to the adjudicator’s fitting of the contested policies to the language of 
the exemption provision. The Oates’ Decentralization Theorem furthermore assigns the burden of proof to the party 
relying on its application, while its application by the judicial decision maker falls within the scope of good faith 
adjudication under Article 11 and 3.2 of the DSU. 
 
When confronted with rational heterogeneity among the WTO Membership along one of Kantorowicz’ teleological 
dimensions, I argue that the multilateral standard of review better aids the adjudicator in her constructive task to 
overcome (international) law’s aporia. To facilitate the application of the appropriate standard of review, the 
conditions of the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem can serve as a formal mechanism to positively identify the 
conditions under which deference can be appropriate. This dissertation has developed this framework in the context 
of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, the rational heterogeneity among the Membership as 
                                                        
1032 Under conditions of rational heterogeneity such substantive or material prejudice comes to the fore when the adjudicators draw on 
economic science to support their notion that the GATT 1994 expresses the demands of the Washington Consensus as sociological teleology, or 
when adjudicators effectively construe the provisions of the covered agreement along those lines without clarifying their understanding of the 
cooperative stance of the Membership in this context. 
1033 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law,” 65 The Modern Law 
Review 159 (2002); reproduced in The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 128 
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pertains to the normative theories of economic growth (a sociological teleology), and critically applied to the case 
China – Raw Materials. 
 
To address the potential for application of the multilateral standard of review to the weaken of the predictability of 
the multilateral trading system, in contravention of Article 3.2 DSU, I formally delineate the space of the adjudicator 
to exercise deference to developmental policies in her decision. This formal approach to judicial predictability 
retains its embedded character (provision specific) as well as allows the adjudicator to situate her decision within the 
object and purpose of the covered agreement, without precluding the rational heterogeneity of the Membership. 
However, the lack of substantive predictability potentially leaves the decision maker at risk of finding insufficient 
discipline when construing the material scope of exemption provisions. This challenge to the proposed standard of 
review and associated judicial decision is considered hereunder. 
 
2. Doctrinal Distinctions: Implications for Scope  
 
The legal distinction at the center of this dissertation is between “exemption” and “exception” provisions, as applied 
to Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 in contrast with Article XX GATT 1994. Mavroidis lucidly clarifies that “[t]he 
former term covers transactions that do not come at all under the ambit of the relevant legal discipline, the 
consequence being that parties remain free to act on their own volition […] [the latter term covers] an agreed 
deviation from an established discipline and signals a shift in the allocation of the burden of proof […].”1034 
 
Whereas application of the multilateral standard of review maintains the formal aspects of predictability of the 
adjudicator’s decision, a judicial decision also needs to comport to established legal doctrine and allow for a 
construction of the provision that fits the agreement as whole. The judicial decision maker’s interpretation of the 
provision therefore needs to satisfy the hermeneutic demands of Article 11 and 3.2 DSU, while her construction 
considers the provision’s object and purpose in relation to the goal-orientation of the Membership as well as the 
agreement’s rules and exceptions – both as developed and as written. 
                                                        




By according proper scope to exemption provisions, the decision maker more comprehensively addresses the 
tripartite balance of the GATT 1994: “rule-exception-exemption.” The cross-provision implication of the adopting 
the multilateral standard of review primarily finds expression in the discipline it exerts on the (overly-broad) 
construction of exception provisions. However, by the same measure, it is crucial to set appropriate limits to the 
scope of exemption provisions. The adjudicator finds this scope through application of the customary rules of 
interpretation in public international law, in accordance with the relevant standard of review – i.c. the multilateral 
standard of review.  
 
Whereas I address the particular analytical aspects of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 in Chapter 5, supra, it is useful to 
observe that the Appellate Body found the appropriate standard of review in light of the obligations of the particular 
covered agreement.1035 The Appellate Body went on to note that its concept of an “embedded” standard of review is 
particularly instructive as an agreement-specific expression of a broader rule.1036 Note that the Appellate Body will, 
in almost all cases, seek to identify the revealed “common intention” of the Membership and apply it toward its 
construction of the “broader rule.” 
 
Crucially, it is through her assessment of the “colour, texture and shading”1037 of the object and purpose of covered 
agreements that the adjudicator finds the revealed common intention of the Membership and sets the contours to her 
legitimate interpretation of the provisions of the multilateral agreement. The Appellate Body has, as argued in 
Chapters 3 and 4, supra, established a hierarchy of proximity in its assessment of the “object and purpose,” looking 
at the construction and purported aim of the commitment first (“l’objet”), with the general result (“le but”) 
elucidating that construction. As the Appellate Body observes in its report China – Rare Earth:1038 
 
“the specific relationship among individual terms and provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and 
between such provisions and the Marrakesh Agreement, must be determined on a case-by-case basis 
                                                        
1035 The WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS (2005), notes: “[W]e recall that an ‘objective 
assessment’ under Article 11 of the DSU must be considered in the light of the obligations of the particular covered agreements at issue in order to 
derive the more specific contours of the appropriate standard of review.” (¶184) See further WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Continued 
Hormones Suspension (2008), ¶¶590-593; and WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples (2010), ¶¶356-359. 
1036 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS (2005), ¶184; notes that its standard of review is 
“instructive for cases under the SCM Agreement that also involve agency determinations.” 
1037 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (1998), ¶153. 
1038 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Rare Earth (2014), ¶¶ 5.55, 5.57  
266 
 
through a proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of these agreements. In other words, this specific 
relationship must be ascertained through scrutiny of the provisions concerned, read in the light of their 
context and object and purpose, with due account being taken of the overall architecture of the WTO 
system as a single package of rights and obligations, and any specific provisions that govern or shed light 
on the relationship between the provisions of different instruments [...].”  
 
The adjudicator’s understanding of the place of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 relative to  
the rule of Article XI:1 GATT 1994, to which it creates space for Member States to act on their own volition, and to 
the GATT 1994 as a whole,  co-determines the appropriate scope of the exemption provision together with the 
standard of review identified as appropriate to the provision under consideration. As such, exemption provisions 
serve as the third point to the Appellate Body’s two-part observation on the discipline the covered agreements exert 
on Member State’s unfettered volition. 1039 
 
In this dissertation I argue that the appropriate standard of review suitable to Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, under 
conditions of rational heterogeneity among the Membership, is the multilateral standard. This conclusion directly 
impacts the balance between this exemption provision and Article XI:1 (rule) and Article XX:j GATT 1994 
(exception) in a way that centrally raises the potential of over-extending the scope of the exemption provision. 
Should the adjudicator be relatively free of doctrinal and normative teleological demands – which the Appellate 
Body was in its report China – Raw Materials – the formal predictability of an “open” standard of review alone 
might leave her interpretative room crucially unconstrained. 
 
Attention therefore shifts to the interpretation of the language and the construction of the appropriate scope of the 
provision. The adjudicator construes the appropriate scope through a good faith object and purpose analysis of the 
provision, while offering an interpretation that is in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law – as demanded by Article 3.2 DSU. Note that the Appellate Body found1040 the customary rules of 
interpretation to be codified in Articles 31-33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  (VCLT). 
 
                                                        
1039 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Publications (2010), ¶¶222-223, the AB notes “that WTO Members’ regulatory requirements may 
be WTO-consistent in one of two ways. First, they may simply not contravene any WTO obligation. Secondly, even if they contravene a WTO 
obligation, they may be justified under an applicable exception.” This perspective in turn clarifies the WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline 
(1996), p. 30, where it held that “so far as concerns the WTO, [Member State legislative autonomy] is circumscribed only by the need to respect 
the requirement of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements.”  
1040 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996), at 16-17. 
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An object and purpose analysis first establishes the immediate substantive content of the provision under 
consideration before considering the scope of its obligations against the agreement as a whole. This hierarchical 
approach by the Appellate Body finds support in the embedded nature of the standard of review. Consequently, the 
standard of review and the object and purpose analysis work in tandem in a manner that is sensitive to the character 
of the exemption provision as part of the tripartite “rule-exception-exemption” balance of the GATT 1994.  The 
VCLT furthermore uses the singular “object and purpose” to place emphasis on the balance and unity of the 
concepts. 
 
The exemption provision of Article XI:2 fully inherits its primary scope from Article XI:1 GATT 1994, as it reads: 
“The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following.” The use of the imperative “shall not 
extend” indicates the preclusion of the obligations as captured by paragraph 1 of Article XI GATT 1994. The 
exemption provision therefore inherits the full scope of the obligations created by Article XI:1 GATT 1994. 
 
The WTO Panel report in India – Quantitative Restrictions observed that “[T]he text of Article XI:1 is very broad in 
scope, providing for a general ban on import or export restrictions or prohibitions 'other than duties, taxes or other 
charges'.” The Panel furthermore interpreted the scope of “restrictions” according to its ordinary meaning, noting 
that “the scope of the term 'restriction' is also broad, as seen in its ordinary meaning, which is 'a limitation on action, 
a limiting condition or regulation'."1041 Subsequent reports of the Panel and Appellate Body1042 and various 
commentators1043 have generally agreed and accorded a broad scope to Article XI:1 GATT 1994. 
 
More pressingly, the scope of Article XI:2(a) is narrowed to capture only those “export prohibitions or restrictions 
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting 
contracting party.” (emphasis added) In this dissertation, I argue that the adjudicator should read this sentence in 
accordance with the multilateral standard of review, such that “other products essential” stands in relation to “critical 
shortage” but not to “foodstuffs.” In other words, the multilateral standard of review allows for an interpretation of 
                                                        
1041 WTO Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions (1999), ¶5.128. 
1042 See Chapter 5, supra. 
1043 A notable exception can be found in Robert Howse and Tim Josling, “Agricultural Export Restrictions and International Trade Law: A 
Way Forward,” International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC) Position Paper, 2012. 
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the coordinating conjunctive “or” that does not substantively limit one part of the expression by another of equal 
rank. In this way an interpretative space for substantial deference is opened up that works to favor developmental 
policies. The multilateral standard of review does however impose formal limits when fitting disputed policy 
measures to the exemption provision (see previous section of this epilogue). 
 
The central criticism of my permissive interpretation of “or” asserts it does not comport with the intended meaning 
of the provision at the time of drafting and rests mainly on two arguments: (i) it violates a reasonable interpretation 
of the intentions of the Contracting Parties as expressed by the preparatory work (Article 32 VCLT); and (ii) it limits 
the value of the well-established relationship between the headline rule of Article XI:1 and the exceptions of Article 
XX GATT 1994. 
 
a. Preparatory Work and the Multilateral Standard of Review 
 
The judicial decision maker may, according to Article 32 VCLT, have recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation in case an interpretation in accordance with Article 31 VCLT leaves the meaning of a word ambiguous 
or obscure, or leads to a constructive result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Such supplemental means of 
interpretation include the preparatory work of the treaty as well as the circumstances of its conclusion. 
 
Article 32 VCLT clarifies when an adjudicator may have reference to material outside the text of a treaty and how 
this should inform her interpretation and construction. The supplementary means of interpretation can only support 
the decision maker in her judicious task after application of the framework of Article 31 VCLT leaves the meaning 
of the provision in serious doubt or manifestly absurd. Dorr stresses the limited room for application of the 
supplemental means of interpretation, where he observes that “[s]ince the role which preparatory material can play 
in the process of interpretation marks the essential difference between the textual and the ‘intentions’ approaches to 
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treaty interpretation, the restrictive design of Art 32 characterize the provision as a further confirmation of the fact 
that the Vienna rules of interpretation are clearly based on the textual approach.”1044 
 
The multilateral standard of review, while emphasizing the collaborative intent of the Membership, is strictly bound 
by and limited to the declarations hereof in the preamble and what the adjudicators can learn through the language 
and structure of the provisions of the covered agreements. The proposed multilateral standard of review is not party-
specific in its construction of these “intentions” and works to avoid the interpretative trap of having to directly 
weigh one Member State’s collaborative intent against another’s. 
 
This emphasis on the common intention of the Membership finds support in the work of International Law 
Commission on the law of treaties. Waldock, for instance, cautions use of the preparatory work “because they are 
simply evidence of the intentions of some of the parties, and their cogency depends on the extent to which they 
furnish proof of the common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the terms of the treaty.”1045 The 
United States objected to this approach and attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the rule on the use of preparatory 
work (Art. 32 VCLT) and the general rule on interpretation (Art. 31 VCLT) be expressed in one provision – which 
would have been suggestive of equal rank and footing.1046 
 
In addition to the preparatory work, Article 32 VCLT allows the adjudicator to have supplemental reference to the 
factual circumstances at the time of conclusion of the treaty. In its report in EC – Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body 
clarifies that: 
 
“an event, act or instrument may be relevant […] not only if it has actually influenced a specific aspect of 
the treaty text in the sense of a relationship of cause and effect; it may also qualify as a ‘circumstance of the 
conclusion’ when it helps to discern what the common intentions of the parties were at the time of the 
conclusion with respect to the treaty or specific provision.”1047 
 
                                                        
1044 Oliver Dorr, “Article 32,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 572 at 3. 
1045 See Waldock III 58, ¶21, as paraphrased in Oliver Dorr, “Article 32,” in Oliver Dorr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 573 at 6. 
1046 See, Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 303–304. 
1047 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts (2005), ¶¶282-309. 
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While the supplemental means of interpretation can be used to “confirm” a chosen meaning or construction, the 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law instead favor its use to aid the adjudicator in her 
“meaning determination” in case of ambiguity or absurdity. This application of the supplemental rules of 
interpretation finds support in the Appellate Body’s report US – Gambling, where it concluded after an investigating 
in accordance with Article 31 VCLT that the meaning of the commitments made by the United States were still 
ambiguous. The Appellate Body ultimately felt that it was “required, in this case, to turn to the supplementary means 
of interpretation provided for in Art 32 of the Vienna Convention.” 
 
In order to have recourse to the supplemental means of interpretation, the adjudicator has to persuasively argue that 
the meaning she arrived at by recourse to the elements of Article 31 VCLT remains sufficiently ambiguous or is 
manifestly absurd to the extent that further clarification needs to be sought for her to reach a judicial decision.1048 
While I argue that an interpretation of the language of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 in accordance with the 
multilateral standard of review does not leave the meaning of the provision or its language (i.c. the word “or”) 
sufficiently ambiguous or manifestly absurd, some may disagree and prefer recourse to supplemental means of 
interpretation to elucidate its meaning further. 
 
Recourse to the preparatory work of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1947, suggests that the economic circumstances of its 
conclusion (i.e. post-war shortages and a desire to retain industrial capacities) were of pre-eminent importance to the 
Contracting Parties. In that context, Australia tabled a carve-out from the abolition of quantitative restrictions in 
Article XI:1 that addressed temporary restrictions applied to prevent critical shortages of foodstuffs.1049 Cuba and 
India rather expressed support for a carve-out favoring the promotion of domestic infant industries.1050 
 
                                                        
1048 A regrettable example of where this was insufficiently achieved by the adjudicator can be found in the WTO Panel Report, Chile – Price 
Band System (2002), where the Panel merely observed that it “considered that the text and context of ‘variable import levy’ and ‘minimum import 
price’ alone do not enable us to determine the meaning of those terms without ambiguity” (¶7.35) before taking recourse to supplemental means of 
interpretation. 
1049 See, GATT documentation, E/PC/T/W/223 at p. 3, referenced by Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis 
of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 153. 
1050 See, GATT documentation, E/PC/T/A/PV/40(1) at p. 18, referenced by Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Alan O. Sykes, The 
Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 153. 
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The proposal Australia tabled formed the backbone of the later Article XI:2(a) GATT 1947, however other 
Contracting Parties succeeded in widening the scope of the provision.1051 Whereas the concerns voiced by India in 
the context of the exemption provision to Article XI:1 GATT 1947 gave primary shape to Article XVIII:C GATT 
1947, its apparent failure to have its concerns directly adopted in Article XI:2(a) GATT 1947 is of limited 
interpretational value as supplementary means of interpretation. 
 
The International Court of Justice, for example, held in its Namibia Opinion that: “[t]he fact that a particular 
proposal is not adopted by an international organ does not necessarily carry with it the inference that a collective 
pronouncement is made in a sense opposite to that proposed. There can be many reasons determining rejection or 
non-approval.”1052 This reasoning suggests a construction which aims to limit the scope of Article XI:2(a) GATT 
1994 based on the rejection of India’s concerns during the negotiations is not persuasive. The failure to adopt India’s 
suggestion in Article XI:2(a) does not therefore suggest an expansive reading of the provision goes against the 
intention of all Contracting Parties – in fact, there is some evidence in the expansion of the provision’s scope beyond 
foodstuffs to suggest the opposite. 
 
Moreover, the multilateral standard of review is preferable as a judicial standard to an interpretation that explicitly 
relies on aspects of Power and Utopia that originate from outside the text of the agreement to supplement its 
understanding. Application of the multilateral standard of review promises to safeguard the judicial decision, as an 
expression of the multilateral character of the agreement, against arguments that a certain interpretation or balance 
was not foreseen or intended by one or several Contracting Parties during the negotiations. 
 
To stress the urgency of such concerns, as neither fanciful or contrived, recent remarks by the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) Lighthizer in service of President Trump’s radical turn in trade policy1053 are instructive. 
                                                        
1051 See for further detail on the genesis of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, Chapter 5, supra, and the sources 
referenced. 
1052 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) (1970), ICJ Rep 16, ¶ 69. 
1053 At the time of writing, the United States has initiated global safeguard action on washers and solar panels, and declared global tariffs on 
steel and aluminum imports on national security grounds. While various WTO Member States are petitioning to be exempt from these unilateral 
trade enforcement actions by the United States, President Trump is set to continue his posture by suggesting further action against China on account 
of alleged historic and ongoing “theft” of US intellectual property. For an analysis of the trade agenda’s in the 2016 US Presidential campaign, see 
Marcus Noland, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Sherman Robinson, and Tyler Moran, “Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign,” 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-6 (September 2016); Safeguard action is undertaken pursuant to Section 201 of 
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USTR Lighthizer has observed that it would be a mistake to assume that “the United States effectively gave away its 
entire trade regime in the Uruguay Round.”1054 He argues that the agreement cannot but be understood against 
various pre-conclusion aspects of the Uruguay Round negotiations and associated power dynamics. 
 
USTR Lighthizer testified that: “[o]ur negotiators in the Uruguay Round painstakingly set forth specific rules 
[regarding trade remedies] and made clear that WTO dispute settlement panels should defer to national authorities 
like the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission where possible. However, the WTO 
has ignored this mandate and has instead engaged in an all-out assault on trade remedy measures.”1055 The USTR 
continues: 
 
Rogue WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions have consistently undermined U.S. interests by inventing 
new legal requirements that were never agreed to by the United States. […] Our trading partners have been 
able to obtain through litigation what they could never achieve through negotiation. The result has been a 
loss of sovereignty for the United States in its ability to enact and enforce laws for the benefit of the 
American people and American businesses.1056 
 
This is the same kind of argument Brexiteers have raised against the European Court of Justice and should not serve 
as part of the interpretative toolkit of the adjudicator to a multilateral or plurilateral agreement. 
 
Furthermore, the “Contracting Parties” of 1947 are not identical to the Membership of WTO and GATT 1994. There 
is not only a clear time-inconsistency in the Membership between 1947 and 1994, but more importantly, the 
character of the Membership is distinctly different from the post-War victorious parties of 1947. By attempting to 
anchor the interpretation of Article XI:2(a) to circumstances that might have been prevalent in the post-War or Cold-
War context, the adjudicator pays insufficient attention to the development of the (sociological) context as well as 
the evolving extent of heterogeneity of the Membership from 1947 to 1994 (and beyond). 
 
                                                        
the Trade Act of 1974; See, US President Trump, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Section 201 Actions (January 23, 2018); National 
security action is undertaken pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; US President Trump, Presidential Proclamation on 
Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States (March 8, 2018); Further trade enforcement action is expected pursuant to Section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974. 
1054 “Closing Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer at the Sixth Round of NAFTA Renegotiations,” as delivered (January 29, 2018) in 
Montreal, Canada, with respect to Canada’s WTO claim that US trade remedy measures violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures Agreements; United States – Certain Systematic Trade Remedies Measures (January 8, 2018). 
1055 Testimony of Robert E. Lighthizer, US Senate Committee on Finance, Hearing on Trade Enforcement for a 21st Century Economy (June 
12, 2007), p. 6. See also, Testimony of Robert E. Lighthizer, U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, Evaluating China’s Role in 
the World Trade Organization Over the Past Decade (June 9, 2010), pp. 23-24, together with fn. 111. 
1056 Testimony of Robert E. Lighthizer, US Senate Committee on Finance, Hearing on Trade Enforcement for a 21st Century Economy (June 
12, 2007), p. 6. 
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Note that a categorical exclusion of the application of Article 32 VCLT to the GATT 1994 is itself a violation of the 
customary rules of interpretation of international law and conflicts with judicial practice under the WTO/GATT. 
Whereas recourse to Article 32 VCLT can be appropriate in general, when proposed interpretations leave the 
meaning of provisions ambiguous or obscure, application to the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 
is circumscribed by an objective good faith construction of that provision. Such judicial construction takes the object 
and purpose of the exemption provision into account to limit the extent to which historic conditions of Power and 
Utopia can constrain the specific and evolving multilateral character of the Membership of GATT 1994. 
 
Lastly, an adjudicatory decision that favors the incorporation of supplemental means of interpretation could point to 
practice in the GATT 1994 that facilitates continuity of thought between the GATT 1947 and GATT 1994. As 
Roessler notes: “in short, in dubio pro GATT 1947.”1057 The Appellate Body, in its report in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages, similarly finds adopted reports “an important part of the GATT acquis.”1058 However, reliance on this 
connection to reject an application of the multilateral standard of review to the interpretation of Article XI:2(a) 
GATT 1994 reads the obligations of an “objective good faith” object and purpose interpretation too thin.  
 
b. Conscious Expansion of the Exemption Provision 
 
By proposing application of a new multilateral standard of review, I consciously argue for an expansion of the ambit 
of exemption provisions to restore a tripartite balance in the GATT 1994 of “rules-exemptions-exceptions”. I argue 
that this expansion furthers a judicial construction of the exemption provision that more comprehensively satisfies 
the object of the agreement, to enter into “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” that are responsive 
to and “consistent with [Member State’s] respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development.” 
 
                                                        
1057 Frieder Roessler, "The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the WTO" in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard 
Quick, eds., New Directions in International Economic law: essays in honor of John H. Jackson (Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 
2001), p. 343. 
1058 Unadopted reports under the GATT 1947 can still provide “useful guidance” to GATT 1994 Panels and the Appellate Body; see WTO 
Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (1996), ¶ 6.10; confirmed by the Appellate Body in WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages (1996), p. 15. 
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To achieve these collaborative principles of the WTO Agreement, I argue the adjudicator should interpret the 
exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) primarily in its own right and not as an inherently subservient appendix to 
the established relationship between Article XI:1 (rule) and Article XX GATT 1994 (exception). The effectiveness 
principle of legal interpretation supports a construction of the exemption provision that does not limit its ambit in 
favor of an incomplete, but existing, relationship between rule and exception provisions in the GATT 1994. 
 
The effectiveness principle was not however incorporated separately in Articles 31-33 VCLT, for fear of inviting 
“extensive” or “liberal” approaches that go beyond what the terms of any treaty can reasonably be said to 
express.1059 Instead, the ILC held that a good faith reading of the treaty’s text within its object and purpose 
sufficiently captures this maxim without exceeding the four-corners of the treaty itself. In the context of the WTO, 
this interpretative maxim is generally taken to prohibit a reading of the covered commitments “that would result in 
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”1060 
 
In expanding the ambit of exemption provisions, I argue that “redundancy” or “inutility” are relative terms to the 
extent that they do not have a precise singular meaning outside their application to a particular agreement. A good 
faith construction of the agreement consequently seeks to strike an appropriate balance between the scope of 
provisions in conformity with the object and purpose of the agreement as a whole. The Appellate Body, in its report 
Korea – Dairy, held similarly that “[i]n light of the interpretive principle of effectiveness, it is the duty of any treaty 
interpreter to ‘read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously.’ 
An important corollary of this principle is that a treaty should be interpreted as a whole, and, in particular, its 
sections and parts should be read as a whole.”1061 
 
Therefore, I argue the inappropriateness of constructing the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) limited to its 
direct relation to the exception provision of Article XX(j) GATT 1994. I contend the Appellate Body errs where it 
proceeds to consider the provision of Article XI:2(a) in the framework of the entire agreement to find appropriate 
                                                        
1059 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 219, ¶6. 
1060 See, for example, WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Gasoline (1996), at 21 and the WTO Panel Report, Chile – Price Band 
System (2002), ¶7.71. 
1061 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy (2000), ¶81. 
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context to the construction of “critical shortage” in “the words ‘general or local short supply’ in Article XX(j) of the 
GATT 1994.”1062 
 
In fact, the Appellate Body relates Article XI:2(a) even more directly to Article XX(j) GATT, when it holds that 
“[c]ontrary to Article XI:2(a), […], Article XX(j) does not include the word ‘critical’, or another adjective further 
qualifying the short supply. We must give meaning to this difference in the wording of these provisions. To us, it 
suggests that the kinds of shortages that fall within Article XI:2(a) are more narrowly circumscribed than those 
falling within the scope of Article XX(j).”1063 
 
Whereas I submit that the Appellate Body thus effectively collapses the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) into 
a “critical shortage”-test, it moreover fails to accord appropriate analytical weight to the exemption provision as a 
separate category in the GATT’s tripartite balance. The multilateral standard of review seeks to re-establish an 
appropriate balance between the various provisions of the GATT 1994 that is in better conformity with its object and 
purpose. 
 
It seems uncontroversial, given a proper scope of the provision, that the “purpose” of the exemption provision of 
Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 should be construed to support the “reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements” of the GATT/WTO. The embedded multilateral standard of review works to give effect to the 
provisions of the GATT 1994 so as to contribute to the agreement’s collaborative objectives of “expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services [...] in a manner consistent with [Member States’] respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development.”  
 
In this way, the space for Member States to pursue policies in service of their rational economic heterogeneity is 
preserved, while maintaining the necessary balance and constraints for the adjudicator to arrive at a legitimate 
judicial decision. However, the lack of substantive predictability in the adjudicator’s decision, as a result of 
application of the multilateral standard of review, places considerable onus on the formal constraints to the judicial 
                                                        
1062 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 325. 
1063 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials (2012), ¶ 325. 
276 
 
decision. Furthermore, as I argue for an improved balance between rules, exception and exemption provisions, to 
favor including developmental policies under the ambit of the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, 
existing “strong” developmental rights are possibly diminished in scope as a consequence. 
 
B. (Un)Intended Consequences: Impact on “Strong” Developmental Rights 
 
In this dissertation I show that an economic distinction between “Developmental” and “Commercial” policies can be 
made – as argued in Chapter 2, supra – and use it to delineate the rational heterogeneity among of the WTO 
Membership, with respect to their economic/sociological teleology (Kantorowicz). This distinction goes to the heart 
of the rules-based multilateral trading system that aims to prevent beggar-thy-neighbor, mercantilist behavior while 
stimulating international commerce, such that “a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand” might be realized for all Member States. Crucially, the multilateral trading system is normatively 
indeterminate between the pursuit of an economic “mature growth model” or a model of “catch up” growth, within 
the disciplines set by the provisions of the agreement. 
 
Developing countries however negotiated the introduction of Article XVIII:C to explicitly afford more legal space 
for the adoption of industrial policies aimed at import substitution industrialization. While born out of India’s early 
amendment to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions for development reasons, the current language was 
first introduced during the 1955 Review Session and maintained in the GATT 1994 – accompanied from an 
“Understanding on the Balance of Payment Provisions of the GATT 1994.” 
 
The provision demands particular consideration now that my proposed multilateral standard of review seeks to 
expand the ambit of exemption provisions in an effort to effect the tripartite balance of the GATT 1994. Moreover, 
the established constructive triangle “rule-exception-exemption” leaves no obvious room for previously strong 
developmental rights that received analytical and interpretative strength from standing tangential to the established 




A potential consequence of the application of a multilateral standard of review to certain provisions in the GATT 
1994 is that the proposed deference to domestic developmental policies could lead to a weakening of existing 
“strong” developmental rights. Strong “developmental rights” find separate expression in the GATT in Article 
XVIII:C GATT 1994, which lays out a mechanism by which the establishment of certain industries might be aided 
by state help – including by deviations from otherwise regulated policies in the GATT 1994.  
 
The language of this provision has not been subject to interpretation by Panels or the Appellate Body. In fact, this 
Article has been invoked only three times thus far under the GATT 1994.1064 In all three cases, the issue turned on 
the determination of which relevant (political/institutional) body has jurisdiction over the notification and 
consultation process (see Chapter 4, supra). The relationship between these Committees, rooted in the political 
WTO institution, and the judicial dispute settlement system was the central topic in the Appellate Body report in 
India – Quantitative Restrictions.1065 In that case, the Appellate Body rejected the demand that it should adopt a 
measure of deference to the (political) decision in the relevant WTO institutions as function of the notion of 
institutional balance. 
 
Moreover, the Appellate Body considered India’s substantial position, that a removal of its quantitative restrictions 
would demand it materially alter its developmental policy, against the context of Balance of Payment problems.1066 
The original connection of Article XVIII GATT with BoP problems limits application to the present economic 
circumstances of floating or flexible exchange rate policies being adopted broadly. 
 
The question at present is different however and pertains to the classification of Article XVIII:C GATT 1994 as 
either an “exception” or “exemption” for industrial policy purposes by qualifying Member States. Consistent with 
the Appellate Body’s general practice, barring doctrinal or normative constraints, I approach the construction of 
                                                        
1064 World Trade Organization, “Application of Article XVIII, Section C, of GATT 1994,” WT/COMTD/39 (July 24, 2002), Committee on 
Trade and Development, identifies: Malaysia – Polypropylene and Polyethylene (1995), Colombia – Imports of Salt (1998), and Bangladesh – 
Chicks, Eggs, Cartons and Salt (2002). 
1065 WTO Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions (1999); see Chapter 4, supra, for a deeper examination of this case. 
1066 BoP problems had been a consequence of India’s import substitution policy before, but the International Monetary Fund found that India, 
at the time of the dispute, was no longer facing BoP problems. However the Panel and Appellate Body did consider India’s recourse to Article 
XVIII primarily under section “B” pertaining to the balance of payments instead of the industrial policy section “C.” 
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Article XVIII:C GATT 1994 through an object and purpose assessment in order to establish its appropriate 
“embedded” standard of review.  
 
Article XVIII:13 observes that “if a contracting party [which is in the early stages of development] finds that 
governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the 
general standard of living of its people, but that no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement is 
practicable to achieve that objective, it may have recourse to the provisions and procedures set out in this Section 
[C].” Article XVIII:4(a) GATT 1994 contains even stronger language, noting a qualifying Member State “shall be 
free to deviate temporarily […].” This language is not further clarified by the 1994 Understanding on the Balance-
of-Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994. 
 
The strong and mandatory formulation “shall be free” om Article XVIII:4(a) GATT 1994, whether or not read in 
combination with the permissive “may” of Article XVIII:13, is integrally connected with the word “temporary.” The 
question of how to construct “temporary” will help clarify whether to envision Article XVIII as an exemption or 
exception provision – and subsequently, in what way the introduction of the multilateral standard of review impacts 
the provision’s rights and obligations. 
 
In furtherance of her effort to establish the appropriate object and purpose of the provision, the decision maker can 
find contrast with the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994, where the word “temporary” connects to 
the “applied” measures (as in “temporarily applied”).1067 As a consequence, it becomes meaningful that “temporary” 
in Article XVIII:4(a) relates to the “deviation” from the rules of the covered agreement (as in “shall be free to 
deviate temporarily”). If however, the adjudicator chooses to give pre-eminence to a construction of the word 
“temporarily” in relation to the general exception provision Article XX the focus falls away and instead accrues to 
the temporary deviation from “the provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement.” 
 
                                                        
1067 possibly also in relation to the “critical” nature of the shortages to distinguish the (see Chapter 5, supra) 
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The relationship with the exemption provision of Article XI:2(a) GATT 1994 is however contested when concerning 
quantitative restrictions on exports.1068 In particular, Article XVIII:2 refers specifically to “measures affecting 
imports” whereas XVIII:7 seems primarily concerned with the modification of concessions – which practically all 
pertain to imports. Article XVIII:5, lastly, seeks to primarily address a loss of export markets for prime 
commodities. While it is safe to say that Article XVIII provides a carefully crafted method of adjusting tariff 
concessions, I hold the “stronger” reading to emphasize the ability to temporarily deviate from the obligations of the 
GATT. 
 
Furthermore, the provision of Article XVIII:C is arguably meant to stand tangential to the established relationship 
between headline rules and exception provisions, such as Article XX GATT 1994, in order to fortify developing 
countries’ industrial policy rights. The object and purpose analysis of the provision situates Article XVIII:C GATT 
1994 in the ambit of the WTO Agreement, which observers that Member State’s “relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, […] and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services […] in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development.” 
 
From the object and purpose analysis of the provision, the adjudicator could conclude that a measure of liberty was 
meant to be accorded to qualifying Member States in Article XVIII GATT 1994 to pursue the establishment of 
certain industries, in temporary – but complete - deviation from the “other Articles of this Agreement.” As such, the 
provision materially operates as time-constrained exemption provision and is, as such, subject to the multilateral 
standard of review. 
 
The arguments made in support of an interpretation that emphasizes the Membership of the GATT 1994 as a 
heterogeneous and evolving body, instead of being statically reflective of the composition of the Contracting Parties 
in 1947 (or 1955 respectively), also find application to the current provision. Such an expansive analysis of the 
scope of this (temporary) exemption provision could, perhaps problematically, work to accord deference to a claim 
                                                        
1068 See, Ilaria Espa, Export Restrictions on Critical Minerals and Metals: Testing the Adequacy of WTO Disciplines (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), pp. 138-139. 
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by a Member State to be “in the early stages of development” with respect the promotion of the establishment of a 
particular industry.1069 
 
Note however that at the core of the “rational heterogeneity” of the Membership, from which the multilateral 
standard of review operates, lies the distinction between “commercial” and “developmental” policies. This crucial 
distinction clearly places the accumulation of productive skills central to the process of economic growth and 
development; rejecting vehemently application of industrial policies for mercantilist considerations – even if 
undertaken by those Member States that are in the early stages of development. 
 
Application of the multilateral standard of review to the construction and interpretation of Article XVIII:C GATT 
1994, does, in the absence of further constraining doctrinal and normative teleologies, bring with it the formal 
discipline of the conditions of the Oates’ Decentralization Theorem. These conditions, such as (a) the absence of 
meaningful centralization gains and (b) limited inter-jurisdictional spill-over, likely work to limit the scope of the 
words “shall be free to deviate” when fitting the contested policies to the language of the provision. At the same 
time, application of the multilateral standard of review could deprive the permissive language of Article XVIII:C of 
its “strong” character such as to effectively hollow out the meaning of “may have recourse to” in Article XVIII:13 
GATT 1994 through application of formal requirements to ensure predictability of the judicial decision. 
 
                                                        
1069 In the context of Article 1.1(b) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, a similar development could be said have occurred 
in respect of Canada’s Feed-in Tariff Program; it is unclear how in future disputes the Appellate Body will distinguish between circumstances in 
which a government intervenes or distorts an existing market, on the one hand; and circumstances in which the government’s intervention is deemed 
to be so far-reaching as to create a new market, on the other hand; see, for a broader analysis, Jan Bohanes, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Industrial 
Policy,” E15 Think Piece, ICTSD and World Economic Forum (2015). 
